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# SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA

OF

MĀDHAVĀCĀRYA

SANSKRIT TEXT, ENGLISH TRANSLATION, NOTES & APPENDIX

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# PREFACE

I well remember the interest excited among the learned Hindus of Calcutta by the publication of the Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mādhava Āchārya in the Bibliotheca Indica in 1858. It was originally edited by Paṇḍit Īśvara-candra Vidyāsāgara but a subsequent edition, with no important alterations, was published in 1872 by Paṇḍit Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati. The work had been used by Wilson in his "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (first published in the Asiatic Researches, vol. xvi, Calcutta, 1828); but it does not appear to have been ever much known in India. MS. copies of it are very scarce; and those found in the North of India, as far as I have had an opportunity of examining them, seem to be all derived from one copy, brought originally from the South, and therefore written in the Telugu character. Certain mistakes are found in all alike, and probably arose from some illegible readings in the old Telugu original. I have noticed the same thing in Nāgarī copies of Mādhava's Commentary on the Black Yajur Veda, which are current in the North of India.

As I was at that time Oriental Secretary of the Bengal Asiatic Society, I was naturally attracted to the book; and I subsequently read it with my friend Paṇḍit Maheśacandra Nyāyaratna, the present Principal of the Sanskrit College at Calcutta. I always hoped to translate it into English; but I was continually prevented by other engagements while I remained in India. Soon after my return to England, I tried to carry out my intention; but I found that several chapters, to which I had not paid the same attention as to the rest, were too difficult to be translated in England, where I could no longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the Paṇḍits of the Sanskrit College. In despair I laid my translation aside for years, until I happened to learn that my friend, Mr. A.E. Gough, at that time a Professor in the Sanskrit College at Benares, was thinking of translating the book. I at

once proposed to him that we should do it together, and he kindly consented to my proposal; and we accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work. He had the advantage of the help of some of the Paṇḍits of Benares, especially of Paṇḍit Rāma Miśra, the assistant Professor of Sāṅkhya, who was himself a Rāmānuja, and I trust that, though we have doubtless left some things unexplained wrongly we may have been able to throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original abounds. Our translations were originally published at intervals in the Benares Paṇḍit between 1874 and 1878 ; but they have been carefully revised for their present republication.

The work itself is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India, and gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets, and the principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain them ; and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself for the time into the position of their advocate, and holds, as it were, a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own.[1] We may sometimes differ from him in his judgement of the relative importance of their doctrines, but it is always interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic. In the course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure details in the different systems; and I can hardly imagine a better guide for the European reader who wishes to study any one of these Darśanas in its native authorities. In one or two cases (as notably in the Bauddha, and perhaps in the Jaina system) he could only draw his materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of Brahmanical controversialists ; but in the great majority he quotes directly from

1. The most remarkable instance of this Philosophical equanimity is that of Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote standard treatises on each of the six systems except the Vaiśeṣika, adopting, of course, the peculiar points of view of each, and excluding for the time very alien tenet.

the works of their founders or leading exponents, and he is continually following in their track even where he does not quote their exact words.[1]

The systems are arranged from the Vedanta point of view,—our author having been elected, in A.D. 1331, the head of the Smārta order in the Maṭh of Śringeri in the Mysore territory, century, founded Śaṅkarācārya, the great Vedāntist teacher of the eighth century, through whose efforts the Vedānta became what it is at present—the acknowledged view of Hindu orthodoxy. The systems from a gradually ascending scale,—the first, the Cārvāka and Bauddha, being the lowest as the furthest removed from the Vedānta, and the last, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga, being the highest as approaching most nearly to it.

The sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest minds in India throughout the mediaeval period of its history. Hiouen Thsang says of the schools in his day : "Les écoles philosophiques sont constamment en lutte, et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnees s'ēléve camme les flots de la mer. Les hérétiques des diverses sectes s'attachent ā des maitres particuliers, et, par des voies différentes, marchent tous au méme but." We can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the mediaeval literature. Thus, for instance, when King Harsha wanders among the Vindhya forests, he finds "seated on the rocks and reclining under the trees Ārhata begging monks, Śvetapadas, Mahāpāśupatas, Pāṇḍarabhikṣus, Bhāgavatas, Varṇins, Keśaluñcanas, Lokāyatikas Kāpilas, Kāṇādas, Anupanishadas, Īśvarakārins, Dharmaśāstrins, Paurāṇikas, Sāptatan'avas Śābdas, Pāñcarātrikas, etc , all listening to their own accepted tenets and zealously defending them."[2] Many of these sects will occupy us in the ensuing pages ; many of them also are found in Mādhava's poem on the controversial triumphs of Śaṅkarācārya, and in the spurious

1. An index of the names of authors and works quoted is given in Dr. Hall's Bibliographical Catalogue, pp. 162-164, and also in Professor Aufrecht's Bodleian Catalogue, p. 247.
2. Śrīharṣa-charita, p. 204, Calcutta ed.

prose work on the same, subject, ascribed to Anantānandagiri. Well may some old poet have put into the mouth of Yudhiṣṭhira the lines which one so often hears from the lips of modern paṇḍits—

Vedā vibhinnāḥ smṛtayo vibhinnā,
Nāsau munir yasya matam na bhinnam,
Dharmasya tattvaṃ nihitaṃ guhāyāṃ,
Mahājano yena gataḥ sa pānthāḥ.[1]

And may we not also say with Clement of Alexandria, μιᾶς τοίνυν οὔσης τῆς ἀληθείας, τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος μυρίας ἐκτροπὰς ἔχει, καθάπερ αἱ βάκχαι τὰ τοῦ Πενθέως διαφορήσασαι μέλη αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε Ἑλληνικῆς αἱρέσεις, ἑκάστη ὅπερ ἔλαχεν, ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, φωτὸς δ', οἶμαι, ἀνατολῇ πάντα φωτίζεται

E. B. C.

1. Found in the Mahābh. iii 17402 with some variations. I give them as I have heard them from Paṇḍit Rāmanārayaṇa Vidyāratna.

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# SARVA-DARŚANA-SAṄGRAHA

## THE PROLOGUE

नित्यज्ञानाश्रयं वन्दे निःश्रेयसनिधिं शिवम् ।
येनैव जातं मह्यादि तेनैवेदं सकर्तृकम् ॥

I worship Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest were produced, in *him* only has this all a maker.

पारं गतं सकलदर्शनसागराणा-
मात्मोचितार्थचरितार्थितसर्वलोकम् ।
श्रीशार्ङ्गपाणितनयं निखिलागमज्ञं
सर्वज्ञविष्णुगुरुमन्वहमाश्रयेऽहम् ॥ २ ॥

Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Vishṇu, who knows all the Āgamas, the son of Śārṅgapāṇi, who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term Soul.

श्रीमत्सायणदुग्धाब्धिकौस्तुभेन महौजसा ।
क्रियते माधवार्येण सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहः ॥ ३ ॥

The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mādhava, mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk ocean of the fortunate Sāyaṇa.

पूर्वेषामतिदुस्तराणि सुतरामालोड्य शास्त्राण्यसौ
श्रीमत्सायणमाधवः प्रभुरुपन्यास्यत्सतां प्रीतये ।
दूरोत्सारितमत्सरेण मनसा शृण्वन्तु तत्सज्जना
माल्यं कस्य विचित्रपुष्परचितं प्रीत्यै न संजायते ? ॥ ४ ॥

Having thoroughly searched the Śāstras of former teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sāyaṇa-Mādhava[1] the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers ?

## *NOTES*

1. Dr. A.C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the Vaṃśa-Brāhmaṇa, has solved the riddle of the relation of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa. Sāyaṇa is a pure Draviḍian name given to a child who is born after all the elder children have died. Mādhava elsewhere calls Sāyaṇa his "younger brother," as an allegorical description of his body, himself being the eternal soul. His use of the term Sāyaṇa-Mādhavaḥ were (not the dual) seems to prove that the two names represent the same person. The body seems meant by the Sāyaṇa of the third śloka. Māyaṇa was the father of Mādhava, and the true reading may be *śrīman-māyaṇa.*

# CHAPTER I

## THE CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM

अथ कथं परमेश्वरस्य निःश्रेयसप्रदत्वमभिधीयते ? बृहस्पतिमतानुसारिणा नास्तिकशिरोमणिना चार्वाकेण तस्य दूरोत्सारितत्वात् । दुरुच्छेदं हि चार्वाकस्य चेष्टितम् । प्रायेण सर्वप्राणिनस्तावत्—

यावज्जीवं सुखं जीवेन्नास्ति मृत्योरगोचरः ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ॥

[We have said in our preliminary invocation "salutation to Śiva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme felicity,"] but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Cārvāka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school, the follower of the doctrine of Bṛhaspati ? The efforts of Cārvāka are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain—

While life is yours, life joyously ;
None can escape Death's searching eye :
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return ?

इति लोकगाथाम् अनुरुन्धाना नीतिकामशास्त्रानुसारेण अर्थकामौ एव पुरुषार्थौ मन्यमानाः, पारलौकिकमर्थम् अपह्नुवानाः, चार्वाकमतमनुवर्तमाना एवानुभूयन्ते । अत एव तस्य चार्वाकमतस्य 'लोकायतम्' इत्यन्वर्थम् अपरं नामधेयम् ॥

The mass of men, in accordance with the Śāstras of policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Cārvāka. Hence another name for that school is Lokāyata,—a name well accordant with the thing signified.[1]

तत्र पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि चत्वारि तत्वानि । तेभ्य एव देहाकारपरिणतेभ्यः किण्वादिभ्यः मदशक्तिवत् चैतन्यमुपजायते । विनष्टेषु सत्सु स्वयं विनश्यति ।

तदाहुः -'विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्येवानुविनश्यति, स न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति' (बृह० उप० २।४।१२) । तच्चैतन्यविशिष्टदेह एवात्मा । देहातिरिक्ते आत्मनि प्रमाणाभावात् । प्रत्यक्षैकप्रमाणवादितया अनुमानादेः अनङ्गीकारेण प्रामाण्याभावात् ॥

In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients;[2] and when these are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also. They quote the Śruti for this [Brihad Araṇy. Up. ii. 4, 12], "Springing forth from these elements itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed when they are destroyed,—after death no intelligence remains."[3] Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc.

अङ्गनाद्यालिङ्गनादिजन्यं सुखमेव पुरुषार्थः । न च 'अस्य दुःखसंभिन्नतया पुरुषार्थत्वमेव नास्ति' इति मन्तव्यम् । अवर्जनीयतया प्राप्तस्य दुःखस्य परिहारेण सुखमात्रस्यैव भोक्तव्यत्वात् । तद्यथा —मत्स्यार्थी सशल्कान् सकण्टकान् मत्स्यानुपादत्ते । स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते । यथा वा धान्यार्थी सपलालानि धान्यानि आहरति, स यावदादेयं तावदादाय निवर्तते । तस्माद् दुःखभयात् नानुकूलवेदनीयं सुखं त्यक्तुमुचितम् ॥

न हि 'मृगाः सन्ति' इति शालयो नोप्यन्ते । न हि 'भिक्षुकाः सन्ति' इति स्थाल्यो नाधिश्रीयन्ते । यदि कश्चिद् भीरु दृष्टं सुखं त्यजेत्, तर्हि स पशुवत् मूर्खो भवेत् । तदुक्तम्—

त्याज्यं सुखं विषयसङ्गमजन्म पुंसां
दुःखोपसृष्टमिति मूर्खविचारणैषा ।
व्रीहीञ्जिहासति सितोत्तमतण्डुलाढ्यान्
को नाम भोस्तुषकणोपहितान्हितार्थी ॥ इति ।

The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can, and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the

man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and having taken as many as he wants, desists ; or just as the man who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken as much as he wants, desists. It is not therefore for us, through a fear of pain to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it ; nor do they refuse to set the cooking pots on the fire, because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet—

> The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects, is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain,—such is the reasoning of fools ;
>
> The berries of paddy, rich with the finest while grains,
> What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust.[4]

ननु पारलौकिकसुखाभावे बहुवित्तव्ययशरीरायाससाध्येऽग्निहोत्रादौ विद्यावृद्धाः कथं प्रवर्तिष्यन्ते ? इति चेत्, तदपि न प्रमाणकोटिं प्रवेष्टुमीष्टे। अनृत-व्याघात-पुनरुक्तदोषै दुषिततया वैदिकम्मन्यैरेव धूर्तबकैः परस्परं—कर्मकाण्डप्रामाण्यवादिभिः ज्ञानकाण्डस्य ज्ञानकाण्डप्रामाण्यवादिभिः कर्मकाण्डस्य च— प्रतिक्षिप्तत्वेन, त्रय्या धूर्तप्रलापमात्रत्वेन, अग्निहोत्रादेः जीविकामात्रप्रयोजनत्वात्। तथा च आभाणकः—

> अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्ठनम् ।
> बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविकेति बृहस्पतिः ॥ इति ।

If you object that if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world, then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue, your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, since the agnihotra, etc., are only useful as means of livelihood, for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology;[5] then again the impostors who call themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the authority of the jñāna-kāṇḍa, is over-thrown by those who maintain that of the karma-kāṇḍa, while those who maintain the authority of the jñāna-kāṇḍa reject that of the karma-kāṇḍa ; and

lastly the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying—

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing oneself with ashes,—
Bṛihaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense.

अत एव कण्टकादिजन्यं दुःखमेव नरकः। लोकसिद्धो राजा परमेश्वरः। देहच्छेदो मोक्षः। देहात्मवादे च 'स्थूलोऽहं, कृशोऽहं, कृष्णोऽहम्' इत्यादि समानाधिकरण्योपपत्तिः। 'मम शरीरम्' इति व्यवहारो 'राहोः शिरः' इत्यादिवदौपचारिकः॥

Hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, etc., ; the only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight ; and the only Liberation is the dissolution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body ; such phrases as "I am thin," "I am black," etc., are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, etc. and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject [the body]; like and the use of the phrase "my body" is metaphorical "the head of Rāhu" [Rāhu being really *all head*].

तदेतत्सर्व समग्राहि—

अङ्गनालिङ्गनाज्जन्यसुखमेव पुमर्थता।
कण्टकादिव्यथाजन्यं दुःखं निरय उच्यते॥
लोकसिद्धो भवेद्राजा परेशो नापरः स्मृतः।
देहस्य नाशो मुक्तिस्तु न ज्ञानान्मुक्तिरिप्यते॥
अत्र चत्वारि भूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः।
चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते॥
किण्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यो द्रव्येभ्यो मदशक्तिवत्।
अहं स्थूलः कृशोऽस्मीति सामानाधिकरण्यतः॥
देहः स्थौल्यादियोगाच्च स एवात्मा न चापरः।
मम देहोऽयमित्युक्तिः संभवेदौपचारिकी॥

All this has been thus summed up—

In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire, and air ;
And from these four elements alone is intelligence produced.,—

Just like the intoxicating power from kiṇwa, etc., mixed together; since in "I am fat," "I am lean," these attributes[6] abide in the same subject,

And since fatness, etc., reside only in the body,[7] it alone is the soul and no other,

And such phrases as "my body" are only significant metaphorically.

स्यादेतत्। स्यादेष मनोरथो यद्यनुमानादेः प्रामाण्यं न स्यात्। अस्ति च प्रामाण्यम्। कथमन्यथा धूमोपलम्भानन्तरं धूमध्वजे प्रेक्षावतां प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्येत? 'नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्ति' इति वचनश्रवणसमनन्तरं फलार्थिनां नदीतीरे प्रवृत्तिरिति?

"Be it so," says the opponent; "your wish would be gained if inference, etc., had no force of proof; but then they have this force; else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, should the thoughts of the intelligence immediately proceed to fire; or why on hearing another say, 'There are fruits on the bank of the river,' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore?"

तदेतन्मनोराज्यविजृम्भणम्। व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताशालि हि लिङ्गं गमकम् अभ्युपगतमनुमानप्रामाण्यवादिभिः। व्याप्तिश्च उभयविधोपाधिविधुरः सम्बन्धः। स च सत्तया चक्षुरादिवन्नाङ्गभावं भजते किं तु ज्ञाततया। कः खलु ज्ञानोपायो भवेत्?

All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy. Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the *sign* or middle term as the causer of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major.[8] Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed;[9] and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the eye, etc., are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being *known*. What then is the means of this connection's being known?

न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्। तच्च बाह्यमान्तरं वाऽभिमतम्। न प्रथमः। तस्य संप्रयुक्तज्ञानजनकत्वेन भवति प्रसरसंभवेऽपि भूतभविष्यतोस्तदसंभवेन सर्वोपसंहारवत्याः व्याप्तेः दुर्ज्ञानत्वात्। न च व्याप्तिज्ञानं सामान्यगोचरमिति मन्तव्यम्। व्यक्त्योरविनाभावाभावप्रसङ्गात्।

We will first show that it is not *perception.* Now perception is held to be of two kinds : external and internal [*i.e.*, as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind]. The former is not the required means ; for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition[10] which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case[11] [as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire].

नाऽपि चरमः। अन्तःकरणस्य बहिरिन्द्रियतन्त्रत्वेन बाह्येऽर्थे स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रवृत्यनुपपत्तेः। तदुक्तम्—चक्षुराद्युक्तविषयं परतन्त्रं बहिर्मनः (त० वि० २०) इति ॥

Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an extenal object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, "The eye, etc., have their objects as described ; but mind externally is dependent on the others."

नाप्यनुमानं व्याप्तिज्ञानोपायः तत्र तत्रापि एवमित्यनवस्थादौःस्थ्यप्रसङ्गात्।

Nor can *inference* be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad-infinitum* retrogression.

नापि शब्दस्तदुपायः काणादमतानुसारेण अनुमाने एवान्तर्भावात्। अनन्तर्भावे वा वृद्धव्यवहाररूपलिङ्गावगतिसापेक्षतया प्रागुक्तदूषणलङ्घनाजङ्घालत्वात्। धूमधूमध्वजयोरविनाभावोऽस्तीति वचनमात्रे मन्वादिवद्विश्वासाभावाच्च।

Nor can *testimony* be the means thereof, since we may either allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaiśeshika doctrine of Kaṇāda, that this is included in the topic of inference ; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over

the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the recognition of a *sign* in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man ;[12] and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, than for our receiving the *ipse dixit* of Manu, etc. [which, of course, we Cārvākas reject].

अनुपदिष्टाविनाभावस्य पुरुषस्यान्तरदर्शनेन अर्थान्तरानुमित्यभावे स्वार्थानुमानकथायाः कथाशेषत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च कैव कथा परानुमानस्य ?

And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing [as fire] on seeing another thing [as smoke] ; hence, on your own showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself[13] would have to end in mere idle words.

उपमानादिकं तु दुरापास्तम् । तेषां संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धादिबोधकत्वेन अनौपाधिकसंबन्धबोधकत्वासंभवात् ॥

Then again *comparison*,[14] etc., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection [i.e., the universal proposition], because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name to something so named.

किं च उपाध्यभावोऽपि दुरवगमः । उपाधीनां प्रत्यक्षत्वनियमासम्भवेन प्रत्यक्षाणामभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि, अप्रत्यक्षाणामभावस्य अप्रत्यक्षतयाऽनुमानाद्यपेक्षायामुक्तदूषणानतिवृत्तेः । अपि च, 'साधनाव्यापकत्वे सति साध्यसमव्याप्तिः' इति तल्लक्षणं कक्षीकर्त्तव्यम् । तदुक्तम् —

अव्याप्तसाधनो यः साध्यसमव्याप्तिरुच्यते स उपाधिः ।
शब्देऽनित्ये साध्ये सकर्तृकत्वं घटत्वमश्रवतां च ॥
व्यावर्त्तयितुमुपात्तान्यत्र क्रमतो विशेषणानि त्रीणि ।
तस्मादिदमनवद्यं समासमेत्यादिनोक्तमाचार्य्यैश्च ॥ इति ।

Again, this same absence of a condition,[15] which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection [i.e., a universal proposition], can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception : and

therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible ; and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, "it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension with the major term though not constantly accompanying the middle". These three distinguishing clauses, "not constantly accompanying the middle term," "constantly accompanying the major term," and "being constantly accompanied by it" [i.e., reciprocal], are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound, as "being produced," "the nature of a jar," and "the not causing audition;"[16] wherefore the definition holds,—and again it is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning *samāsama.*[17]

तत्र विध्यध्यवसायपूर्वकत्वान्निषेधाध्यवसायस्य उपाधिज्ञाने जाते तद-भाव-विशिष्टसम्बन्धरूपव्याप्तिज्ञानं, व्याप्तिज्ञानाधीनं चोपाधिज्ञानमिति परस्पराश्रय-वज्रप्रहारदोषो व्रजलेपायते । तस्मादविनाभावस्य दुर्बोधतया नानुमानाद्यवकाशः ॥

But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible, i.e., a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition ; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference, etc.[18]

धूमादिज्ञानानन्तरमग्न्यादिज्ञाने प्रवृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षमूलतया भ्रान्त्या वा युज्यते । क्वचित्फलप्रतिलम्भस्तु मणिमन्त्रौषधादिवद् यादृच्छिकः ।

The step which the mind takes form the knowledge of smoke, etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error ; and

that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental—just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc.

अतस्तत्साध्यमदृष्टादिकमपि नास्ति । नन्वदृष्टानिष्टौ जगद्वैचित्र्यमाकस्मिकं स्यादिति चेत्—न तद्भद्रम् । स्वभावादेव तदुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तम्—

अग्निरुष्णो जलं शीतं समस्पर्शस्तथानिलः ।
केनेदं चित्रितं तस्मात्स्वभावात्तद्व्यवस्थितिः ॥ इति ॥

From this it follows that fate, etc.,[19] do not exist, since these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adṛishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus it has been said—

The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing cool the breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety ? from their own nature was it born.

तदेतत्सर्वं बृहस्पतिनाप्युक्तम्—

न स्वर्गो नापवर्गो वा नैवात्मा पारलौकिकः ।
नैव वर्णाश्रमादीनां क्रियाश्च फलदायिकाः ॥
अग्निहोत्रं त्रयो वेदास्त्रिदण्डं भस्मगुण्ठनम् ।
बुद्धिपौरुषहीनानां जीविका धातृनिर्मिता ॥
पशुश्चेन्निहतः स्वर्गं ज्योतिष्टोमे गमिष्यति ।
स्वपिता यजमानेन तत्र कस्मान्न हिंस्यते ॥
मृतानामपि जन्तूनां श्राद्धं चेत्तृप्तिकारणम् ।
निर्वाणस्य प्रदीपस्य स्नेहः संवर्धयेच्छिखाम् ॥
गच्छतामिह जन्तूनां व्यर्थं पाथेयकल्पनम् ।
गेहस्थकृतश्राद्धेन पथि तृप्तिरवारिता ॥
स्वर्गस्थिता यदा तृप्तिं गच्छेयुस्तत्र दानतः ।
प्रासादस्योपरिस्थानामत्र कस्मान्न दीयते ?
यावज्जीवेत्सुखं जीवेदृणं कृत्वा घृतं पिबेत् ।
भस्मीभूतस्य देहस्य पुनरागमनं कुतः ? ॥
यदि गच्छेत्परं लोकं देहादेष विनिर्गतः ।
कस्माद् भूयो न चायाति बन्धुस्नेहसमाकुलः ? ॥
ततश्च जीवनोपायो ब्राह्मणैर्विहितस्त्विह ।
मृतानां प्रेतकार्याणि न त्वन्यद्विद्यते क्वचित् ॥

त्रयो वेदस्य कर्त्तारो भण्डधूर्तनिशाचराः ।
जर्भरीतुर्फरीत्यादि पण्डितानां वचः स्मृतम् ॥
अश्वस्यात्र हि शिश्नं तु पत्नीग्राह्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
भण्डैस्तद्वत्परं चैव ग्राह्यजातं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥
मांसानां खादनं तद्वन्निशाचरसमीरितम् ॥ इति ॥

And all this has been also said by Bṛihaspati—

There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world,

Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.

The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing one's self with ashes.

Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness.

If a beast slain in the Jyotishṭoma rite will itself go to heaven,

Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father ?[21]

If the Śrāddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, it is needless to give provisions for the journey.

If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the Śrādha here,

Then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the house top ?

When life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt ;

When once the body reduces in ashes, how can it ever return again ?

If he who departs from the body goes to another world,

How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of his kindred ?

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here

All these ceremonies for the dead,—there is no other fruit anywhere.

The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves and demons.

All the well-known formulae of the pundits, jarpharī, turpharī, etc.[21]

And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Aśwamedha,

These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,[22]

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons.

तस्माद्बहूनां प्राणिनामनुग्रहार्थं चार्वाकमतमाश्रयणीयमिति रमणीयम् ॥

Hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge to the doctrine of Cārvāka. Such is the pleasant consummation. E.B.C.

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे चार्वाकदर्शनम् ॥

*NOTES*

"Śaṅkara Bhāskara and other commentators name the Lokāyatikas, and these appear to be a branch of the sect of Cārvāka" (Colebrooke). Lokāyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (*loka* and *āyata*). Laukāyatika occurs in Pāṇini's ukthagaṇa.

2. *Kiṇva* is explained as "drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, etc." Colebrooke quotes from Śaṅkara : "The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor ; and as betel, areca, lime, and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally."

3. Of course Śaṅkara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpretation, applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the Supreme is once attained. Cf. Śabara's Comm. Jaimini Sūt., i. i. 5.

4. I take *kaṇa* as here equal to the Bengali *kunṛ* Cl. Atharva-V, xi. 3, 5. *Aśvāḥ kaṇā gāvas taṇḍulā masakātuśāḥ.*
5. See Nyāya Sūtras, ii. 57.
6. i.e., personality and fatness, etc.
7. I read *dehe* for *dehaḥ*.
8. Literally, "must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*).
9. For the *sadigdha* and *niśchita upādhi* see Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 125. The former is accepted only by one party.
10. Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire).
11. The attributes of the class are not always found in every members,—thus idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place.
12. See Sāhitya Darpaṇa (Ballantyne's trans. p. 16), and Siddhānta-M., p. 80.
13. The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument.
14. *Upamāna* or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named." Ballantyne's Tarka Saṅgraha.
15. The upādhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term, as in the inference "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too general. In the case of a true vyāpti, there is, of course no upādhi.
16. If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upādhi "that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it," then in the Naiyāyika argument "sound is non-eternal, because it has the nature of sound," "being produced" would serve as a Mīmāṁsaka upādhi, to establish the *vyabhicāra* fallacy, as it is reciprocal with "non-eternal;" but the omitted clause excludes

it, as an upādhi must be consistent with *either* party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyāyika maintains that "being produced" *always* accompanies the class of sound. Similarly, if we defined the upādhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major," we might have as an upādhi "the nature of a jar," as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while, at the same time, wherever the class of a jar is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the upādhi as "not constantly accompanying the middle term, and constantly accompanying the major," we might have as a Mīmāṁsaka upādhi "the not causing audition," i.e., the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, either being inaudible and yet eternal.

17. This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanāchārya, "where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (i.e., universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (e.g. to prove the existence of smoke), there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first." Thus "the mountain has smoke because it has fire" (here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire), or "because it has fire from wet fuel" (smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term *is* thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as "the mountain has fire because it has smoke;" here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat, which is the reciprocal of fire. I wish to add here, once for all, that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another, difficulty in the Sarva-darśana-

saṅgraha to my old friend and teacher, Paṇdhit Maheśa Chandra Nyāyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College.

18. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, P. Hyp. ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system *infra,* we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species.

19. *Adṛiṣṭa,* i.e., the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births.

20. This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209.

21. Rig-Veda, x. 107. For the Aśvamedha rites, see Wilson's Rig-Veda, Preface, vol. ii. p. xiii.

22. Or this may mean "and all the various other things to be handled in the rites."

## CHAPTER II

## THE BAUDDHA SYSTEM

अत्र बौद्धैरभिधीयते—यदभ्यधायि, 'अविनाभावो दुर्बोध इति तदसाधीयः। तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यामविनाभावस्य सुज्ञानत्वात्। तदुक्तम्—

कार्यकारणभावाद्वा स्वभावाद्वा नियामकात्।
अविनाभावनियमोऽदर्शनान्न न दर्शनात्॥

(प्र० वा० १।३३)। इति॥

At this point the Buddhists remark: As for what you (Cārvākas) laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance, your position is unacceptable, inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable by means of identity and causality. It has accordingly been said—

> "From the relation of cause and effect, or from identity as a determinant, results a law of invariable concomitance—not through the mere observation of the desired result in similar cases, nor through the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases."[1]

'अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ अविनाभावनिश्चायकौ' इति पक्षे साध्यसाधनयोरव्यभिचारो दुरवधारणो भवेत्। भूते भविष्यति वर्तमाने चानुपलभ्यमानेऽर्थे व्यभिचारशङ्काया अनिवारणात्। ननु तथाविधस्थले तावकेऽपि मते व्यभिचारशङ्का दुष्परिहरा—इति चेत्; मैवं वोचः। विनापि कारणं कार्यमुत्पद्यतामित्येवंविधायाः शङ्काया व्याघातावधिकतया निवृत्तत्वात्। तदेव ह्याशङ्क्येत यस्मिन्नाशङ्क्यमाने व्याघातोदयो नावतरेयुः। तदुक्तम्—'व्याघातावधिराशङ्का' (कुसु० ३।७) इति॥

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyāyikas) that it is concomitance and non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyāyika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposi-

tion as that an effect may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of any kind ; for such doubts alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[2]

तस्मात्तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयेनाविनाभावो निश्चीयते । तदुत्पत्तिनिश्चयश्च कार्यहेत्वोः प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भानुपलम्भपञ्चकनिबन्धनः । कार्यस्योत्पत्तेः प्रागनुपलम्भः, कारणोपलम्भे सति उपलम्भः, उपलब्धस्य पश्चात्कारणानुपलम्भादनुपलम्भः इति पञ्चकारण्या धूमधूमध्वजयोः कार्यकारणभावो निश्चीयते ॥

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance (of the major) ; and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is not ascertained by five indications, viz., (1) That an effect is not cognised prior to its effectuation, that (2) the cause being perceived (3) the effect is perceived and that after the effect is cognised (4) there is its non-cognition, (5) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.

तथा तादात्म्यनिश्चयेनाप्यविनाभावो निश्चीयते 'यदि शिंशपा वृक्षत्वमतिपतेत्', स्वात्मानमेव जह्यादिति विपक्षे बाधकप्रवृत्तेः । अप्रवृत्ते तु बाधके भूयः सहभावोपलम्भेऽपि व्यभिचारशङ्कायाः को निवारयिता ? शिंशपावृक्षयोश्च तादात्म्य निश्चयो 'वृक्षोऽयं शिंशपेति' सामानाधिकरण्यबलादुपपद्यते । न ह्यत्यन्ताभेदे तत्सम्भवति । पर्यायत्वेन युगपत्प्रयोगायोगात् । नाप्यत्यन्ताभेदे, गवाश्वयोरनुपलम्भात् । तस्मात्कार्यात्मानौ कारणात्मानौ अनुमापयत इति सिद्धम् ॥

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the ascertainment of identity (e.g., a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no obsurdity, and where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment or the identity of sisu and tree is

competent in virtue of the reference to the same object (i.e., predication)—This tree is a sisu. For reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where there is no difference whatever (e.g., to say, "A jar is a jar,"* is no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed ; nor can reference to the same object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self same supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).

यदि कश्चित्प्रामाण्यमनुमानस्य नाङ्गीकुर्यात्तं प्रति ब्रूयात् —अनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीत्येतावन्मात्रमुच्यते, तत्र न किंचन साधनमुपन्यस्यते, उपन्यस्यते वा ? न प्रथमः । अशिरस्कवचनस्योपन्यासे साध्यासिद्धेः ।

'एकाकिनी प्रतिज्ञातं हि प्रतिज्ञा न साधयेत्' ।

इति न्यायात् । नापि चरमः । अनुमानं प्रमाणं न भवतीति ब्रुवाणेन वचनप्रमाणामनभ्युपगच्छता त्वया स्वपरकीयशास्त्रे प्रामाण्येनोपगृहीतस्य वचनस्योपन्यासे मम माता वन्ध्येतिवद् व्याघातापातात् ॥

किं च प्रमाणतदाभासव्यवस्थापनं तत्समानजातीयत्वादिति वदता भवतैव स्वीकृतं स्वभावानुमानम् । परगता विप्रतिपत्तिस्तु वचनलिङ्गेनेति ब्रुवता कार्यलिङ्गकमनुमानम् । अनुपलब्ध्या कश्चिदर्थं प्रतिषेधयतानुपलब्धिलिङ्गकमनुमानम् । तथा चोक्तं तथागतैः—

प्रमाणान्तरसामान्यस्थितेरन्यधियो गतेः ।
प्रमाणान्तरसद्भावः प्रतिषेधाच्च कस्यचित् ॥ इति ।

पराक्रान्तं चात्र सूरिभिरिति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुपरम्यते ।

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence *pramāṇa*, one may reply : You merely assert thus much, that inference is not a form of evidence ; do you allege no proof of this, or do you allege any ? The former alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that base assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none) you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted

your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term. Conformably it has been said by Tathāgata—

"The admission of a form of evidence in general results from its being present to the understanding of others."

"The existence of a form of evidence also follows from its negation by a certain person."

All this has been fully handled by great authorities ; and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise.

ते च बौद्धाश्चतुर्विधया भावनया परमपुरुषार्थं कथयन्ति । ते च माध्यमिक-योगाचार-सौत्रान्तिक-वैभाषिकसंज्ञाभिः प्रसिद्धा बौद्धा यथाक्रमं सर्वशून्यत्व-बाह्यार्थ-शून्यत्व-बाह्यार्थानुमेयत्वबाह्यार्थप्रत्यक्षत्ववादानातिष्ठन्ते । यद्यपि भगवान्बुद्ध एक एव बोधयिता तथापि बोद्धव्यानां बुद्धिभेदाच्चातुर्विध्यम् । यथा 'गतोऽस्तमर्कः' इत्युक्ते जारजौरानूचानादयः स्वेष्टानुसारेणाभिसरणपरस्वहरणसदाचरणादिसमयं बुध्यन्ते । सर्वं क्षणिकं क्षणिकं, दुःखं दुःखं, स्वलक्षणं स्वलक्षणं, शून्यं शून्यमिति भावना-चतुष्टयमुपदिष्टं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

These same Bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four standpoints. Celebrated under the designations of Mādhyamika, Yogāchāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāshika, these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective idealism), the interribility of external objects (representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects (representationism).[3] Though the venerated Buddha be the only one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity of views ; just as when one has said, "The sun has set," the adulterer the thief, divinity student, and others understand that it is time to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth, according to their several inclinations.

It is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out : viz., (1) All is momentary, momentary ; (2.) all is pain, pain ; (3) all is like itself alone : (4) all is void, void.

तत्र क्षणिकत्वं नीलादिक्षणानां सत्त्वेनानुमातव्यं—यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं, यथा जलधरपटलं, सन्तश्चामी भावा इति। न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वलक्षणस्य सत्त्वस्य नीलादिक्षणानां प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यव्यावृत्तिरिति न्यायेन व्यापकक्रमाक्रमव्यावृत्तौ अक्षणिकात्सत्त्वव्यावृत्तेः सिद्धत्वाच्च। तच्चार्थक्रियाकारित्वं क्रमाक्रमाभ्यां व्याप्तम्। न च क्रमाक्रमाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः संभवति।

परस्परविरोधे हि न प्रकारान्तरस्थितिः।
नैकतापि विरुद्धानामुक्तिमात्रविरोधतः॥ (कुसु० ३/८)

इति न्यायेन व्याघातस्योद्भटत्वात्।

Of these p ints of view, the momentariness of fleeting things, blue and so forth (i.e.. whatever be their quality) is to be inferred from their existence ; thus, whatever *is* is momentary (or fluxional) like a bank of clouds, and all these things *are* .[4] Nor may any one object that the middle term (existence) is unestablished ; for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things ; and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established, provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity, according to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained. Now this practical efficiency (here identified with existence) is contained under succession and simultaneity, and no medium is possible between succession and non-succession (or simultaneity) ; there being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise, according to the rule—

"In a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior alternative ;"

"Nor is their unity on contradictories there being a repugnance in the very statement."[5]

तौ च क्रमाक्रमौ स्थायिनः सकाशाद् व्यावर्तमानौ अर्थक्रियामपि व्यावर्तयन्तौ क्षणिकत्वपक्ष एव सत्त्वं व्यवस्थापयतः इति सिद्धम्।

And this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent, and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency, determine existence of the alternative of momentariness. —Q.E.D.

नन्वक्षणिकस्य अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं किं न स्यादिति चेत्—तदयुक्तम्। विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथा हि—वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकालेऽतीतानागतयोः किम् अर्थक्रिययोः स्थायिनः सामर्थ्यमस्ति नो वा। आद्ये तयोरनिराकरणप्रसङ्गः, समर्थस्य क्षेपायोगात्। यद्यदा यत्करणसमर्थं तत्तदा तत्करोत्येव यथा सामग्री स्वकार्यं समर्थश्चायं भाव इति प्रसाङ्गानुमानाच्च।

Perhaps some one may ask : Why may not practical efficiency reside in the non-fluxional (or permanent) ? If so, this is wrong, as obnoxious to the following dilemma. Has your "permanent" a power of past and future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency or no ? On the former alternative (if it has such power), it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency, because we cannot deny that it has power, and because we infer the consequence, that which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time, as, for instance, a complement of causes, and this entity is thus powerful.

द्वितीये कदापि न कुर्यात्। सामर्थ्यमात्रानुबन्धित्वादर्थक्रियाकारित्वस्य। यद्यदा यन्न करोति तत्तदा तत्रासमर्थं यथा हि शिलाशकलमङ्कुरे। न चैष वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकाले वृत्तवर्तिष्यमाणे अर्थक्रिये करोतीति तद्विपर्ययाच्च॥

On the latter alternative (if the permanent has no such power of past and future agency), it will never do anything, because practical efficiency results from power only ; what at any time does not do anything, that at that time is unable to do it, as, for instance, a piece of stone does not produce a germ ; and this entity while exerting its present practical efficiency, does not exert its past and future practical. efficiency Such is the cantradiction.

ननु क्रमवत्सहकारिलाभात् स्थायिनोऽतीतानागतयोः क्रमेण करणमुपपद्यत इति चेत्—तत्रेदं भवान्पृष्टो व्याचष्टाम्। सहकारिणः किं भावस्योपकुर्वन्ति न वा? न चेन्नापेक्षणीयास्ते। अकिंचित्कुर्वतां तेषां तादर्थ्यायोगात्। अथ भावस्तैः सहकारिभिः सहैव कार्यं करोति इति स्वभाव इति चेत्—अङ्ग! तर्हि सहकारिणो न जह्यात्। प्रत्युत पलायमानानपि गले पाशेन बद्ध्वा कृत्यं कुर्यात्। स्वभावस्यानपायात्।

उपकारकत्वपक्षे सोऽयमुपकारः किं भावाद्भिद्यते न वा। भेदपक्ष आगन्तुकस्यैव तस्य कारणत्वं स्यात्। न भावस्याक्षणिकस्य। आगन्तुकातिशयान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वात्कार्यस्य। तदुक्तम्—

वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्फलः ॥ इति ॥

You will perhaps rejoin : By assuming successive subsidiaries, there is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and future practical efficiency. If so, we would ask you to explain : Do the subsidiaries assist the entity or not ? If they do not, they are not required ; for if they do nothing they can have nothing to do with the successive exertion. If they do assist the thing, is this assistance (or supplementation) other than the thing or not ? If it is other than the thing, then this adventitious (assistance) is the cause and the non-momentary entity is not the cause : for the effect will then follow, by concomitance and non-concomitance the adventitious supplementation. Thus it has been said :

"What have rain and shine to do with the soul ? Their effect is on the skin of man ;
"If the soul were like the skin, it would be non-permanent ; and if the skin were like the soul, there could be no effect produced upon it."

किं च, सहकारिजन्योऽतिशयः किमतिशयान्तरमारभते न वा ? उभयथाऽपि प्रागुक्तदूषणपाषाणवर्षणप्रसङ्गः । अतिशयान्तरारम्भपक्षे बहुमुखानवस्थादौ स्थ्यमपि स्यात् । अतिशये जनयितव्ये सहकार्यन्तरापेक्षायां तत्परम्परापात इत्येकानवस्थाऽऽस्थेया ।

तथा सहकारिभिः सलिलपवनादिभिः पदार्थसार्थैराधीयमाने बीजस्यातिशये बीजमुत्पादकमभ्युपेयम् । अपरथा तदभावेऽप्यतिशयः प्रादुर्भवेत् ।

बीजं चातिशयमादधानं, सहकारिसापेक्षमेवाधत्ते । अन्यथा सर्वदोपकारापत्तौ अङ्कुरस्यापि सदोदयः प्रसज्येत । तस्मादतिशयार्थमपेक्ष्यमाणैः सहकारिभिः अतिशयान्तरमाधेयं बीजे । तस्मिन्नप्युपकारे पूर्वन्यायेन सहकारिसापेक्षस्य बीजस्य जनकत्वे सहकारिसंपाद्यबीजगतातिशयानवस्था प्रथमा व्यवस्थिता ।

Perhaps you will say : The entity produces its effect, *together with* its subsidiaries. Well, then (we reply), let the entity not give up its subsidiaries, but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round their neck, and so produce the effect which it has to produce, and without forfeiting its own proper nature. Besides (we continue), does the additament (or supplementation), constituted

by the subsidiaries give rise to another additament or not? In either case the aforementioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of stones. On the alternative that the additament takes on another additament, you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress *in infinitum*. If when the additament is to be generated another auxiliary (or additament) be required, there will ensue an endless series of such additaments: this must be confessed to be one infinite regress. For example, let a seed be granted to be productive when an additament is given, consisting of a complement of objects such as water, wind, and the like, as subsidiaries; otherwise an additament would be manifested without subsidiaries. Now the seed in taking on the additament takes it on always with the need of (ulterior) subsidiaries; otherwise, as there would always be subsidiaries, it would follow that a germ would always be arising from the seed. We shall now have to add to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves requiring an additament. If when this additament is given, the seed be pro ductive only on condition of subsidiaries as before, there will be established an infinite regression of additaments to (or supplementations of) the seed, to be afforded by the subsidiaries.

अथोपकारः कार्यार्थमपेक्ष्यमाणोऽपि बीजादिनिरपेक्षं कार्यं जनयति तत्सापेक्षं वा। प्रथमे बीजादेरहेतुत्वमापतेत्। द्वितीयेऽपेक्ष्यमाणेन बीजादिनोपकारेऽतिशयः आधेयः। एवं तत्र तत्रापीति बीजादिजन्यातिशयनिष्ठातिशयपरम्परापात इति द्वितीयानवस्था स्थिरा भवेत्।

Again, we ask, does the supplementation required for the production of the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like or does it require the seed and the like? On the first alternative (if the supplementation works independently), it would ensue that the seed is in no way a cause. On the second (if the supplementation require the seed, the seed, or whatever it may be that is thus required, must take on a supplementation or additament, and thus there will be over and over again an endless series of additaments added to the additament constituted by the seed; and thus a second infinite regression is firmly set up.

एवमपेक्ष्यमाणेनोपकारेण बीजादौ धर्मिण्युपकारान्तरमाधेयम्—इत्युपकाराधेयबीजाश्रयातिशयपरम्परापात इति तृतीयानवस्था दुरवस्था स्यात्।

In like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another subsidiary to the seed, or whatever it may be that is the

subject of the additions, and thus there will be an endless succession of additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented by the subsidiaries; and so a third infinite regression will add to your embarrassment.

अथ भावादभिन्नोऽतिशयः सहकारिभिराधीयत इत्यभ्युपगम्येत, तर्हि प्राचीनो भावोऽनतिशयात्मा निवृत्तोऽन्यश्चातिशयात्मा कुर्वद्रूपादिपदवेदनीयो जायत इति फलितं ममापि मनोरथद्रुमेण ।

Now (or the other grand alternative), let it be granted that a supplementation identical with the entity the seed, or whatever it may be) is taken on. If so, the former entity, that *minus* the supplementation, is no more, and a new entity identical with the supplementation, and designated (in the technology of Buddhism) *kurvadrūpa* (or effect-producing object), comes into being: and thus the tree of my desires (my doctrine of a universal flux) has borne its fruit.

तस्मात्क्रमेण अक्षणिकस्य अर्थक्रिया दुर्घटा । नाप्यक्रमेण घटते । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि—युगपत्सकलकार्यकरणसमर्थः स्वभावस्तदुत्तरकालमनुवर्तते न वा ? प्रथमे तत्कालवत्कालान्तरेपि तावत्कार्यकरणमापतेत् । द्वितीये स्थायित्ववृत्त्याशा, मूषकभक्षितबीजादौ अङ्कुरादिजननप्रार्थनामनुहरेत् ।

Practical efficiency, therefore, in the non-momentary is inadmissible. Nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time; for such a possibility is reargued by the following dilemma. Is this (permanent) entity (which you contend for) able to produce all its effects simultaneously, or does it continue to exist after production of effects? On the former alternative, it will result that the entity will produce its effects just as much as one time as at another; on the second alternative, the expectation of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate.

यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तं तन्नाना, यथा शीतोष्णे । विरुद्धधर्माध्यस्तश्चायमिति जलधरे प्रतिबन्धसिद्धिः । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । स्थायिनि कालभेदेन सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्ययोः प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययसिद्धत्वात् । तत्रासामर्थ्यसाधकौ प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययौ प्रागुक्तौ ।

सामर्थ्यसाधकावभिधीयेते । यद्यदा यज्जननासमर्थं तत्तदा तन्न करोति यथा शिलाशकलमङ्कुरम् । असमर्थश्चायं वर्तमानार्थक्रियाकरणकालेऽतीतानागतयोरर्थक्रिययोरिति प्रसङ्गः । यद्यदा: यत्करोति तत्तदा तत्र समर्थं यथा सामग्री स्वकार्ये । करोति चायमतीतानागतकाले तत्कालवर्तिन्यावर्थक्रिये भाव इति प्रसङ्गव्यत्ययो विपर्ययः ।

That to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse as heat and cold ; but this thing is determined by contrary attiibutions. Such is the argumentation applied to the cloud (to prove that it has not a permanent but a fluxional existence). Nor is the middle term disallowable, for possession and privation of power and impotence are allowed in regard to the permanent (which you assert) at different times. The concomitance and non-concomitance already described (viz., That which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time, and What at any time does not do any thing, that at that time is unable to do it) are affirmed (by us) to prove the existence of such power. The negative rule is : What at any time is unable to produce anything, that at that time does not produce it, as a piece of stone, for example, does not produce a germ ; and this entity (the seed, or whatever it may be), while exerting a present practical efficiency, is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies. The contradiction violating this rule is : What at any time does anything, that at that time is able to do that thing, as a complement of causes is able to produce its effect ; and this (permanent) entity exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those times.

तस्माद्विपक्षे क्रमयौगपद्यव्यावृत्या, व्यापकानुपलम्भेन अधिगतव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिक, प्रसङ्गतद्विपर्ययबलाद् गृहीतान्वयव्याप्तिकं च सत्वं क्षणिकत्वपक्ष एव व्यवस्थास्यतीति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं ज्ञानश्रिया—

> यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः सन्तश्च भावा अमी
> सत्ता शक्तिरिहार्थकर्मणि मितेः सिद्धेषु सिद्धा न सा ।
> ना·येकैव विधान्यथा परकृतेनापि क्रियादिर्भवेद्
> द्वेधापि क्षणभङ्गसंगतिरतः साध्ये च विश्राम्यति ॥

(To recapitulate.) Existence is restricted to the momentary ; there being observed in regard to existence a negative rule, that in regard to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded, existence which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable ; and there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule in virture of a concomitance observed (viz., that the existent is accompanied or "pervaded" by the momentary), and in virtue of a non-concomitance observed (viz., that the non-momentary is

accompanied or "pervaded" by the non-existent). Therefore it has been said by Jñāna-śri—

"What is momentary, as a cloud, and as these existent things;

"The power of existence is relative to practical efficiency, and belongs to the ideal; but this power exists not as eternal in things eternal (ether, etc.);

"Nor is there only one form, otherwise one thing could do the work of another;

"For two reasons, therefore (viz., succession and simultaneity), a momentary flux is congruous and remains true in regard to that which we have to prove."

न च कणभक्षाक्षचरणादिपक्षकक्षीकारेण सत्तासामान्ययोगित्वमेव सत्त्वमिति मन्तव्यम् । सामान्यविशेषसमवायानामसत्त्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

Nor is it to the held, in acceptance of the hypothesis of the Vaiśeshikas and Naiyāyikas, that existence is a participation in the universal form existence; for were this the case, universality, particularity, and co-inhesion (which do not participate in the universal) could have no existence.

न च तत्र स्वरूपसत्तानिबन्धनः सद्व्यवहारः । प्रयोजकगौरवापत्तेः । अनुगतत्वाननुगतत्वविकल्पपराहतेश्च । सर्षपमहीधरादिषु विलक्षणेषु क्षणेष्वनुगतस्याकारस्य मणिषु सूत्रवद्, भूतगणेषु गुणवच्चाप्रतिभासनाच्च । किं च सामान्यं सर्वगतं स्वाश्रयसर्वगतं वा ? प्रथमे सर्ववस्तुसंकरप्रसङ्गः । अपसिद्धान्तापत्तिश्च । यतः प्रोक्तं प्रशस्तपादेन—'स्वविषयसर्वगतमिति' ।

Nor is the ascription of existense to universality, particularity, and co-inhesion dependent on any *sui generis* existence of their own; for such an hypothesis is operose, requiring too many *sui generis* existences. Moreover, the existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence (of the one in the many); and there is not presented to us any one form running through all the diverse momentary things, mustard-seeds, mountains and so forth, like the string running through the gems strung upon it. Moreover (we would ask), is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in its subjicible subject? If it is everywhere all things in the universe will be confounded together (chaos will be eternal), and you will be involved in a tenet you reject, since Praśasta-pāda has said, "Present in all its subjects."

किं च विद्यमाने घटे वर्तमानं सामान्यमन्यत्र जायमानेन संबध्यमानं तस्मादागच्छत्संबध्यते अनागच्छाद्वा ? आद्ये द्रव्यत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये सम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः ।

Again (if the universal is present only in its proper subjects), does the universal (the nature of a jar) residing in an already existing jar, on being attached to another jar now in making, come from the one to attach itself to the other, or not come from it ? On the first alternative (if it comes), the universal must be a substance (for substances alone underlie qualities and motions) ; whereas, if it does not come, it cannot attach itself to the new jar.

किं च विनष्टे घटे सामान्यमवतिष्ठते, विनश्यति, स्थानान्तरं गच्छति वा ? प्रथमे निराधारत्वापत्तिः । द्वितीये नित्यत्ववाचोयुक्त्ययुक्तिः । तृतीये द्रव्यत्वप्रसक्तिः—इत्यादि दूषणग्रहग्रस्तत्वात्सामान्यमप्रमाणिकम् । तदुक्तम्—

अन्यत्र वर्तमानस्य ततोऽन्यस्थानजन्मनि ।
तस्मादचलतः स्थानाद् वृत्तिरित्यतियुक्तता ॥
यत्रासौ वर्तते भावस्तेन संबध्यते न तु ।
तद्देशिनं च व्याप्नोति किमप्येतन्महाद्भुतम् ॥
न याति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान्न चांशवत् ।
जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसंततिः ॥ इति ।

Again (we ask), when the jar ceases to exist, does the universal outlast it, or cease to exist, or go to another place ? On the first supposition it will exist without a subject to inhere in ; on the second, it will be improper to call it eternal (as you do) ; on the third, it will follow that it is a substance (or base of qualities and motions). Destroyed as it is by the malign influence of these and the like objections, the universal is unauthenticated.

Conformably it has been said—

"Great is the dexterity of that which, existing in one place, engages without moving from that place in producing itself in another place.

"This entity (universality) is not connected with that wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies that place : great is this miracle.

"It goes not away, nor was it there, nor is it subsequently divided, it quits not its former repository : what a series of difficulties !"

अनुवृत्तप्रत्ययः किमालम्बन इति चेत्—अङ्ग, अन्यापोहालम्बन एवेति संतोष्टव्यमायुष्मता, इत्यलमतिप्रसङ्गेन ।

If you ask : On what does the assurance that the one exists in the many rest ? You must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to repose on difference from that which is different (or exclusion of heterogeneity). We dismiss further prolixity.

सर्वस्य संसारस्य दुःखात्मकत्वं सर्वतीर्थङ्करसम्मतम् । अन्यथा तन्निविवृत्सूनां तेषां तन्निवृत्त्युपाये प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्सर्वं दुःखं दुःखमिति भावनीयम् ।

That all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common verdict of all the founders of institutes, else they would not be found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for bringing it to an end. We must, therefore, bear in mind that all is pain, and pain alone.

ननु किंवदिति पृष्टे दृष्टान्तः कथनीय इति चेत्—मैवम् । स्वलक्षणानां क्षणानां क्षणिकतया सालक्षण्याभावादेतेन सदृशमपरमिति वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । ततः स्वलक्षणं स्वलक्षणमिति भावनीयम् ।

If you object : When it is asked, like what ? You must quote an instance,—we reply : Not so, for momentary objects self-characterised being momentary, have no common characters, and therefore it is impossible to say that this is like that. We must therefore hold that all is like itself alone, like itself alone.

एवं शून्यं शून्यमित्यपि भावनीयम् । स्वप्ने जागरणे च न मया दृष्टमिदं रजतादीति विशिष्टनिषेधस्योपलम्भात् । यदि दृष्टं सत्तदा तद्विशिष्टस्य दर्शनस्येदंतायाः अधिष्ठानस्य च तस्मिन्नध्यस्तस्य रजतत्वादेस्तत्संबन्धस्य च समवायादेः सत्त्वं स्यात् । न चैतदिष्टं कस्यचिद्वादिनः । न चार्धजरतीयमुचितम् । न हि कुक्कुट्या एको भागः पाकायापरो भागः प्रसवाय कल्प्यतामिति कल्प्यते ।

तस्मादध्यस्ताधिष्ठान-तत्सम्बन्ध-दर्शन-द्रष्टॄणां मध्य एकस्यानेकस्य वा असत्त्वे निषेधविषयत्वेन सर्वस्यासत्त्वं बलादापतेदिति भगवतोपदिष्टे 'माध्यमिकाः' तावदुत्तम-प्रज्ञा इत्थमचीकथन् भिक्षुपादप्रसारणन्यायेन, क्षणभङ्गाद्यभिधानमुखेन, स्थायित्वा-नुकूलवेदनीयत्वानुगतत्व-सर्वसत्यत्व-भ्रमव्यावर्तनेन सर्वशून्यतायामेव पर्यवसानम् ।

In like manner we must hold that all is void, and void alone. For we are conscious of a determinate negation. This silver or the like has not been seen by me in sleeping or waking. If what is seen were (really) existent, then reality would pertain to the cor-

responding act of vision, to the (nacre, etc.), which is the basis of its particular nature (or hocceity), to the silver etc., illusorily superposed upon that basis, to the connection between them, to the co-inherence, and so forth : a supposition not entertained by any disputant. Nor is a semi-effect existence admissible. No one imagines that one-half of a fowl may be set apart for cooking, and the other half for laying eggs. The venerated Buddha, then, having taught that of the illusorily superposed (silver, etc.) the basis (nacre, etc.), the connection between them, the act of vision, and the *videns*, if one or more be unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal, all being equally objects of the negation ; the Mādhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows, viz., that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of reality.

अतस्तत्वं सदसदुभयानुभयात्मकचतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं शून्यमेव । तथा हि—
यदि घटादेः सत्त्वं स्वभावस्तर्हि कारकव्यापारवैयर्थ्यम् ।

The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four alternatives, viz., from reality, from unreality, from both (reality and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify this : If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like, the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous.

असत्त्वं स्वभाव इति पक्षे प्राचीन एव दोषः प्रादुःष्यात् । यथोक्तम्—

न सत कारणापेक्षा व्योमादेरिव युज्यते ।
कार्यस्यासंभवी हेतुः खपुष्पादेरिवासतः ॥ इति ॥

If non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue ; as it is said—

"Necessity of a cause befits not the existent, ether and the like, for instance ;
"No cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect, flowers of the sky and the like, for instance."

विरोधादितरौ पक्षावनुपपन्नौ । तदुक्तं भगवता लङ्कावतारे—

बुद्ध्या विविच्यमानानां स्वभावो नावधर्यंते ।
अतो निरभिलप्यास्ते निःस्वभावाश्च दर्शिताः ॥ इति ।

इदं वस्तु बलायातं यद्वदन्ति विपश्चित: ।
यथा यथार्थाश्चिन्त्यन्ते विशीर्यन्ते तथा तथा ।। इति च ।
न क्वचिदपि पक्षे व्यवतिष्ठत इत्यर्थ: ।

The two remaining alternatives, as self-contradictory, are inadmissible. It has accordingly been laid down by the venerated Buddha in the Alaṅkārāvatāra[6]—

Of things discriminated by intellect, no nature is ascertained ;[7]
Those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and natureless."

And again—

"This matter perforce results, which the wise declare, No sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated."

दृष्टार्थव्यवहारश्च स्वप्नव्यवहारवत्संवृत्या संगच्छते । अत एवोक्तम् –
परिव्राट्-कामुक-शुनामेकस्यां प्रमदातनौ ।
कुणप: कामिनी भक्ष्य इति तिस्रो विकल्पना: ।। इति ।

That is to say; the objects are not determined by any one of the four alternatives. Hence it is that it has been said—

"A religious mendicant, an amorous man, and a dog have three views of a woman's person, respectively that it is a carcass, that it is a mistress, and that it is a prey."

तदेवं भावनाचतुष्टयवशान्निखिलवासनानिवृत्तौ परनिर्वाणं शून्यरूपं सेत्स्यतीति वयं कृतार्था:, नास्माकमुपदेश्यं किंचिदस्तीति । शिष्यस्तावद्योगश्चाचारश्चेति द्वयं करणीयम् तत्राप्राप्तस्यार्थस्य प्राप्तये पर्यनुयोगो योग: । गुरुक्तस्यार्थस्याङ्गीकरणमाचार: । गुरुक्तस्याङ्गीकरणादुत्तमा:, पर्यनुयोगस्याकरणादधमाश्च अतस्तेषां माध्यमिका इति प्रसिद्धि: ।

In consequence, then, of these four points of view, when all ideas are come to an end final extinction, which is a void, will result. Accordingly we have overtaken our end, and there is nothing to be taught to us. There consequently remain only two duties to the student—interrogation and acceptance. Of these, interrogation is the putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained. Acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher. These (Bauddha nihilists) are excellent in assenting to that which the religious teacher enounces, and defective in interrogation, whence their conventional designation of Mādhyamikas (or mediocre).

गुरुक्तं भावनाचतुष्टयं बाह्यार्थस्य शून्यत्वं चाङ्गीकृत्यान्तरस्य शून्यत्वं चाङ्गीकृतं कथमिति पर्यनुयोगस्य करणात् केषांचिद्योगाचारप्रथा । एषा हि तेषां परिभाषा– स्वयंवेदनं तावदङ्गीकार्यम् । अन्यथा जगदान्ध्यं प्रसज्येत । तत्कीर्तितं धर्मकीर्तिना "अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यति ।" इति ।

Certain other Buddhists are styled Yogāchāras, because while they accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide, and the void of external things, they make the interrogation : Why has a void of the internal (or baselessness of mental phenomena) been admitted ? For their technology is as follows : — Self-subsistent cognition must be allowed, or it will follow that the whole universe is blind. It has conformably been proclaimed by Dharmakīrti : "To one who disallows preception the vision of objects is not competent."

बाह्यं ग्राह्यं नोपपद्यत एव । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । अर्थो ज्ञानग्राह्यो भवन्नुत्पन्नो भवति अनुत्पन्नो वा ? न पूर्वः, उत्पन्नस्य स्थित्यभावात् । नापरः, अनुत्पन्नस्यासत्त्वात् । अथ मन्येथाः 'अतीत एवार्थो ज्ञानग्राह्यस्तज्जनकत्वादिति' तदपि बालभाषितम् । वर्तमानतावभासविरोधात् । इन्द्रियादेरपि ज्ञानजनकत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

किं च, ग्राह्यः किं परमाणुरूपोऽर्थोऽवयविरूपो वा । न चरमः, कृत्स्नैकदेशविकल्पादिना तन्निराकरणात् । न प्रथमः अतीन्द्रियत्वात् । षट्केन युगपद्योगस्य बाधकत्वाच्च । यथोक्तम् –

षट्केन युगपद्योगात्परमाणोः षडंशता ।
तेषामप्येकदेशत्वे पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥ इति ।

An external *percipibile* is not admissible in consequence of the following dilemma. Does the object cognitively apprehensible arise from an entity or not ? It does not result from an entity, for that which is generated has no permanence. Nor is it non-resultant, for what has not come into being is non-existent. Or (we may proceed) do you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible, as begetting cognition ? If so, this is childish nonsense, because it conflicts with the apparent presentness of the object, and because on such a supposition the sense organs (and other imperceptible the things) might be apprehended. Further (we ask), Is the *percipible* a simple atom or a complex body? The latter is cannot be. this alternative being ejected by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived. The former alternative is equally impossible, an atom being supersensible, and it not being able to combine simultaneously with six others : as it has been said—

"If an atom could simultaneously combine with six, it would have six surfaces;

"And each of these being taken separately, there would be a body of atomic dimension."

तस्मात्स्वव्यतिरिक्तग्राह्यविरहात्तदात्मिका बुद्धिः स्वयमेव स्वात्मरूपप्रकाशिका प्रकाशवदिति सिद्धम्। तदुक्तम्—

नान्योऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवोऽपरः।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात्स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते॥ इति।

Intellect, therefore, as having no other *percipibile* but itself, is shown to be itself its own *percipibile*, self-subsistent, luminous with its own light, like light. Therefore it has been said—

There is naught to be objectified by intellect; there is no cognition ulterior thereto;

"There being no distinction between percept and percipient, intellect shines forth of itself alone."

ग्राह्यग्राहकयोरभेदश्चानुमातव्यः। यद्वेद्यते येन वेदनेन, तत्ततो न भिद्यते यथा ज्ञानेनात्मा। वेद्यन्ते तैश्च नीलादयः। भेदे हि सति अधुना अनेनार्थस्य संबन्धित्वं स्यात्। तादात्म्यस्य नियमहेतोरभावात्। तदुत्पत्तेरनियामकत्वात्। यश्चायं ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तीनां पृथगवभासः स एकस्मिश्चन्द्रमसि द्वित्वावभास इव भ्रमः। अत्राप्यनादिरविच्छिन्नप्रवाहा भेदवासनैव निमित्तम्। यथोक्तम्—

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये॥ इति॥
अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते॥ इति च।

The identity of percipient and percept is inferrible, thus; That which is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition, as soul, for instance, is not other than the cognition of soul; and blue and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions. For if there were a difference (between percept and percipient), the object could not now have any connection with the cognition, there being no identity to determine a constancy of connection and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection. As for the appearance of an interval between the object and subject consciousnesses, this is an illusion, like the appearance of two moons when there is only one.

The caue of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without beginning and without interruption; as it has been said—

"As invariably cognised together, the blue object and the cognition thereof are identical ;
"And the difference should be accounted for by illusory cognitions, as in the example of the single moon."

And again—

"Though there is no division, the soul or intellect, by reason of illusory perceptions,
"Appears to possess a duality of cognitions, of percepts and of percipient."

न च रसवीर्यविपाकादि समानमाशामोदकोपार्जितमोदकानां स्यादिति वेदितव्यम् । वस्तुतो वेद्य-वेदकाकारविधुराया अपि बुद्धेः व्यवहर्तृपरिज्ञानानुरोधेन विभिन्नग्राह्यग्राहकाकाररूपवत्तया तिमिराद्युपहताक्ष्णा केशोण्डुकनाडीज्ञानभेदवत् अनाद्युपप्लववासनासामर्थ्यात् व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः पर्यनुयोगायोगात् । यथोक्तम्—

अवेद्यवेदकाकारा यथा भ्रान्तैर्निरीक्ष्यते ।
विभक्तलक्षणग्राह्यग्राहकाकारविप्लवा ॥
तथा कृतव्यवस्थेयं केशादिज्ञानभेदवत् ।
यदा तदा न संचोद्या ग्राह्यग्राहकलक्षणा ॥ इति ॥

तस्माद् बुद्धिरेवानादिवासनावशात् अनेकाकारावभासत—इति सिद्धम् ।

Nor must it be supposed that (on this hypothesis) the juice, the energy, and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be the same; for it cannot be questioned that though the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and subiect, yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning by reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient, conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency, just as to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and another minute object may appear either diverse or identical; as it has been said—

"As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, appears by reason of illusory cognitions,
"Illuded with the diverse forms of perception, percept and percipient;

"So when the intellect has posited a diversity, as in the example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and the like,

Then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as percipient and percept."

Thus it has been evinced that intellect, as affected be beginningless ideation, manifests itself under diverse forms.

ततश्च प्रागुक्त-भावना-प्रचय-बलात् निखिल वासनोच्छेद-विगलित-विविध-विषयाकारोपप्लव-विशुद्ध-विज्ञानोदयो महोदयो इति ।

When, therefore, by constancy of reflection (on the four points of view) aforesaid, all ideation has been interrupted, there arises knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects, such illusions being now melted away; and this is technically called *Mahodaya* (the grand exaltation, emancipation).

अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते—यथोक्तं 'बाह्यं वस्तुजान्तं नास्तीति' तदयुक्तम् । प्रमाणाभावात् । न च सहोपलम्भनियमः प्रमाणमिति वक्तव्यम् । वेद्यवेदकयोरभेदसाधकत्वेनाभिमतस्य तस्याप्रयोजकत्वेन सन्दिग्धविपक्षव्यावृत्तिकत्वात् । ननु भेदे सहोपलम्भनियमात्मकं साधनं न स्यादितिचेन्न । ज्ञानस्यान्तर्मुखतया, ज्ञेयस्य बहिर्मुखतया च भेदेन प्रतिभासमानत्वात् । एकदेशत्वैककालत्व-लक्षणसहत्व-नियमासम्भवाच्च । किं च नीलाद्यर्थस्य ज्ञानाकारत्वेऽहमिति प्रतिभासः स्यात् । न तु 'इदमिति' प्रतिप्रत्तिः । प्रत्ययादव्यतिरेकात् । अथोच्यते—ज्ञानस्वरूपोऽपि नीलाकारो भ्रान्त्या बहिर्वत् भेदेन प्रतिभासत इति, न च तत्राहमुल्लेख इति । तथोक्तम्—

परिच्छेदान्तराद्योऽयं भागो बहिरिव स्थितः ।
ज्ञानस्याभेदिनो भेदप्रतिभासोऽप्युपप्लवः ॥ इति ।
यदन्तर्ज्ञेयतत्त्वं तद्बहिर्वदवभासते । इति च ।

Others again (the Sautrāntikas) hold that the position that there is no external world is untenable, as wanting evidence. Nor (they contend) can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous cognition is an evidence, for this simultaneous cognition which you accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive, being found in dubious and in contrary instances. If you rejoin (they proceed) : Let there be a proof of this identity, and let this proof be invariability of simultaneous cognition,—we refuse this, because inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object, it is manifested in duality, and because such invariability of simul-

taneity as to time and place is impossible. Moreover (they continue) if the object, blue or whatever it be, were only a form of cognition, it should be presented as *Ego*, not as *Hoc aliquid*, because the cognition and the object would be identical. Perhaps you will say: A blue form consisting of cognition is illusorilly presented as external and as other than self, and consequently the Ego is not suggested; and so it has been said—

> "This side of knowledge which appears external to the other portion,
> "This appearance of dualily in the unity of cognition is an illusion."

And again—

> "The principle to be known as internal also manifests itself as if it were external."

तदयुक्तम्। बाह्यार्थाभावे तदुत्पत्तिरहिततया बहिर्वदित्युपमानोक्तेरयुक्तेः। न हि वसुमित्रो वन्ध्यापुत्रवदवभासत इति प्रेक्षावानाचक्षीत। भेदप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वेऽभेदप्रतिभासस्य प्रामाण्यं तत्प्रामाण्ये च भेदप्रतिभासस्य भ्रान्तत्वमिति परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गाच्च। अविसंवादान्नीलतादिकमेव संविदाना बाह्यमेवोपाददते, जगत्युपेक्षन्ते चान्तरमिति व्यवस्थादर्शनाच्च।

एवं चायमभेदसाधको हेतुर्गोमयपायसीयन्यायवत् आभासतां भजेत्। अतो बहिर्वदिति वदता बाह्यं ग्राह्यमेवेति भावनीयमिति भवदीय एव बाणो भवन्तं प्रहरेत्।

To this we reply (say the Sautrāntikas): This is untenable, for if there be no external objects, there being no genesis of such, the comparison "as if they were external" is illegitimate. No man in his senses would say, "Vasumitra looks like the son of a childless mother." Again, if the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness of the presentment of duality, and the presentment of duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity, you are involved in a logical circle. Without controversy we observe that cognitions take external things, blue or whatever they may be, as their objects, and do not take merely internal modifications as such, and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal states. Thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is difference between subject and object, turns out a mere absurdity,

like milky food made of cow-dung. When then you say "as if it were external." you must already suppose all external *percipibile*, and your own arrow will return upon you and would you.

ननु ज्ञानाद्भिन्नकालस्यार्थस्य ग्राह्यत्वमनुपपन्नमिति चेत्— तदनुपपन्नम् । इन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टस्य विषयस्योत्पाद्ये ज्ञाने स्वाकारसमर्पकतया समर्पितेन चाकारेण तस्यार्थस्यानुमेयतोपपत्तेः । अत एव पर्यनुयोगपरिहारौ समग्राहिषाताम्—

भिन्नकालं कथं ग्राह्यमिति चेद् ग्राह्यतां विदुः ।
हेतुत्वमेव च व्यक्तेर्ज्ञानाकारार्पणक्षमम् ॥ इति ।

If any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with the cognition is inadmissible, we (Sautrāntikas) reply that this objection is inadmissible, inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production, and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed. The interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised—

"If it be asked, How can there be a past *percipibile*? They recognise perceptibility.
"And a competent inferribility of the individual thing is its imposition of its form."

तथा च यथा पुष्ट्या भोजनमनुमीयते, यथा च भाषया देशः, यथा वा संभ्रमेण स्नेहः, तथा ज्ञानाकारेण ज्ञेयमनुमेयम् । तदुक्तम्—

अर्थेन घटयत्येनां न हि मुक्त्वार्थरूपताम् ।
तस्मात्प्रमेयाधिगतेः प्रमाणं मेयरूपता ॥ इति ।

To exemplify. As nourishment is inferred from a thriving look, as nationality is inferred from language, and as affection is inferred from flurried movements, so from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred. Therefore it has been said—

"With half (of itself) the object moulds (the cognition) without losing the nature of a half;
"The evidence, therefore, of the recognition of a knowable is the nature of the knowable,"

न हि वित्तिसत्तैव तद्वेदना युक्ता । तस्याः सर्वत्राविशेषात् । तां तु सारूप्यमाविशत् सरूपयितुं घटयेदिति च । तथा बाह्यार्थसद्भावे प्रयोगः—ये यस्मिन्सत्यपि कादाचित्कास्ते सर्वे तदतिरिक्तसापेक्षाः । यथा—अविवक्षति अजिगमिषति मयि

वचनगमनप्रतिभासा विवक्षु-जिगमिषु-पुरुषान्तर-सन्तानसापेक्षाः । तथा च विवादाध्यासिताः प्रवृत्तिप्रत्ययाः सत्यप्यालयविज्ञाने कदाचिदेव नीलाद्युल्लेखिन । इति । तत्रालयविज्ञानं नामाहमास्पदं विज्ञानम् । नीलाद्युल्लेखि च विज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानम् । यथोक्तम्—

तस्यादालयविज्ञानं यद्भवेदहमास्पदम् ।
तत्स्यात्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानं यन्नीलादिकमुल्लिखेत् ॥ इति ।

For consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the cognition, for this consciousness is everywhere alike, and if indifference were to attach itself to this, it would reduce all things to indifference. Accordingly the formal argument for the existence of external things : Those things which while a thing exists appear only at times, all depend upon something else than that thing, as, for instance, if I do not wish to speak or to walk, presentments of speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or walking ; and in like manner the presentments of activity under discussion, while there exists the recognition of a subject of them, are only at times manifested as blue and so forth. Of these, the recognition of a subject is the presentation of the Ego, the manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity, as it has been said—

"That is a recognition of a subject which is conversant about
the Ego :
"That is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and the rest."

तस्मादालयविज्ञानसन्तानातिरिक्तः कादाचित्कप्रवृत्तिविज्ञानहेतुर्बाह्योऽर्थो ग्राह्य एव, न वासनापरिपाकप्रत्ययकादाचित्कत्वात् कदाचिदुत्पाद इति वेदितव्यम् ।

Over and above, therefore, the complement of subject recognitions, let it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible, which is the cause of presentments of activity ; and that this external world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of presentments resulting from ideation.

विज्ञानवादिनये हि वासना नाम एकसंतानवर्तिनामालय-विज्ञानानां तत्तत्प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानजननशक्तिः । तस्याश्च स्वकार्योत्पादं प्रत्याभिमुख्यं परिपाकः । तस्य च प्रत्ययः कारणं स्वसंतानवर्तिपूर्वक्षणः कक्षीक्रियते । संतानान्तरनिबन्धनत्वानङ्गीकारात् ।

ततश्च प्रवृत्तिविज्ञानजनकालयविज्ञानवर्तिवासनापरिपाकं प्रति सर्वेऽप्यालयविज्ञानवर्तिन: क्षणा: समर्था एवेति वक्तव्यम् । न चेदेकोऽपि न समर्थ: स्यात् । आलयविज्ञानसंतानवर्तित्वाविशेषात् । सर्वे समर्था इति पक्षे कालक्षेपानुपपत्ति: । ततश्च कादाचित्कत्वनिर्वाहाय शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धविषया: सुखादिविषया: षडपि प्रत्ययाश्चतुर: प्रत्ययान् प्रतीत्योत्पाद्यन्त इति चतुरेणानिच्छताप्यच्छमतिना स्वानुभवमनाच्छाद्य परिच्छेत्तव्यम् ॥

ते चत्वार: प्रत्यया: प्रसिद्धा आलम्बन-समनन्तर-सहकार्यधिपतिरूपा: । तत्र ज्ञानपदवेदनीयस्य नीलाद्यवभासस्य चित्तस्य नीलादालम्बनप्रत्ययान्नीलाकारता भवति । समनन्तरप्रत्ययात् प्राचीनज्ञानोद्बोधरूपता । सहकारिप्रत्ययात् आलोकात् स्पष्टता । चक्षुषोऽधिपतिप्रत्ययाद्विषयग्रहणप्रतिनियम: ॥

उदितस्य ज्ञानस्य रसादिसाधारण्ये प्राप्ते नियामकं चक्षुरधिपतिर्भवितुमर्हति । लोके नियामकस्याधिपतित्वोपलम्भात् । एवं चित्तचैत्तात्मकानां सुखादीनां चत्वारि कारणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

According to the view of the Sensationalists (*vijñānavādin*), ideation is a power of generating such and such sensation (or presentments of activity) in subject-recognitions which exist as a single stream. The maturescence of this power is its readiness to produce its effect ; of this the result is a presentment (or sensation); the antecedent momentary object (sensation) in the mental train is accepted as the cause, no other mental train being admitted to exercise such causality. It must therefore be stated that all momentary objects (fleeting sensations) in the subject-consciousness are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness, which maturescence is productive of presentments of activity. If any one (of these fleeting sensations) had not this power, none would possess it, all existing alike in the stream of subject-recognitions. On the supposition that they all have this power, the effects cannot be diversified, and therefore any intelligent man, however unwilling, if he has a clear understanding, must decide, without putting out of ight the testimony of his consciousness, that to account for the occasional nature (of sense percepts) the six cognitions of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, of pleasure, and so forth, are produced on occasion of four conditions These four conditions are known as (1) the data, (2) the suggestion, (3) the medium, and (4) the dominant (organ). Of these, the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in the

understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like, which manifestation is styled a cognition. The resuscitation of forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition. The restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the medium, light, far instance, as a condition, and from the dominant, the eye, for example, as another condition. The eye, as determinant of one particular cognition (form) where taste, etc., might have been equally cognised, is able to become dominant; for in everyday life he who determines is regarded as dominant. We must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and its modifications.

सोऽयं चित्तचैतात्मकः स्कन्धः पञ्चविधो रूप-विज्ञान-वेदना-संज्ञा-संस्कार-संज्ञकः। तत्र रूप्यन्त एभिर्विषया इति रूप्यन्त इति च व्युत्पत्त्या सविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि रूपस्कन्धः। आलयविज्ञान-प्रवृतिविज्ञानप्रवाहो विज्ञानस्कन्धः। प्रागुक्तस्कन्धद्वय-संबन्धजन्यः सुखदुःखादिप्रत्ययप्रवाहो वेदनास्कन्धः। गौरित्यादिशब्दोल्लेखिसंवित्-प्रवाहः संज्ञास्कन्धः। वेदना-स्कन्ध-निबन्धना रागद्वेषादयः क्लेशाः उपक्लेशाश्च मदमानादयो धर्माधर्मौ च संस्कारस्कन्धः॥

So also the universe, which consists of mind and its modifications, is of five kinds, entitled (1) the sensational, (2) the perceptional, (3) the affectional, (4) the verbal and (5) the impressional. Of these, the sensible world (*rūpa-skandha*) is the sense organs and their objects, according to the etymology, viz., that objects are discriminated (*rūpyante*) by these. The perceptional world is the stream of subject-recognitions and of presentment of activity. The affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid worlds. The verbal (or symbolical) world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words—the words ' cow," and so forth. The impressional world is the miseries, as desire, aversion, etc., caused by the affectional world, the lesser miseries, as conceit, pride, etc., and merit and demerit.

तदिदं सर्वं दुःखं दुःखायतनं दुःखसाधनं चेति भावयित्वा तन्निरोधोपायं तित्त्वज्ञानं संपादयेत्। अत एवोक्तम्—दुःखसमुदायनिरोधमार्गाश्चत्वार आर्यबुद्धस्याभिमतानि तत्त्वानि।

Reflecting, therefore, that this universe is pain, an abode of pain, and an instrument of pain, a man should acquire a knowledge

of the principles, the method of suppressing this pain. Hence it has been said—

"The principles sanctioned by Buddha are to the saint the four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain."[8]

तत्र दुःखं प्रसिद्धम् । समुदायो दुःखकारणम् । तद् द्विविधं—प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धनो हेतूपनिबन्धनश्च तत्र प्रत्ययोपनिबन्धनस्य संग्राहकं सूत्रम्—'इदं प्रत्ययफलम्' इति । इदं कार्यं ये अन्ये हेतवः प्रत्ययन्ति गच्छन्ति, तेषामवमानानां हेतूनां भावः प्रत्ययत्वं कारणसमवायः, तन्मात्रस्य फलं, न चेतनस्य कस्यचिदिति सूत्रार्थः ।

यथा बीजहेतुरङ्कुरो धातूनां षण्णां समवायाज्जायते । तत्र पृथिवीधातुरङ्कुरस्य काठिन्यं गन्धं च जनयति । अब्धन्तुः स्नेहं रसं च जनयति । तेजोधातू रूपमौष्ण्यं च । वायुधातुः स्पर्शनं चलनं च । आकाशधातुरवकाशं शब्दं च । ऋतुधातुर्यथायोगं पृथिव्यादिकम् ।

In these words the sense of pain is known to every one ; the "aggregate means the cause of pain. This aggregate is twofold, as (1) determined by concurrence ; or (2) determined by causation. Of these, there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by concurrence, "which other causes resort to this effect ;" the condition of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence ; the concurrence of causes is the result of this only, and not of any conscious being,- such is the meaning of the aphorism. To exemplify this. A germ caused by a seed, is generated by the concurrence of six elements. Of these, water as an element produces hardness and smell in the germ ; water as an element produces viscidity and moisture ; light as an element produces colour and warmth ; air as an element produces touch and motion ; ether as an element produces expansion and sound ; season as an element produces a fitting soil, etc.

हेतूपनिबन्धनस्य च संग्राहकं सूत्रम्—'उत्पादाद्वा तथागतानामनुत्पादाद्वा स्थितैवैषां धर्माणां धर्मता धर्मस्थितिता धर्मनियामकता च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादानुलोमता ।' तथागतानां बुद्धानां मते धर्माणां कार्यकारणरूपाणां या धर्मता कार्यकारणभावरूपा, एषा उत्पादादनुत्पादाद्वा स्थिता । यस्मिन्सति यदुत्पद्यते, यस्मिन्नसति यन्नोत्पद्यते तत्तस्य कारणस्य कार्यम्— इति । 'धर्मता' इत्यस्य विवरणं धर्मस्थितितेत्यादि । धर्मस्य कार्यस्य कारणानतिक्रमेण स्थितिः । स्वार्थिकः तल् प्रत्ययः धर्मस्य कारणस्य कार्यं प्रति नियामकता ।

नन्वयं कार्यकारणभावश्चेतनमन्तरेण न संभवतीत्यत उक्तम्—प्रतीत्येति । कारणे सति तत्प्रतीत्य प्राप्य समुत्पादेऽनुलोमता = अनुसारिता या, सैव धर्मतोत्पादादनुत्पादाद्वा धर्माणां स्थिता । न चात्र कश्चिच्चेतनोऽधिष्ठातोपलभ्यत—इति सूत्रार्थः ॥

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य हेतूपनिबन्धनो यथा—बीजादङ्कुरः, अङ्कुरात्काण्डं, काण्डान्नालः, नालाद् गर्भः, ततः शूकं, ततः पुष्पं ततः फलम् । न चात्र बाह्ये समुदाये कारणं बीजादि कार्यमङ्कुरादि वा चेतयते—'अहमङ्कुरं निर्वर्तयामि, अहं बीजेन निर्वर्तितः' इति । एवमाध्यात्मिकेष्वपि कारणद्वयमवगन्तव्यम् । 'पुरःस्थिते प्रमेयाब्धौ ग्रन्थविस्तरभीरुभिः' इति न्यायेनोपरम्यते ।

The aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by causation is : "With the Tathāgatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production, or by non production ; there is continuance as a condition, and determination by a condition and conformity of the production to the cause;" that is to say, according to the doctrine of the Tathāgata Buddhas, the nature of these conditions, that is, the causal relation between the cause and effect, results from production or from non-production. That which comes into being, provided that something exists, is the effect of that as its cause; such is the explanation of the nature (or causal relation). Continuance as a condition is where the effect is not found without its cause. The (abstract) affix *tal* (in the word *sthititā*) has the sense of the concrete. Determination by a condition is the determination of the effectory the cause. Here some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent. For this reason it is added that there existing a cause, conformity of the genesis to that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions (that is, in causes and effects); and in all this no intelligent designer is ob erved [9] To illustrate this, the causal determination of a genesis to be gone through is as follows : From the seed the germ, from the germ the stalk, from the stalk the hollow stem, from the hollow stem the bud, from the bud the spicules, from the spicules the blossom, from the blossom the fruit. In this external aggregate niether the cause, the seed and the rest, nor the effect, the germ and the rest has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being, or of being brought to being by the seed. In like manner in mental facts two causes are to be recog-

nised. There is a whole ocean of scientific matter before us, but we desist, apprehensive of making our treatise unduly prolix.

तदुभयनिरोधः । तदनन्तरं विमलज्ञानोदयो वा मुक्तिः । तन्निरोधोपायो मार्गः । स च तत्त्वज्ञानम् । तच्च प्राचीनभावनाबलाद्भवतीति परमं रहस्यम् । सूत्रस्यान्तं पृच्छतां कथितं –'भवन्तश्च सूत्रस्यान्तं पृष्टवन्तः, सौत्रान्तिका भवन्तु' इति । भगवताऽभिहिततया सौत्रान्तिकसंज्ञा संजातेति ॥

Emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates, or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to such supperssion. The method (path, road) is the mode of suppressing them. And this method is the knowledge of the principles, and this knowledge accrues from former ideas. Such is the highest mystery. The name Sautrāntika arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate purport (*anta*) of the aphorism (*sūtra*), "As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be Sautrāntikas."

केचन बौद्धाः - बाह्येषु गन्धादिष्वान्तरेषु रूपादिस्कन्धेषु सत्स्वपि, तत्रानास्थामुत्पादयितुं सर्वं शून्यमिति प्राथमिकान्विनेयान् अचकथद्भगवान्, द्वितीयांस्तु विज्ञानमात्रग्रहाविष्टान्विज्ञानमेवैकं सदिति, तृतीयानुभयं सत्यमित्यास्थितान्विज्ञेयमनुमेयमिति, सेयं विरुद्धा भाषेति वर्णयन्तः—वैभाषिकाख्यया ख्याताः ।

एषा हि तेषां परिभाषा समुन्मिषति । विज्ञेयानुमेयत्ववादे प्रात्यक्षिकस्य कस्यचिदप्यर्थस्याभावेन, व्याप्तिसंवेदनस्थानाभावेन अनुमानप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः, सकललोकानुभवविरोधश्च । ततश्चार्थो द्विविधः—ग्राह्योऽध्यवसेयश्च । तत्र ग्रहणं निर्विकल्पकरूपं प्रमाणम् । कल्पनापोढत्वात् । अध्यवसायः सविकल्पकल्पकरूपोऽप्रमाणम् । कल्पनाज्ञानत्वात् ।

तदुक्तम्—

कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
विकल्पो वस्तुनिर्भासादसंवादादुपप्लवः ॥ इति ।
ग्राह्यं वस्तु प्रमाणं हि ग्रहणं यदितोऽन्यथा ।
न तद्वस्तु न तन्मानं शब्दलिङ्गेन्द्रियादिजम् ॥ इति च ।

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of odours, etc., and the internal, consisting of colours, etc., in order to produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the venerated Buddha styled Prāthmika

(primary) disciples. A second school, attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (*viruddhā bhāshā*), and are known under the designation of Vaibhāshikas.

Their technical language springs up as follows:—According to the doctrine of inferrible, sensibles there being no perceptible object, and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects, therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation ; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said—

> "Apprehension, exempt from ideality and not illusory, is non-discriminative. Discrimination, as resulting from the appearances of things, is without controversy an illusion.
>
> "The perceptible evidence of things is perception : if it were aught else,
>
> There could neither be things, nor evidence of things derived from verbal communication, inference, or sense."

ननु सविकल्पकस्याप्रामाण्ये कथं ततः प्रवृत्तस्यार्थप्राप्तिः संवादश्चोपपद्येयातामिति चेत्- न तद् भद्रम् । मणिप्रभाविषयमणिविकल्पन्यायेन पारंपर्येणार्थप्रतिलम्भसंभवेन तदुपपत्तेः । अवशिष्टं सौत्रान्तिकप्रस्तावे प्रपञ्चितमिति नेह प्रतन्यते ।

Here some one may say : If discriminative cognition be unauthentic, how is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for ? Let it be replied : This question does not concern us, for these may be accounted for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects, just as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem (we may yet handle the gem, because it underlines the light, while if we were to take nacre for silver, we could not lay hold of any silver). The rest has been fully discussed in describing the Sautrāntikas and therefore need not here be further detailed.

न च विनेयाशयानुरोधेनोपदेशभेदः । सांप्रदायिको न भवतीति भणितव्यम् । यतो भणितं बोधिचित्तविवरणे—

देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोक उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥
गम्भीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा ।
भिन्ना हि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥ इति ।

द्वादशायतनपूजा श्रेयस्करीति बौद्धनये प्रसिद्धम्—

अर्थानुपार्ज्य बहुशो द्वादशायतनानि वै ।
परितः पूजनीयानि किमन्यैरिह पूजितैः ॥
ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि पञ्चैव तथा कर्मेन्द्रियाणि च ।
मनोबुद्धिरिति प्रोक्तं द्वादशायतनं बुधैः ॥ इति ।

विवेकविलासे बौद्धमतमित्थमभ्यधायि—

बौद्धानां सुगतो देवो विश्वं च क्षणभङ्गुरम् ।
आर्यसत्याख्यया तत्त्वचतुष्टयमिदं क्रमात् ॥
दुःखमायतनं चैव ततः समुदयो मतः ।
मार्गश्चेत्यस्य च व्याख्या क्रमेण श्रूयतामतः ॥
दुःखं संसारिणः स्कन्धास्ते च पञ्च प्रकीर्तिताः ।
विज्ञानं वेदना संज्ञा संस्कारो रूपमेव च ॥
पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि शब्दाद्या विषयाः पञ्च मानसम् ।
धर्मायतनमेतानि द्वादशायतानि तु ॥
रागादीनां गणो यस्मात्समुदेति नृणां हृदि ।
आत्मात्मीयस्वभावाख्यः स स्यात्समुदयः पुनः ॥
क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा इति या वासना स्थिरा ।
स मार्ग इति विज्ञेयः स च मोक्षोऽभिधीयते ॥
प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च प्रमाणद्वितयं तथा ।
चतुष्प्रस्थानिका बौद्धाः ख्याता वैभाषिकादयः ॥
अर्थो ज्ञानान्वितो वैभाषिकेण बहु मन्यते ।
सौत्रान्तिकेन प्रत्यक्षग्राह्योऽर्थो न बहिर्मतः ॥
आकारसहिता बुद्धिर्योगाचारस्य संमता ।
केवलां संविदं स्वस्थां मन्यन्ते मध्यमाः पुनः ॥
रागादिज्ञानसंतानवासनोच्छेदसंभवा ।
चतुर्णामपि बौद्धानां मुक्तिरेषा प्रकीर्तिता ॥

कृत्तिः कमण्डलुर्मौण्ड्यं चीरं पूर्वाह्णभोजनम् ।
सङ्घो रक्ताम्बरत्वं च शिश्रिये बौद्धभिक्षुभिः ।।
इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे बौद्धदर्शनम् ।।

It should not be contented that a diversity of instruction according to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional (or orthodox) ; for it is said in the gloss on the Bodha citta—

"The instructions of the leader of mankind (Buddha) accommodating themselves to the character and disposition (of those who are to be taught).

"Are said to be diverse in many ways, according to a plurality of methods.

"For as deep or superficial, and sometimes both deep and superficial.

"Instructions are diverse, and diverse is the doctrine of a universal void which is a negation of duality."

It is well known in Buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve inner seats (*āyatana*) is conducive to felicity.

"After acquiring wealth in abundance, the twelve inner seats.

"Are to be thoroughly reverenced; what use of reverencing aught else below ?

"The five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action.

"The common sensory and the intellect have been described by the wise at the twelve inner seats."

The system of the Buddhists is described as follows in the Viveka-vilāsa :—

"Of the Bauddhas Sugata (Buddha) is the deity, and the universe is momentarily fluxional ;

The following four principles in order are to be known by the name of the noble truths :—

"Pain, the inner seats, and from them an aggregate is held,[10]

"And the path (method) ; of all this let the explication be heard in order.

"Pain and the *Skandhas* of the embodied one, which are declared to be five, —

"Sensation, consciousness, name, impression, and form.

"The five organs of sense, the five objects of sense, sound and the rest, the common sensory.

"And (the intellect) the abode of merit,—these are the twelve inner seats.

"This should be the complement of desire and so forth, when it arises in the heart of man.

"Under the name of soul's own nature it should be the aggregate.

"The fixed idea that all impressions are momentary,

"This is to be known as the path, and is also styled emancipation.

"Furthermore, they are two instruments of science, perception and inference.

"The Bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects, the Vaibhāshikas and the rest.

"The Vaibhāṣika highly esteems an object concomitant to the cognition ;

'The Sauntrāntika allows no external objects apprephensible by perception ;

"The Yogācāra admits only intellect accompanied with forms ;

"The Mādhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent.

"All the four (sects of) Bauddhas proclaim the same emancipation,

"Arising from the extirpation of desire, etc., the stream of cognitions and impressions.

"The skin garment, the water-pot, the tonsure, the rags, the single meal in the forenoon,

'The congregation, and the red vesture, are adopted by the Bauddha, mendicants."[11] A.E.G.

NOTES

1. This śloka is quoted in the "Benares Pandit," vol. i.p. 89, with a commentary, and the later part of the second line is there read more correctly, '*darsanān na na darsanātt.*
2. Kusumānjali, iii. 7.
3. The Bauddhas are thus divided into—
   (*i*) Mādhyamikas or Nihilists.

(*ii*) Yogācāras or Subjective Idealists.
(*iii*) Sautrāntikas or Representationists.
(*iv*) Vaibhāṣikas or Presentationists.

4 Cf: Ferrier's Lectures and Remains, vol. i.p. 1:9.
"Suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset. The whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues, but you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey. You see them even now melting away before your eyes, although your eyes cannot place before you the conlusion which your reason draws. And what conclusion is that? That conclusion is that you never, even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived, see any abilding colour, any colour which truly *is*. Within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations. One shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance but because the process is one to which no measurement applies.... reasons refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scence, or to declare that it is, because in the very act of being it is not; it has given place to something else. It is a series of fleeting colours, no one of which *is*, because each of them continually vanishes in another."

5. Principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria.

6. Query, Laṅkāvatāra ?

7. Cf Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic, p. 213. If every *completed* object of congnition must consist of object *plus* the subject, the object without the subject must be incomplete, that is, inchoate—that is, no possible object of knowledge at all. This is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation; and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a *flux*—or, as we have depicted it elsewhere, perhaps more philosophically, as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into sense, and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense."

8. Cf. Burnouf, *Lotus*, p. 520.—Should we read *samudaya*

9. Cf. G.H. Lewe's History of Philosophy, Vol. i. p. 85. "We not

only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement of materials in the house, but we see why it must have done so, because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses ; that not being a recognised property of bricks, mortar, wood, and glass. But what we know of organic materials is that they *have* this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms ; precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency."

10. These are not the usual four 'sublime truths;' cf. p. 30.
11. Mādhava probably derived most of his knowledge of Buddhist doctrines from Brahmanical works ; consequently some of his explanations (as, e.g., that of *samudyāa* or *samudaya*. etc.) seem to be at variance with those given in Buddhist works.

# CHAPTER III

## THE ĀRHATA SYSTEM

तदित्थं मुक्तकच्छानां मतमसहमाना विवसनाः कथंचित्स्थायित्वमास्थाय क्षणिकत्वपक्षं प्रतिक्षिपन्ति। यद्यात्मा कश्चिन्नास्थीयेत स्थायी, तदैहलौकिकपारलौकिकफलसाधनसंपादनं विफलं भवेत्। न ह्येतत्संभवत्यन्यः करोत्यन्यो भुङ्क्त इति। तस्माद्योऽहं प्राक् कर्म अकरवं सोऽहं सम्प्रति तत्फलं भुञ्ज इति पूर्वापरकालानुयायिनः स्थायिनस्तस्य स्पष्टप्रमाणावसिततया पूर्वापरभागविकलकालकलावस्थितिलक्षणक्षणिकता परीक्षकैरर्हद्भिर्न परिग्रहार्हा॥

The Gymnosophists[1] (Jainas), rejecting these opinions of the Muktakachchahas,[2] and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent, overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything. (They say) : If no continuing soul is accepted, then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless. But surely this can never be imagined as possible – that one should act and another reap the consequences ! Therefore as this conviction, "I who previously did the deed, am the person who now reap its consequences," establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul, which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period, the discriminating Jaina Ārhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence, i.e. an existence which lasts only an instant, and has no previous or subsequent part.

अथ मन्येथाः –

प्रमाणवत्त्वादायातः प्रवाहः केन वार्यते ?

इति न्यायेन 'यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकम्' इत्यादिना प्रमाणेन क्षणिकतायाः प्रमिततया, तदनुसारेण समानसंतानवर्तिनामेव प्राचीनः प्रत्ययः कर्मकर्ता, तदुत्तरः प्रत्ययः फलभोक्ता॥

न चातिप्रसङ्गः। कार्यकारणभावस्य नियामकत्वात्। यथा मधुररसभावितानामाम्रबीजानां परिकर्षितायां भूमावुप्तानामङ्कुरकाण्डस्कन्धशाखापल्लवादिषु तद्द्वारा परम्परया फले माधुर्यनियमः। यथा वा लाक्षारसावसिक्तानां कार्पासबीजादीनामङ्कुरादिपारम्पर्येण कार्पासादौ रक्तिमनियमः।

यथोक्तम् —

यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।
फलं तत्रैव बध्नाति कार्पासे रक्तता यथा ॥
कुसुमे बीजपूरादेर्यल्लाक्षाद्यवसिच्यते ।
शक्तिराधीयते तत्र काचित्तां किं न पश्यसि ? ॥ इति ।

But the opponent may maintain, "The unbroken stream (of momentary sensations) has been fairly proved by argument, so who can prevent it ? In this way, since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument, whatever is, is momentary, etc., 'it follows that in each parallel line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit.

Nor may you object that, 'if this were true, effects might extend beyond all bounds'—[i.e., A might act, and B receive the punishment]—because there is an essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and effect. Thus we see that when mango seeds, after being steeped in sweet juices, are planted in prepared soil, there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot, the stalk, the stem, the branches, the peduncle, etc., and so on by an unbroken series to the fruit itself; or again, when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice, there will be a similar certainty of finding, through the same series of shoot, etc., an ultimate redness in the cotton. As it has been said—

"In whatever series of successive states the original imression of the action was produced,
"There verily accrues the result, just like the redness produced in cotton,
"When lac juice, etc , are poured on the flower of the citron, etc.,
"A certain capacity is produced in it,—do you not see it ?"

तदपि काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । जलधरादौ दृष्टान्ते क्षणिकत्वमनेन प्रमाणेन प्रमितं, प्रमाणान्तरेण वा । नाद्यः । भवदभिमतस्य क्षणिकत्वस्य क्वचिदप्यदृष्टचरत्वेन दृष्टान्तासिद्धावस्यानुमानस्यानुत्थानात् । न द्वितीयः । तेनैव न्यायेन सर्वत्र क्षणिकत्वसिद्धौ सत्वानुमानवैफल्यापत्तेः । अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं सत्त्वमित्यङ्गीकारे मिथ्यासर्पदंशादेरप्यर्थक्रियाकारित्वेन सत्त्वापादनाच्च । अत एवोक्तम् — उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सदिति ।

But all this is only a drowing man's catching at a straw, for it is overthrown by the following dilemma :

In the example of the "cloud," etc., [*supra*, p. 15], was your favourite "momentariness" proved by this very proof or by some other ? It could not be the former, because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud, and consequently as your example is not an ascertained fact, your supposed inference falls to the ground. Nor can it be the latter—because you might always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof (if you had it), and consequently your argument regarding all existence ["whatever is, is momentary," etc.,] would become needless. If you take as your definition of "existence" "that which produces an effect," this will not hold, as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope, since this undoubtedly produces the effect [of fe r]. Hence it has been said that the definition of an existence is "that which possesses an origin, an end, and an [intermediate] duration."

अथोच्यते—सामर्थ्यासामर्थ्यलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासात्तत्सिद्धिरिति, तदसाधु। स्याद्वादिनामनेकान्ततावादस्येष्टतया विरोधासिद्धेः। यदुक्तं कार्पासादिदृष्टान्त इति, तदुक्तिमात्रम्। युक्तेरनुक्तेः। तत्रापि निरन्वयनाशस्यानङ्गीकाराच्च।

न च संतानिव्यतिरेकेण संतानः प्रमाणपदवीमुपारोढुमर्हति। तदुक्तम्—

सजातीयाः क्रमोत्पन्नाः प्रत्यासन्नाः परस्परम्।
व्यक्तयस्तासु संतानः स चैक इति गीयते॥ इति।

As for what was said [in. p. 16] that the "momentariness of objects is proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously," *that* also is wrong—for the alleged contradiction is not proved, as the holders of the Syād-vāda[3] [*vide infra*] willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of causes. As for what was said of the example of the cotton, that is only mere words, since no proof is given, and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction [at each moment]. And again, your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence, as has been said, "In individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact,

there may be a continued series; and this series is held to be one [throughout all"].

न च कार्यकारणभावनियमोऽतिप्रसङ्गं भङ्क्तुमर्हति । तथा ह्युपाध्यायबुद्ध्यनुभूतस्य शिष्यबुद्धिः स्मरेत्तदुपचितकर्मफलमनुभवेद्वा ॥

तथा च कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । तदुक्तं सिद्धसेनवाक्यकारेण—

कृतप्रणाशाकृतकर्मभोग-
भवप्रमोक्षस्मृतिभङ्गदोषान् ।
उपेक्ष्य साक्षात्क्षणभङ्गमिच्छ-
न्नहो महासाहसिकः परोऽसौ ॥ (वी० स्तु० १८) इति ।

Nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects For even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed, or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired; and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed away without result, and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed. This has been said by the author of the Siddhasenāvākya—

The loss of the things done,—the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing not done,—the dissolution of all existence,—and the abolition of memory,—boll indeed is the Buddhist antagonist, when, in the teeth of these four objections, he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction !"

किं च क्षणिकत्वपक्षे ज्ञानकाले ज्ञेयस्यासत्त्वेन ज्ञेयकाले ज्ञानस्यासत्त्वेन च ग्राह्यग्राहकभावानुपपत्तौ सकललोकयात्रास्तमियात् । न च समसमयवर्तिता शङ्कनीया । सव्येतरविषाणवत्कार्यकारणभावासंभवेनाग्राह्यस्यालम्बनप्रत्ययत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Moreover, (on your supposition of momentary existence), as at the time of the perception (the second moment) the object (of the first moment) does n t exist, and similarly at the time of the object's existence the perception does not exist, there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived, and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end. Nor may you suppose that the object and the perception are simultaneous, because this would imply that, like the two horns of an animal, they did not stand in the relation of cause and effect [as this relation necessarily involves succession], and consequently the *Ālambana*,

or the object's data [*supra*, p. 29], would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes (*prataya*).[4]

अथ भिन्नकालस्यापि तस्याकारार्पकत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वम्—तदप्यपेशलम् । क्षणिकस्य ज्ञानस्याकारार्पकताश्रयताया दुर्वचत्वेन साकारज्ञानवादप्रत्यादेशात् ।

निराकारज्ञानवादेऽपि योग्यतावशेन प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थायाः स्थितत्वात् । तथा हि प्रत्यक्षेण विषयाकाररहितमेव ज्ञानं प्रतिपुरुषमहमहमिकया घटादिग्राहकमनुभूयते, न तु दर्पणादिवत्प्रतिबिम्बाक्रान्तम् ।

विषयाकारधारित्वे च ज्ञानस्यार्थे दूरनिकटादिव्यवहाराय जलाञ्जलिर्वितीर्येत । न च चेदमिष्टापादानमेष्टव्यम् । दवीयान्महीधरो नेदीयादीर्घो बाहुरिति व्यवहारस्य निराबाधं जागरूकत्वात् । न चाकाराधायकस्य तस्य दवीयस्त्वादिशालितया तथा व्यवहार इति कथनीयम् । दर्पणादौ तथानुपलम्भात् ।

किं चार्थादुपजायमानं ज्ञानं यथा तस्य नीलाकारतामनुकरोति तथा यदि जडतामपि, तर्हि अर्थवत्तदपि जडं स्यात् । तथा च वृद्धिमिष्टवतो मूलमपि ते नष्टं स्यादिति महत्कष्टमापन्नम् ।

If you say that "the object may still be perceived, inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception, even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other," this too will not hold. For if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it, you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form ; and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it, you are equally met by the fact that, if we are to avoid incongruity, there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case. Thus by perception the abstract consciousness, which before existed uninfluenced by the external object, becomes modified under the form of a jar, etc., with a definite reference to each man's personality [i.e., I see the jar], and is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror. Moreover, if the perception only reproduced the form of the object, there would be an end of using such words as "far," "near." etc., of the objects.[5] Nor can you accept this conclusion, "as exactly in accordance with your own views", because in spite of all our logic, the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as "the mountain is nearer" or "further," "long" or "large." Nor may you say that "it is the object (which supplies the form) that really possesses these qualities

of being 'further,' etc., and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception [though not really belonging to it"]—because we do not find that this is the case in a mirror [i.e., it does not become a *far* reflection because it represents a far object.]

And again, as the perception produced by an object follows it in assuming the form of blue, so too, if the object be insentient, it ought equally to assume its form and so become itself insentient. And thus, according to the proverb, "wishing to grow, you have destroyed your root," and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties.

अथैतद्दोपपरिजिहीर्षया ज्ञानं जडतां नानुकरोति—इति ब्रूषे, हन्त, तर्हि तस्या ग्रहणं न स्यादित्येकमनुसंधित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवत इति न्यायापातः ।

ननु मा भूज्जडताया ग्रहणम् । किं नश्छिन्नम् ? तदग्रहणेऽपि नीलाकारग्रहणे तयोर्भेदोऽनेकान्तो वा भवेत् । नीलाकारग्रहणे चागृहीता जडता कथं तस्य स्वरूपं स्यात् ? अपरथा गृहीतस्य स्तम्भस्यागृहीतं त्रैलोक्यमपि रूपं भवेत् ।

It, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,[6] and so it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient ?" [We reply], that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that both the blue and the insentience should together const'tute the character of the thing ?] We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also contituting its character."[7]

तदेतत् प्रमेयजातं प्रतापचन्द्रप्रभृतिभिरर्हन्मतानुसारिभि: प्रमेयकमलमार्तण्डादौ प्रबन्धे प्रपञ्चितमिति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयान्नोपन्यस्तम् ॥

All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratāpachandra and others, in the *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*, etc., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much.

तस्मात्पुरुषार्थाभिलाषुकैः पुरुषैः सौगती गतिर्नानुगन्तव्या, अपि तु आर्हती एवार्हणीया । अर्हत्स्वरूपं च हेमचन्द्रसुरिभिराप्तनिश्चयालंकारे निरटङ्कि—

सर्वज्ञो जितरागादिदोषस्त्रैलोक्यपूजितः ।
यथास्थितार्थवादी च देवोऽर्हन्परमेश्वरः ॥ इति ।

Therefore those who wish for the *summum bonum* of man must not accept the doctrine of Buddha, but rather honour only the Arhata doctrine. The Ārhat's nature has been thus described by Arhachchandra-sūri,[8] in his *Āptaniścayālaṅkāra.*

The divine Arhat is the supreme lord, the omniscient one. who has overcome all faults, desire, etc.,—adored by the three worlds, the declarer of things as they are."

ननु न कश्चित्पुरुषविशेषः सर्वज्ञपदवेदनीयः प्रमाणपद्धतिमध्यास्ते । तत्सद्भावग्राहकस्य प्रमाणपञ्चकस्य तत्रानुपलम्भात् । तथा चोक्तं तौतातितैः—

सर्वज्ञो दृश्यते तावमस्नेदानीस्मदादिभिः ।
दृष्टो न चैकदेशोऽस्ति लिङ्गं वा योऽनुमापयेत् ॥
न चागमविधिः कश्चिन्नित्यसर्वज्ञबोधकः ।
न च तत्रार्थवादानां तात्पर्यमपि कल्प्यते ॥
न चान्यार्थप्रधानैस्तैस्तदस्तित्वं विधीयते ।
न चानुवदितुं शक्यः पूर्वमन्यैरबोधितः ॥
अनादेरागमस्यार्थो न च सर्वज्ञ आदिमान् ।
कृत्रिमेण त्वसत्येन स कथं प्रतिपाद्यते ? ॥
अथ तद्वचनेनैव सर्वज्ञोऽज्ञैः प्रतीयते ।
प्रकल्प्येत कथं सिद्धिरन्योन्याश्रययोस्तयोः ॥
सर्वज्ञोक्ततया वाक्यं सत्यं तेन तदस्तिता ।
कथं तदुभयं सिध्येत्सिद्धमूलान्तराद्‌ते ॥
असर्वज्ञप्रणीतात्तु वचनान्मूलवर्जितात् ।
सर्वज्ञमवगच्छन्तः स्ववाक्यात्किं न जानते ? ॥
सर्वज्ञसदृशं कञ्चिद्यदि पश्येम सम्प्रति ।
उपमानेन सर्वज्ञं जानीयाम ततो वयम् ॥
उपदेशोऽपि बुद्धस्य धर्माधर्मादिगोचरः ।
अन्यथा नोपपद्येत सार्वज्ञ्यं यदि नाभवत् ॥
एवमर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणं नात्र युज्यते ।
उपदेशस्य सत्यत्वं यतो नाध्यक्षमीक्ष्यते ॥ इत्यादि ।

But may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof, since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply, as has been declared by Tautātita [Bhaṭṭa Kumārila[9]] ?

1. "No omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others ; nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence.

2. Nor is there any injunction (*vidhi*) of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one, nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages (*arthavāda*) be applied here

3. "His existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics : and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions (*anuvāda*), as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before.

4. "An omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal Veda ; and how can he be established by a made and spurious Veda ?

5. "Do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word ? How can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support ?

6 ["If you say,] 'The saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient, and this proves the Arhat's existence ; how can either point be established without some previously established foundation ?

7. "But they who accept a [supposed] omniscient on the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's words.

8. "And again, if we now could see anything like an omniscient being, we might have a chance of recognising him by the [well-known fourth] proof, comparison (*upamāna*).

9. "And the teaching of Buddha [as well as that of Jina], which embraces virtue, Vice etc., would not be established as authoritative, if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience,[10] and so on."

अत्र प्रतिविधीयते । यदभ्यधायि 'तत्सद्भावग्राहकस्य प्रमाणपञ्चकस्य तत्रानुपलम्भात्' इति तदयुक्तम् । तत्सद्भावावेदकस्यानुमानादेः सद्भावात् । तथा हि कश्चिदात्मा सकलपदार्थसाक्षात्कारी, तद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्ध-

प्रत्ययत्वात् । यद्यद्ग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिवन्धप्रत्ययं, तत्तत्साक्षात्कारि, यथा— अपगततिमिरादिप्रतिबन्धं लोचनविज्ञानं रूपसाक्षात्कारि ।

तदग्रहणस्वभावत्वे सति प्रक्षीणप्रतिबन्धप्रत्ययश्च कश्चिदात्मा । तस्मात्सकलपदार्थसाक्षात्कारीति । न तावदशेषार्थग्रहणस्वभावत्वमात्मनोऽसिद्धम् ।

चोदनावलान्निखिलार्थज्ञानोत्पत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या, सर्वमनेकान्तात्मकं सत्त्वादिति व्याप्तिज्ञानोत्पत्तेश्च । 'चोदना हि भूतं भवन्तं भविष्यन्तं सूक्ष्मं व्यवहितं विप्रकृष्टमित्येवंजातीयकमर्थमवगमयति' (मी० सू० १।१।२ शबरभाष्य) इत्येवंजातीयकैरध्वरमीमांसागुरुभिर्विधिप्रतिषेधविचारणानिबन्धनं सकलार्थविषयज्ञानं प्रतिपद्यमानैः सकलार्थग्रहणस्वभावकत्वमात्मनोऽभ्युपगतम् ।

न चाखिलार्थप्रतिबन्धकावरणप्रक्षयानुपपत्तिः । सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रयलक्षणस्यावरणप्रक्षयहेतुभूतस्य सामग्रीविशेषस्य प्रतीतत्वात् । अनया मुद्रयापि क्षुद्रोपद्रवा विद्राव्याः ।

We reply as follows:—As for the supposed contradiction of an Arhat's existence derived from the failure of the five affirmative proofs,—this is untenable, because the *are* proofs, as inference, etc , which *do* establish[11] his existence'. Thus any soul will become omniscient when, (its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same), the hindrances to such knowledge are done away. Whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object, will, when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away, actually know it, just as the sense of vision coguises form, directly the hindrances of darkness, etc., are removed Now there *is* such a soul, which has its hindrances done away, its natural capacity for grasping all things remaining unchanged; therefore there is an omniscient being. Nor is the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; for otherwise the Mīmāṁsist could not maintain that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the authoritative injunction of a text,[12]—nor could there otherwise be the knowledge of universal propositions, such as that in our favourite argument, "All things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence" (and, of course, a follower of the Nyāya will grant universal propositions can be known, though he will dispute the truth of this particular one]. Now it is clear that the teachers of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things; since they allow that a knowledge embracing all things

can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions, as is said [by Śabara in his commentary on the Sūtras, i. 1, 2], "A precept makes known the past, the present, the future, the minute, the obstructed, the distant, etc." Nor can you say that "it is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's knowing all things," because we [Jainas] are convinced that there are certain special means to destroy these obtructions, viz, the three ["gems"], right intuition, etc. By this charm also, all inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight.

नन्वावरणप्रक्षयवशादशेषविषयं विज्ञानं विशदं मुख्यप्रत्यक्षं प्रभवतीत्युक्तं, तदयुक्तम् । तस्य सर्वज्ञस्यानादिमुक्तत्वेनावरणस्यैवासंभवादिति चेन् तन्न । अनादिमुक्तत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः । न सर्वज्ञोऽनादिमुक्तः । मुक्तत्वादितरमुक्तवत् । बद्धापेक्षया हि मुक्तव्यपदेशः । तद्रहिते चास्याप्यभावः स्यादाकाशवत् ॥

नन्वनादेः क्षित्यादिकार्यपरंपरायाः कर्तृत्वेन तत्सिद्धिः । तथा हि—क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवद् । तदप्यसमीचीनम् । कार्यत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः । न च सावयवत्वेन तत्साधनमित्यभिधातव्यम् । यस्मादिदं विकल्पजालमवतरति ।

सावयवत्वं किमवयवसंयोगित्वम्, अवयवसमवायित्वम्, अवयवजन्यत्वम्, समवेतद्रव्यत्वम्, सावयवबुद्धिविषयत्वं वा ?

But the Naiyāyika may interpose, "You talk of the pure intelligence, which, after all hindrances are done away, sees all objects, having sense-perception at its height; but this is irrelevant, because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient, as from all enternity he has been always liberated." We reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being. There cannot be an omniscient who is eternally "liberated," from the very fact of his being "liberated," like other liberated persons, —since the use of the term "liberated" necessarilly implies the having been previously bound : and if the latter is absent, the former must be too, as is seen in the case of the ether. "But is not this being's existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects the earth, etc.? according to the well-known argument, 'the earth, etc., must have had a maker, because they have the nature of effects, as a jar." This argument, however, will not hold, because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects. You cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts, because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma. Does this "being composed of parts" mean (1) the

being in contact with the parts; or (ii) "the being in intimate relation to the parts; or (iii) the being produced from parts,;" or (iv) the being a substance in intimate relation; or (v) the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts?

न प्रथमः। आकाशादौ अनैकान्त्यात्। न द्वितीयः, सामान्यादौ व्यभिचारात्। न तृतीयः, साध्याविशिष्टत्वात्। न चतुर्थः। विकल्पयुगलार्गलग्रहगलत्वात्। समवायसम्बन्धमात्रवद् द्रव्यत्वं समवेतद्रव्यत्वमन्यत्र समवेतद्रव्यत्वं वा विवक्षितं हेतूक्रियते?

आद्ये गगनादौ व्यभिचारः। तस्यापि गुणादिसमवायवत्वद्रव्यत्वयोः सम्भवात्। द्वितीये साध्याविशिष्टता। अन्यशब्दार्थेषु समवायकारणभूतेष्ववयवेषु समवायस्य साधनीयत्वात्। अभ्युपगम्यैतदभाणि। वस्तुतस्तु समवाय एव न समस्ति। प्रमाणाभावात्।

Not *the first*, because it would apply too widely, as it would include ether [since this, though not itself composed of parts, is an contact with the parts of other things;] nor *the second*, because it would similarly include genus, etc. [as this resides in a substance by intimate relation, and yet itself is not composed of parts;] nor *the third*, because this involves a te m ("produced") just as much disputed as the one directly in question;[13] nor *the fourth*, because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative:—Do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance, and to have something else in intimate relation to itself,—or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else, in order to be valid for your argument? If you say the former it will equally apply to ether, since this is a substance, and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation; if you say the later, your new position involves as much dispute as the original point, since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts, or the so-called "intimate causes," which you mean by 'something else." We use these terms in compliance with your terminology; but, of course, from our point of view, we do not allow such a thing as "intimate relation," as there is no proof of its existence.

नापि पञ्चमः। आत्मादिनानैकान्त्यात्। तस्य सावयवबुद्धिविषयत्वेऽपि कार्यत्वाभावात्। न च निरवयवत्वेऽप्यस्य सावयवार्थसम्बन्धेन सावयवबुद्धिविषयत्वमौपचारिकमित्येष्टव्यम्। निरवयवत्वे व्यापित्वविरोधात्परमाणुवत्।

Nor can *the fifth* alternative be allowed, because this would reach too far as it would include soul, etc., since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect.[14] Nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself, but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts, because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading just as the atom [which is indiscerptible but not all pervading].

किं च, किमेकः कर्त्ता: साध्यते, किं वाऽनेके ? प्रथमे प्रासादादौ व्यभिचारः । स्थपत्यादीनां बहूनां पुरुषाणां तत्र कर्तृत्वोपलम्भात् । द्वितीये बहूनां विश्वनिर्मातृत्वे तेषु मिथो वैमत्यसम्भावनाया अनिवार्यत्वादेकैकस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यान्यरूपतया सर्वमसमञ्जसमापद्येत । सर्वेषां सामर्थ्यसाम्येनैकेनैव सकलजगदुत्पत्तिसिद्धौ इतरवैयर्थ्यं च ।

तदुक्तं वीतरागस्तुतौ—

कर्त्तास्ति कश्चिज्जगतः स चैकः
स सर्वगः स स्ववशः स नित्यः ।
इमाः कुहेवाकविडम्बनाः स्यु-
स्तेषां न येषामनुशासकस्त्वम् ।। (वी० स्तु० ६) इति ।

And, moreover, is there only one maker? Or, again, is he independent?

In the former case your position will apply too far, as it will extend erroneously to palaces, etc., where we see for ourselves the work of many different men, as carpenters, etc., and [in the second case] if all the world were produced by this one maker, all other agents would be superfluous. As it has been said in the *Vītarāgastuti* or "Praise of Jina"—

1. There is one eternal maker for the world, all pervading, independent, and true; they have none of these inextricable delusions, whose teacher art *thou*."

अन्यत्रापि—

कर्त्ता न तावदिह कोऽपि यथेच्छया वा
दृष्टोऽन्यथा कटकृतावपि तत्प्रसङ्गः ।
कार्यं किमत्रभवतापि च तक्षकाद्यै-
राहत्य च त्रिभुवनं पुरुषः करोति ।। इति।

तस्मात्प्रागुक्तकारणत्रितयबलादावरणप्रक्षये सार्वज्ञ्यं युक्तम् ।

And again—

2. "There is here no maker acting by his own free will, else his influence would extend to the making of a mat. What would be the use of yourself or all the artisans, if Īśvara fabricates the three worlds ?"

Therefore, it is right to hold, as we do, that omniscience is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to.

न चास्योपदेष्ट्रन्तराभावात् सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रितयानुपपत्तिरित्ति भणनीयम् । पूर्वसर्वज्ञप्रणीतागमप्रभवत्वादमुष्य अशेषार्थज्ञानस्य । न चान्योन्याश्रयादिदोषः । आगमसर्वज्ञपरम्पराया बीजाङ्कुरवदनादित्वाङ्गीकारादित्यलम् ।

Nor need the objection be made that "right intuition," etc., are impossible, as is there no other teacher to go to,—because this universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former omniscient Jinas. Nor is our doctrine liable to the imputa tion of such faults as *Anyonyāśrayatā*,[15] etc., because we accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and ominiscient teachers, like the endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed. So much for this preliminary discussion.

रत्नत्रयपदवेदनीयतया प्रसिद्धं सम्यग्दर्शनादित्रितयमर्हत्प्रवचनसंग्रहपरे परमागमसारे प्ररूपितम्—'सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः' इति (त०सू० १।१) । विवृतं च योगदेवेन—'येन रूपेण जीवाद्यर्थो व्यवस्थितस्तेन रूपेण अर्हता प्रतिपादिते तत्त्वार्थे विपरीताभिनिवेशरहितत्वाद्यपरपर्यायं श्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् ।' तथा च तत्त्वार्थसूत्रं— तत्त्वार्थं (र्थे) श्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनमिति ।

अन्यदपि—

रुचिर्जिनोक्ततत्त्वेषु सम्यक्श्रद्धानमुच्यते ।
जायते तन्निसर्गेण गुरोरधिगमेन वा ।। इति ।

परोपदेशनिरपेक्षमात्मस्वरूपं निसर्गः । व्याख्यानादिरूपपरोपदेशजनितं ज्ञानमधिगमः ।

The well-known triad called the three gems, right intuition, etc., are thus described in the *Paramāgamasāra* (which is devoted to the exposition of the docrines of the Arhats)—"Right intuition, right knowledge, right conduct are the path of liberation." This has been thus explained by Yogadeva ;—

(*a*) When the meaning of the predicaments, the soul etc., has been declared by an Arhat in exact accordance with their reality, absolute faith in the teaching, i.e., the entire absence of any contrary idea, is "right intuition." And to this effect runs the *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, "Faith in the predicaments[16] is right 'intuition." Or, as another definition gives it, "Acquiescence in the predicaments declared by a Jina is called "right faith;" it is produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction." "Natural character" means the soul's own nature, independent of another's teaching; "instruction" is the knowledge produced by the teaching of another in the form of explanation, etc.

येन स्वभावेन जीवादयः पदार्था व्यवस्थितास्तेन स्वभावेन मोहसंशयरहितत्वेनावगमः सम्यग्ज्ञानम् । यथोक्तम्—

यथावस्थिततत्त्वानां संक्षेपाद्विस्तरेण वा ।
योऽवबोधस्तमत्राहुः सम्यग्ज्ञानं मनीषिणः ।। इति ।

(*b*) "Right knowledge" is a knowledge of the predicaments, soul, etc., according to their real nature, undisturbed by any illusion or doubt; as it has been said—

"That knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the wise."

तज्ज्ञानं पञ्चविधं मतिश्रुतावधिमनःपर्यायकेवलभेदेन । तदुक्तम्—मतिश्रुतावधि-मनःपर्याय-केवलानि ज्ञानमिति । अस्यार्थः—ज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमे सति इन्द्रियमनसी पुरस्कृत्य व्यापृतः सन्यथार्थं मनुते सा मतिः (1) ज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमे सति मतिजनितं स्पष्टं ज्ञानं श्रुतम् (1) सम्यग्दर्शनादिगुणजनितक्षयोपशमनिमित्तमवच्छिन्नविषयं ज्ञानमवधिः (1) ईर्ष्यान्तरायज्ञानावरणक्षयोपशमे सति परमनोगतस्यार्थस्य स्फुटं परिच्छेदं ज्ञानं मनःपर्यायः (1) तपःक्रियाविशेषान्यदर्थं सेवन्ते तपस्विनः तज्ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानासंसृष्टं केवलम् (1)

This knowledge is fivefold as divided into *mati, śruta, avadhi*' *manas-paryāya* and *kevala*; as it has been said, "*Mati, śruta, avadhi, mans-paryāya* and *kevala*, these are knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows:—

1. *Mati* is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished,

2. *Śruta* is the clear knowledge produced by *mati*, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.

3. *Avadhi* is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," etc.[17]

4. *Manas-paryāya* is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.

5. *Kevala* is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.

तत्राद्यं परोक्षं, प्रत्यक्षमन्यत्—तदुक्तम्—

विज्ञानं त्वपराभासि प्रमाणं बाधवर्जितम् ।
प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च द्विधा ज्ञेयं विनिश्चतात् ।। इति ।
अन्तर्गणिकभेदस्तु सविस्तरः तत्रैवागमेऽवगन्तव्यः ।

The first of these (*mati*) is not self-cognised, the other four are. Thus it has been said :—

"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which manifests itself as well as its objects ; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways."

But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.

संसरणकर्मोच्छित्तावुद्यतस्य श्रद्दधानस्य ज्ञानवतः पापगमनकारणक्रियानिवृत्तिः सम्यक्चारित्रम् । तदेतत्सप्रपञ्चमुक्तमर्हता—

सर्वथावद्ययोगानां त्यागश्चारित्रमुच्यते ।
कीर्तितं तदहिंसादिव्रतभेदेन पञ्चधा ।।
अहिंसासूनृतास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहाः ।।
न यत्प्रमादयोगेन जीवितव्यपरोपणम् ।
चराणां स्थावराणां च तदहिंसाव्रतं मतम् ।।
प्रियं पथ्यं वचस्तथ्यं सूनृतं व्रतमुच्यते ।
तत्तथ्यमपि नो तथ्यमप्रियं चाहितं च यत् ।।
अनादानमदत्तस्यास्तेयव्रतमुदीरितम् ।
बाह्याः प्राणाः नृणामर्थो हरता तं हता हि ते ।।
दिव्यौदरिककामानां कृतानुमतकारितैः ।
मनोवाक्कायतस्त्यागो ब्रह्माष्टादशधा मतम् ।।
सर्वभावेषु मूर्च्छायास्त्यागः स्यादपरिग्रहः ।

भावनाभिर्भावितानि पञ्चभिः पञ्चधा क्रमात् ।
महाव्रतानि लोकस्य साधयन्त्यव्ययं पदम् ॥ इति ।

भावनापञ्चकप्रपञ्चनं च निरूपितम् —

हास्यलोभभयक्रोधप्रत्याख्यानैर्निरन्तरम् ।
आलोच्यभाषणेनापि भावयेत्सूनृतं व्रतम् ॥ इत्यादिना ।

एतानि सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मिलितानि मोक्षकारणं न प्रत्येकम् । यथा रसायनम्, तथा चात्र ज्ञानश्रद्धानाचरणानि संभूय फलं साधयन्ति, न प्रत्येकम् ।

(a) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat—

1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as the five vows,' *ahiṁsā*, *sūnṛta*, *asteya*, *brahmacyarya* and *aparigraha*.[18]

2. "The 'vow' of *ahiṁsā* is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.

3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of *sūnṛta*. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to others and prejudicial

4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of *asteya;* the external life is a man's property, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.

5. "The vow" of *brahmacarya* ( chastity ) is eighteenfold, viz., the abandonment of all desires, [9] heavenly or earthly, in thought, world, and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another to act.

6. "The vow" of *aparigraha* is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.

7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."

The full account of the five states of mind (*bhāvanā*) has been given in the following passage [of which we only quote one śloka]—

1. "Let him carry out the 'vow' of *sūnṛita* uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter greed, fear, and anger, and by the deliberate avoidance of speech,"[20]—and so forth.

These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine,-[1] united, which produce the elixir's effect, but not severally.

अत्र मंक्षेपतस्तावज्जीवाजीवाख्ये द्वे तत्त्वे स्तः। तत्र वोधात्मको जीवः। अवोधात्मकस्त्वजीवः। तदुक्तं पद्मनन्दिना।

चिदचिद् द्वे परे तत्त्वे विवेकस्तद्विवेचनम्।
उपादेयमुपादेयं हेयं हेयं च कुर्वतः॥
हेयं हि कर्तृरागादि तत्कार्यमविवेकिता।
उपादेयं परं ज्योतिरुपयोगैकलक्षणम्॥ इति।

Here we may say concisely that the *tattvas* or predicaments are two, *jīva* and *ajīva*; the soul, *jīva*, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, *ajīva*, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus said—

"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul'; 'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected The affection, etc., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to be pursued, which is defined as *upayoga*."

सहजचिद्रूपपरिणतिं स्वीकुर्वाणे ज्ञानदर्शने उपयोगः। स परस्परप्रदेशानां प्रदेशवन्धात्कर्मणैकीभूतस्यात्मनोऽन्योन्यत्वप्रतिपत्तिकारणं भवति।

सकलजीवसाधारणं चैतन्यम् उपशमक्षयक्षयोपशमवशात् औपशमिकक्षयात्मकक्षायौपशमिकभावेन कर्मोदयवशात्कलुषान्याकारेण च परिणतजीवपर्यायविवक्षायां जीवस्वरूपं भवति। यदवोचद्वाचकाचार्यः—'औपशमिकक्षायिकौ भावौ मिश्रश्च जीवस्य स्वतत्त्वमौदयिकपारिणामिकौ च' (त० सू० २।१) इति।

अनुदयप्राप्तिरूपे कर्मण उपशमे सति जीवस्योत्पद्यमानोभाव औपशमिकः। यथा पङ्के कलुषतां कुर्वति कतकादिद्रव्यसंबन्धादधःपतिते जलस्य स्वच्छता (१) कर्मणः क्षये सति जायमानो भावः क्षायिकः। यथा पङ्कात्पृथग्भूतस्य निर्मलस्य स्फाटिकादिभाजनान्तर्गतस्य जलस्य स्वच्छता। यथा मोक्षः (२) उभयात्मा भावो मिश्रः। यथा जलस्यार्धस्वच्छता (३) कर्मोदये सति भवन्भाव औदयिकः। कर्मोपशमाद्यनपेक्षः सहजो भावश्चेतनत्वादिः पारिणामिकः (४) तदेतद्यथासम्भवं भव्यस्याभव्यस्य वा जीवस्य स्वरूपमिति सूत्रार्थः॥

*Upayoga* [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of *pradeśa* and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces [between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather be defined as "the cause of its recognising tha it is other than these.[22]

Intelligence (*chaitanya*) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as *parianata* [i.e., as it is in itself]; but by the influence of *upaśamakṣaya* and *kṣayopaśama* it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[23] or again, by the influence of actions as they arise, it assume the appearance of foulness, etc.[24] As has been said by Vācakācarya [in a sūtra]—

"The *aupaśamika*, the *Kṣāyika* and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul, and also the *audayika* and the *Pāriṇāmika*."

1. The *aupaśamika* state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,[25] etc.

2. The *Kṣāyika* state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effect, as in final liberation.

3. The "mixed" (*miśra*) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure.

4. The *audayika* state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent influence on the future]. The *Pāriṇāmika* state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence. &c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[26] This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sūtra quoted above.

तदुक्तं स्वरूपसम्बोधने —

ज्ञानाद् भिन्नो न नाभिन्नो भिन्नाभिन्नः कथंचन ।
ज्ञानं पूर्वापरीभूतं सोऽयमात्मेति कीर्तितः ।।

ननु भेदाभेदयोः परस्परपरिहारेण अवस्थानादन्यतरस्यैव वास्तवत्वादुभयात्म-

कत्वमयुक्तमिति चेत्—तद्युक्तम्। बाधे प्रमाणाभावात्। अनुपलम्भो हि बाधकं प्रमाणम्। न सोऽस्ति। समस्तेषु वस्तुष्वनेकान्तात्मकत्वस्य स्याद्वादिनां मते सुप्रसिद्धत्वादित्यलम्।

This has been explained in the *Svarūpa-sambodhana*—

"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it, —in some way both different and the same,—knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be."

If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absured," we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absured. Only a valid non-perception[17] can thus preclude a suggestion as absured; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the *Syād-vāda*) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.

अपरे पुनर्जीवाजीवयोरपरं प्रपञ्चमाचक्षते जीवाकाशधर्माधर्मपुद्गलास्तिकायभेदात्। एतेषु पञ्चसु तत्त्वेषु कालत्रयसम्बन्धितया अस्तीति स्थितिव्यपदेशः। अनेकप्रदेशत्वेन शरीरवत्कायव्यपदेशः।

तत्र जीवा द्विविधाः, संसारिणो मुक्ताश्च। भवाद्भवान्तरप्राप्तिमन्तः संसारिणः। ते च द्विविधाः—समनस्का, अमनस्काश्च। तत्र संज्ञिनः समनस्काः। शिक्षाक्रियालापग्रहणरूपा संज्ञा। तद्विधुरास्त्वमनस्काः ते चामनस्का द्विविधाः; त्रसस्थावरभेदात्।

Others lay down a different set of *tattvas* from the two mentioned above, *jīva* and *ajīva;* they hold that there are five *astikāyas* or categories,—*jīva, ākāśa, dharma, adharma* and *pudgala.* To all these five we can apply the idea of "existence" (*asti*),[18] as connected with the three divisions of time, and we can similarly apply the idea of "body" (*kāya*),[19] from their occupying several parts of space.

The *jīvas* (souls) are divided into two, the "mundane" and the "released." The "mundane" pass from birth to birth; and these are also divided into two, as those possessing an internal sense (*samanaska*), and those destitute of it (*amanaska*). The former possesses *samjñā*, i.e., the power of apprehension, talking acting, and receiving instruction; the latter are those without this power. These latter are also divided into two, as "locomotive" (*trasa*), or "immovable" (*sthāvara*).

तत्र द्वीन्द्रियादयः शङ्खगण्डोलकप्रभृतयः चतुर्विधास्त्रसाः । पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायु-वनस्पतयः स्थावराः ।

तत्र मार्गगतधूलिः पृथिवी इष्टकादिः पृथिवीकायः । पृथिवी कायत्वेन येन गृहीता स पृथिवीकायिकः । पृथिवीं कायत्वेन यो ग्रहीष्यति स पृथिवी जीवः । एवम-वादिष्वपि भेदचतुष्टयं योज्यम् । तत्र पृथिव्यादि कायत्वेन गृहीतवन्तो ग्रहीष्यन्तश्च स्थावरा गृह्यन्ते न पृथिव्यादिपृथिवीकायादयः । तेषामजीवत्वात् । ते च स्थावराः स्पर्शनैकेन्द्रियाः । भवान्तरप्राप्तिविधुरा मुक्ताः ।

The "locomotive" are those possessing at least two senses [touch and taste], as shell-fiish, worms, etc., and are thus of four kinds [as possessing two, three, four, or five senses]; the "immovable" are earth, water, fire, air, and trees.[30] But here a distinction must be made. The dust of the road is properly "earth," but bricks, etc., are aggregated "bodies of earth," and that soul by whom this body is appropriated becomes "earthen-bodied," and that soul which will hereafter appropriate it is the "earth-soul." The same four divisions must also be applied to the others, water, etc. Now the souls which have appropriated or will appropriate the earth, etc., as their bodies, are reckoned as "immovable;" but earth, etc., and the "bodies of earth," etc., are not so reckoned, because they are inanimate.[31] These other immovable things, and such as only possess the one sense of touch are considered as "released," since they are incapable of passing into any other state of existence.

धर्माधर्माकाशास्तिकायाः ते एकत्वशालिनो निष्क्रियाश्च द्रव्यस्य देशान्तर-प्राप्तिहेतवः । तत्र धर्माधर्मौ प्रसिद्धौ । आलोकेनावच्छिन्ने नभसि लोकाकाशपद वेदनीये तयोः सर्वत्रावस्थितिः । गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोरुपकारः । अतएव धर्मास्तिकायः प्रवृत्यनुमेयः । अधर्मास्तिकायः स्थित्यनुमेयः । अन्यवस्तुप्रदेशमध्येऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः प्रवेशोऽवगाहः । तदाकाशकृत्यम् ।

*Dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* are singular categories [and not generic]. and they have not the attribute of "action," but they are the causes of a substance's change of place.

*Dharma*, "merit," and *adharma*, "demerit," are well known. They assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally extended[32] sky [or other] characterised by light, and also called Lokākāśa; hence the presence of the category "merit" is to be inferred from progress, that of "demerit" from stationariness.

The effect of *ākāśa* is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another.

स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवन्तः पुद्गलाः (त० सू० ५।२४)। ते च द्विविधाः—अणवः स्कन्धाश्च। भोक्तुमशक्या अणवः द्व्यणुकादयः स्कन्धाः तत्र द्व्यणुकादिस्कन्धभेदात् अण्वादिरुत्पद्यते। अण्वादिसङ्घातात् द्व्यणुकादिरुत्पद्यते। क्वचिद् भेदसङ्घाताभ्यां स्कन्धोत्पत्तिः (त० सू० ५।२६)। अतएव पूरयन्ति गलन्तीति पुद्गलाः।

कालस्यानेकप्रदेशत्वाभावेन अस्तिकायत्वाभावेऽपि द्रव्यत्वमस्ति। तल्लक्षणयोगात्। तदुक्तं—गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् (त० सू० ५।३८) इति। द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः (त० सू० ५।३६)। यथा जीवस्य ज्ञानत्वादिधर्मरूपाः, पुद्गलस्य रूपत्वादिसामान्यस्वभावाः। धर्माधर्माकाशकालानां यथासम्भवं गतिस्थित्यवगाहवर्तनाहेतुत्वादिसामान्यादि गुणाः।

तस्य द्रव्यस्योक्तरूपेण भवनं पर्यायः। उत्पादस्तद्भावः परिणामः पर्याय इति पर्यायाः। यथा जीवस्य घटादिज्ञानसुखक्लेशादयः। पुद्गलस्य मृत्पिण्डघटादयः। धर्मादीनां गत्यादिविशेषाः अतएव षड् द्रव्याणीति प्रसिद्धिः।

*Pudgala*, "body," possesses touch, taste, and colour, Bodies are of two kinds atomic and compound. Atoms cannot be enjoyed,[33] the compounds are the binary and other combinations. Atoms are produced by the separation of these binary and other compounds, while these arise from the conjunction of atoms. Compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction [combined]; hence they are called *pudgalas*, because they "fill" (*pūr*), and "dissolve" (*gal*) Although "time" is not properly an *astikāya*, because it does not occupy many separate parts of space (as mentioned in the definition), still it is a *dravya* (or *tattva*), as the definition will hold; "substance" (*dravya*) possesses "qualities and action."[34] Qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities, as the general qualities, knowledge, etc., of the *jīva*, form etc., of the body, and the power of causing progress, stationariness and motion into a place previously occupied, in the case respectively of "merit" "demerit," and *ākāśā*. "Action" (*paryāya*) has thus been defined; the actions (*paryāyāḥ*) of a substance are, as has been said, its existence, its production its being what it is, its development, its course to the end, as, e.g.. in the *jīva*, the knowledge of objects, as of a jar, etc., happiness, pain, etc.; in the *pudgala*, the lump of clay, the jar, etc.; in merit and demerit, the special functions of progress, etc. Thus there are six substances or *tattvas* (i.e., the five above mentioned and "time").

केचन सप्त तत्त्वानीति वर्णयन्ति । तदाह—जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धसम्वरनिर्जर-मोक्षास्तत्त्वानि (त० सू० १।४) इति । तत्र जीवाजीवौ निरूपितौ। आस्रवो निरूप्यते—औदारिकादिकायादिचलनद्वारेण आत्मनश्चलनं योगपदवेदनीयमास्रवः । यथा सलिलावगाहि द्वारं जलाद्यास्रवणकारणत्वादास्रव इति निगद्यते, तथा योगप्रणाडिकया कर्मास्रवतीति स योग आस्रवः ।

यथार्द्रं वस्त्रं समन्ताद्वातानीतं रेणुजातमुपादत्ते, तथा कषायजलार्द्र आत्मा योगानीतं कर्म सर्वप्रदेशैर्गृह्णाति । यथा वा निष्टप्तायःपिण्डो जले क्षिप्तोऽम्भः समन्ताद् गृह्णाति, तथा कषायोष्णो जीवो योगानीत कर्म समन्तादादत्ते । कषति=हिनस्ति आत्मानं कुगतिप्रापणादिति कषायः, क्रोधो मानो माया लोभश्च ।

स द्विविधः शुभाशुभभेदात् । अत्राहिंसादिः शुभः काययोगः । सत्यमितहित-भाषणादिः शुभो वाग्योगः । अर्हत्सिद्धाचार्योपाध्यायसाधुनामधेयपञ्चपरमेष्ठिभक्तित-पोरुचिश्रुतविनयादिः शुभो मनोयोगः । एतद्विपरीतस्त्वशुभः त्रिविधो योगः ।

Others reckon the *tattvas* as seven, as has been said—

"The *tattvas* are *jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā*, and *moksha*," *Jiva* and *ajiva* have been already described. *Āsrava* is described as the movement of the soul called *yoga.*[35] through its participation in the movement of its various bodies, *audārika*, etc. As a door opening into the water is called *āsrava*, because it causes the stream to descend through it,[36] so this *yoga* is called *āsrava*, because by it as by a pipe actions and their cousequences flow in upon the soul. Or, as a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind so the soul wet with previous sins, collects by its manifold points of contact with the body, the actions which are brought to it by *yoga*. Or as, when water is thrown on a heated, lump of iron, the iron absorbs the water alītogether, so the *jīva*, heated by previous sins, receives from every side the actions which are brought by *yoga*. *Kashāya* ("sin," "pefilement" is so called because it "hurts" (*kasa*) the soul by leading it into evil states; it comprises anger, pride, delusion, and lust. *Āsrava* is twofold, as good or evil. Thus abstaining from doing injury is a good *yoga* of the body; speaking what is true, measured, and profitable is a good *yoga* of the speech.

तदेतदास्रवभेदप्रभेदजातं, 'कायवाङ्मनःकर्मयोगः । स आस्रवः । शुभः पुण्यस्य । अशुभः पापस्य' (त० सू० ६।१-४) इत्यादिना सूत्रसंदर्भेण ससंरम्भम-भाणि ।

अपरे त्वेवं मेनिरे—आस्रवयति पुरुषं विषयेष्विन्द्रियप्रवृत्तिरास्रवः इन्द्रियद्वारा हि पौरुषं ज्योतिः विषयान्स्पृशद् रूपादिज्ञानरूपेण परिणमत इति ।

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषायवशाद्योगवशाच्चात्मा सूक्ष्मैकक्षेत्रावगाहिनामनन्तप्रदेशानां पुद्गलानां कर्मबन्धयोग्यानामादानमुपश्लेषणं यत्करोति, स बन्धः । तदुक्तं—सकषायत्वाज्जीवः कर्मभावयोग्यान्पुद्गलानादत्ते स बन्धः (त० सू० ८।२) इति ।

तत्र कषायग्रहणं सर्वबन्धहेतूपलक्षणार्थम् । बन्धहेतून्पपाठ वाचकाचार्यः मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगा बन्धहेतवः (त० सू० ८।१) इति ।

These various subdivisions of *āsrava* have been described at length in several *Sūtras*. "*Āsrava* is the impulse to action with body, speech, or mind, and it is good or evil as it produces merit or demarit," etc. Others, however, explain it thus—"*Āsrava* is the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects; the light of the soul, coming in contact with external objects by means of the senses, becomes developed as the knowledge of form etc."[37]

*Bandha*, "bondage," is when the soul, by the influence of "false intuition," "non-indifference, carelessness, and "sin" (*kaṣāya*), and also by the force of *yoga*, assumes various bodies occupying many parts of space, which enter into its own subtile body, and which are suited too the bond of its previous actions. As has been said—

"Through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes bodies suitable to its past actions, this is, 'bondage.'

In this quotation the word "sin" (*kaṣāya*) is used to include the other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed. Vācakācārya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage: "The causes of bondage are false intuition, non-indifference, carelessness, and sin."

मिथ्यादर्शनं द्विविधम्— मिथ्याकर्मोदयात्परोपदेशानपेक्षं तत्त्वाश्रद्धानं नैसर्गिकमेकम् । अपरं परोपदेशजम् । पृथिव्यादिषट्कोपादानं षडिन्द्रियासंयमनं चाविरतिः । पञ्चसमितित्रिगुप्तिष्वनुत्साहः प्रमादः । कषायः क्रोधादिः । तत्र कषायान्ताः स्थित्यनुभवबन्धहेतवः प्रकृतिप्रदेशबन्धहेतुर्योग इति विभागः ।

(*a*) "False intuition" is twofold,—either innate from one's natural character, as when one disbelieves Jaina doctrines from the influence of former evil actions, irresepectively of another's teaching,

—or derived, when learned by another's teaching.

(*b*) "Non-indifference is the non-restraint of the five senses, and the internal organ from the set of six, earth, etc.

(*c*) "Garelessness" (*pramāda*) is a want of effort to practise the five kinds of *samiti*, *gupti*, etc.

(*d*) "Sin" consists of anger, etc. Here we must make the distinction that the four things, false intuition, etc., cause those kinds of bondage called *sthiti* and *anubhāva yoga* (or *āsrava*) causes those kinds called *prakṛti* and *pradeśa*.

बन्धश्चतुर्विध इत्युक्तं, प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभवप्रदेशास्तद्विधय: (त० मू० ८।३) इति । यथा निम्बगुडादेस्तिक्तत्वमधुरत्वादिस्वभाव एवमावरणीयस्य ज्ञानदर्शनावरणत्वम् आदित्यप्रभाच्छादकाम्भोधरवत्प्रदीपप्रभातिरोधायककुम्भवच्च । मदमद्वदनीयस्य सुखदु:खोत्पादकत्वमसिधारामधुलेहनवत् ।

दर्शने मोहनीयस्य तत्त्वार्थाश्रद्धानकारित्वं दुर्जनसङ्गवत् । चारित्रे मोहनीयस्यामंयमहेतुत्वं मद्यमदवत् । आयुपो देहवन्धनकर्त्तृकं जलवत् । नाम्नो विचित्रनामकारित्वं चित्रिकवत् । गोत्रस्योच्चनीचकारित्वं कुम्भकारवत् दानादीनां विघ्ननिदानत्वमन्तरायस्य स्वभाव: कोशाध्यक्षवत् ।

"Bondage" is fourfold, as has been said : "*Prakṛiti*, *sthiti*, *anubhāva*, and *pradeśa* are its four kind."

1. Prakṛti means "the natural qualities." as bitterness or sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses. This may be subdivided into eight *mūla-prakṛties*.[38]

Thus obstructions (*āvaraṇa*)[39] cloud the knowledge and intuition, as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp. This is (*a*) *jñānāvaraṇa* or (*b*) *darśanāvaraṇa*, (*c*) An object recognised as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain, as licking honey from a sword's edge,—this is *vedaniya*. (*d*) A delusion (*mohanīya*) in intuition produces want of faith in the Jaina categories, like association with the wicked; delusion in conduct produces want of self-restraint, like intoxication. (*e*) *Ayus* produces the bond of body, like a snare.[40] (*f*) *Nāman*, or "the name" produces, various individual appellations, as a painter paints his different pictures. (*g*) *Gotra* produces the idea of noble and ignoble, as the potter fashions his pots. (*h*) *Antarāya* produces obstacles to liberality, etc., as the treasurer hindes the king by considerations of economy.

सोऽयं प्रकृतिबन्धोऽष्टविधो द्रव्यकर्मावान्तरभेदमूलप्रकृतिवेदनीयः । तथा वोचदुमास्वातिवाचकाचार्यः—आद्यो ज्ञानदर्शनावरणवेदनीयमोहनीयायुर्नामगोत्रान्तरायाः (त० सू० ८।४) इति ।

तद्भेदं च समगृह्णात्पञ्च-नव-द्वयष्टाविंशति-चतुर्द्विचत्वारिंशद्-द्वि-पञ्चभेदा यथाक्रमम् (त० सू० ८।५) इति । एतच्च सर्वं विद्यानन्दादिभिर्विवृतमिति विस्तरभयान्न प्रस्तूयते ।

Thus is the *prakṛti-bandha* eightfold, being denominated as the eight *mūla prakṛtis,* with sub-divisions according to the different actions of the various subject-matter.

And thus has Umāsvāti-vācakācārya[41] declared : "The first kind of *bandha* consists of obstruction of the knowledge and the intuition, *vedanīya, mohanīya, āyus, nāman, gotra,* and *antarāya,*" and he has also reckoned up the respective subdivision of each as five, nine, twenty-eight, four, two, forty, two, and fifteen. All this has been explained at full length in the *Vidyānanda* and other works, and here is omitted through fear of prolixity.

यथाजागोमहिष्यादिक्षीराणामेतावन्तमनेहसं माधुर्यस्वभावादप्रच्युतिस्तथा ज्ञानावरणादीनां मूलप्रकृतीनामादितस्तिसृणामन्तरायस्य च त्रिंशत्सागरोपमकोटिकोटयः परा स्थितिः (त० सू० ८।१४) इत्याद्युक्तकाला दुर्दान्तिवत्स्वीयस्वभावादप्रच्युतिः स्थितिः ।

यथाजागोमहिष्यादिक्षीराणां तीव्रमन्दादिभावेन स्वकार्यकरणे सामर्थ्यविशेषोऽनुभावः तथा कर्मपुद्गलानां स्वकार्यकरणे सामर्थ्यविशेषोऽनुभावः । कर्मभावपरिणतपुद्गलस्कन्धानामनन्तानन्तप्रदेशानामात्मप्रदेशानुप्रवेशः प्रदेशबन्धः ।

2. *Sthiti.* As the milk of the goat, cow, buffalo, etc., have continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period, so the first three *mūla-prakṛtis, jñānāvaraṇa,* etc., and the last, *antarāya,* have not swerved from their respective natures even through the period described in the words, "*sthiti* lasts beyonds crores of crores of periods of time measured by thirty *sāgaropamas.*"[42] This continuance is *sthiti.*

3. *Anubhāva.* As in the milk of goats, cows, buffaloes, etc., there exists, by its rich or poor nature, a special capacity for producing[43] its several effects, so in the different material bodies produced by our actions there exists a special capacity (*anubhāva*) for producing their respective effects,

4. *Pradeśa.* The *bandha* called *pradeśa* is the entrance into the different parts of the soul by the masses, made up of an endless number of parts, of the various bodies which are developed by the consequences of actions.

आस्रवनिरोधः संवरः । येनात्मनि प्रविशत्कर्म प्रतिषिध्यते स गुप्तिसमित्यादिः संवरः । संचारकारणयोगादात्मनो गोपनं गुप्तिः सा त्रिविधा—कायवाङ्मनोनिग्रह-भेदात् । प्राणिपीडापरिहारेण सम्यगयनं समितिः । सेर्याभाषादिभिः पञ्चधा । प्रपञ्चितं च हेमचन्द्राचार्यैः—

लोकातिवाहिते मार्गे चुम्बिते भास्वदंशुभिः ।
जन्तुरक्षार्थमालोक्य गतिरीर्या मता सताम् ॥
अनवद्यमृतं सर्वजनीनं मितभाषणम् ।
प्रिया वाचंयमानां सा भाषासमितिरुच्यते ॥
द्विचत्वारिंशता भिक्षादोषैर्नित्यमदूषितम् ।
मुनिर्यदन्नमादत्ते सैषणासमितिर्मता ॥
आसनादीनि संवीक्ष्य प्रतिलङ्घ्य च यत्नतः ।
गृह्णीयान्निक्षिपेद्ध्यायेत्सादानसमितिः स्मृता ॥
कफमूत्रमलप्रायैर्निर्जन्तुजगतीतले ।
यत्नाद्यदुत्सृजेत्साधुः सोत्सर्गसमितिर्भवेत् ॥

अत एव—

आस्रवः स्रोतसो द्वारं संवृणोतीति संवरः ।

इति निराहुः । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः—

आस्रवो भवहेतुः स्यात्संवरो मोक्षकारणम् ।
इतीयमार्हती सृष्टिरन्यदस्याः प्रपञ्चनम् ॥

*Samvara* is the stopping of *āsrava*—that by which the influence of past actions (*karman*) is stopped from entering into the soul. It is divided into *gupti*, *samiti*, tec., *Gupti* is the withdrawal of the soul from that "impulse" (*yoga*) which causes mundane existence,—it is threefold, as relating to body, speech, or mind. *Samiti* is the acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings. This is divided into five kinds, as *īrya*,[44] *bhāṣā*, etc., as has been explained by Hemacandra.

1. "In a public highway, kissed by the sun's rays, to walk circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings, this the good call *īryā*.

2. "Let him practise[45] a measured utterance in his intercourse with all people; this is called *bhāṣā-samiti*, dear to the restrainers of speech.

3. "The food which the sage takes, ever free from the forty-two faults which may accrue to alms, is called the *eṣaṇā-samiti*.[46]

4. "Carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it, let him take a seat, etc., set it down, and meditate,- this is called the *ādāna-samiti*.

5. "That the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures,[47] this is the *utsarga-samiti*[48] Hence *saṃvara* has been etymologically analysed as that which closes (*sam...vṛṇoti* the door of the stream of *āsrava*,[49] as has been said by the learned, "*Āsrava* is the cause of mundane existence *saṃvara* is the cause of liberation;[50] this is the Ārhat doctrine in a handful; all else is only the amplification of this.

अर्जितस्य कर्मणस्तपः प्रभृतिभिर्निर्जरणं निर्जराख्यं तत्त्वम् । चिरकाल-प्रवृत्तकषायकलापं पुण्यं सुखदुःखे च देहेन जरयति नाशयति । केशोल्लुञ्चनादिकं तप उच्यते । सा निर्जरा द्विविधा यथाकालौपक्रमिकभेदात् । तत्र प्रथमा यस्मिन्काले यत्कर्मफलप्रदत्वेनाभिमतं तस्मिन्नेव काले फलदानाद् भवन्ती निर्जरा कामादिपाकजेति च जेगीयते । यत्कर्म तपोबलात्स्वकामनयोदयावलिं प्रवेश्य प्रपद्यते सौपक्रमिकनिर्जरा । यदाह—

संसारबीजभूतानां कर्मणां जरणादिह ।
निर्जरा संमता द्वेधा सकामाकामनिर्जरा ॥
स्मृता सकामा यमिनामकामा त्वन्यदेहिनाम् ॥ इति ।

*Nirjarā* is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by self-mortification, etc. ; it destroys by the body the merit and demerit of all the previously performed actions, and the resulting happiness and misery; "self-mortification means the plucking out of the hair, etc. This *nirjarā* is twofold[51] "temporary" (*yathākāla*) and ancillary (*aupakramaṇika*). It is "temporary" as when a desire is dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit, and at that particular time, from this completion of the object aimed at *nirjarā* arises, being caused by the consumption of

the desire etc. But when, by the force of asceticism, the sage turns all actions into means for attaining his end (liberation), this is the *nirjarā* of actions. Thus it has been said : "From the decaying of the actions which are the seeds of mundane existence, *nirjarā* arises, which is twofold, *sakāma* and *akāma*. That called *sakāma* belong to ascetics, the *akāma* to other embodied spirts."[52]

मिथ्यादर्शनादीनां बन्धहेतूनां निरोधेऽभिनवकर्माभावान्निर्जराहेतुसंन्निधानेनार्जितस्य कर्मणो निरसनादात्यन्तिककर्ममोक्षणं मोक्षः। तदाह—बन्धहेत्वभावनिर्जराभ्यां कृत्स्नकर्मविप्रमोक्षणं मोक्षः (त० सू० १०।२) इति।

तदनन्तरमूर्ध्वं गच्छत्यालोकान्तात् (त० सू० १०।५)। यथा हस्तदण्डादिभ्रमिप्रेरितं कुलालचक्रमुपरतेऽपि तस्मिस्तद्बलादेवासंस्कारक्षये भ्रमति, तथा भवस्थेनात्मनापवर्गप्राप्तये बहुशो यत्कृतं प्रणिधानं मुक्तस्य तदभावेऽपि पूर्वसंस्कारादालोकान्तं गमनमुपपद्यते। यथा वा मृत्तिकालेपकृतगौरवमलाबुद्रव्यं जलेऽधः पतति, पुनरपेतमृत्तिकाबन्धमूर्ध्वं गच्छति, तथा कर्मरहित आत्मा असङ्गत्वादूर्ध्वं गच्छति। बन्धच्छेदादेरण्डबीजवच्चोर्ध्वं गतिस्वभावाच्चाग्निशिखावत्।

*Mokṣa*. Since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire absence of all future actions, as all the cause of bondage (false perception, etc.) are stopped,[53] and since all past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes of *nirjarā*, there arises the absolute release from all actions,—this is *mokṣa;* as it has been said : "*Mokṣa* is the absolute release from all actions by the decay (*nirjarā*) of the causes of bondage and of existence."

Then the soul rises upward to the end of the world. As a potter's wheel, whirled by the stick and hands, moves on even after these have stopped, until the impulse is exhausted, so the previous repeated contemplations of the embodied souls for the attainment of *mokṣa* exert their influence even after they have ceased, and bear the soul onward to the end of the world; or, as the gourd, encased with clay, sinks in the water, but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrance, so the soul, delivered from works, rises upward by its isolation,[54] from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant, or by its own native tendency like the flame.

अन्योन्यं प्रदेशानुप्रवेशे सत्यविभागेनावस्थानं बन्धः। परस्परप्राप्तिमात्रं सङ्गः। तदुक्तं, पूर्वप्रयोगादसङ्गत्वाद्बन्धच्छेदात्तथा गतिपरिणामाच्च (त० सू०

१०।६ ) । आविद्धकुलालचक्रवद्व्यपगतलेपालाबुवदेरण्डबीजवदग्निशिखावच्च (त० सू० १०।७) इति । अतएव पठन्ति—

गत्वा गत्वा निवर्तन्ते चन्द्रसूर्यादयो ग्रहाः ।
अद्यापि न निवर्तन्ते त्वालोकाकाशमागताः ।। (प० न०) इति ।

"Bondage" is the condition of being unseparated, with a mutual interpenetration of parts [between the soul and the body]; *saṅga* is merely mutual contact. This has been declared as follows—

"[Liberation] is unhindered, from the continuance of former impulses, from the absence of *saṅga*, from the cutting of all bonds and from the nature development of the soul's own powers of motion, like the potter's wheel, the gourd with its clay removed, the seed of the castor-oil plant, or the flame of fire."—

Hence they recite a śloka—

"However often they go away, the plants return, the sun,
moon, and the rest;
"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to
Ālokākāśa."

अन्ये तु गतसमस्तक्लेशतद्वासनस्यानावरणज्ञानस्य सुखैकतानस्यात्मनः उपरिदेशावस्थानं मुक्तिरित्यास्थिषत । एवमुक्तानि सुखदुःखसाधनाभ्यां सहितानि नव पदार्थान्केचनाङ्गीचक्रुः । तदुक्तं सिद्धान्ते जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापयुतावास्रवः संवरो निर्जरणं बन्धो मोक्षश्च नव तत्त्वानीति । संग्रहे प्रवृत्ता वयमुपरताः स्मः ।

Others hold *mokṣa* to be the abiding in the highest regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof.

Others hold nine *tattvas*, adding "merit," and "demerit" to the foregoing seven,—these two being the cause of pleasure and pain. This has been declared in the *Siddhānta*, "*Jīva, ajīva, puṇya, pāpa, āsrava, saṁvara, nirjaraṇa, bandha,* and *mokṣa* are the nine *tattvas*." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.

अत्र सर्वत्र सप्तभङ्गिनयाख्यं न्यायमवतारयन्ति जैनाः स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति स्यादस्ति च नास्ति च, स्यादवक्तव्यः स्यादस्ति चावक्तव्यः, स्यादस्ति, स्यान्नास्ति चावक्तव्यः इति । तत्सर्वमनन्तवीर्यः प्रत्यपीपदत्—

तद्विधानविवक्षायां स्यादस्तीति गतिर्भवेत् ।
स्यान्नास्तीति प्रयोगः स्यात्तन्निषेधे विवक्षिते ।।

क्रमेणोभयवाञ्छायां प्रयोग: समुदायभाक् ।
युगपत्तद्विवक्षायां स्यादवाच्यमशक्तित: ।।
आद्यावाच्यविवक्षायां पञ्चमो भङ्ग इष्यते ।
अन्त्यावाच्यविवक्षायां षष्टभङ्गसमुद्भव: ।।
समुच्चयेन युक्तश्च सप्तमो भङ्ग उच्यते । इति ।

Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the *sapta-bhaṅgi-naya*,[55] or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable, "may be, it is not, and not predicable, "may be, it is and it is not, and not predicable." All this Anantavīrya has thus laid down—

1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say 'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, may be, it is not."

2. When you desire to establish each in turn, let your procedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared "indescribable" from the impossibility to describe it.

3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises."

4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously."

स्याच्छन्द: खल्वयं निपातस्तिङन्तप्रतिरूपकोऽनेकान्तद्योतक: । यथोक्तम्—

वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति विशेषणम् ।
स्यान्निपातोऽर्थयोगित्वात्तिङन्तप्रतिरूपक: ।। इति ।

यदि पुनरेकान्तद्योतक: स्याच्छब्दोऽयं स्यात्तदा स्यादस्तीति वाक्ये स्यात्पदमनर्थकं स्यात् । अनेकान्तद्योतकत्वे तु स्यादस्ति कथंचिदस्तीति स्यात्पदात्कथंचिदित्ययमर्थो लभ्यत इति नानर्थक्यम् । तदाह—

स्याद्वाद: सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात्किंवृत्तचिद्विधे: ।
सप्तभङ्गिनयापेक्षो हेयादेयविशेषकृत् ।। इति ।

*Syāt*, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said—

"This particle *syāt* is in the form of a verb, but, from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning.

If, again, the word *syāt* denoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;' *syāt*, "may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow," *kathamchit*; and so it is not really useless. As one has said—

"The doctrine of the *syād-vāda* arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute;[56] it depends on the *sapta-bhaṅgi-naya*, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted."

यदि वस्त्वस्त्येकान्ततः सर्वथा सर्वदा सर्वत्र सर्वात्मनाऽस्तीति नोपादित्साजिहासाभ्यां क्वचित्कदाचित्केनचित्प्रवर्तेत निवर्तेत वा । प्राप्ताप्रापणीयत्वाद्धेयहानानुपपत्तेश्च । अनेकान्तपक्षे तु कथंचित्केनचित्सत्वेन हानोपादाने प्रेक्षावतामुपपद्येते ।

किं च वस्तुनः सत्त्वं स्वभावः, असत्त्वं वा इत्यादि प्रष्टव्यम् । न तावदस्तित्वं वस्तुनः स्वभाव इति समस्ति । घटोऽस्तीत्यनयोः पर्यायतया युगपत्प्रयोगायोगात् । नास्तीति प्रयोगविरोधाच्च । एवमन्यत्रापि योज्यम् । यथोक्तम्—

घटोऽस्तीति न वक्तव्यं सन्नेव हि यतो घट ।
नास्तीत्यपि न वक्तव्यं विरोधात्सदसत्त्वयोः ।। इत्यादि ।

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this "Is *being* or *non-being* the real nature of the thing ?" The real nature of the thing cannot be *being*, for then you could not properly use the phrase, "It is a pot" (*ghaṭo'sti*), as the two words "is" and "pot" would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot, as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions.[57] As it has been declared—

"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is ;'

"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," etc.

तस्मादित्थं वक्तव्यम्—सदसत्सदसदनिर्वंचनीयवादभेदेन प्रतिवादिनश्चतुर्विधाः । पुनरप्यनिर्वंचनीयमतेन मिश्रितानि सदसदादिमतानीति त्रिविधाः । तान्प्रति किं वस्त्वस्तीत्यादि पर्यनुयोगे 'कथंचित्तदस्ति ' इत्यादि प्रतिवचनसंभवेन ते वादिनः सर्वे निर्विष्णाः सन्तस्तूष्णीमासत इति सम्पूर्णार्थविनिश्चायिनः स्याद्वादमङ्गीकुर्वतस्तत्र तत्र विजय इति सर्वमुपपन्नम् । यदवोचदाचार्यः स्याद्वादमञ्ज्रर्याम्—

अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।<br>
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥<br>
न्यायानामेकनिष्ठानां प्रवृत्तौ श्रुतवर्त्मनि ।<br>
संपूर्णार्थविनिश्चायि स्याद्वस्त श्रुतमुच्यते ॥ इति ।<br>
अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाद् यथा परे मत्सरिणः प्रवादाः ।<br>
नयानशेषानविशेषमिच्छन् न पक्षपाती समयस्तथार्हतः ॥<br>
(हेमचन्द्रकृत द्वितीयद्वात्रिंशिका वी० स्तु श्लो० ३०)

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (*anirvacanīyatā*);[58] three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[59] Now, when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist ?" etc., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way," etc., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of the *Syādvāda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said the teacher in the *Syādvāda-mañjarī*—

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation.[60] What our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealed *Syād-vāda*, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects."

जिनदत्तसूरिणा जैनं मतमित्थमुक्तम्—

बलभोगोपभोगानामुभयोर्दानलाभयोः ।
अन्तरायस्तथा निद्रा भीरज्ञानं जुगुप्सितम् ॥
हिंसा रत्यरती रागद्वेषावविरतिः स्मरः ।
शोको मिथ्यात्वमेतेऽष्टादश दोषा न यस्य सः ॥
जिनो दवो गुरुः सम्यक्तत्त्वज्ञानोपदेशकः ।
ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्राण्यपवर्गस्य वर्तनी ॥
स्याद्वादस्य प्रमाणे द्वे प्रत्यक्षमनुमापि च ।
नित्यानित्यात्मकं सर्वं नव तत्त्वानि सप्त वा ॥
जीवाजीवौ पुण्यपापे चास्रवः संवरोऽपि च ।
बन्धो निर्जरणं मुक्तिरेषां व्याख्याधुनोच्यते ॥
चेतनालक्षणो जीवः स्यादजीवस्तदन्यकः ।
सत्कर्मपुद्गलाः पुण्यं पापं तस्य विपर्ययः ॥
आस्रवः स्रोतसो द्वारं संवृणोतीति संवरः ।
प्रवेशः कर्मणां बन्धो निर्जरस्तद्वियोजनम् ॥
अष्टकर्मक्षयान्मोक्षोऽथान्तर्भावश्च कैश्चन ।
पुण्यस्य संवरे पापस्यास्रवे क्रियते पुनः ॥
लब्धानन्तचतुष्कस्य लोकागूढस्य चात्मनः ।
क्षीणाष्टकर्मणो मुक्तिर्निर्व्यावृत्तिर्जिनोदिता ॥
सरोजहरणा भैक्षभुजो लुञ्चितमूर्धजाः ।
श्वेताम्बराः क्षमशीला निःसङ्गा जैनसाधवः ॥
लुञ्चिताः पिच्छिकाहस्ताः पाणिपात्रा दिगम्बराः ।
ऊर्ध्वाशिनो गृहे दातुर्द्वितीयाः स्युर्जिनर्षयः ॥
भुङ्क्ते न केवली न स्त्री मोक्षमेति दिगम्बरः ।
प्राहुरेषामयं भेदो महान्श्वेताम्बरैः सह ॥ इति ।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे आर्हतदर्शनम् ॥

The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-sūri—

"The hindrances belong to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (*doṣa*) according to our system.[61] The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true

knowledge of the *tattvas*. The path[62] of emancipation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof (*pramāṇa*) in the *Syād-vāda* doctrine,—sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seven *tattvas*. The *jīva*, the *ajīva*, merit and demerit, *āsrava*. *samvara, bandha, nirjarā, mukti,*—we will now explain each. *Jīva* is defined as intelligence; *ajīva* is all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite; *āsrava* is the bondage of actions,[63] *nirjarā* is the unloosing thereof; *mokṣa* arises from the destruction of the eight forms of *karman* or "action". But by some teachers "merit" is included in *samvara*,[64] and "demerit" in *āsrava*.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[65] and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetāmbaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they live by alms,[66] they pluck out their hair, they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the Jaina *Sādhus*. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, they carry peacock's tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver's house,—these are the second class of the Jaina Ṛṣis.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Śvetāmbaras.[67] E.B.C.

*NOTES*

1. *Vivasanas* "without garments".
2. "The Buddhists are also called *Muktakacchas*, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked"—*Colebrooke.*
3. Read *Syād-vādinām.*
4. I propose to read *infra grāhyasya* for agrāhyasya.
5. As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.
6. I correct the reading *tasyāgrahaṇam* to *tāsya grahaṇam* (*tasyā* being *jaḍatāyāḥ*).
7. i.e., if you say that the *avayava* may be not seen though the *avayavin* is seen, then I may say that the post is the *avayavin*, and the unperceived three worlds its *avayava*,

8. I read *arhatsvarūpam arhachchandra* in *infra.*
9. The following passage occurs in some part of Kumārila's writing in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the Sāṅkara-digvijaya, chap. iv., it is mentioned that Kumārila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching. *Jainagurumukhāt kaścid vidyāleśo jātaḥ.*
10. Kumārila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs,—the sixth, *abhāva,* being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" or *arthāpatti.* A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient". He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.
11. Read *tatsadbhāvā-vedakasya* for *tatsadbhāvādekasya.*
12. For *nikhilārthajñānā notpatty,* I propose to read *nikhilārthajñā-notpatty.*
13. *Janya* is included in *Kārya* and equally disputed.
14. Thus "I am possessed of a body (*aham Śarīrī*), "my hand," etc., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I".
15. Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the etc., includes the *Anavasthādoṣa* or reasoning *ad infinitum.* He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.
16. *Infra,* read *tattvārthe* for *tattvārtham.*
17. I read *Samyagdarśanādi* for *asamyagdarśanādi*; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition" etc.
18. Cf. the five *yamas* in the *Yogasūtras,* 30. ii. Hemachandra (*Abhidh* 81) calls them *yamas.*
19. I read *kāmānām* for *kāmāṇām.*

20. For *abhāṣaṇa*, see Hemach. 16.
21. I propose *raśāyanajñānaśraddhā acāraṇāni* for *rasāyaṇajñānam śraddhānāvarṇam*. For *avacāraṇa*, see *Suśruta*, vol. ii. p. 157, &c. If *anāvaraṇa* be the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the absence of obstructions."
22. This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra *Abhibh*. 79.
23. Or this may mean "by the influence of *upaśama-kṣaya* or *kṣayopaśama*, it appears charact erised by one or the other."
24. I read *kalushā-dyākāreṇa* for *kaluṣānyākareṇa*. The *upaśama-kṣaya* and *ksĥayopaśama* seem to correspond to the *upaśamika* and *kshāyika* states about to be described.
25. *Strychnos potatorum*.
26. Just as in the Sānkhya philosophy the soul is not really bound though it seems to it self to be so.
27. A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, etc.
28. I read '*stiti*' for *sthiti*.
29. Hence the term here used for "category"—*astikāya*.
30. These (by Hemach. *Abhidh*. 21), possess only one sense—touch. I read *śaṅkhagaṇḍatakaprabhṛitayas trasāś caturvidhāḥ pṛithivyaptejo*.
31. I read *teṣām ajivatvāt* for *teshām jīvatvāt*. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because the former only are animate."
32. I read *sarvatrāvasthite* for *sarvatrāvasthiti*. In the preceding line I read *alokenāvachchinne* for *ālokenāvicchinne*.
33. Cf. Siddhānta-muktāvali, p. 27. The *viṣaya* is *upabhoga-sādhanam*, but it begins with the *dvyaṇuka*. This category takes up the forms of *sthāvara* which were excluded from *jīvā*.
34. I is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mādhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition of *dravya*,—cf. *Vaiśeṣ. Sūtra*, i. 1, 15. *Paryāya* is explained as *karman* in Hemach. *Anek* seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach. *Abhidh*. 1503, *paryāyo 'nụkramaḥ kramaḥ*.

35. *Yoga* seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.
36. Read *āsravaṇakāraṇatvād.*
37. The *jñāna* is one but it becomes apparently manifold by its connection with the senses and external objects.
38. These are also called the eight *karmans* in Govindānanda's gloss, *Ved. Sūt.*, 2, 33.
39. The Calcutta MS. reads *ādaraṇīyasya* for *āvaraṇīyasya.* But *dvaraṇīya* may be used for *āvaraṇa* (*Pāṇ.* iii. 4.68). Cf. *Yoga Sūt.*, ii. 52, whererver Vyāsa s Comm. has *āvaraṇīya.*
40. *Jālavat* ? The printed text has *jalavat.*
41. Umāsvāmi ?
42. For the *sāgaropama*, see Wilson's *Essays*, vol. i. p. 309. I read *ityādyuktakālād ūrdhvam api* for the obscure *ityādyuktam kāladuraddhānavat.* I also read at the end of the line *pracyutiḥ sthitiḥ* for *pracyutisthitiḥ.*
43. Read *svakāryakaraṇe.*
44. For *īrṣyā* read *īryā*, –a bad misreading.
45. I read *āpadyetā* for *āpadyatā.*
46. For *seṣaṇā* read *saiṣaṇā.*
47. Join *nirjantu* and *jagatitale.*
48. Mādava omits the remaining divisions of *samvara.* Wilson, *Essays*, vow. i. p. 311 gives them as *parishahā*, "endurance", as of a vol; *yatidharma*, "the ten duties of an ascetic, patience gentleness", etc. ; *bhāvanā*, "conviction, such as that worldly existences are not eternal, etc.; *cāritra*, virtuous observance.
49. Read *āsravasrotaso.*
50. For *moha*, in line 16, read *moksha.*
51. I read *yathākāla* for *yathā kāla.*
52. This passage is very difficult and not improbably corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinary *nirjarā* is when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. That *nirjarā* is "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the attainment of the highest good. The former is *akāmā*, "desireless," because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the latter is *sakāmā*, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.

53. I read *nirodhe* for *nirodhah*. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed.
54. Literally "absence of *sanga*."
55. Read *saptabhaṅgīnayu*, see Ved. S. Gloss., ii. 2, 23.
56. I cannot understand the words at the end of the first line, *kim vṛitatadridhiḥ* and therefore leave them untranslated.
57. Thus Govindānanda applies it (*Ved Sūt*., ii. 2, 33) to "may be it is one," "may be it is many," etc.
58. This is Śriharṣa's tenet in the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*.
59. For *matenamiśritāni* read *matena miśritāni*.
60. For *na yasya* read *nayasya*.
61. This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is really identical mith that given in Hemachandra's *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*, 72, 73; but we must correct the reading to *antarāyās, rāgadveṣāv aviratiḥ smaraḥ*, and *hāso* for *himsā*. The order of the eighteen *doshas* in the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.
62. For *vartini* read *vartiniḥ*.
63. This seems corrupt,—a line is probably lost.
64. For *samsrave* read *samvare*.
65. Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, the liberated and liberation ? These are called *ananta*. See Weber's *Bhagavati*, pp. 250, 261-266.
66. *Sarajoharaṇāh* is explained by the *rajoharaṇadhārin* (=*vratin*) of Halāyudha, ii. 189.
67. Cf. Wilson, *Essays*, i. 340. For *strīm* read *stri*.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE RĀMĀNUJA SYSTEM

तदेतदार्हतमतं प्रामाणिकगर्हणमर्हति । न ह्येकस्मिन्वस्तुनि परमार्थे सति परमार्थसतां युगपत्सदसत्त्वादिधर्माणां समावेशः सम्भवति । न च सदसत्त्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोः समुच्छयासम्भवे विकल्पः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यम् । क्रिया हि विकल्प्यते न वस्त्विति न्यायात् ।

न च 'अनेकान्तं जगत्सर्वं हेरम्बनरसिंहवत्' इति दृष्टान्तावष्टम्भवशाद्देष्टव्यम् । एकस्मिन्देशे गजत्वं सिंहत्वं वाऽपरस्मिन्नरत्वमिति देशभेदेन विरोधाभावेन तस्यैकस्मिन्देश एव सत्त्वासत्त्वादिनाऽनेकान्तत्वाभिधाने दृष्टान्तानुपपत्तेः । ननु द्रव्यात्मनासत्त्वं पर्यायात्मना तदभाव इत्युभयमप्युपपन्नमिति चेत्, मैवम् - कालभेदेन हि कस्यचित्सत्त्वमसत्त्वं च स्वभाव इति न कश्चिद्दोषः ।

न चैकस्य ह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्ववदनेकान्तत्वं जगतः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । प्रतियोगिभेदेन विरोधाभावात् । तस्मात्प्रमाणाभावाद्युगपत्सत्त्वासत्त्वे परस्परविरुद्धे नैकस्मिन्वस्तुनि वक्तुं युक्ते । एवमन्यासामपि भङ्गीनां भङ्गोऽवगन्तव्यः ?

Thus doctrine of the Ārhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should any one say : Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence, and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence ? there being the rule that it is action, not *Ens*, that alternates.

Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa and of the incarnation of Vishṇu as half man, half lion; for the elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts being different, these examples are inapplicable to the

maintenance of a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the same part (or place). Again, if any one urge : Let there be existence in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be compatible; we rejoin : Not so, for if you had said that at different times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure.

Nor is it to be contended : Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length and shortness which pertain to the same thing (in different relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects. Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other *bhaṅgas* Ārhata tenets).

किं च, सर्वस्यास्य मूलभूतः सप्तभङ्गिनयः स्वयमेकान्तोऽनेकान्तो वा । आद्ये सर्वमनेकान्तमिति प्रतिज्ञाव्याघातः । द्वितीये विवक्षितार्थासिद्धिः । अनेकान्तत्वेनासाधकत्वात् । तथा चेयमुभयतःपाशा रज्जुः स्याद्वादिनः स्यात् ।

अपि च, नवत्वसप्तत्वादिनिर्धारणस्य फलस्य तन्निर्धारयितुः प्रमातुश्च तत्करणस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रमेयस्य च नवत्वादेरनियमे साधु समर्थितमात्मनस्तीर्थकरत्वं देवानांप्रियेणार्हतमतप्रवर्तकेन ।

Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the seven *bhaṅgas*, which lies at the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory), or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent) proving nothing.[1] In either case, there is rope for a noose for the neck of the Syād-Vādin.

An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Ārhata system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be, when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, whether it be ninefold or not !

तथा जीवस्य देहानुरूपपरिमाणत्वाङ्गीकारे योगबलादनेकदेहपरिग्राहकयोगिशरीरेषु प्रतिशरीरं जीवविच्छेदः प्रसज्येत । मनुजशरीरपरिमाणो जीवो

मतङ्गजदेहं कृत्स्नं प्रवेष्टुं न प्रभवेत् । किं च गजादि शरीरं परित्यज्य पिपीलिकाशरीरं विशत: प्राचीनशरीरसन्निवेशविनाशोऽपि प्राप्नुयात् । न च यथा प्रदीपप्रभाविशेष: प्रपाप्रसादाद्युदरवर्तिसंकोचविकाशवांस्तथा जीवोऽपि मनुजमतङ्गजादिशरीरेषु स्यादित्येषितव्यम् । प्रदीपवदेव सविकारत्वेनानित्यत्वप्राप्तौ कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गात् ।

In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Ārhatas say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies, there is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not (in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion, according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the roadside in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition) that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good and evil unmerited.

एवं प्रधानमल्लनिबर्हणन्यायेन जीवपदार्थदूषणाभिधानदिशाऽन्यत्रापि दूषणमुत्प्रेक्षणीयम् । तस्मान्नित्यनिर्दोषश्रुतिविरुद्धत्वादिदमुपादेयं न भवति । तदुक्तं भगवता व्यासेन—नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात् । (ब्र० सू० २।२।३१) इति । रामानुजेन च जैनमतनिराकरणपरत्वेन तदिदं सूत्रं व्याकारि । एष हि तस्य सिद्धान्त: —चिदचिदीश्वरभेदेन भोक्तृ-भोग्यनियामकभेदेन च व्यवस्थितास्त्रय: पदार्था इति । तदुक्तम्—

ईश्वरश्चिदचिच्चेति पदार्थत्रितयं हरि: ।
ईश्वरश्चिदिति प्रोक्तो जीवो दृश्यमचित्पुन: ।। इति ।

As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated,

Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the enternal, infallible revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyāsa accordingly propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rāmānuja with the express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets of Rāmānuja are as follows—Three categories are established, as soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer. Thus it has been said—

> "Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles : Hari (Vishṇu)
> "Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible world is not-soul."

अपरे पुनरशेषविशेप्रत्यनीकं चिन्मात्रं ब्रह्मैव परमार्थः। तच्च नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावमपि 'तत्त्वमसि' (छा० उ० ६।८।७) इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्याधिगतजीवैक्यं बध्यते मुच्यते च।

तदतिरिक्तनानाविधभोक्तृभोक्तव्यादिभेदप्रपञ्चः सर्वोऽपि तस्मिन्नविद्यया परिकल्पितः, 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' (छा० उ० ६।२।१) इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यात्—इति ब्रुवाणाः, 'तरति शोकमात्यवित्' (छा० उ० ७।१।३) इत्यादिश्रुतिशिरःशतवशेन निर्विशेषब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविद्ययाऽनाद्यविद्यानिवृत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणाः, 'मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति' (काठ० उ० २।१) इति भेदनिन्दाश्रवणेन पारमार्थिकं भेदं निराचक्षाणाः, विचक्षणम्मन्याः, तमिमं विभागं न सहन्ते।

तत्रायं समाधिरभिधीयते। भवेदेतेदेवं यद्यविद्यायां प्रमाणं विद्येत। नन्विदमनादि भावरूपं ज्ञाननिर्वर्त्यमज्ञानम् 'अहमज्ञो मामत्यं च न जानामि' इति प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणसिद्धम्। तदुक्तम्—

> अनादि भावरूपं यद्विज्ञानेन विलीयते।
> तदज्ञानमिति प्राज्ञा लक्षणं संप्रचक्षते॥ (चित्सुखी १।९) इति।

Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkarāchārya), maintain that pure intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is really existent: and that this absolute whose essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object" (predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation. The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject

and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one reality), as is attested by a number of texts : Existent only, fair sir, was this in the beginning. One only without a second, and so forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of individuated spirits and the undifferenced abosolute, in conformity with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz., death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and thinking themselves very wise, the Śāṅkaras will not tolerate this division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:— This might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But there is no such ignorance (or illusion) an unbeginning entity, suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said (to explain the views of the Śāṅkara)—

"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by knowledge."
"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."

न चैतज्ज्ञानाभावविषयमित्याशङ्कनीयम् । को ह्येवं ब्रूयात्प्रभाकरकरावलम्बी भट्टदत्तहस्तो वा ? नाद्यः—

स्वरूपपररूपाभ्यां नित्यं सदसदात्मके ।
वस्तुनि ज्ञायते किंचित्कैश्चिद्रूपं कदाचन ॥
भावान्तरमभावो हि कयाचित्तु व्यपेक्षया ।
भावान्तरादभावोऽन्यो न कश्चिदनिरूपणात् ॥

इति वदता भावव्यतिरिक्तस्याभावस्यानभ्युपगमात् ।

This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom ? One who leans on the arm of Prabhākara, or one to whom Kumārilabhaṭṭa gives his hand ? Not the former, for in the words—

"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the existent and non-existent,"
"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times,

"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught else is observed."

न द्वितीयः। अभावस्य षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरत्वेन ज्ञानस्य नित्यानुमेयत्वेन च तदभावस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः। यदि पुनः प्रत्यक्षाभाववादी कश्चिदेवमाचक्षीत, तं प्रत्याचक्षीत —अहमज्ञ इत्यस्मिन्ननुभवेऽहमित्यात्मनोऽभावधर्मितया ज्ञानस्य प्रतियोगितया चावगतिरस्ति न वा ? अस्ति चेत्, विरोधादेव न ज्ञानानुभवः। न चेत्, धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानसापेक्षो ज्ञानाभावानुभवः सुतरां न संभवति । तस्याज्ञानस्य भावरूपत्वे प्रागुक्तदूषणाभावात् अयमनुभवो भावरूपाज्ञानगोचर एवाभ्युपगन्तव्य इति।

They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (*anupalabdhi*), and knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and other things); it may be replied : "Is there, or is there not, in the consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised by an absence and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent ? If there is such apprehension consciousness of the absence of knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will not readily become possible. Inasmuch (the (Śāṅkaras continue) as the forgoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance or illusion) be entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myseelf, and other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative ignorance.

तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थायितम् । भावरूपस्याज्ञानस्य ज्ञानाभावेन समानयोगक्षेमत्वात् । तथाहि—विषयत्वेनाश्रयत्वेन चाज्ञानस्य व्यावर्तकतया प्रत्यगर्थः प्रतिपन्नो न वा ? प्रनिपन्नश्चेत्, स्वरूपज्ञाननिवर्त्यं तदज्ञानमिति तस्मिन्प्रतिपन्ने कथंकारमवतिष्ठते ? अप्रतिपन्नश्चेत्, व्यावर्तकाश्रयविषयशून्यमज्ञानं कथमनुभूयेत ?

अथ विशदः स्वरूपावभास एवाज्ञानबिरोधी, नात्रानेन सह भासत इत्याश्रयविषयज्ञाने सत्यपि नाज्ञानानुभवविरोध इति—हन्त, तर्हि ज्ञानाभावेऽपि समानमेतदन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् । तस्मादुभयाभ्युपगतज्ञानाभाव एव 'अहमज्ञो, मामन्यं च न जानामि' इत्यनुभवगोचर इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् ।

All this (the Rāmānuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a subject (or ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented, how can we conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no object? If you say : A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we rejoin—Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of cognition allowed by us both.

अस्तु तर्ह्यनुमानं मानं विवादास्पदं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्त-स्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यं-स्वदेशगत-वस्त्वन्तर-पूर्वकम् अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वादन्ध-कारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीपप्रभावत् इति ।

तदपि न क्षोदक्षमम् । अज्ञानेऽप्यनभिमताज्ञानान्तरसाधनेऽपसिद्धान्तापातात् । तदसाधनेऽनैकान्तिकत्वात् । दृष्टान्तस्य साधनविकलत्वाच्च । न हि प्रदीपप्रभाया अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वं संभवति । ज्ञानस्यैव प्रकाशकत्वात् । सत्यपि प्रदीपे ज्ञानेन विषयप्रकाशसंभवात् । प्रदीपप्रभायास्तु चक्षुरिन्द्रियस्य ज्ञानं समुत्पादयतो विरोधि-संतमसनिरसनद्वारेणोपकारकत्वमात्रमेवेत्यलमति विस्तरेण ।

Well, then (the Śāṅkaras may contend), let the form of cognition evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as follows—Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another entity (*sc.* illusion), an entity different from mere prior non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the darkness. The argument (we reply) will not stand

grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the antecedent) illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and moreover, the example is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that illumines the hitherto unillumained object, since it is knowledge only that illumines; and an illumination of object may be effected by knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition, ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness. We dismiss further prolixity.

प्रतियोगश्च विवादाध्यासितमज्ञानं न ज्ञानमात्रब्रह्माश्रितम्: अज्ञानत्वात्, शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानवदिति । ननु शुक्तिकाद्यज्ञानस्याश्रयस्य प्रत्यगर्थस्य ज्ञानमात्रस्वभावत्वमेव इति चेत्, मैवं शङ्किष्ठाः । अनुभूतिर्हि स्वसद्भावेनैव कस्यचिद्वस्तुनो व्यवहारानुगुणत्वापादनस्वभावो ज्ञानावगतिसंविदाद्यपरनामा सकर्मकोऽनुभवितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषः । अनुभवितुरात्मत्वमात्मवृत्तिगुणविशेषस्य ज्ञानत्वमित्याश्रयणात् ।

ननु ज्ञानरूपस्यात्मनः कथं ज्ञानगुणकत्वमिति चेत्, तदसारम् । यथा हि मणिद्युमणिप्रभृति तेजोद्रव्यं प्रभावद्रूपेणावतिष्ठमानं प्रभारूपगुणाश्रयः । स्वाश्रयादन्यत्रापि वर्तमानत्वेन रूपवत्त्वेन च प्रभा द्रव्यरूपापि तच्छेषत्वनिबन्धनगुणव्यवहारा । एवमयमात्मा स्वप्रकाशचिद्रूप एव चैतन्यगुणः ।

तथा च श्रुतिः—स यथा सैन्धवघनोऽनन्तरोऽब्राह्यः कृत्स्नो रसघन एवैवं वा अरेऽयमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव (बृ० उ० ४।५।१३) । अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति (बृ० उ० ४।३।९) । न विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते (बृ० उ० ४।३।३०) । योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः (बृ० उ० ४।३।७) । एष हि द्रष्टा स्प्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता रसयिता मन्ता बोद्धा कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुषः (प्रश्नो० ४।९) इत्यादिका ।

The counterposition (of the Rāmānujas) is as follows:—The illusion under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge, because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, etc. If any one ask : Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion about nacre, etc., knowledge only for its nature ? They reply : Do not start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about (i.e., the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness, also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehen-

sion, intelligence, etc., constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If any one ask : How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have cognition as a quality ? they reply : This question is futile; for as a gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of light, are substances in which light as a quality inhers—for light, as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a quality derived from determination by that substance,—so this soul, while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also inteligence as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts : A lump of salt is always within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the understander, the doer; the person is knowledge, and the like texts.

न च 'अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः' (छा० ८।३।२) इति श्रुतिरविद्यायां प्रमाणमित्याश्रयितुं शक्यम्। ऋतेतरविषयो ह्यनृतशब्दः। ऋतशब्दश्च कर्मवचनः। 'ऋतं पिबन्तौ' (का० ३।१) इति वचनात्। ऋतं कर्म फलाभिसन्धिरहितं, परमपुरुषाराधनवेषं तत्प्राप्तिफलम्। अत्र तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सांसारिकाल्पफलं कर्मानृतं ब्रह्मप्राप्तिविरोधि। 'य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः' (छा० ८।३।२) इति वचनात्।

'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात्' (श्वे० उ० ४।२०) इत्यादौ मायाशब्दो विचित्रार्थसर्गकरत्रिगुणात्मकप्रकृत्यभिधायको नानिर्वचनीयाज्ञानवचनः।

तेन मायासहस्रं तच्छम्बरस्याशुगामिना।
बालस्य रक्षता देहमेकैकांशेन सूदितम्॥

(वि० पु० १।१९।२०)

इत्यादौ विचित्रार्थसर्गसमर्थस्य पारमार्थिकस्यैवासुराद्यस्त्रविशेषस्यैव मायाशब्दाभिधेयत्वोपालम्भात्। अतो न कदाचिदपि श्रुत्याऽनिर्वचनीयाज्ञानप्रतिपादनम्।

It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in

untruth (*anṛta*) ; for the word untruth (*anṛta*) denotes that which is other than truth (*ṛita*). The word *ṛita* has a passive sense, as appears from the words, Drinking *ṛita*. *Ṛita* means works done without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in question, untruth (*anṛta*) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from propitiation of the Supreme Spirit), which temporal fruit is obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (*brahman*); the entire text (when the context is supplied) being : They who find not this supreme sphere (*brahma-loka*) are enveloped in untruth. In such texts, again, as Let him know illusion (*māyā*) to be the primary emanative cause (*prakṛti*), the term (*māyā*) designates the emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (*guṇa*), and creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the inexplicable illusion (for which the Śāṅkaras contend).

In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child, moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (*māyā*) of the barbarian were swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion' (*māyā*) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of projective diversified creation. The Veda, never sets out an inexplicable illusion.

नाप्यैक्योपदेशान्यथानुपपत्त्या । तत्त्वंपदयोः सविशेषब्रह्माभिधायित्वेन विरुद्धयोर्जीवपरयोः स्वरूपैक्यस्य प्रतिपत्तुमशक्यतयाऽर्थापत्तेरनुदयदोषदूषित्वात् ।

तथा हि—तत्पदं निरस्तसमस्तदोषम् अनवधिकातिशया सङ्ख्येयकल्याण-गुणास्पदं जगदुदयविभवलयलीलं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयति । 'तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेय' (छा० ६।२।३) इत्यादिषु तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात् । तत्समानाधिकरणं त्वंपदं चाचिद्वि-शिष्टजीवशरीरकं ब्रह्माचष्टे । प्रकारद्वयविशिष्टैकवस्तुपरत्वात् सामानाधिकरण्यस्य ।

Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred from the "grand text" That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a supposition (as that they are indentical would violate the law of excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excel-

lence, a repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a pastime;[2] such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates one thing determined by two modes.

ननु 'सोऽयं देवदत्त' इतिवत् तत्त्वमिति पदयोर्विरुद्धभागत्यागलक्षणया निर्विशेषस्वरूपमात्मैक्यं सामानाधिकरण्यार्थः किं न स्यात् । यथा सोऽयमित्यत्र देशान्तरकालान्तरसंबन्धी पुरुषः प्रतीयते । इदंशब्देन च संनिहितदेशवर्तमानकालान्तरसंबन्धी । तयोः समानाधिकरण्येनैक्यमवगम्यते । तत्रैकस्य युगपद्विरुद्धदेशकालप्रतीतिर्न संभवतीति द्वयोरपि पदयोः स्वरूपपरत्वे स्वरूपस्य चैक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यम् । एवमत्रापि किंचिज्ज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादि-विरुद्धांश-प्रहाणेनाखण्डस्वरूपं लक्ष्यत इति चेत्—

Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vādin may reply : Why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words. This is that Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a different time and place, and by word This, a person in relation to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That) must refer to the essence (and not to be the accidents of time and place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text, That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz., finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul).

विषमोऽयमुपन्यासः । दृष्टान्तेऽपि विरोधवैधुर्येण लक्षणागन्धासंभवात् । एकस्य तावद् भूतवर्तमानकालद्वयसंबन्धो न विरुद्धः । देशान्तरस्थितिर्भूता संनिहित-

देशस्थितिर्वर्तत इति देशभेदसंबन्धविरोधश्च कालभेदेन परिहरणीयः । लक्षणापक्षेऽप्येकस्यैव पदस्य लक्षकत्वाश्रयणेन विरोधपरिहारे पदद्वयस्य लाक्षणिकत्वस्वीकारो न संगच्छते । इतरथैकस्य वस्तुनः तत्तेदंताविशिष्टत्वावगाहनेन प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः प्रामाण्यानङ्गीकारे स्थायित्वासिद्धौ क्षणभङ्गवादी बौद्धो विजयेत ।

This suggestion (the Rāmānujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that Deva-datta), and consequently not the smallest particle of "implication" (*lakshṇā* both This and That being used in their denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it differs as this and as that, permanence in things will be inadmissible, and that Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things will be triumphant.

एवमत्रापि जीवपरमात्मनोः शरीरात्मभावेन तादात्म्यं न विरुद्धमिति प्रतिपादितम् । जीवात्मा हि ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारत्वाद् ब्रह्मात्मकः । 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मनोऽन्तरो यमात्मा न वेद यस्यात्मा शरीरम्' (बृ० ३।७।२२) इति श्रुत्यन्तरात् ।

We have, therefore (the Rāmānujas continue), laid it down in this question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul is the body.

अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते । सर्वे शब्दाः परमात्मन एव वाचकाः । न च पर्यायत्वम् । द्वारभेदसंभवात् । तथा हि जीवस्य शरीरतया प्रकारभूतानि देवमनुष्यादिसंस्थानानीव

सर्वाणि वस्तूनीति ब्रह्मात्मकानि तानि सर्वाणि । अतः—

देवो मनुष्यो यक्षो वा पिशाचोरगराक्षसाः ।
पक्षी वृक्षो लता काष्ठं शिला तृणं घटः पटः ॥

इत्यादयः सर्वे शब्दाः प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोगेनाभिधायकतया प्रसिद्धा लोके, तद्वाच्यतया प्रतीयमानतत्तत्संस्थानवद्वस्तुमुखेन तदभिमानिजीवतदन्तर्यामिपरमात्मपर्यन्तसंघातस्य वाचकाः । देवादिशब्दानां परमात्मपर्यन्तत्वमुक्तं तत्त्वमुक्तावल्यां चतुर्थसरे ।

जीवं देवादिशब्दो वदति तदपृथक्सिद्धभावाभिधाना-
न्निष्कर्षाभावयुक्ताद्बहुरिह च दृढो लोकवेदप्रयोगः ।
आत्मासंबन्धकाले स्थितिरनवगता देवमर्त्यादिमूर्ते-
र्जीवात्मानुप्रवेशाज्जगति विभुरपि व्याकरोन्नामरूपे ॥
(तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापः ४।८२) इति ।

Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow. All words are designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine, human, etc., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit. Hence—

God, Man, Yakṣa, Piśāca, serpent, Rākṣasa, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,—these and all other words, be they what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within. That God and all other words whatsover ultimately denote the Supreme Spirit is stated in the Tattvamuktāvalī and in the Caturantara—

"God, and all other words, designate the soul, none else than That, called the established entity,"
"Of this there is much significant and undoubted exemplification in common speech and in the Veda;"
"Existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown; in the form of gods, mortals, and the rest"

"When pervading the individual spirit, the infinite has made a diversity of names and forms in the world."

अनेन देवानिशब्दानां शरीरविशिष्टजीवपर्यन्तत्वं प्रतिपाद्य, 'संस्थानैक्याद्यभावे' (त० मु० क० ४।८३) इत्यादिना शरीरलक्षणं दर्शयित्वा, 'शब्दैस्तन्वंशरूपप्रभृतिः' (४।८४) इत्यादिना विश्वस्येश्वरा पृथक्सिद्धत्वमुपपाद्य, 'निष्कर्षाकूत' (४।८५) इत्यादिना पद्येन सर्वेषां शब्दानां परमात्मपर्यन्तत्वं प्रतिपादितं तत्सर्वं तत एवावधार्यम् । अयमेवार्थः समर्थितो वेदार्थसंग्रहे नामरूपश्रुतिव्याकरणसमये रामानुजेन ।

In these words the author, setting forth that all words, God, and the rest, designate the body, and showing in the words, "No unity in systems," etc., the characteristic of body and showing in the words, "By words which are substitutes for the essence of things," etc., that it is established that nothing is different from the universal Lord, down in the verses, Significant of the essence etc., that all words ultimately designate the Supreme Spirit. All this may be ascertained from that work. The same matter has been enforced by Rāmānuja in the Vedārtha-saṅgraha, when analysing the Vedic text about names and forms.

किं च सर्वप्रमाणस्य सविशेषविषयतया निर्विशेषवस्तुनि न किमपि प्रमाणं समस्ति । निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्षेऽपि सविशेषमेव वस्तु प्रतीयते । अन्यथा सविकल्पके सोऽयमिति पूर्वप्रतिपन्नप्रकारविशिष्टप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः ।

Moreover, every form of evidence having some determinate object, there can be no evidence of an undetermined (unconditionate) reality. Even in non-discriminate perception it is a determinate (or conditioned) thing that is cognised. Else in discriminative perception there could not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented form. Again, that text, That are thou, is not sublative of the universe as rooted in illusion, like a sentence declaratory that what was illusorily presented as a snake is a piece of rope; nor does knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring (this illusory universe) to an end; for we have already demonstrated that there is proof of these positions.

किं च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं न प्रपञ्चस्य बाधकम् । भ्रान्तिमूलकत्वात् भ्रान्तिप्रयुक्तरज्जुसर्पवाक्यवत् । नापि ब्रह्मात्मैक्यज्ञानं निवर्तकम् । तत्र प्रमाणाभावस्य

प्रागेवोपपादनात् । न च प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वप्रतिष्ठापनपक्ष एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञान-प्रतिज्ञाव्याकोपः ।

प्रकृति-पुरुष-महदहंकार-तन्मात्र-भूतेन्द्रिय-चतुर्दशभुवनात्मकब्रह्माण्ड-तदन्तर्वर्ति देव-तिर्यङ्-मनुष्य स्थावरादि-सर्वप्रकार-संस्थान-संस्थितं कार्यमपि सर्वं ब्रह्मैवेति कारणभूतब्रह्मात्मज्ञानादेव सर्वविज्ञानं भवतीत्येकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानस्योपपन्नतर-त्वात् । अपि च ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्य मिथ्यात्वे सर्वस्यासत्त्वादेव एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञा बाध्येत ।

Nor is there an absurdity (as the Śāṅkaras would say), on the hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe, in affirming that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things : for it is easily evinced that the mundane egg, consisting of the primary cause (*Prakṛati*), intellect, self-position, the rudimentary elements, the gross elements, the organs (of sense and of action), and the fourteen worlds, and the gods, animals, men, immovable things, and so forth, that exist within it, constituting a complex of all forms, is all an effect, and that from the single cognition of absolute spirit as its (emanative) cause, when we recognise that all this is absolute spirit (these being a tautology between cause and effect), there arises cognition of all things. and thus by cognition of one cognition of all. Besides, if all else than absolute spirit were unreal, then all being non-existent, it would follow that by one cognition all cognition would be sublated.

नामरूपविभागानर्हसूक्ष्मदशावत्प्रकृतिपुरुषशरीरं ब्रह्मकारणावस्थम् । जगतस्त-दापत्तिरेव प्रलयः । नामरूपविभागविभक्तस्थूलचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरं ब्रह्म कार्यावस्थम् ब्रह्मणस्तथाविधस्थूलभावश्च सृष्टिरित्यभिधीयते । एवं च कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वमपि आरम्भणाधिकरणे प्रतिपादितमुपपन्नतरं भवति ।

निर्गुणवादाश्च प्राकृतहेयगुणनिषेधविषयतया व्यवस्थिताः । नानात्वनिषेध-वादाश्चैकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः शरीरतया प्रकारभूतं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनात्मकं वस्त्विति सर्व-स्यात्मतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवावस्थितमिति सर्वात्मकब्रह्मपृथग्भूतवस्तुसद्भावनिषेध-परत्वाभ्युपगमेन प्रतिपादितः ।

It is laid down (by the Rāmānujas) that retractation into the universe (*pralaya*) is when the universe, the body whereof consists of souls and the originant (*prakṛiti*), returns to its imperceptible state, unsusptible of division by names and forms existing as absolute

spirit the emanative cause; and that creation (or emanation) is the gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit, the body whereof is soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms, in the condition of the (emanative) effect of absolute spirit. In this way the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism (of Vyāsa) treating of origination, is easily explicable. The statements that the Supreme Spirit is void of attributes, are intended (it is shown) to deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by those that desire emancipation. The texts which deny plurality are explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real existence of things apart from the Supreme Spirit, which is identical with all things, it being Supreme Spirit which subsists under all forms as the soul of all things sentient and unsentient being forms as being the body of absolute Spirit.[3]

किमत्र तत्त्वं भेदोऽभेद उभयात्मकं वा ? सर्वं तत्त्वम् । तत्र सर्वशरीरतया सर्वप्रकारं ब्रह्मैवावस्थितमित्यभेदोऽभ्युपेयते । एकमेव ब्रह्म नानाभूतचिदचित्प्रकारात् नानात्वेनावस्थितमिति भेदाभेदौ । चिदचिदीश्वराणां स्वरूपस्वभाववैलक्षण्यादसंकराच्चभेदः ।

What is the principle here involved, pluralism of monism, or a universe both one and more than one ? Of these alternatives monism is admitted is saying that Supreme Spirit alone subsists in all forms as all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only Supreme Spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as soul and not-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the essential natures of soul, not-soul, and the Lord, are different, and not to be confounded.

तत्र चिद्रूपाणां जीवात्मनामसंकुचितापरिच्छिन्न-निर्मलज्ञानरूपाणाम् अनादि कर्मरूपाविद्यावेष्टितानां तत्तत्कर्मानूरूपज्ञानसंकोचविकाशौ भोग्यभूताचित्संसर्गस्तदनुगुणसुख-दुःखोपभोगद्वयरूपा भोक्तृता भगवत्प्रतिपत्तिर्भगवत्पदप्राप्तिरित्यादयः स्वभावाः ।

अचिद्वस्तूनां तु भोग्यभूतानामचेतनत्वमपुरुषार्थत्वं विकारास्पदत्वमित्यादयः ।

परस्येश्वरस्य भोक्तृ-भोग्ययोरन्तर्यामिरूपेणावस्थानमपरिच्छेद्यज्ञानैश्वर्यवीर्य-शक्ति-तेजःप्रभृत्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येय-कल्याणगुणगणता स्वसंकल्पप्रवृत्तस्वेतरसम-

स्तचिदचिद्वस्तुजातता स्वाभिमतस्वानुरूपैकरूपदिव्यरूपनिरतिशयविविधानन्तभूषणतेत्यादयः ।

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord) individual spirits, or souls, consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge, but enveloped in illusion, that is, in works from all eternity, undergo contraction and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits. Soul experiences fruition, and after reaping pleasures and pains proportionate to merits and demerits, there ensues knowledge of the Lord or attainment of the sphere of the Lord. Of things which are not-soul, and which are objects of fruition (or experience of pleasure and pain), unconsciousness, unconduciveness to the end of man, susceptibility of modification, and the like, are the properties. Of the Supreme Lord the attributes are subsistence, as the internal controller (or animator) of both the subjects and the objects of fruition; the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge, dominion, majesty, power, brightness, and the like, the countless multitude of auspicious qualities; the generation at will of all things other than himself, whether spiritual or non spiritual; various and infinite adornment with unsurpassable, excellence singular, uniform, and divine.

वेङ्कटनाथेन त्वित्थं निरटङ्कि पदार्थविभागः—

द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदान्मितमुभयविधं तद्विदस्तत्त्वमाहुः
द्रव्यं द्वेधा विभक्तं जडमजडमिति प्राच्यमव्यक्तकालौ ।
अन्त्यं प्रत्यक्परावच्च प्रथममुभयथा तत्र जीवेशभेदा-
न्नित्या भूतिर्मतिश्चेत्यपरमिह जडामादिमां केचिदाहुः ॥

(त० मु० १।६)

तत्र द्रव्यं दशावत्प्रकृतिरिह गुणैः सत्त्वपूर्वैरुपेता
कालोऽब्दाद्याकृतिः स्यादणुरवगतिमाञ्जीव ईशोऽन्य आत्मा ।
संप्रोक्ता नित्यभूतिस्त्रिगुणसमधिका सत्त्वयुक्ता तथैव
ज्ञातुर्ज्ञेयावभासो मतिरिति कथितं संग्रहाद् द्रव्यलक्ष्म ॥

(त० मु० १।७) इत्यादिना ।

Veṅkaṭa-nātha has given the following distribution of things—

"Those who know it have declared the principle to be twofold, substance and non-substance;"

"Substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient; the former being the unevolved (*avyakta*), and time."

"The latter is the 'near' (*pratyak*) and the 'distant' (*parāk*); the 'near' being twofold as either soul or the Lord;"

"The 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence; the other principle some have called the unsentient primary."

Of these—

"Substance undergoes a plurality of condition; the originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords;"

"Time has the form of years, etc.; soul is atomic and cognisant; the other spirit is the Lord;"

"Eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three cords (or modes of phenomenal existence), and also as characterised by goodness;"

"The cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is intelligence; thus are the characteristics of substance summarily recounted."

तत्र चिच्छब्दवाच्या जीवात्मानः परमात्मनः सकाशाद् भिन्ना नित्याश्च । तथा च श्रुतिः—'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया' (मु० ३।१।१, श्वे० ४।६) इत्यादिका । अत एवोक्तं 'नानात्मानो व्यवस्थातः' (वैशे० सू० ३।२।२०) इति तन्नित्यत्वमपि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धम्—

न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चि-
न्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो
न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ।। (गीता० २।२०) इति ।

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति अनश्नन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ।।

Of these (soul, not-soul, and the Lord), individual spirits, called souls, are different from the Supreme Spirit and eternal. Thus the text : Two birds, companions, friends, etc. (Rig-Veda, i. 164,20). Accordingly it is stated (in the aphorisms of Kaṇāda, iii.2, 20), Souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions the eternity of souls is often spoken of in revelation—

"The soul is neither born, nor dies, nor having been shall it again cease to be;"

"Unborn, unchanging, eternal, this ancient of days is not killed when the body is killed" (Bhagavadgītā, ii. 20).

अन्यथा कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्गः । अत एवोक्तम्—'वीतरागजन्मादर्शनात्' (न्या० सू० ३।१।२५) इति । तदणुत्वमपि श्रुतिप्रसिद्धम्—

बालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।
भागो जीवः स विज्ञेयः स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ।। (श्वे० ५।९) इति ।

'आराग्रमात्रः पुरुषः' (श्वे० ५।८), अणुरात्मा चेतसा वेदितव्यः' (मुण्ड० ३।१।९) इति च ।

Otherwise (were the soul not eternal) there would follow a failure of requital and fruition (of pleasures and pains) unmerited. It has accordingly been said (in the aphorisms of Gautama, iii. 25): Because no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire. That the soul is atomic is well known from revelation—

"If the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a hundred times."

"The soul may be supposed a part of that, and yet it is capable of infinity."

And again—

"Soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a wheel. Spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as atomic."

अचिच्छब्दवाच्यं दृश्यं जडं जगत्त्रिविधं भोग्य-भोगोपकरण-भोगायतनभेदात् ।

तस्य जगतः कर्तोपादानं चेश्वरपदार्थः पुरुषोत्तमो वासुदेवादिपदवेदनीयः । तदप्युक्तम्—

वासुदेवः परं ब्रह्म कल्याणगुणसंयुतः ।
भुवनानामुपादानं कर्ता जीवनियामकः ।। इति ।

स एव वासुदेवः परमकारुणिको भक्तवत्सलः परमपुरुषस्तदुपासकानुगुणतत्तत्फलप्रदानाय स्वलीलावशादर्चा-विभव-व्यूह-सूक्ष्मान्तर्यामिभेदेन पञ्चधावतिष्ठते ।

The visible, unsentient world, designated by the term not-soul, is divided into three, as the object, the instrument, or the site of fruition. Of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the

Deity, known under the names Purushottama (best of spirits), Vāsudeva (a patronymic of Kṛṣṇa), and the like.

> "Vāsudeva is the supreme absolute spirit, endowed with auspicious attributes,"
>
> "The substantial cause, the efficient of the worlds, the animator of spirits."

This same Vāsudeva, infinitely compassionate, tender to those devoted to him, the Supreme Spirit with the purpose of bestowing various rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of pastime, exists under five modes, distinguished as "adoration" (*arcā*), "emanation" (*vibhava*), "manifestation" (*vyūha*), "the subtile" (*sūkṣma*), and the "internal controller."

तत्रार्चा नाम प्रतिमादयः । रामाद्यवतारो विभवः । व्यूहश्चतुर्विधो वासुदेवसंकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धसंज्ञकः । सूक्ष्मं संपूर्णषड्गुणं वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म । गुणा अपहतपाप्मत्वादयः । 'सोऽपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको किजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः' (छा० ८।७।३) इति श्रुतेः । अन्तर्यामी सकलजीवनियामकः । 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नात्मानमन्तरो यमयति' (बृ० मा० ३।७।२२) इति श्रुतेः ।

तत्र पूर्वपूर्वमूर्त्युपासनया पुरुषार्थपरिपन्थिदुरितनिचयक्षये सत्युत्तरोत्तरमूर्त्युपास्त्यधिकारः । तदुक्तम्—

> वासुदेवः स्वभक्तेषु वात्सल्यात्तत्तदीहितम् ।
> अधिकार्यानुगुण्येन प्रयच्छति फलं बहु ॥
> तदर्थं लीलया स्वीयाः पञ्चमूर्त्तीः करोति वै ।
> प्रतिमादिकमर्चा स्यादवतारास्तु वैभवाः ॥
> संकर्षणो वासुदेवः प्रद्युम्नश्चानिरुद्धकः ।
> व्यूहश्चतुर्विधो ज्ञेयः सूक्ष्मं सम्पूर्णषड्गुणम् ॥
> तदेव वासुदेवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म निगद्यते ।
> अन्तर्यामी जीवसंस्थो जीवप्रेरक ईरितः ॥
> य आत्मनीति वेदान्तवाक्यजालैर्निरूपितः ।
> अर्चोपासनया क्षिप्ते कल्मषेऽधिकृतो भवेत् ॥
> विभवोपासने पश्चाद् व्यूहोपास्तौ ततः परम् ।
> सूक्ष्मे तदनु शक्तः स्यादन्तर्यामिणमीक्षितुम् ॥ इति ।

(1) "Adoration" is images, and so forth. (2) "Emanation" is his incarnation, as Rāma, and so forth. (3) His "manifestation"

is fourfold, as Vāsudeva Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. (4) "The subtile" is the entire Supreme Spirit, with six attributes, called Vāsudeva. His attributes are exemption from sin, and the rest. That he is exempt from sin is attested in the Vedic text : Passionless, deathless without sorrow, without hunger, desiring truth, true in purpose. (5) The "internal controller," actuator of all spirits according to the text : Who abiding in the soul, rules the soul within. When by worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end of the soul (i.e., emancipation) have been destroyed, the votary becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment. It has, therefore, been said—

"Vāsudeva, in his tenderness to his votaries, gives as desire, by each,"
'According to the merits of his qualified worshippers, large recompense."
"For that end, in pastime he makes to himself his five embodiments;"
"Images and the like are 'adoration; his incarnations are 'emanations;"
"As Saṅkarṣaṅa, Vāsudva, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, his manifestation is to be known to be fourfold; 'the subtle' is the entire six attributes,"
"That self-same called Vāsudva is styled the Supreme Spirit,"
"That internal controller is declared as residing in the soul, the actuator of the soul,"
"Described in a multitude of texts of the Upaniṣads, such as 'Who abiding in the soul.'"
"By the worship of 'adoration,' a man casting off his defilement becomes a qualified votary,"
"By the subsequent worship of 'emanation,' he becomes qualified for the worship of 'manifestation,' next,"
"By the worship thereafter of 'the subtile,' he becomes able to behold the 'internal controller'."

तदुपासनं च पञ्चविधमभिगमनमुपादानमिज्या स्वाध्यायो योग इति श्रीपञ्चरात्रेऽभिहि तम् । तत्राभिगमनं नाम देवतास्थानमार्गस्य संमार्जनोपलेपनादि । उपादानं गन्धपुष्पादिपूजासाधनसंपादनम् । इज्या नाम देवतापूजनम् । स्वाध्यायो

नाम अर्थानुसंधानपूर्वको मन्त्रजपो वैष्णवसूक्तस्तोत्रपाठो नामसंकीर्त्तनं तत्त्व प्रतिपादकशास्त्राभ्यासश्च । योगो नाम देवतानुसंधानम् ।

The worship of the Deity is described in the Pañcharātra as consisting of five elements. viz., (1) the access, (2) the preparation, (3) oblation, (4) recitation. (5) devotion. Of these, access is the sweeping, smearing, and so forth, of the way to the temple. The preparation is the provision of perfumes, flowers, and the like appliances of worship. Oblation is worship of the deities. Recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts, with attention to what they mean, the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of Vishṇu, the commemoration of his names, and study of institutes which set forth the truth. Devotion is meditation on the Deity.

एवमुपासनाकर्मसमुच्चितेन विज्ञानेन द्रष्टृवदर्शने नष्टे भगवद्भक्तस्य तन्निष्ठस्य भक्तवत्सलः परमकारुणिकः पुरुषोत्तमः स्वयाथात्म्यानुभवानुगुणनिरवधिकानन्दरूपं पुनरावृत्तिरहितं स्वपदं प्रयच्छति । तथा च स्मृतिः—

मामुपेत्य पुनर्जन्म दुःखालयमशाश्वतम् ।
नाप्नुवन्ति महात्मानः संसिद्धिं परमां गताः ॥

(गी० ८।१५) इति ।

स्वभक्तं वासुदेवोऽपि संप्राप्यानन्दमक्षयम् ।
पुनरावृत्तिरहितं स्वीयं धाम प्रयच्छति ॥ इति च ।

When the vision of the visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by the merit of such worship, the infinitely compassionate Supreme Spirit, tender to his votaries, bestows upon the votary devoted to his lord and absorbed in his lord, his own sphere infinite and endless, marked by consciousness of being like him, from which there is no future return (to the sorrows of transmigratory existence). So the traditionary text—

"When they have come to me, the high-sould no longer undergo future birth, a receptacle of pain, transitory, having attained to the supreme consummation."

"Vāsudeva, having found his votary, bestows upon him his own mansion, blissful, undecaying, from whence there is no more return."

तदेतत्सर्वं हृदि निधाय महोपनिषन्मतावलम्बनेन भगवद्बोधायनाचार्यकृतां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं विस्तीर्णामालक्ष्य रामानुजः शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यमकार्षीत् । तत्र

'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र० सू० १।१।१) इति प्रथमसूत्रस्यायमर्थः—अत्राथशब्दः पूर्ववृत्तकर्माधिगमनानन्तयार्थः। तदुक्तं—वृत्तिकारेण – वृत्तात्कर्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्म विविदिषतीति।

After laying up all this in his heart, leaning upon the teaching of the great Upanishad, and finding the gloss on the Vedānta aphorisms by the venerated Bodhāyanāchārya too prolix. Rāmānuja composed a commentary on the Śārīrakamīmāṁsā (or Vedānta theosophy). In this the sense of the first aphorism, "Then hence the absolute must be desired to be known," is given as follows:—The word *then* in this aphorism means, after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites. Thus the glossator writes : "After learning the sacred rites," he desires to know the absolute.

अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। अधीतसाङ्गवेदस्याधिगततदर्थस्य विनश्वरफलात्कर्मणो विरक्तत्वाद् हेतोः स्थिरमोक्षाभिलाषुकस्य तदुपायभूतब्रह्मजिज्ञासा भवति। ब्रह्मशब्देन स्वभावतो निरस्तसमस्तदोषानवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणः पुरुषोत्तमोऽभिधीयते।

एवं च कर्मज्ञानस्य तदनुष्ठानस्य च वैराग्योत्पादनद्वारा चित्तकल्मषापनय-द्वारा च ब्रह्मज्ञानं प्रति साधनत्वेन तयोः कार्यकारणत्वेन पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसयोरेक-शास्त्रत्वम्। अत एव वृत्तिकाराः—'एकमेवेदं शास्त्रं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेन' इत्याहुः।

कर्मफलस्य क्षयित्वं ब्रह्मज्ञानफलस्य चाक्षयित्वं 'परीक्ष्य लोकात्कर्मचितान्तान-ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन' (मु० १।२।१२) इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरनुमानार्थापत्त्युपबृंहिताभिः प्रत्यपादि। एकैकनिन्दया कर्मविशिष्टस्य ज्ञानस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वं दर्शयति श्रुतिः—

अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते।
ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः॥

(बृ० ४।४।१० तथा ई० ९)

विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह।
अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते॥

(ई० ११) इत्यादि।

The word *hence* states the reason, viz., because one who has read the Veda and its appendages and understands its meaning is averse from sacred rites, their recompense being perishable. The

wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs for permanent liberation, as being the means of such liberation. By the word *absolute* is designated the Supreme Spirit, from whom are essentially excluded all imperfections, who is of illimitable excellence, and of innumerable auspicious attributes. Since then the knowledge of sacıed rites and the performance of those rites is mediately through engendering dispassionateness, and through putting away the defilement of the understanding, an instrument of the knowledge of the absolute; and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge of the absolute being consequently cause and effect, the former and the latter Mīmāṁsā constitute one system of institutes. On this account the glossator has described this system as one with the sixteenfold system of Jaimini. That the frui of sacred rites is perishable, and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperıshable, has been laid down in virtue of Vedic texts, such as : Scanning the spheres gained by rites, let him become passionless; Not wrought by the rite performed, accompanied with inference and disjunctive reasoning. Revelation, by censuring each when unaccompanied by the other, shows that it is knowledge together with works that is efficacious of emancipation, in the words :

"Blind darkness they enter who prefer illusion, and a greater darkness still do they enter who delight in knowledge only, knowledge and illusion· He who knows these both, he passing beyond death together with illusion, tastes immortality by knowledge."

तदुक्तं पाञ्चरात्ररहस्ये —
स एव करुणासिन्धुर्भगवान्भक्तवत्सलः ।
उपासकानुरोधेन भजते मूर्तिपञ्चकम् ॥
तदर्चाविभवव्यूहसूक्ष्मान्तर्यामिसंज्ञकम् ।
यदाश्रित्यैव चिद्वर्गस्तत्तज्ज्ञेयं प्रपद्यते ॥
पूर्वपूर्वोदितोपास्तिविशेषक्षीणकल्मषः ।
उत्तरोत्तरमूर्तीनामुपास्त्यधिकृतो भवेत् ॥
एवं ह्यहरहः श्रौतस्मार्तधर्मानुसारतः ।
उक्तोपासनया पुंसां वासुदेवः प्रसीदति ॥
प्रसन्नात्मा हरिर्भक्त्या निदिध्यासनरूपया ।
अविद्यां कर्मसङ्घातरूपां सद्यो निवर्तयेत् ॥

ततः स्वाभाविकाः पुंसां ते संसारतिरोहिताः ।
आविर्भवन्ति कल्याणाः सर्वज्ञत्वादयो गुणाः ॥
एवं गुणाः समानाः स्युर्मुक्तानामीश्वरस्य च ।
सर्वकर्तृत्वमेवैकं तेभ्यो देवे विशिष्यते ॥
मुक्तास्तु शेषिणि ब्रह्मण्यशेषे शेषरूपिणः ।
सर्वानश्नुवते कामान्सह तेन विपश्चिता ॥ इति ।

Conformably it is said in the Pañcarātra-rahasya—

"That ocean of compassion, the Lord tender to his votaries,"

"For his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him."

"These are styled Adoration, Emanation Manifestation, the Subtile, the Internal Controller,"

"Resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of knowledge,"

"As a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship,"

"He becomes qualified for the worship of each next embodiment,"

"Thus day by day, according to religion, revealed and traditional,"

"By the aforesaid worship Vāsudeva becomes propitious to mankind."

"Hari, when propitiated by devotion in the form of meditation,"

"At once brings to a close that illusion which is the aggregate of works."

"Then in souls the essential attributes form which transmigration has vanished,"

"Are manifested, auspicious, omniscience, and the rest."

"These qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and the Lord,"

"Universal efficieney alone among them is peculiar to the Deity."

"Emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute, which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior,"

"They enjoy all beatitudes together with that Spirit."

तस्मात्तापत्रयातुरैरमृतत्वाय पुरुषोत्तमादिपदवेदनीयं ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्युक्तं भवति । 'प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थप्राधान्येन सह ब्रूत इतः सनोऽन्यत्र' इति वचनबलादिच्छाया इष्यमाणप्रधानत्वादिष्यमाणं ज्ञानमिह विधेयम् । तच्च ध्यानो-

पासनादिशब्दवाच्यं वेदनं न तु वाक्यजन्यमापातज्ञानम् । पदसन्दर्भश्राविणो व्युत्पन्नस्य विधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्तत्वात् ।

'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः' (बृ० २।४।५), 'आत्मत्येवोपासीत' (बृ० १।४।७), 'विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत, (बृ० ४।४।२१), 'अनुविद्य बिजानाति' (छा० ८।७।१) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ।

It is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain must, for the attainment of immortality, investigate the absolute spirit known under such appellations as the Highest Being. According to the maxim : The base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly, and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead, the notion of desire is predominant (in the word *jijñāsitavya*), and desired knowledge is the predicate (in the aphorism). Then hence the absolute must be desired to be known. Knowledge is cognition designated by such terms as meditation, devotion ; not the merely superficial knowledge derived from verbal communication, such being competent to any one who hears a number of words and understands the force each, even without any predication ; in conformity with such Vedic texts as : Self indeed it is that is to be seen to he heard, to be thought, to be pondered ; He should meditate that it is self alone ; Having known, let him acquire excellent wisdom ; He should know that which is beyond knowledge.

अत्र 'श्रोतव्यः' इत्यनुवादः । अध्ययनविधिना साङ्गस्य स्वाध्यायस्य ग्रहणेऽधीतवेदस्य पुरुषस्य प्रयोजनवदर्शनात्तन्निर्णयाय स्वरसत एव श्रवणे प्रवर्तमानतया तस्य प्राप्तत्वात् । मन्तव्य इति चानुवादः । श्रवणप्रतिष्टार्थत्वेन मननस्यापि प्राप्तत्वात् । अप्राप्ते शास्त्रमर्थवदिति न्यायात् । ध्यानं च तैलधारावदविच्छिन्नस्मृतिसंतानरूपम् । 'ध्रुवा स्मृतिः स्मृतिप्रतिलम्भे सर्वग्रन्थीनां विप्रमोक्ष' इति ध्रुवायाः स्मृतेरेव मोक्षोपायत्वश्रवणात् । सा च स्मृतिर्दर्शनसमानाकारा ।

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्दृष्टे परावरे ॥ (बृ० २।२।८)

इत्यनेनैकवाक्यत्वात् । तथा च 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः' (बृ० २।४।५) इत्यनेनास्या दर्शनरूपता विधीयते । भवति च भावनाप्रकर्षात्स्मृतेर्दर्शनरूपत्वम् । वाक्यकारेणैतत्सर्वं प्रपञ्चितं 'वेदनमुपासनं स्यात्' इत्यादिना ।

In these texts "to be heard" is explanatory, hearing being understood (but not enounced) in the text about sacred study (viz., *ṣaḍaṅgena vedo'dhyeyo jñeyasca,* the Veda, with its six appendages, is to be studied and known) ; so that a man who has studied the Veda must of his own accord, in acquiring the Veda and its appendages, engage in "hearing," in order to ascertain the sense by examining it and the occasion of its enouncement. The term "to be thought" (or "to be inferred") is also explanatory, cogitation (or inference) being understood as the complementary meaning of hearing, according to the aphorism : Before its signification is attained the system is significant. Meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil, it being revealed in the text, in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all knots,—that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of emancipation. And this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition,

"Cut is his heart's knot, solved are all his doubts,
"And exhausted are all his works, when he has seen the Highest and Lowest,"

because he becomes one with that Supreme. So also in the words, Self indeed is to be seen, it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is an intuition. Reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of the representations. The author of the Vākya has treated of all this in detail in the passage beginning cognition is meditation.

तदेव ध्यानं विशिनष्टि श्रुतिः—

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो, न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम् ।।
(कठ० २।२३) ।

प्रियतम एव हि वरणीयो भवति । यथायं प्रियतम आत्मानं प्राप्नोति, तथा स्वयमेव भगवान् प्रयतत इति भगवतैवाभिहितम्—

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ।। (गी० १०।१०) इति ।
पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वनन्यया ।
(गी० ८।२२) इति च ।

The characters of this meditation are laid out in the text : "This soul is not attainable by exposition, nor by wisdom, nor

by much learning ; Whom God chooses by him God may be attained. To him this self unfolds its own nature. For it is that which is dearest which is choice-worthy, and as the soul finds itself most dear, so the Lord is of Himself most dear, as was declared by the Lord Himself—

> "To them always devoted, who worship me with love,
> "I give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to me."

And again—

> "That Supreme Spirit, Arjuna, is attainable by faith unwavering."

भक्तिस्तु निरतिशयानन्दप्रियानन्यप्रयोजन-सकलेतरवैतृष्ण्यवज्ज्ञानविशेष एव। तत्सिद्धिश्च विवेकादिभ्यो भवतीति वाक्यकारेणोक्तं—तल्लब्धिर्विवेकविमोकाभ्यास-क्रियाकल्याणानवसादानुद्धर्षेभ्यः सम्भवान्निर्वचनाच्चेति ।

तत्र विवेको नामादुष्टादन्नात्सत्त्वशुद्धिः । अत्र निर्वचनम्—'आहारशुद्धेः सत्त्वशुद्धिः सत्त्वशुद्धया ध्रुवा स्मृतिः' इति । विमोकः कामानभिष्वङ्गः । शान्त उपासीतेति निर्वचनम् ।

पुनः पुनः संशीलनमभ्यासः । निर्वचनं च स्मार्तमुदाहृतं भाष्यकारेण—'सदा तद्भावभावितः' (गी० ८।६) इति । श्रौतस्मार्तकर्मानुष्ठानं शक्तितः क्रिया । क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः' इति निर्वचनम् । सत्यार्जवदयादानादीनि कल्याणानि । 'सत्येन लभ्यत' इत्यादि निर्वचनम् । दैन्यविपर्ययोऽनवसादः । नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यः' (मु० ३।२।४) इति निर्वचनम् । तद्विपर्ययजा तुष्टिरुद्धर्षः । तद्विपर्ययोऽनुद्धर्षः । 'शान्तो दान्त' इति निर्वचनम् ।

तदेवमेवंविधनियमविशेषसमासादित-पुरुषोत्तम-प्रसाद-विध्वस्त-तमःस्वान्तस्य अनन्यप्रयोजनानवरतनिरतिशय-प्रिय-विशदात्मप्रत्ययावभासतापन्नध्यानरूपया भक्त्या पुरुषोत्तमपदं लभ्यत इति सिद्धम् । तदुक्तं यामुनेन-उभयपरिकर्मितस्वान्तस्यैकान्तिकात्यन्तिकभक्तियोगो लभ्य इति । ज्ञानकर्मयोगसंस्कृतान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः ।

But devotion (or faith) is a kind of cognition which admits no other motive than the illimitable beatitude, and is free from all other desires ; and the attainmeut of this devotion is by discrimination and other means. As is said by the author of the Vākya : Attainment thereof results from discrimination (*viveka*) exemption (*vimoka*) practice (*abhyāsa*), observance (*kriyā*), excellence (*kalyāṇa*), freedom from despondency (*anavasāda*), satisfaction (*anuddharṣa*),

according to the equivalence (of the definition), and the explication (of these terms). Of these means, discrimination is purity of nature, resultant from eating undefiled food, and the explication (of discrimination) is irom purity of diet, purity of understanding, and by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence. Exemption is non-attachment to sensuous desires ; the explication beingar, Let the quietist meditate. Practice is reiteration ; and of this a traditionary explication is quoted (from the Bhagavad-gītā) by (Rāmānuja) the author of the commentary : For ever modified by the modes thereof. Observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and tradition according to one's ability ; the explication being (the Vedic text), He who has performed rites is the best of those that know the supreme. The excellences are veracity, integrity, clemency, charity (almsgiving), and the like ; the explication being. It is attained by veracity Freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection ; the explication being, This soul is not attained by the faint-hearted. Satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of dejection; the explication being. Quiescent. self subdued. it has thus been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Spirit, propitiated by certain rites and observances, which devotion is meditation transformed into a presentative manifestation of soul, without ulterior motive, as incessantly and illimitably desired, the sphere of the Supreme Spirit (Vaikuṇtha) is attained. Thus Yāmuna says : Attainable by the final and absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both (works and knowledge) ; that is, in one whose internal organ is rectified by the devotion of works and knowledge,

किं पुनर्ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यमित्यपेक्षायां लक्षणमुक्तम्—'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्रह्मसूत्रम् १।१।२) इति । जन्मादीति सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयम् । तद्गुणसंविज्ञानो बहुव्रीहिः । अस्याचिन्त्यविविधविचित्ररचनस्य नियतदेशकालभोगब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तक्षेत्रज्ञमिश्रस्य जगतो, यतो—यस्मात् सर्वेश्वरात् निखिलहेयप्रत्यनीकस्वरूपात् सत्यसंकल्पाद्यनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणात् सर्वज्ञात्सर्वशक्तेः पुंसः सृष्टिस्थितिप्रलयाः प्रवर्तन्त इति सूत्रार्थः ।

In anticipation of the inquiry. But what absolute is to be desired to be known ? the definition is given (in the second aphorism). From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. The genesis

and so forth, the creation (emanation), sustenation, and retractation (of the universe). The purport of the aphorism is that the emanation, sustentation, and retraction of this universe, inconceivably multiform in its structure, and interspersed with souls, from Brahmā to a tuft of grass, of determinate place, time, and fruition, is from this same universal Lord, whose essence is contrary to all qualities which should be escaped from, of illimitable excellences such as indefeasible volition, and of innumerable auspicious attributes, omniscient, and omnipotent.

इत्थंभूते ब्रह्मणि किं प्रमाणमिति जिज्ञासायां शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणमित्युक्तम्—'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र० सू० १।१।३) इति शास्त्रं योनिः कारणं प्रमाणं यस्य तच्छास्त्रयोनि । तस्य भावः तत्त्वं तस्मात् । ब्रह्मज्ञानकारणत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य तद्योनित्वं ब्रह्मणः इत्यर्थः ।

न च ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणान्तरगम्यत्वं शङ्कितुं शक्यम् । अतीन्द्रियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षस्य तत्र प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि महार्णवादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवदित्यनुमानम् । तस्य पूतिकूष्माण्डायमानत्वात् । तल्लक्षणं ब्रह्म 'यतो वा इमानि भूतानि' (तै० ३।१।१) इत्यादि वाक्यं प्रतिपादयतीति स्थितम् ।

In anticipation of the further inquiry, What proof is there of an absolute of this nature ? It is stated that the system of institutes itself is the evidence (in the third aphorism) : Because it has its source from the system. To have its source from the system is to be that whereof the cause or evidence is the system. The system, then is the source (or evidence) of the absolute, as being the cause of knowing the self, which is the cause of knowing the absolute. Nor is the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other form of evidence. For perception can have no conversancy about the absolute since it is supersensible. Nor can inference, for the illation, the ocean, and the rest, must have a maker, because it is an effect like a water-pot, is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin. It is evinced that it is such texts as, Whence also these elements, that prove the existence of the absolute thus described.

यद्यपि ब्रह्म प्रमाणान्तरगोचरतां नावतरति तथापि प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिपरत्वाभावे सिद्धरूपं ब्रह्म न शास्त्रं प्रतिपादयितुं प्रभवतीत्येतत्पर्यनुयोगपरिहारायोक्तम्— 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र० सू० १।१।४) इति । तुशब्दः प्रसक्ताशङ्का-यावत्यर्थः । तच्छास्त्र-प्रमाणकत्वं ब्रह्मणः सम्भवत्येव । कुतः ? समन्वयात् । परमपुरुषार्थभूतस्यैव ब्रह्मणो-ऽभिधेयतयान्वयादित्यर्थः ।

न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्योरन्यतरविरहिणः प्रयोजनशून्यत्वम् । स्वरूपपरेष्वपि 'पुत्रस्ते जातो' 'नायं सर्पः' इत्यादिषु हर्षप्राप्तिभयनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनवत्त्वं दृष्टमेवेति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् । दिङ्मात्रमिह प्रदर्शितम् । विस्तरस्त्वाकरादेवावगन्तव्य इति विस्तारभीरुणोदास्यत इति सर्वमनाकुलम् ।

।। इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे रामानुजदर्शनम् ।।

Though the absolute (it may be objected) be unsusceptible of any other kind of proof, the system, did it not refer to activity and cessation of activity, could not posit the absolute aforesaid. To avoid by anticipation any queries on this point, it is stated (in the fourth aphorism) : But that is from the construction. This is intended to exclude the doubt anticipated. The evidence, then, of the system is the only evidence that can be given of the absolute. Why ? Because of the construction, that is, because the absolute, that is, the highest end for man, is construed as the subject (of the first aphorism, viz. Then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known). Moreover, a sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose, for we observe that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things, such as, A son is born to you, This is not a snake, convey a purpose, viz,, the cessation of joy or of fear. Thus there is nothing unaccounted for. We have here given only a general indication. The details may be learnt from the original (viz., Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on the Vedānta aphorisms) ; we therefore decline a further treatment, apprehensive of prolixity ; and thus all is clear. A.E.G.

*NOTES*

1. Cf. "The argument in defence of the Maxim of Contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours; a postulate such that, if you deny is no speech is either significant or trust worthy to inform and guide those who hear it. You may cite innumberable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life, which the Herakleitean must go through like other persons, and when, if he procceded upon his own theory, he could neither give nor receive information by speech nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to

co-exist in his own mind. Accordingly the Herakleitean Kratylus (so Aristotle says) renounced the use of affirmative speech, and simply pointed with his finger."—Grotes. Aristotle, vol. ii. pp. 297, 298.

2. Cf. the dictum of Herakleitus: Making worlds is Zeus's pastime; and that of Plato (Laws, Book vii. p. 803) : Man is made to be the plaything of God.
3. "Whose body nature is, and God the soul."—*Pope.*
4. For further details respecting Rāmānuja and his system, see Wilson's Works, vol. i pp. 34-46; and Banerjea's Dialogues, ix. The *Tattva-muktāvali :* was printed in the *Pandit* for September 1871; but the lines quoted in p. 73 are not found there.

## CHAPTER V

# THE SYSTEM OF PŪRṆA-PRAJÑA

तदेतद्रामानुजमतं जीवाणुत्व-दासत्व-वेदापौरुषेयत्व-सिद्धार्थबोधकत्व-स्वतःप्रमाणत्व-प्रमाणत्रित्व-पञ्चरात्रोपजीव्यत्व-प्रपञ्चभेदसत्यत्वादिसाम्येऽपि परस्पर-विरुद्धभेदादिपक्षत्रयकक्षीकारेण क्षपणकपक्षनिक्षिप्तमित्युपेक्षमाणः, 'स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि' (छा० ६।८।७) इत्यादिवेदान्तवाक्यजातस्य भङ्ग्यन्तरेणार्थान्तरपरत्वमुपपाद्य ब्रह्ममीमांसाविवरणव्याजेन आनन्दतीर्थः प्रस्थानान्तरमास्थिषत ।

Ānanda-Tīrtha (Pūrṇa-prajña, or Madhva) rejected this same Rāmānuja system, because, though like his own views, it teaches the atomic size of the soul, the servitude of the soul, the existence of the Veda without any personal author, the authenticity of the Veda, the self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge, the triad of evidences, dependency upon the Pañca-rātra, the reality of plurality in the universe, and so forth,—yet, in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions, etc. it coincides with the tenets of the Jainas. Showing that He is soul. That art thou, and a number of other texts of the Upaniṣads bear a different import under a different explanation, he set up a new system under the guise of a new explication of the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā (or Vedānta).

तन्मते हि द्विविधं तत्त्वं स्वतन्त्रपरतन्त्रभेदात् । तदुक्तं तत्त्वविवेके—

स्वतन्त्रं परतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।
स्वतन्त्रो भगवान्विष्णुर्निर्दोषोऽशेषसद्गुणः ।। इति ।

ननु सजातीय-विजातीय-स्वगत-नानात्वशून्यं ब्रह्म तत्त्वमिति प्रतिपादकेषु वेदान्तेषु जागरूकेषु कथमशेषसद्गुणत्वं कथ्यत इति चेत्, मैवम् । भेदप्रमापकबहु-प्रमाणविरोधेन तेषां तत्र प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेः । तथा हि, प्रत्यक्षं तावदिदमस्माद्भिन्नम् इति नीलपीतादेर्भेदमध्यक्षयति ।

For in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into independent and dependent; as it is stated in the Tattvaviveka ;—

"Independent and dependent, two principles are received ;
"The independent is Viṣṇu the Lord, exempt from imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

Here it will be urged (by the Advaita-vādins) : Why predicate of the absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the Upaniṣads, which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and hetrogeneity, and of all plurality in itself ? To this be it replied : Not so, for these texts of the Upaniṣads, as contradictory of many proofs positive of duality, cannot afford proof of universal unity ; perception, for example, in the consciousness. This is different from that, pronounces a difference between things, blue and yellow and so forth.

अथ मन्येथाः—किं प्रत्यक्षं भेदमेवावगाहते किं वा धर्मिप्रतियोगिघटितम् ? न प्रथमः, धर्मिप्रतियोगिप्रतिपत्तिमन्तरेण तत्सापेक्षस्य भेदस्याशक्याध्यवसायात् । द्वितीयेऽपि धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणपुरःसरं भेदग्रहणमथवा युगपत्तत्सर्वग्रहणम् ?

न पूर्वः, बुद्धेर्विरम्य व्यापाराभावात् । अन्योन्याश्रयप्रसङ्गाच्च । नापि चरमः, कार्यकारणबुद्धयोर्यौगपद्याभावात् । धर्मिप्रतीतिर्हि भेदप्रत्ययस्य कारणम् । एवं प्रतियोगिप्रतीतिरपि । संनिहितेऽपि धर्मिणि व्यवहितप्रतियोगिज्ञानमन्तरेण भेदस्याज्ञातत्त्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कार्यकारणभावावगमात् । तस्मान्न भेदप्रत्यक्षं सुप्रसरमिति चेत् ।

The opponent will rejoin : Do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional difference, or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite ? The former alternative will not hold : for without a cognition of the thing and its opposite, the recognition of the difference, which presupposes such a cognition, will be impossible. On the latter alternative it must be asked. Is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary, or are all the three (the thing, its contrary, and the contrariety) simultaneously apprehended ? It cannot be thus preceded for the operation of the intellect is without delay (or without successive steps), and there would also result a logical seesaw (apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and its contrary, and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difference). Nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension (of the thing, its contrary, and the difference) ; for cognitions related as cause and effect

cannot be simultaneous, and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference ; the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance (mutual exclusion), the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present, without a cognition of its absent contrary. The perception of difference, therefore (the opponent concludes), is not easily admissible.

किं वस्तुस्वरूपभेदवादिनं प्रति इमानि दूषणानि उद्घुष्यन्ते, किं वा धर्मभेदवादिनं प्रति ? प्रथमे चोरापराधान्माण्डव्यनिग्रहन्यायापातः । भवदभिधीयमानदूषणानां तदविषयत्वात् ।

ननु वस्तुस्वरूपस्यैव भेदत्वे प्रतियोगिसापेक्षत्वं न घटते घटवत् । प्रतियोगिसापेक्ष एव सर्वत्र भेदः प्रथत इति चेन्न । प्रथमं सर्वतो विलक्षणतया वस्तुस्वरूपे ज्ञायमाने प्रतियोग्यपेक्षया विशिष्टव्यवहारोपपत्तेः ।

तथा हि—परिमाणघटितं वस्तुस्वरूपं प्रथममवगम्यते । पश्चात्प्रतियोगिविशेषापेक्षया ह्रस्वं दीर्घमिति तदेव विशिष्य व्यवहारभाजनं भवति ।

To this let the reply be as follows :—Are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves, or against one who maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes ? In the former case, you will be, as the saying runs, punishing a respectable Brāhman for the offence of a thief, the objections you adduce being irrelevant. If it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference, then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart ; but if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart, it will exist everywhere ; this statement must be disallowed, for while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else, the determinate usage (name and notion) may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart ; for example, the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is first cognised, and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate judgment, as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart (or contrasted object).

तदुक्तं विष्णुतत्त्वनिर्णये—'न च विशेषणविशेष्यतया भेदसिद्धिः । विशेषणाविशेष्यभावश्च भेदापेक्षः । धर्मिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदसिद्धिः भेदापेक्षं च धर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतया भेदस्यायुक्तिः । पदार्थस्वरूपत्वाद् भेदस्य'—इत्यादिना ।

Accordingly, it is said in the Viṣṇutattva-nirṇaya : Difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and determinate; for this relation of determinant and determinate (or predicate and subject) presupposes difference; and if differences were proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart, and the thing and its counterpart to presuppose difference, difference as involving a logical circle could not be accounted for; but difference is itself a real predicament (or ultimate entity).

अत एव गवार्थिनो गवयदर्शनान्न प्रवर्तन्ते, गो शब्दं च न स्मरन्ति । न च नीरक्षीरादौ स्वरूपे गृह्यमाणे भेदप्रतिभासोऽपि स्यादिति भणनीयम् । समानाभिहारादिप्रतिबन्धकबलाद् भेदभानव्यवहाराभावोपपत्तिः । तदुक्तम्—

अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ।। इति । (सां० का०७) ।

अतिदूरात्— गिरिशिखरवर्तिपर्वतादौ, अतिसामीप्यात्—लोचनाञ्जनादौ, इन्द्रियघातात्—विद्युदादौ, मनोऽनवस्थानात्—कामाद्युपप्लुतमनस्कस्य स्फीतालोकवर्तिनि घटादौ, सौक्ष्म्यात्—परमाण्वादौ, व्यवधानात् – कुड्यान्तर्हिते, अभिभवात्—दिवा प्रदीपप्रभादौ, समानाभिहारात्—नीरक्षीरादौ, यथावत् ग्रहणं नास्तीत्यर्थः ।

For this reason (viz., because difference is a *thing*) it is that men in quest of a cow do not act (as if they had found her) when they see a gayal, and do not recall the word *cow*. Nor let it be objected that (if difference be a real entity and as such perceived) on seeing a mixture of milk and water, there would be a presentation of difference ; for the absence of any manifestation of, and judgment about, the difference, may be accounted for by the force of (the same) obstructive (as hinder the perception of other things), viz., aggregation of similars and the rest. Thus it has been said (in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, v. vii.)—

"From too great remoteness, from too great nearness, from defect in the organs, from instability of the common sensory.
"From subtility from interposition, from being overpowered, and from aggregation of similars."

There is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak of a mountain, because of its too great remoteness ; of

collyrium applied to the eyes, and so forth, because of too great proximity ; of lightning and the like, because of a defect in the organs ; of a jar or the like in broad daylight, by one whose common sensory is bewildered by lust and other passions, because of instability of the common sensory ; of an atom and the like, because of their subtility ; of things behind a wall, and so forth, because of interposition : of the light of a lamp and the like, in the day-time, because of its being overpowered ; of milk and water, because of the aggregation of similars.

भवतु वा धर्मभेदवादस्तथापि न कश्चिद्दोषः । धर्मिप्रतियोगिग्रहणे सति पश्चात्तद्घटितभेदग्रहणोपपत्तेः । न च परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गः । परानपेक्ष्य प्रभेदशालिनी वस्तुनो ग्रहणे सति धर्मभेदभानसंभवात् । न च धर्मभेदवादे तस्य तस्य भेदस्य भेदान्तरभेद्यत्वेनानवस्था दुरवस्था स्यादित्यास्थेयम् । भेदान्तरप्रसक्तौ मूलाभावात् । भेदभेदिनौ भिन्नाविति व्यवहारादर्शनात् ।

न चैकभेदबलेनान्यभेदानुमानम् । दृष्टान्तभेदाविघातेनोत्थाने दोषाभावात् । सोऽयं पिण्याकयाचनार्थं गतस्य खारिकातैलदातृत्वाभ्युपगम इव । दृष्टान्तभेदविमर्दे त्वनुत्थानमेव । न हि वरविघाताय कन्योद्वाहः । तस्मान्मूलक्षयाभावादनवस्था न दोषाय ।

Or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted, and no harm is done ; for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes and of its contrary, the presentation of difference in their modes is possible. Nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes of things, as each difference must be different from some ulterior difference, their will result an embarrassing progression to infinity, there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said ulterior difference, inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and say that two things are different as differenced from the different.

Nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference, for there being no difference to serve as the example in such inference, there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference. And thus it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a little oil-cake, and have had to give us gallons of oil. If there be no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge. The bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom. There being, then, no fundamental difficulty, this infinite progression presents no trouble.

अनुमानेनापि भेदोऽवसीयते । परमेश्वरो जीवाद् भिन्नः । तं प्रति सेव्यत्वात् । यो यं प्रति सेव्यः स तस्माद् भिन्नः । यथा भृत्याद्राजा ।

न हि सुखं मे स्याद् दुःखं मे न मनागपि—इति पुरुषार्थमर्थयमानाः पुरुषाः स्थपतिपदं कामयमानाः सत्कारभाजो भवेयुः । प्रत्युत सर्वानर्थभाजनं भवन्ति । यः स्वस्यात्मनो हीनत्वं परस्य गुणोत्कर्षं च कथयति स स्तुत्यः प्रीतः स्तावकस्य तस्याभीष्टं प्रयच्छति । तदाह—

घातयन्ति हि राजानो राजाहमिति वादिनः ।
ददत्यखिलमिष्टं च स्वगुणोत्कर्षवादिनाम् ॥ इति ।

Difference (duality) is also ascertained by inference. Thus the Supreme Lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience; and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that person, a king, for instance, from his attendant. For men, desiring as they do the end of man, Let me have pleasure, let me not have the slightest pain, if they covet the position of their lord, do not become objects of his favour, nay, rather, they become recipients of all kinds of evil. He who asserts his own inferiority and the excellence of his superior, he it is who is to be commended; and the gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire. Therefore it has been said –

"Kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings,
"And grant to those who proclaim their kingly preeminence all that they desire."

एवं च परमेश्वराभेदतृष्णया विष्णोर्गुणोत्कर्षस्य मृगतृष्णिकासमत्वाभिधानं विपुलकदलीफललिप्सया जिह्वाच्छेदनमनुहरति । एतादृशविष्णुविद्वेषणादन्धतमसप्रवेशप्रसङ्गात् । तदेतत्प्रतिपादितं मध्यमन्दिरेण महाभारततात्पर्यनिर्णये—

अनादिद्वेषिणो दैत्या विष्णौ द्वेषो विवर्धितः ।
तमस्यन्धे पातयति दैत्यानन्ते विनिश्चयात् ॥

(म० भा० ता० १।११११) इति ।

Thus the statement of those (Advaita-vādins) in their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord, that the supreme excellence of Vishṇu is like a mirage, is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain, since it results that through offending this supreme Vishṇu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness (*andha-tamasa*). The same thing is laid down by Madhya-mandira in the Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirṇaya—

"O Daityas, enemies of the eternal, Viṣṇu's anger is waxed great;"

"He hurls the Daityas into the blind darkness, because they decide blindly."

सा च सेवा अङ्कन-नामकरण-भजनभेदात् त्रिविधा। तत्राङ्कनं नारायणायुधादीनां तद्रूपस्मरणार्थमपेक्षितार्थसिद्ध्यर्थं च। तथा च शाकल्यसंहितापरिशिष्टम्—

चक्रं बिभर्ति पुरुषोऽभितप्तं
बलं देवानाममृतस्य विष्णोः।
स याति नाकं दुरितावधूय
विशन्ति यद्यतयो वीतरागाः॥
देवासो येन विधृतेन बाहुना
सुदर्शनेन प्रयातास्तमायन्।
येनाङ्किता मनवो लोकसृष्टिं
वितन्वन्ति ब्राह्मणास्तद्वहन्ति॥
तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं येन गच्छन्ति लाञ्छिताः।
उरुक्रमस्य चिह्नैरङ्किता लोके सुभगा भवामः॥ इति।

This service (or obedience of which we have spoken) is trichotomised into (1) stigmatisation, (2) imposition of names, (3) worship.

Of these, (1) stigmatisation is (the branding upon one-self) of the weapons of Nārāyaṇa (or Viṣṇu) as a memorial of him, and as a means of attaining the end which is needful (emancipation). Thus the sequel of the Śākalaya-saṁhitā—

"The man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal Viṣṇu, which is the might of the gods,"

"He, shaking off his guilt, goes to the heaven (Vaikuṇṭha) which ascetics, whose desires are passed away, enter into;"

"The discus Sudarśana by which, uplifted in his arm, the gods entered that heaven;"

"Marked wherewith the Manus projected the emanation of the world, the weapon Brāhmans wear (stamped upon them);"

"Stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of Viṣṇu;"

"Marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding (Viṣṇu), let us become beatified."

'अतप्ततनूर्न तदामो अश्नुते श्रितास इद्वहन्तस्तत्समासत' (तै० आ० १।११)
इति तैत्तिरीयकोपनिषच्च । स्थानविशेषश्चाग्नेयपुराणे प्रदर्शितः—

दक्षिणे तु करे विप्रो बिभृयाच्च सुदर्शनम् ।
सव्येन शङ्खं बिभृयादिति ब्रह्मविदो विदुः ॥

अन्यत्र चक्रधारणे मन्त्रविशेषश्च दर्शितः—

सुदर्शन महाज्वाल कोटिसूर्यसमप्रभ ! ।
अज्ञानान्धस्य मे नित्यं विष्णोर्मार्गं प्रदर्शय ॥
त्वं पुरा सागरोत्पन्नो विष्णुना विधृतः करे ।
नमितः सर्वदेवैश्च पाञ्चजन्य नमोऽस्तु ते ॥ इति ।

Again, the Taittirīyaka Upaniṣad says: "He whose body is not branded, is raw, and tastes it not: votaries bearing it attain thereto." The particular parts to be branded are specified in the Āgneya-purāṇa —

"On his right hand let the Brāhman wear Sudarśana—
"On his left the conch-shell: thus have those who know the Veda declared."

In another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being branded with the discus—

"Sudarśana, brightly blazing, effulgent as ten million suns,"
"Show unto me, blind with ignorance the everlasting way of Viṣṇu."
"Thou aforetime sprangest from the sea, brandished in the hand of Viṣṇu.
"Adored by all the gods; O Pāñcajanya, to the be adoration."

नामकरणं पुत्रादीनां केशवादिनाम्ना व्यवहारः, सर्वदा तन्नामानुस्मरणार्थम् । भजनं दशविधं—वाचा सत्यं हितं प्रियं स्वाध्यायः, कायेन दानं परित्राणं परिरक्षणं, मनसा दया स्पृहा श्रद्धा चेति । अत्रैकैकं निष्पाद्य नारायणे समर्पणं भजनम् । तदुक्तम्—

अङ्कनं नामकरणं भजनं दशधा च तत् । इति ।

(2) Imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such names as Keśava, as a continual memorial of the name of the Supreme Lord.

(3) Worship is of ten kinds, viz., with the voice, (1) veracity. (2) usefulness, (3) kindliness, (4) sacred study; with the body, (5) almsgiving, (6) defence, (7) protection; with the common sensory, (8) mercy, (9) longing, and (10) faith. Worship is the dedication to Nārāyaṇa of each of these as it is realised. Thus it has been said—

"Stigmatisation, imposition of names, worship; the last is of ten kinds."

एवं ज्ञेयत्वादिनापि भेदोऽनुमातव्यः । तथा श्रुत्यापि भेदोऽवगन्तव्यः । 'सत्यमेनमनु विश्वे मदन्ति, रातिं देवस्य गृणतो मघोनः ।' 'सत्यः सो अस्य महिमा गृणे शवो, यज्ञेषु विप्रराज्ये ।' 'सत्य आत्मा, सत्यो जीवः, सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा सत्यं भिदा, मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्यो मैवारुवण्य' इति मोक्षानन्दभेदप्रतिपादक-श्रुतिभ्यः ।

इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः ।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्तं प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च ।। (गी० १४।२)

'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्'; 'प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च' (ब्र० सू० ४।४।१७-१८) इत्यादिभ्यश्च । न च 'ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति' (मु० ३।२।९) इति श्रुतिबलाज्जीवस्य पारमैश्वर्यं शक्यशङ्कम् । 'संपूज्य ब्राह्मणं भक्त्या शूद्रोऽपि ब्राह्मणो भवेत्'—इतिवद् बृंहितो भवतीत्यर्थपरत्वात् ।

Difference (or duality between the Supreme Being and the universe) may also be inferred from cognisability and other marks. So also difference (or duality) may be understood from revelation, from texts setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude, such as "All rejoicne over truth attained, truthful, and celebrating the gift of the divine Indra, they recount his glory;" "Sarva, among those that know the truth, O Brāhman, is in the universe, true spirit; true is individual spirit; truth is duality, truth is duality, in me is illusion, in me illusion, in me illusion."

Again :—

"After attaining this knowledge, becoming like unto me,"
"In creation they are not born again, in retractation they perish not" (Bhagavad-gītā, xiv. 3).

According also to such aphorisms as, "Excepting cosmical operation because of occasion, and because of non-proximity."

Nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is God in virtue of the text, He that knows the absolute becomes the

absolute ; for this text is hyperbolically eulogistic, like the text, Worshipping or Brāhman devoutly a Śūdra becomes a Brāhman, i.e., becomes exalted.

ननु—

प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तेत न संशयः ।
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमद्वैतं परमार्थतः ॥

(माण्डूक्यकारिका १।१७)

इति वचनाद् द्वैतस्य कल्पितत्वमवगम्यत इति चेत्सत्यम् । भावमनभिसंधायाभिधानात् । तथा हि—यद्ययमुत्पद्येत तर्हि निवर्तेत न संशयः । तस्मादनादिरेवायं प्रकृष्टः पञ्चविधो भेदप्रपञ्चः । न चायमविद्यमानः । मायामात्रत्वात् । मायेति भगवदिच्छोच्यते ।

महामायेत्यविद्येति नियतिर्मोहिनीति च ।
प्रकृतिर्वासनेत्येव तवेच्छानन्त कथ्यते ॥
प्रकृतिः प्रकृष्टकरणाद्वासना वासयेद्यतः ।
अ इत्युक्तो हरिस्तस्य मायाविद्येति संज्ञिना ॥
मायेत्युक्ता प्रकृष्टत्वात्प्रकृष्टे हि मयाभिधा ।
विष्णोः प्रज्ञप्तिरेवैका शब्दैरेतैरुदीर्यते ॥
प्रज्ञप्तिरूपो हि हरिः सा च स्वानन्दलक्षणा ।

इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यबलात् ।

If any one urge that according to the text :—

"If the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end," this duality is merely illusory, and in reality a unity, and that duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined ; it may be replied : What you say is true, but you do not understand its meaning ; for the real meaning is, If this world had been produced, it would, without doubt, come to an end ; therefore this universe is from everlasting, a fivefold dual universe ; and it is not non existent, because it is mere illusion. Illusion is defined to be the will of the Lord, in virtue of the testimony of many such passages as :—

"The great illusion, ignorance, necessity, the bewilderment,
"The originant, ideation,—thus is thy will called, O Infinite.
"The originant, because it originates greatly ; ideation, because
it produces ideas ;

"The illusion of Hari, who is called *a*, is termed (*a-vidyā*) ignorance :

"Styled (*māyā*) illusion, because it is pre-eminent, for the name (*māyā*) is used of the pre-eminent ;

"The excellent knowledge of Viṣṇu is called, though one only, by these names ;

"For Hari is excellent knowledge, and this is characterised by spontaneous beatitude."

सैव प्रज्ञा मानत्राणकर्त्री च यस्य तन्मायामात्रम् । ततश्च परमेश्वरेण ज्ञातत्वाद्रक्षितत्वाच्च न द्वैतं भ्रान्तिकल्पितम् । न हीश्वरे सर्वस्य भ्रान्तिः संभवति । विशेषादर्शननिबन्धनत्वाद् भ्रान्तेः ।

That in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects sustenation thereof, that is pure illusion, as known and sustained, therefore by the Supreme Lord duality is not illusorily imagined. For in the Lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible, illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences (which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature).

तर्हि तद्व्यपदेशः कथमित्यत्रोत्तरमद्वैतं परमार्थत इति । परमार्थत इति परमार्थापेक्षया । तेन सर्वस्मादुत्तमस्य विष्णुतत्त्वस्य समभ्यधिकशून्यत्वमुक्तं भवति ।

तथा च परमा श्रुतिः—

जीवेश्वरभिदा चैव जडेश्वरभिदा तथा ।
जीवभेदो मिथश्चैव जडजीवभिदा तथा ॥
मिथश्च जडभेदो यः प्रपञ्चो भेदपञ्चकः ।
सोऽयं सत्योऽप्यनादिश्च सादिश्चेन्नाशमाप्नुयात् ॥
न च नाशं प्रयात्येष न चासौ भ्रान्तिकल्पितः ।
कल्पितश्चेन्निवर्तेत न चासौ विनिवर्तते ॥
द्वैतं न विद्यत इति तस्मादज्ञानिनां मतम् ।
मतं हि ज्ञानिनामेतन्मितं त्रातं हि विष्णुना ॥

If it be asked how then that (illusory duality) is predicated the answer is that in reality there is a non-duality, that is in reality. Viṣṇu being better than all else, has no equal and no superior. Accordingly, the grand revelation :—

"A difference between soul and the Lord, a difference between

the unsentient and the Lord,

"A difference among souls, and a difference of the unsentient and the soul each from the other.

"Also the difference of unsentient things from one another, the world with its five divisions.

"This same is real and from all eternity; if it had a beginning it would have an end :

"Whereas it does not come to an end; and it is not illusorily imagined :

"For if it were imagined it would cease, but it never ceases :

"That there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those that lack knowledge;

"For this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known and sustained by Viṣṇu."

तस्मान्मात्रमिति प्रोक्तं परमो हरिरेव तु । इत्यादि । तस्माद्विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्ष एव तात्पर्यं सर्वागमानाम् । एतदेवाभिसंधायाभिहितं भगवता—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥
यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥
यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।
स सर्वविद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥
इति गुह्यतमं शास्त्रमिदमुक्तं मयानघ ।
एतद् बुद्ध्वा बुद्धिमान्स्यात्कृतकृत्यश्च भारत ॥

(गी० १५।१६-२०) इति ।

The purpose, then, of all revelations is to set out the supreme excellence of Viṣṇu. With this in view the Lord declared—

"Two are these persons in the universe, the perishable and the imperishable;

"The perishable is all the elements, the imperishable is the unmodified.

"The other, the most excellent person, called the Supreme Spirit,

"Is the undecaying Lord, who pervading sustains the three worlds.
"Since transcending the perishable, I am more excellent that the imperishable (soul),
"Hence I am celebrated among men and in the Veda as the best of persons (*Puruṣottama*);
"He who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons, he all-knowing worships me in every wise.
"Thus this most mysterious institute is declared, blameless (Arjuna) :
"Knowing this a man may be wise, and may have done what he has to do, O Bhārata" (Bhagavad-gītā, xv. 16–20).

महावराहेऽपि—

मुख्यं च सर्ववेदानां तात्पर्यं श्रीपतौ परे ।
उत्कर्षे तु तदन्यत्र तात्पर्यं स्यादवान्तरम् ।। इति ।

युक्तं च विष्णोः सर्वोत्कर्षे महातात्पर्यम् । मोक्षो हि सर्वपुरुषार्थोत्तमः ।

धर्मार्थकामाः सर्वेऽपि न नित्या मोक्ष एव हि ।
नित्यस्तस्मात्तदर्थाय यतेत मतिमान्नरः ।।
इति भाल्लवेयश्रुतेः ।

So in the Mahā-varāha—
"The primary purport of all the Vedas relates to the supreme spouse of Śrī;
"Its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity must be subordinate."

It is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme excellence of Viṣṇu. For emancipation is the highest end of all men, according to the text of the Bhāllaveya Upaniṣad : While merit, wealth, and enjoyment are transitory, emancipation is eternal ; therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto.

मोक्षश्च विष्णुप्रसादमन्तरेण न लभ्यते—

यस्य प्रसादात्परमार्त्तिरूपा—
दस्मात्संसारान्मुच्यते नापरेण ।
नारायणोऽसौ परमो विचिन्त्यो
मुमुक्षुभिः कर्मपाशादमुष्मात् ।।

इति नारायणश्रुतेः ।

तस्मिन्प्रसन्ने किमिहास्त्यलभ्यं
धर्मार्थकामैरलमल्पकास्ते ।
समाश्रिताद् ब्रह्मतरोरनन्तात्
निःसंशयं मुक्तिफलं प्रयान्ति ॥ (वि० पु० १।१७।९१)

इति विष्णुपुराणोक्तेश्च ।

And emancipation is not won without the grace of Viṣṇu, according to the text of the Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad : Thāugh whose grace is the highest state, through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration, while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated; the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated from this snare of works. According also to the words of the Viṣṇu-purāṇa—

"If he be propitiated, what may not here be won ? Enough of all wealth and enjoyments. These are scanty enough. On climbing the tree of the supreme essence, without doubt a man attains to the fruit of emancipation."

प्रसादश्च गुणोत्कर्षज्ञानादेव नाभेदज्ञानादित्युक्तम् । न च तत्त्वमस्यादि-तादात्म्यव्याकोपः । श्रुतितात्पर्यपरिज्ञानविजृम्भणात् ।

आह नित्यपरोक्षं तु तच्छब्दो ह्यविशेषतः ।
त्वंशब्दश्चापरोक्षार्थं तयोरैक्यं कथं भवेत् ॥
आदित्यो यूप इतिवत्सादृश्यार्था तु सा श्रुतिः । इति ।

तथा च परमा श्रुतिः—

जीवस्य परमैक्यं तु बुद्धिसारूप्यमेव तु ।
एकस्थाननिवेशो वा व्यक्तिस्थानमपेक्ष्य सः ॥
न स्वरूपैकता तस्य युक्तस्यापि विरूपतः ।
स्वातन्त्र्यपूर्णतेऽल्पत्वपारतन्त्र्ये विरूपते ॥ इति ।

And it is declared that the grace of Viṣṇu is won only through the knowledge of his excellence, not through the knowledge of non-duality. Nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory of the identity (of personal and impersonal spirit) such as, That art thou (for this pretended identity) is mere babbling from ignorance of the real purport.

"The word That, when undetermined, designates the eternally unknown,
"The word Thou designates a knowable entity; how can these be one ?"

And this text (That art thou) indicates similarity (not identity) like the text, The sun is the sacrificial post. Thus the grand revelation :

"The ultimate unity of the individual soul is either similarity of cognition,
"Or entrance into the same place, or in relation to the place of the individual;
"Not essential unity for even when it is emancipated it is different,
"The difference being independence and completeness (in the Supreme Spirit), and smallness and dependence (in the individual spirit)."

अथवा तत्त्वमसीत्यत्र स एवात्मा स्वातन्त्र्यादिगुणोपेतत्वात् । अतत्त्वमसि त्वं तत्र भवसि तद्रहितत्वादित्येकत्वमतिशयेन निराकृतम् । तदाह्—अतत्त्वमिति वा छेदस्तेनैक्यं सुनिराकृतम् । इति ।

Or to propose another explanation of the text, *Atmā tat tvam asi*, That art thou, it may be divided, *ātmā atat tvam asi*. He alone is soul as possessing independence and other attributes, and thou art not-that (*atat*) as wanting those attributes; and thus the doctrine of unity is utterly expelled. Thus it has been said—

"Or the division may be *Atat tvam*, and thus unity will be well got rid of."

तस्माद् दृष्टान्तनवकेऽपि, स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धः' (छा० ६।८।२) इत्यादिना भेद एव दृष्टान्ताभिधानान्नायमभेदोपदेश इति तत्त्ववादरहस्यम् । तथा च महोपनिषद्—

यथा पक्षी च सूत्रं च नानावृक्षरसा यथा ।
यथा नद्यः समुद्राश्च यथा जीवमहीरुहौ ॥
यथाणिमा च धाना च शुद्धोदलवणे यथा ।
चोरापहार्यौ च यथा यथा पुंविषयावपि ॥
यथाज्ञो जीवसंघश्च प्राणादेश्च नियामकः ।
तथा जीवेश्वरौ भिन्नौ सर्वदैव विलक्षणौ ॥

तथापि सूक्ष्मरूपत्वान्न जीवात्परमो हरिः ।
भेदेन मन्ददृष्टीनां दृश्यते प्रेरकोऽपि सन् ॥
वैलक्षण्यं तयोर्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते बध्यतेऽन्यथा । इति ।

According, therefore, to the Tattva-Vāda-rahasya, the words in the nine examples (in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad), He like a bird tied with a string, etc. teach unity with the view of giving an example of non-duality. Accordingly the Mahopaniṣad :—

"Like a bird and the string ; like the juices of various trees ;
"Like rivers and the sea : like fresh and salt mater ;
"Like a robber and the robbed ; like a man and his energy ;
"So are soul and the Lord diverse, for ever different.

"Nevertheless from subtilty (or imperceptibility) of form, the supreme Hari ;

"Is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the individual spirit, though he is its actuator ;

"On knowing their diversity a man is emancipated : otherwise he is bound"

ब्रह्मा शिवः सुराद्याश्च शरीरक्षरणात्क्षराः ।
लक्ष्मीरक्षरदेहत्वादक्षरा तत्परो हरिः ॥
स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिविज्ञानसुखाद्यैरखिलैर्गुणैः ।
निःसीमत्वेन ते सर्वे तद्वशाः सर्वदैव च ॥ इति ।
विष्णुं सर्वगुणैः पूर्णं ज्ञात्वा संसारवर्जितः ।
निर्दुःखानन्दभुङ् नित्यं तत्समीपे स मोदते ॥
मुक्तानां चाश्रयो विष्णुरधिकोऽधिपतिस्तथा ।
तद्वशा एव ते सर्वे सर्वदैव स ईश्वरः ॥ इति च ।

And again—

"Brahmā Śiva, and the greatest of the gods decay with the decay of their bodies ;

"Greater than these is Hari, undecaying, because his body is for the substentation of Lakṣmī.

"By reason of all his attributes, independence, power, knowledge, pleasure, and the rest,

"All they, all the deities, are in unlimited obedience to him."

And again :

"Knowing Viṣṇu, full of all excellences, the soul, exempted from transmigration.

"Rejoices in his presence for ever, enjoying painless bliss.

"Viṣṇu is the refuge of liberated souls, and their supreme ruler.

"Obedient to him are they for ever ; he is the Lord."

एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं च प्रधानत्वकारणत्वादिना युज्यते न तु सर्वमिथ्यात्वेन । न हि सत्यज्ञानेन मिथ्याज्ञानं संभवति । यथा प्रधानपुरुषाणां ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां ग्रामो ज्ञातोऽज्ञात इत्येवमादिव्यपदेशो दृष्ट एव । यथा च कारणे पितरि ज्ञाते जानात्यस्य पुत्रमिति । यथा वा सादृश्यादेकस्त्रीज्ञानाद् अन्यस्त्रीज्ञानमिति ।

That by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality, not from the falsity of all things. For knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real existence. As we see the current assurance and expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is known or not known ; and as when the father the cause is known, a man knows the son ; (so by knowing the supreme and the cause, the inferior and the effect is known).

तदेव सादृश्यमत्रापि विवक्षितं 'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्' (छा० ६।१।४) इत्यादिना । अन्यथा 'सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातम्' इत्यत्र एक-पिण्डशब्दौ वृथा प्रसज्येयाताम् । मृदा विज्ञातया' इत्येतावतैव वाक्यस्य पूर्णत्वात् ।

न च 'वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' (छा० ६।१।५) इत्येतत्कार्यस्य मिथ्यात्वमाचष्ट इत्येष्टव्यम् । वाचारम्भणं विकारो यस्य तदविकृतं नित्यं नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्यादिकमित्येतद्वचनं सत्यमित्यर्थस्य स्वीकारात् । अपरथा नामधेयमितिशब्दयोर्वैयर्थ्यं प्रसज्येत । अतो न कुत्रापि जगतो मिथ्यात्वसिद्धिः ।

किं च प्रपञ्चो मिथ्येत्यत्र मिथ्यात्वं तथ्यमतथ्यं वा प्रथमे सत्याद्वैतभङ्गप्रसङ्गः । चरमे प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वापातः ।

Otherwise (on the doctrine of the Advaita-vādins that the world is false and illusory) the words *one* and *lump* in the text, By one lump of clay, fair sir, all that is made of clay is recognised, would be use to no purpose, for the text must be completed by supplying the words. By reason of clay recognised. For the text,

Utterance with the voice, modification. name, clay (or other determinate object,—these alone are real, cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made; the reality of these being admitted, for what is meant is, that of which utterance with the voice is a modification, is unmodified, eternal; and a name such as clay, such speech is true. Otherwise it would result that the words *name* and *alone* would be otiose. There is no proof any where, then, that the world is unreal. Besides (we would ask) is the statement that the world is false itself true or false. If the statement is true, there is a violation of a real non-duality. If the statement is untrue, it follows that the world is true.

नन्वनित्यं नित्यमनित्यं वा । उभयथाप्यनुपपत्तिरित्याक्षेपवदयमपि नित्यसमजातिभेदः स्यात् । तदुक्तं न्यायनिर्माणवेधसा —'नित्यमनित्यभावादनित्ये नित्यत्वोपपत्तेर्नित्यसमः' (न्या० सू० ५।१।३५) इति । तार्किकरक्षायां च—

धर्मस्य तदतद्रूपविकल्पानुपपत्तितः ।
धर्मिणस्तद्विशिष्टत्वभङ्गो नित्यसमो भवेत ॥ इति ।

Perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious reasoning, like the dilemma : Is transitoriness permanent or transitory ? There is a difficulty in either case. As it is said by the author of the Nyāyā-Nirvāṇa : The proof of the permanence of the transitory, as being both permanent and transitory, is a paralogism. And in the Tārkika-rakshā—

"When a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such or not such and such,
"The denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is called Nitya-sama.

अस्याः संज्ञाया उपलक्षणत्वमभिप्रेत्याभिहितं प्रबोधसिद्धावन्वर्थित्वात्तूपरञ्जकधर्मसमेति । तस्मादसदुत्तरमिति चेत्—

अशिक्षितत्रासनमेतत् । दुष्टत्वमूलानिरूपणात् । तद् द्विविधं साधारणमसाधारणं च । तत्राद्यं स्वव्याघातकम् । द्वितीयं त्रिविधं युक्ताङ्गहीनत्वमयुक्ताङ्गाधिकत्वमविषयवृत्तित्वं चेति ।

तत्र साधारणमसंभावितमेव । उक्तस्याक्षेपस्य स्वात्मव्यापनानुलम्भात् । एवमसाधारणमपि । घटस्य नास्तितायां नास्तितोक्तौ अस्तित्ववत्प्रकृतेऽप्युपपत्तेः ।

With the implied mention of this same technical expression it is stated in the Prabodha-siddhi : Equality of characteristic modes results from significancy. It is be said, This then is a valid rejoinder,

we reply, This is a mere scaring of the uninstructed, for the source of fallacy has not been pointed out. This is twofold, general and particular : of these, the former is self-destructive, and the latter is of three kinds, defect of a requisite element, excess of an element not requisite, and residence in that which is not the subjicible subject. Of these (two forms of the fallacy), the general form is not suspected, no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma in question (viz,. Is the statement that the word is unreal itself true or false ? etc.) So likewise the particular; for if a water-jar be said to be non-existent, the affirmation of its non-existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence.

ननु प्रपञ्चस्य मिथ्यात्वमभ्युपेयते नासत्त्वमिति चेत्, तदेतत्सोऽयं शिरश्छेदेऽपि शतं न ददाति, विंशतिपञ्चकं तु प्रयच्छतीति शाकटिकवृत्तान्तमनुहरेत् । मिथ्यात्वासत्त्वयोः पर्यायत्वादित्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन ।

If you reply : We accept the unreality (or falsity) of the world, not its non-existence; this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money, but will at once give five score; for falsity and non-existence are synonymous. We dismiss further prolixity.

तत्र 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र० सू० १।१।१) इति प्रथमसूत्रस्यायमर्थः । तत्राथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थोऽधिकारानन्तर्यार्थश्च स्वीक्रियते । अतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थः । तदुक्तं गारुडे—

अथातःशब्दपूर्वाणि सूत्राणि निखिलान्यपि ।
प्रारभ्यन्ते नियत्यैव तत्किमत्र नियामकम् ॥
कश्चार्थस्तु तयोर्विद्वन्कथमुत्तमता तयोः ।
एतदाख्याहि मे ब्रह्मन्यथा ज्ञास्यामि तत्त्वतः ॥
एवमुक्तो नारदेन ब्रह्मा प्रोवाच सत्तमः ।
आनन्तर्याधिकारे च मङ्गलार्थे तथैव च ॥
अथशब्दस्त्वतःशब्दो हेत्वर्थे समुदीरितः । इति ।

The meaning of the first aphorism, viz., Then hence the absolute is to be desired to be known, is as follows—The word *then* is allowed to purport auspiciousness, and to designate subsequency to the qualification (of the aspirant). The word *hence* indicates a reason.

Accordingly it is stated in the Garuda-purāṇa—

"All the aphorisms begin with the words Then and Hence regularly; what then is the reason of this ?

"And what is the sense of those words, O sage ? Why are those the most excellent ?

"Tell me this, Brahmā, that I may know it truly."

Thus addressed by Nārada, the most excellent Brahmā replied—

"The word Then is used of subsequency and of competency, and in an auspicious sense,

"And the word Thence is employed to indicate the reason."

यतो नारायणप्रसादमन्तरेण न मोक्षो लभ्यते प्रसादश्च ज्ञानमन्तरेण, अतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति सिद्धम् ।

जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मणो लक्षणमुक्तं 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' (ब्र० सू० १।१।२) इति । सृष्टिस्थित्यादि यतो भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थः । तथा च स्कान्दं वचः—

उत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारा नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः ।
बन्धमोक्षौ च पुरुषाद्यमात्स हरिरेकराट् ॥

यतो वा इमानीत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यश्च ।

It is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute, because emancipation is not attained without the grace of Nārāyaṇa, and his grace is not attained without knowledge. The absolute, about which the inquiry is to be instituted, is described in the words (of the second aphorism) : From which the genesis, and so forth, of this. The meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which result emanation, sustentation, and retraction; according to the words of the Skandapurāṇa—

"He is Hari the sole ruler, the spirit from whom are emanation, sustentation, retracation, necessity, knowledge, involution (in illusion), and bondage and liberation;

and according to such Vedic texts, From which are these.

तत्र प्रमाणमप्युक्तं 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्' (ब्र० सू० १।१।३) इति । 'नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' (तै० ब्रा० ३।१२।९।७), 'तं त्वौपनिषदम्' (बृ० ३।९।२६) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यस्तस्यानुमानिकत्वं निराक्रियते । च चानुमानस्य स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रामाण्यमस्ति । तदुक्तं कौर्मे—

श्रुतिसाहाय्यरहितमनुमानं न कुत्रचित् ।
निश्चयात्साधयेदर्थं प्रमाणान्तरमेव च ॥

श्रुतिस्मृतिसहायं यत्प्रमाणान्तरमुत्तमम् ।
प्रमाणपदवीं गच्छेन्नात्र कार्या विचारणा ।। इति ।

The evidence adducible for this is described (in the third aphorism): Because it has its source from the system. That the absolute should be reached by way of inference is rejected by such texts as, He that knows not the Veda cogitates not that mighty one; Him described in the Upaniṣads. Inference, moreover, is not by itself authoritative, as is said in the Kurma-purāṇa—

"Inference, unaccompanied by revelation, in no case,
"Can definitely prove a matter, nor can any other form of evidence;
"Whatsoever other form of evidence, companioned by revelation and tradition,
"Acquires the rank of probation about this there can be no hesitaiion."

शास्त्रस्वरूपमुक्तं स्कान्दे—

ऋग्यजुःसामाथर्वा च भारतं पाञ्चरात्रकम् ।
मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ।।
यच्चातेकूलमेतस्य तच्च शास्त्रं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
अतोऽन्यो ग्रन्थविस्तारो नैव शास्त्रं कुवर्त्म तत् ।। इति ।

What a Śāstra (or system of sacred institutes) is, has been stated in the Skanda-purāṇa—

"The Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, the Sāma-veda, the Atharva-veda, the Mahābhārata, the Pañca-rātra, and the original Rāmāyaṇa, are called Śāstras.

"That also which is conformable to these is called Śāstras.
"Any aggregate of composition other than this is a heterodoxy."

तदनेन, 'अनन्यलभ्यः शास्त्रार्थः' इति न्यायेन भेदस्य प्राप्तत्वेन तत्र न तात्पर्यं किन्तु अद्वैत एव वेदवाक्यानां तात्पर्यम्—इत्यद्वैतवादिनां प्रत्याशा प्रतिक्षिप्ता अनुमानादीश्वरस्य सि द्ध्यभावेन तद्भेदस्यापि ततः सिद्ध्यभावात् । तस्मान्न भेदानुवादकत्वमिति तत्परत्वमवगम्यते । अत एवोक्तम्—

सदागमैकविज्ञेयं समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।
नारायणं सदा वन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥ (वि० त० १) इति ।

According, then, to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these, the Monist view, viz., that the purport of the texts of the Veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to non-duality, is rejected : for as there is no proof of a God from inference, so there is no proof of the duality between God and other things from inference. Therefore there can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality, and the texts must be understood to indicate the duality. Hence it is that it has said—

"I ever laud Nārāyaṇa, the one being to be known from genuine revelation, who transcends the perishable and the imperishable, without imperfections, and of inexhaustible excellences."

शास्त्रस्य तत्र प्रामाण्यमुपपादितं 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (ब्र० सू० १।१।४) इति । समन्वय उपक्रमादिलङ्गम् । उक्तं च बृहत्संहितायाम्—

उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासोऽपूर्वता फलम् ।
अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङ्गं तात्पर्यनिर्णये ॥ इति ।

It has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence of (the existence of) this (ultimate reality, *Brahman*), (The fourth aphorism is) : But that is from the construction. In regard to this, the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the construction, in the Bṛihat-saṁhitā—

"Commencement, conclusion, reiteration, novelty, profit, eulogy, and demonstration are the marks by which the purport is ascertained."

एवं वेदान्ततात्पर्यवशात् तदेव ब्रह्म शास्त्रगम्यमित्युक्तं भवति । दिङ्मात्रमत्र प्रादर्शि । शिष्टमानन्दतीर्थभाष्यव्याख्यानादौ द्रष्टव्यम् । ग्रन्थबहुत्वभियोपरम्यत इति । एतच्च रहस्यं पूर्णप्रज्ञेन मध्यमन्दिरेण वायोस्तृतीयावतारम्मन्येन निरूपितम् ।

प्रथमस्तु हनूमान्स्याद् द्वितीयो भीम एव च ।
पूर्णप्रज्ञस्तृतीयश्च भगवत्कार्यसाधकः ॥

It is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the Upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred institutes. We have here given merely a general indication. What remains may be sought from the Ānandatīrtha-bhāṣya-vyākhyāna (or exposition of the Commentary of Ānanda-tīrtha). We desist for fear of giving an undue prolixity to our treatise. This mystery was promulgated by Pūrṇa-prajña Madhya-mandira, who esteemed himself the third incarnation of Vāyu—

"The first was Hanumat, the second Bhīma,

"The third Pūrṇa-prajña, the worker of the work of the Lord."

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्य तत्र तत्र ग्रन्थसमाप्ताविदं पद्यं लिख्यते—

यस्य त्रीण्युदितानि वेदवचने दिव्यानि रूपाण्यलं
बट् तद्दर्शतमित्थमेव निहितं देवस्य भर्गो महत् ।
वायो रामवचोनयं प्रथमकं पृक्षो द्वितीयं वपु-
र्मध्वो यत्तु तृतीयमेतदमुना ग्रन्थः कृतः केशवे ॥

(म० भा० ता० ३२।१८१) ।

एतत्पद्यार्थस्तु 'बलित्था तद्वपुषे धायि दर्शतं देवस्य भर्गः सहसो यतोऽजनि' (ऋ० १।१४१।१) इत्यादिश्रुतिपर्यालोचनयाऽवगम्यत इति । तस्मात्सर्वस्य शास्त्रस्य विष्णुतत्त्वं सर्वोत्तममित्यत्र तात्पर्यमिति सर्वं निरवद्यम् ।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पूर्णप्रज्ञदर्शनम् ।

After expressing the same idea in various passages, he has written the following stanza at the conclusion of his work—

"That whereof the three divine forms are declared in the text of the Veda, sufficiently,

"Has that been set forth; this is the whole majesty in the splendour of the Veda;

"The first incarnation of the Wind-god was he that bowed to the words of Rāma (Hanumat); the second was Bhīma;

"By this Mādhva, who is the third, this book has been composed in regard to Keśava."

The import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various Vedic texts.

The purport of this is that Viṣṇu is the principle above all others in every system of sacred institutes. Thus all is clear.[1]

A. E. G.

*NOTES*

1. For a further account of Ānandatirtha Madhava see Wilson, Works, vol. i. pp. 138-150. His Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras has been printed in Calcutta.

# CHAPTER VI

## THE PĀŚUPATA SYSTEM OF NAKULĪŚA

तदेतद्वैष्णवमतं दासत्वादिपदवेदनीयं परतन्त्रत्वं, दुःखावहत्वान्न दुःखान्तादीप्सितास्पदम् इत्यरोचयमानाः, पारमैश्वर्यं कामयमानाः, 'पराभिमता मुक्ता न भवन्ति, परतन्त्रत्वात्, पारमैश्वर्यरहितत्वात्, अस्मदादिवत्', 'मुक्तात्मानश्च परमेश्वरगुणसंबन्धिनः, पुरुषत्वे सति समस्तदुःखबीजविधुरत्वात्परमेश्वरवत्—इत्याद्यनुमानं प्रमाणं प्रतिपद्यमानाः, केचन माहेश्वराः परमपुरुषार्थसाधनं पञ्चार्थप्रपञ्चनपरं पाशुपतशास्त्रमाश्रयन्ते ।

Certain Māheśvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the Vaishṇavas known by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like, inasmuch as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another, it cannot be a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends. They recognise as stringent such arguments as. Those depending on another and longing for independence do not become emancipated, because they still depend upon another, being destitute of independence like ourselves and others; and Liberated spirits possess the attributes of the Supreme Deity, because at the same time, that they are spirits they are free from the germ of every pain as the Supreme Deity is. Recognising these arguments, these Māheśvaras adopt the Pāśupata system, which is conversant about the exposition of five categories, as the means to the highest end of man.

तत्रेदमादिसूत्रम्—'अथातः पशुपतेः पाशुपतयोगविधिं व्याख्यास्याम' इति । अस्यार्थः—अत्राथशब्दः पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षः । पूर्वप्रकृतश्च गुरुं प्रति शिष्यस्य प्रश्नः । गुरुस्वरूपं गणकारिकायां निरूपितम्—

> पञ्चकास्त्वष्ट विज्ञेया गणश्चैकस्त्रिकात्मकः ।
> वेत्ता नवगणस्यास्य संस्कर्ता गुरुरुच्यते ॥
> लाभा मला उपायाश्च देशावस्थाविशुद्धयः ।
> दीक्षाकारिबलान्यष्टौ पञ्चकास्त्रीणि वृत्तयः ॥

'तिस्रो वृत्तयः' इति प्रयोक्तव्ये 'त्रीणि वृत्तयः' इति च्छान्दसः प्रयोगः ।

In this system the first aphorism is : Now then we shall expound the Pāśupata union and rites of Paśupati. The meaning is as follows—The word *now* refers to smoething antecedent, and this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the spiritual teacher. The natute of a spiritual teacher is explicated in the Gaṇakārikā—

"But there are eight pentads to be known, and a group, one with three factors;
"He that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier, a spiritual guide.
"The acquisitions, the impurities, the expedients, the localities, the perseverance, the purifications,
"The initiations, and the powers, are the eight pentads, and there are three functions."

The employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three (*triṇi*), instead of the feminine (*tisraḥ*), is a Vedic construction.

तत्र विधीयमानमुपायफलं लाभः । ज्ञानतपोनित्यत्वस्थितिशुद्धिभेदात्पञ्चविधः । तदाह हरदत्ताचार्यः—

ज्ञानं तपोऽथ नित्यत्वं स्थितिः शुद्धिश्च पञ्चमम् ।

(*a*) Acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising, and iṣ divided into five members, viz., knowledge, penance, permanence of the body, constancy, and purity. Thus Haradattācārya says : Knowledge, penance, permanence, constancy, and purity as the fifth.

आत्माश्रितो दुष्टभावो मलः । स मिथ्याज्ञानादिभेदात्पञ्चविधः । तदप्याह—

मिथ्याज्ञानमधर्मश्च सक्तिहेतुश्च्युतिस्तथा ।
पशुत्वमूलं पञ्चैते तन्त्रे हेया विवक्तितः ॥

(गणकारिका, ८) इति ।

(*b*) Impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. This is of five kinds, false conception and the rest. Thus Haradatta also says—

"False conception, demerit, attachment, interestedness, and falling.
"These five, the root of bondage, are in this system especially to be shunned."

साधकस्य शुद्धिहेतुरुपायो वासचर्यादिभेदात्पञ्चविधः तदप्याह—

वासचर्या जपो ध्यानं सदा रुद्रस्मृतिस्तथा ।
प्रपत्तिश्चेति लाभानामुपायाः पञ्च निश्चिताः ।। इति ।

(*c*) An expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to liberation.

These expedients are of five kinds, use of habitation, and the rest. Thus he also says—

"Use of habitation, pious muttering, meditation, constant recollection of Rudra,
"And apprehension, are determined to be the five expedients of acquirements."

येनार्थानुसंधानपूर्वकं ज्ञानतपोवृद्धी प्राप्नोति स देशो गुरुजनादिः । यदाह—

गुरुर्जनो गुहादेशः श्मशानं रुद्र एव च । इति ।

(*d*) Locality is that by which, after studying the categories, the aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity, viz., spiritual teachers and the rest. Thus he says—

"The spiritual teachers, a cavern, a special place, the burning-ground, and Rudra only."

आ लाभप्राप्तेरेकमर्यादावस्थितस्य यदवस्थानं सावस्था व्यक्तादिविशेषणविशिष्टा । तदुक्तम्—

व्यक्ताऽव्यक्ता जया दानं निष्ठा चैव हि पञ्चमम् । इति ।

(*e*) Perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads until the attainment of the desired end, and is distributed into the differenced and the rest. Thus it is said—

"The differenced, the undifferenced, muttering acceptance, and devotion as the fifth."

मिथ्याज्ञानादीनामत्यन्तव्यपोहो विशुद्धिः । सा प्रतियोगिभेदात्पञ्चविधा । तदुक्तं—

अज्ञानस्याप्यधर्मस्य हानिः सङ्गकरस्य च ।
च्युतेर्हानि पशुत्वस्य शुद्धिः पञ्चविधा स्मृता ।। इति ।

दीक्षाकारिपञ्चकं चोक्तम्—

द्रव्यं कालः क्रिया मूर्तिर्गुरुश्चैव हि पञ्चमः । इति ।

बलपञ्चकं च—

गुरुभक्तिः प्रसादश्च मतेर्द्वन्द्वजयस्तथा ।
धर्मश्चैवाप्रमादश्च बलं पञ्चविधं स्मृतम् ।। इति ।

(*f*) Purification is the putting away, once for all, of false conception and the other four impurities. It is distributed into five species according to the five things to be put away. Thus it is said—

"The loss of ignorance, of demerit, of attachment, of interestedness.

"And of falling, is declared to be the fivefold purification of the state of bondage."

(*g*) The five initiations are thus enumerated—

"The material, the proper time, the rite, the image, and the spiritual guide as the fifth."

(*h*) The five powers are as follow—

"Devotion to the spiritual guide, clearness of intellect, conquest of pleasure and pain,

"Merit and carefulness, are declared the five heads of power."

पञ्चमल लघूकरणार्थमागमाविरोधिनोऽन्नार्जनोपाया वृत्तयो भैक्ष्योत्सृष्टयथालब्धाभिधा इति । शेषमशेषमाकर एवावगन्तव्यम् ।

अतःशब्देन दुःखान्तस्य प्रतिपादनम् । आध्यात्मिकादिदुःखत्रयव्यपोहप्रश्नार्थत्वात्तस्य । पशुशब्देन कार्यस्य । परतन्त्रवचनत्वात्तस्य । पतिशब्देन कारणस्य । 'ईश्वरः पतिरीशिता' इति जगत्कारणीभूतेश्वरवचनत्वात्तस्य । योगविधी तु प्रसिद्धौ ।

The three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent with propriety, for the diminution of the five impurities, viz., mendicancy, living upon alms, and living upon what chance supplies. All the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect.

In the first aphorism above recited, the word *now* serves to introduce the exposition of the termination of pain (or emancipation, that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of pain personal, physical, and hyperphysical. By the word *pāśu* we are to understand the effect (or created world), the word designating that which is dependent on something ulterior. Bp the

word *pati* we are to understand the cause (or *principium*), the word designating the Lord, who is the cause of the universe, the *pati*, or ruler. The meaning of the words sacrifices and rites every one knows.

तत्र दुःखान्तो द्विविधः—अनात्मकः सात्मकश्चेति। तत्रानात्मक सर्वदुःखानामत्यन्तोच्छेदरूपः। सात्मकस्तु दृक्क्रियाशक्तिलक्षणमैश्वर्यम्। तत्र दृक्शक्तिरेकापि विषयभेदात्पञ्चविधोपचर्यते—दर्शनं श्रवणं मननं विज्ञानं सर्वज्ञत्वं चेति।

तत्र सूक्ष्म-व्यवहित-विप्रकृष्टाशेष-चाक्षुष-स्पर्शादिविषयं ज्ञानं दर्शनम्। अशेषशब्दविषयं सिद्धिज्ञानं श्रवणम्। समस्तचिन्ताविषयं सिद्धिज्ञानं मननम्। निरवशेषशास्त्रविषयं ग्रन्थतोऽर्थतश्च सिद्धिज्ञानं विज्ञानम्। स्वशास्त्रं येनोच्यते। उक्तानुक्ताशेषार्थेषु समासविस्तरविभागविशेषतश्च तत्त्वव्याप्तसदोदितसिद्धिज्ञानं सर्वज्ञत्वमिति। एषा धीशक्तिः।

In this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds, impersonal and personal. Of these, the impersonal consists in the absolute extirpation of all pains; the personal in supremacy consisting of the visual and active powers. Of these two powers the visual, while only one power, is, according to its diversity of objects, indirectly describable as of five kinds, vision, audition, cogitation, discrimination, and omniscience. Of their five, vision is cognition of every kind of visual, tactual, and their sensible objects, though imperceptible, intercepted, or remote. Audition is cognition of principles conversant about all articulate sounds. Cogitation is cognition of principles, conversant about all kinds of thoughts. Discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole system of institutes, according to the text and according to its significance. Omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, rèlative to all matters declared or not declared, summary or in detail, classified and specialised. Such is this intellectual power.

क्रियाशक्तिरेकापि त्रिविधोपचर्यते—मनोजवित्वं कामरूपित्वं विकरणधर्मित्वं चेति। तत्र निरतिशयशीघ्रकारित्वं मनोजवित्वम्। कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्य स्वेच्छया एवानन्त-सलक्षण-विलक्षण-स्वरूप-करणाधिष्ठातृत्वं कामरूपित्वम्। उपसंहृतकरणस्यापि निरतिशयैश्वर्यसम्बन्धित्वं विकरणधर्मित्वमिति। एषा क्रियाशक्तिः।

The active power, though one only, is indirectly describable as of three kinds, the possession of the swiftness of thought, the power of assuming forms at will, and the faculty of expation. Of these, the possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with unsurpassable celerity. The power of assuming forms at will is the faculty of employing at pleasure, and irrespective of the efficacy of works, the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms. The faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supermacy even when such organs are not employed. Such is this active power.

अस्वतन्त्रं सर्वं कार्यम् । तत्त्रिविधं—विद्या कला पशुश्चेति । एतेषां ज्ञानात्संशयादिनिवृत्तिः । तत्र पशुगुणो विद्या । सापि द्विविधा – बोधाबोधस्वभावभेदात् ।

बोधस्वभावा विवेकाविवेकप्रवृत्तिभेदाद् द्विविधा । सा चित्तमित्युच्यते । चित्तेन हि सर्वः प्राणी बोधात्मकप्रकाशानुगृहीतं सामान्येन विवेचितमविवेचितं चार्थं चेतयत इति तत्र विवेकप्रवृत्तिः प्रमाणमात्रव्यङ्ग्या । पश्वर्थधर्माधर्मिका पुनरबोधात्मिका विद्या ।

All that is effected or educed, depending on something ulterior, it is threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the sentient. Of these, sentiency is the attribute of the sentients. It is of two degrees according to its nature as cognitve or incognitive. Cognitive sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as proceeding indiscriminately. The diseriminate procedu'e, manifestable by the instruments of knowledge, is called the cogitative. For by the cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in general, discriminated or not discriminated, when irradiated by the light which is identical with the external things. The incognitive sentieney, again, is either characterised or not characterised by the objects of the sentient soul.

चेतनपरतन्त्रत्वे सत्यचेतना कला । सापि द्विविधा—कार्याख्या कारणाख्या चेति । तत्र कार्याख्या दशविधा—पृथिव्यादीनि पञ्च तत्त्वानि, रूपादयः पञ्च गुणाश्चेति । कारणाख्या त्रयोदशविधा—ज्ञानेन्द्रियपञ्चकं कर्मेन्द्रियपञ्चकम्, अध्यवसायाभिमानसंकल्पाभिधवृत्तिभेदाद् बुद्ध्यहंकारमनोलक्षणमन्तःकरणत्रयं चेति ।

The insentient, which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious, is of two kinds, as styled the effect and as styled the cause.

The insentient, styled the effect, is of ten kinds, viz., the earth and the other four elements, and their qualities, colour, and the rest. The insentient, called the causal insentient, is of thirteen kinds, viz., the five organs of cognition, the five organs of actions and the three internal organs, intellect, the egoising principle, and the cogitant principle, which have for their respective functions ascertainment, the illusive identification of self with not-self, and determination.

पशुत्वसंबन्धी पशुः। सोऽपि द्विविधः--साञ्जनो निरञ्जनश्चेति। तत्र साञ्जनः शरीरेन्द्रियसम्बन्धी। निरञ्जनस्तु तद्रहितः। तत्प्रपञ्चस्तु पञ्चार्थभाष्यदीपिकादौ द्रष्टव्यः। समस्तसृष्टिसंहारानुग्रहकारि कारणम्। तस्यैकस्यापि गुणकर्मभेदापेक्षया विभागः उक्तः 'पतिः साद्यः' इत्यादिना। तत्र पतित्वं निरतिशयदृक्क्रियाशक्तिमत्वं तेनैश्वर्येण नित्यसंबन्धित्वम्। आद्यत्वमनागन्तुकैश्वर्यसंबन्धित्वम्—इत्यादर्शकारादिभिस्तीर्थकरैर्निरूपितम्।

The sentient spirit, that to which transmigratory conditions pertain, is also of two kinds, the appetent and non-appetent. The appetent is the spirit associated with an organism and organs; the non-appetent is the spirit apart from organism and organs. The details of all this are to be found in the Pañcārtha-bhāṣyadīpikā and other works. The cause is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation. This though one is said to be divided according to a difference of attributes and actions (into Maheśvara Viṣṇu etc.,) The Lord is the possessor of infinite, visual, and active power. He is absolutely first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy, as possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent. This is expounded by the author of the Ādarśa, and other institutional authorities.

चित्तद्वारेणेश्वरसंबन्धहेतुर्योगः (पाशु० सू० ५।२)। स च द्विविधः—क्रियालक्षणः, क्रियोपरमलक्षणश्चेति। तत्र जपध्यानादिरूपः क्रियालक्षणः। क्रियोपरमलक्षणस्तु निष्ठासंविद्गत्यादिसंज्ञितः।

Union is a conjunction of the soul with God through the intellect, and is of two degrees, that characterised by action, and that characterised by cessation of action. Of these, union characterised by action consists of pious muttering, meditation, and so forth; union characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness, etc.

धर्मार्थसाधकव्यापारो विधिः। स च द्विविधः—प्रधानभूतो गुणभूतश्च। तत्र प्रधानभूतः साक्षाद्धर्महेतुश्चर्या। सा द्विविधा—व्रतं द्वाराणि चेति। तत्र भस्मस्नानशयनोपहारजपप्रदक्षिणानि व्रतम्। तदुक्तं भगवता नकुलीशेन—भस्मना त्रिषवणं स्नायीत, भस्मनि शयीत (पा० सू० १।८ अग्रतः) इति। अत्रोपहारो नियमः। स च षडङ्गः। तदुक्तं सूत्रकारेण—हसित-गीत-नृत्य हुडुक्कार-नमस्कार-जप्यषडङ्गोपहारेणोपतिष्ठेतेति।

Rite or ritual is activity efficatious of merit as its end. It is of two orders, the principal and the subsidiary. Of these, the principal is the direct means of merit, religious exercise. Religious exercise is of two kinds, acts of piety and postures. The acts of piety are bathing with sand, lying upon sand, oblations, mutterings, and devotional perambulation. Thus the revered Nakuliśa says—

"He should bathe thrice a day, he should lie upon the dust.
Oblation is an observance divided into six members."

Thus the author of the aphorism says—

"He should worship with the six kinds of oblations, viz., laughter, song, dance, muttering *hum*, adoration, and pious ejaculation."

तत्र हसितं नाम कण्ठोष्ठपुटविस्फूर्जनपुरःसरम् अहहेत्यट्टहासः। गीतं गान्धर्वशास्त्रसमयानुसारेण महेश्वरसंबन्धिगुणधर्मादिनिमित्तानां चिन्तनम्। नृत्यमपि नाट्यशास्त्रानुसारेण हस्तपादादीनामुत्क्षेपणादिकमङ्गप्रत्यङ्गोपाङ्गसहितं भावाभावसमेतं च प्रयोक्तव्यम्। हुडुक्कारो नाम जिह्वातालुसंयोगान्निष्पाद्यमानः पुण्यो वृषनादसदृशो नादः। हुडुगिति शब्दानुकारो वषडितिवत्। यत्र लौकिका भवन्ति तत्रैतत्सर्वं गूढं प्रयोक्तव्यम्। शिष्टं प्रसिद्धम्।

Laughter is a loud laugh, Aha, Aha, by dilatation of the throat and lips. Song is a celebration of the qualities, glories, etc., of Maheśvara, according to the conventions of the Gandharva-śāstra, or art of music. The dance also is to be employed according to the *ars saltatoria*, accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet, and with motions of the limbs, and with outward indications of internal sentiment. The ejaculation *hum*, is a sacred utterance, like the bellowing of a bull, accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the palate, an imitation of the sound *hudung* ascribed to a bull, like the exclamation Vaṣat. Where the uninitiated are, all this should be gone through in secret. Other details are too familiar to require exposition.

द्वाराणि तु क्राथन-स्पन्दन-मन्दन-शृङ्गारणावितत्करणावितद्भाषणानि । तत्रासुप्तस्यैव सुप्तलिङ्गप्रदर्शनं क्राथनम् । वाय्वभिभूतस्येव शरीरावयवानां कम्पनम् स्पन्दनम् । उपहतपादेन्द्रियस्येव गमनम् मन्दनम् । रूपयौवनसम्पन्नां कामिनीमवलोक्यात्मानम् कामुकमिव यैर्विलासैः प्रदर्शयति तत् शृङ्गारणम् ।

कार्याकार्यविवेकविकलस्येव लोकनिन्दितकर्मकरणमवितत्करणम् । व्याहतापार्थकादिशब्दोच्चारणमवितद्भाषणमिति ।

गुणभूतस्तु विधिश्चर्यानुग्राहकोऽनुस्नानादिः भैक्ष्योच्छिष्टादिनिर्मितायोग्यताप्रत्ययनिवृत्यर्थः । तदप्युक्तं सूत्रकारेण— अनुस्नाननिर्माल्यलिङ्गधारीति ।

The postures are snoring, trembling, limping, wooing acting absurdly, talking nonsensically. Snoring is showing all the signs of being asleep while really awake. Trembling is a convulsive movement of the joints as if under an attack of rheumatism. Limping is walking if the legs were disabled. Wooing is simulating the gestures of an *innamorato* on seeing a young and pretty woman. Acting absurdly is doing acts which every one dislikes, as if bereft of all sense of what should and what should not be done. Talking nonsensically is the utterance of words which contradict each other, or which have no meaning, and the like.

The subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging, living on broken food, etc. Thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms : Bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing.

तत्र समासो नाम धर्मिमात्राभिधानम् । तच्च प्रथमसूत्र एव कृतम् । पञ्चानां पदार्थानां प्रमाणतः पञ्चाभिधानं विस्तरः । स खलु राशीकरभाष्ये द्रष्टव्यः । एतेषां यथासम्भवं लक्षणतोऽसङ्करेणाभिधानं विभागः । स तु विहित एव ।

शास्त्रान्तरेभ्योऽमीषां गुणातिशयेन कथनं विशेषः । तथा हि—अन्यत्र दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव दुःखान्तः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यप्राप्तिश्च । अन्यत्राभूत्वा भावि कार्यम् इह तु नित्यं पश्वादि । अन्यत्र सापेक्षं कारणम् । इह तु निरपेक्षो भगवानेव । अन्यत्र कैवल्यादिफलको योगः । इह तु पारमैश्वर्यदुःखान्तफलकः । अन्यत्र पुनरावृत्तिरूपस्वर्गादिफलको विधिः । इह पुनरपुनरावृत्तिरूपसामीप्यादिफलकः ।

(It has been stated above that omniscience, a form of the cognitive power, is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth, relative to all matters declared or not declared, summary, or in detail). The summory is the enouncement of the subjects of

attributes generally. This is accomplished in the first aphorism: (Now then we shall expound the Pāśupata union and rites of Paśupati). Detail is the fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the instruments of true knowledge. This is to be found in these Rāśīkara-bhāṣya. Distribution is the distinct enouncement of these categories, as far as possible according to definition. It is an enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters, different from that of other recognised systems. For example, the cessation of pain (or emancipation) is in other systems (as in the Sānkhya) the mere termination of miseries, but in this system it is the attainment of supramecy or of the divine perfections. In other systems the create is that which has become, and that which shall become, but in this system it is eternal, the spirits, and so forth. the sentient and insentient. In other systems the *principium* is determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of works, whereas in this system the *principium* is the Lord not thus determined other institutes union results in insolation, etc., while in these institutes it results in cessation of pains be attainment of the divine perfections. In other systems paradise and similar spheres involve a return to metempsychosis, but in this system they result in nearness to the Supreme Being, either followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory experiences.

ननु महदेतदिन्द्रजालं यन्निरपेक्षः परमेश्वरः कारणमिति । तथात्वे कर्मवैफल्यं स्वकार्याणां समसमयसमुत्पादश्चेति दोषद्वयं प्रादुःष्यात् ।

मैवं मन्येथाः । व्यधिकरणत्वात् । यदि निरपेक्षस्य भगवतः कारणत्वं स्यात्तर्हि कर्मणो वैफल्ये किमायातम् ? प्रयोजनाभाव इति चेत् —कस्य प्रयोजनाभावः कर्मवैफल्ये कारणम् ? किं कर्मिणः, किं वा भगवतः ? नाद्यः । ईश्वरेच्छानुगृहीतस्य कर्मणः सफलत्वोपपत्तेः । तदननुगृहीतस्य यतातिप्रभृतिकर्मवत् कदाचिन्निष्फलत्वसंभवाच्च । न चैतावता कर्मसु अप्रवृत्तिः । कर्षकादिवदुपपत्तेः । ईश्वरेच्छायत्तत्वाच्च पशूनां प्रवृत्तेः ।

Great, indeed, an opponent may say, is this aggregate of illusions, since if God's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works, then merits will be fruitless, and all created things will be simultaneously envolved (there being no reason why this should be created at one time, and that at an other), and thus there will emerge two difficulties.

Think not so, replies the Pāśupata, for your supposition is baseless. If the Lord, irrespective of the efficacy of works, be the cause of all, and thus the efficacy of works be without results, what follows ? If you rejoin that an absence of motives will follow, in whom, we ask, will this absence of motives follows ? If the efficacy of works be without result, will causality belong to the doer of the works as to the Lord ? It cannot belong to the doer of the works, for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only when furthered by the will of the creator, and the efficacy so furthered may sometimes be fruitless, as in the case of the works of Yayāti, and others. From this it will by no means follow that no one will engage in works, for they will engage in them as the husbandman engages in husbanary, though the crop be uncertain. Again, sentient creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the creator.

नापि द्वितीयः । परमेश्वरस्य पर्याप्तकामत्वेन कर्मसाध्यप्रयोजनापेक्षाया अभावात् । यदुक्तं समसमयसमुत्पाद इति, तदप्ययुक्तम् । अचिन्त्यशक्तिकस्य परमेश्वरस्य इच्छानुविधायिन्या अव्याहतक्रियाशक्त्या कायकारित्वाभ्युपगमात् । तदुक्तं सम्प्रदायविद्भिः—

कर्मादिनिरपेक्षस्तु स्वेच्छाचारी यतो ह्ययम् ।
ततः कारणतः शास्त्रे सर्बकारणकारणम् ।। इति ।

Nor does the causality pertain to the Lord olone, for as all his desires are already satisfied, he cannot be actuated by motives to be realised by works. As for your statement continues the Pāśupata that all things will be simultaneously evolved, this is unreasonable, inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed active power which conforms itself to the will of the Lord, whose power is incoficeivable. It has accordingly been said by those versed in sacred tradition—

"Since he, acting according to his will, is not actuated by the efficacy of works,
"For this reason is he in this system the cause of all causes".

ननु दर्शनान्तरेऽपीश्वरज्ञानान्मोक्षो लभ्यत एवेति कुतोऽस्य विशेष इति चेत्—मैवं वादीः । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । किमीश्वरविषयज्ञानमात्रं निर्वाणकारणं किं वा साक्षात्कारः अथ वा यथावत्तत्त्वनिश्चयः ?

Some one may urge : In another system emancipation is attained through a knowledge of God, where does the difference lie ? Say not so, replies the Pāśupata, for you will be caught in a trilemma. Is the mere knowledge of God the cause of emancipation, or the presentation, or the accurate characterisation, of God ?

नाद्यः । शास्त्रमन्तरेणापि प्राकृतजनवद् 'देवानामधिपो महादेवः' इति ज्ञानोत्पत्तिमात्रेण मोक्षसिद्धौ शास्त्राभ्यासवैफल्यप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः । अनेकमलप्रचयोपचितानां पिशितलोचनानां पशूनाम् परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारानुपपत्तेः ।

तृतीयेऽस्मन्मतापातः । पाशुपतशास्त्रमन्तरेण यथावत्तत्त्वनिश्चयानुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—

ज्ञानमात्रे वृथा शास्त्रं साक्षाद् दृष्टिस्तु दुर्लभा ।
पञ्चार्थादन्यतो नास्ति यथावत्तत्त्वनिश्चयः ।। इति ।

Not the mere knowledge, for then it would follow that the study of any system would be superfluous, inasmuch as without any institutional system one might, like the uninstructed, attain emancipation by the bare cognition that Mahādeva is the Lord of the gods, Nor is presentation or intuition of the deity the cause of emancipation, for no intuition of the deity is competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of various impurities, and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh. On the third alternative, viz., that the cause of emancipation is an accurate characterisation of the deity, you will be obliged to consent to our doctrine, inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be realised apart from the system of the Pāśupatas. Therefore it is that our great teacher has said—

"If by mere knowledge, it is not according to any system, but
intuition is unattainable;
'There is no accurate characterisation of principles otherwise
than by the five categories".

तस्मात्पुरुषार्थकामैः पुरुषधौरेयैः पञ्चार्थप्रतिपादनपरं पाशुपतशास्त्रमाश्रयणीयमिति रमणीयम् ।।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे
नकुलीशपाशुपतदर्शनम् ।।

Therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man must adopt the system of the Pāśupatas, which undertakes the exposition of the five categories. A. E. G.

# CHAPTER VII

## THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA

[The seventh system in Mādhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha is the Śaiva-darśana. This sect is very prevalent in the South of India, especially in the Tamil country; it is said to have arisen there about the eleventh century A D. Several valuable contributions have been lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the Rev. H. R. Hoisington and the Rev. T. Foulkes The former especially, by his excellent articles in the American Oriental Society's Journal, has performed a great service to the students of Hindu philosophy. He has there translated the Tattuva-Kaṭṭalei, or law of the Tattwas, the Śiva-Gnānapotham, or instruction in the knowledge of God, and the Śiva-Pirakāsam, or light of Śiva, and the three works shed immense light on the outline as given by Mādhava. One great use of the latter is to enable us to recognise the original Sanskrit names in their Tamil disguish, no easy matter occasionally, as *aṛul* for *anugraha* and *ttḍchei* for *dikṣā* may testify.

The Śaivas have considerable resemblance to the Theistic Sānkhya; they hold that God, souls, and matter are from eternity distinct entities, and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to God. Śiva is the chief deity of the system, and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast, its fetters, and its owner. Paśupati is a well-known name of Śiva, as the master or creator of all things.

There seem to be three different sets of so-called Saiva sūtras. One is in five books, called by Colebrooke the Paśupati śāstra, which is probably the work quoted by Mādhava in the account of the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas; another is in three books, with a commentary by Kṣemarāja, with its first sūtra, *caitanyam ātmā*. The third was commented on by Abhinava-gupta, and opens with the śloka given in the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha, p. 91, lines 1-4. The Ms. which I consulted in Calcutta read the first words—

*Kathañcid āsādya Maheś varasya dāsyam.*

None of these works, however, appear to be the authority of the present sect. They seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight Āgamas and some of the Purāṇas. A list of the Āgamas is given in Mr. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Śaiva Religion;" and of these the Kiraṇa and Karaṇa are quoted in the following treatise].

तमिमं 'परमेश्वरः कर्मादिनिरपेक्षः कारणमिति' पक्षं वैषम्य-वैर्घृण्य-दोष-दूषित्वात् प्रतिक्षिपन्तः, केचन माहेश्वराः शैवागमसिद्धान्ततत्त्वं यथावदीक्षमाणाः, 'कर्मादिसापेक्षः परमेश्वरः कारणमिति' पक्षं कक्षीकुर्वाणाः, पक्षान्तरमुपक्षिपन्ति—पतिपशुपाशभेदात् त्रयः पदार्था इति । तदुक्तं तन्त्रतत्त्वज्ञैः—

त्रिपदार्थं चतुष्पादं महातन्त्रं जगद्गुरुः ।
सूत्रेणैकेन संक्षिप्य प्राह विस्तरतः पुनः ॥ इति ।

## THE ŚAIVA-DARŚANA

Certain, however, of the Māheśvara sect receiving the system of truth authoritatively laid down in the Śaiva Āgama,[1] reject the forgoing opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause as independent of our actions, etc.," on the ground of its being liable to the imputation of partiality and cruelty. They, on the contrary, hold the opinion that "the Supreme Being is a cause in dependence on our actions, etc.," and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the Lord, the soul, and the world (or literally "the master", "the cattle", and "the fetter"). As has been said by those well versed in the Tantra doctrines—

> "The Guru of the world, having first condensed in one sūtra the great tantra, possessed of three categories and four feet, has again declared the same at full length".

अस्यार्थः—उक्तास्त्रयः पदार्था यस्मिन्सन्ति तत्त्रिपदार्थं, विद्याक्रियायोगचर्याख्याश्चत्वारः पादा यस्मिंस्तच्चतुश्चरणं महातन्त्रमिति । तत्र पशूनामस्वतन्त्रत्वात्पाशानामचैतन्यात् तद्विलक्षणस्य पत्युः प्रथममुद्देशः । चेतनत्वसाधर्म्यात् पशूनां तदानन्तर्यम् । अवशिष्टानां पाशानामन्ते विनिवेश इति क्रमनियमः ।

दीक्षायाः परमपुरुषार्थहेतुत्वात् तस्याश्च पशुपाशेश्वरस्वरूपनिर्णयोपायभूतेन मन्त्रमन्त्रेश्वरादिमाहात्म्यनिश्चायकेन ज्ञानेन विना निष्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात् तदवबोधकस्य विद्यापादस्य प्राथम्यम् । अनेकविधसाङ्गदीक्षाविधिप्रदर्शकस्य क्रियापादस्य तदानन्तर्यम् । योगेन विना नाभिमतप्राप्तिरिति साङ्गयोगज्ञापकस्य योगपादस्य

तदुत्तरत्वम् । विहिताचरणनिषिद्धवर्जनरूपां चर्यां विना योगोऽपि न निर्वहतीति तत्प्रतिपादकस्य चर्यापादस्य चरमत्वमिति विवेकः ।

The meaning of this is as follows—Its three categories are the three before mentioned; its four feet are learning, caremonial action, meditation, and morality, hence it is called the great Tantra, possessed of three categories and four feet. Now the 'souls" are not independent, and the "fetters" are unintelligent, hence the Lord, as being different from these, is first declared; next follows the account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing intelligence; lastly follow the "fetters" or matter, such is the order of the arrangement[2]. Since the ceremony of initiation is the means to the highest human end, and this cannot be accomplished without knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns, the Lords of the hymns, etc., and is a means for the ascertainment of the real nature of the "cattle", the "fetter", and the "master", we place as first the "foot" of *knowledge* (*Jñāna*) which makes known all this unto us[3] Next follows the "foot" of *ceremonial action* (*kriyā*) which declares the various rules of initiation with the divers component parts thereof. Without meditation the end cannot be attained, hence the "foot" of *meditation* (*yoga*) follows next, which declares the various kinds of *yoga* with their several parts. And as meditation is worthless without practice, i. e., the fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is forbidden, lastly follows the fourth "foot" of practical duty (*caryā*), which includes all this.

तत्र पतिपदार्थः शिवोऽभिमतः । मुक्तात्मनां विद्येश्वरादीनां च यद्यपि शिवत्वमस्ति, तथापि परमेश्वरपारतन्त्र्यात् स्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति । ततश्च तनुकरणभुवनादीनां भावानां संनिवेशविशिष्टत्वेन कार्यत्वमवगम्यते । तेन च कार्यत्वेनैषां बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमनुमीयत इत्यनुमानवशात्परमेश्वरप्रसिद्धिरुपपद्यते ।

Now Śiva is held to be the Lord (or master). Although participation in the divine nature of Śiva belongs to liberated souls and to such beings as Vidyeśvara, etc., yet these are not independent, since they depend on the Supreme Being; and the nature of an effect is recognised to belong to the worlds, etc., which resemble him, from the vera fact of the orderly arrangement of their parts And from their thus being effects we infer that they must have been

caused by an intelligent being. Bv the strength of this inference is the universal acknowledgment of a Supreme Being confirmed.

ननु देहस्यैव तावत्कार्यत्वमसिद्धम् । नहि क्वचित्केनचित् कदाचित् देहः क्रियमाणो दृष्टचरः । सत्यम्, तथापि न केनचित् क्रियमाणत्वं देहस्य दृष्टमिति कर्तृदर्शनापह्नवो न युज्यते । तस्यानुमेयत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः ।

तथा हि— देहादिकं कार्यं भवितुमर्हति संनिवेशविशिष्टत्वात् विनश्वरत्वाद्वा घटादिवत् । तेन च कार्यत्वेन बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमनुमातुं सुकरमेव ।

विमतं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वाद् घटवत् । तदुक्तसाधनं तदुक्तसाध्यं यथार्थादि । न यदेवं न तदेवं यथात्मादि । परमेश्वरानुमानप्रामाण्यसाधनमन्यत्राकारीत्युपरम्यते ।

अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा ।।

इति न्यायेन प्राणिकृतकर्मापेक्षया परमेश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेः ।

"But may we not object thāt it is not proved that the body is thus an effect ? for certainly none has ever, at any time or place, seen a body being made by any one". We grant it : yet it is not proper to deny that a body has same maker on the ground that its being made has not been seen by any one, since this can be established from inference [if not from actual perception].

Bodies, etc., must be effects, because they possess an orderly arrangement of parts, or because they are destructible, as jars, etc., and from their being effects it is easy to infer that they must have been caused bv an intelligent being. Thus the subject in the fact that it is an effect, like jars, etc.; that which has the aforementioned middle term (*sādhana*) must have the aforementioned major (*sādhya*); and that which has not the former will not have the latter, as the soul, etc[4]. The argument which establishes the authority of the original inference to prove a Supreme Being has been given elsewhere, so we refrain from giving it at length here. In fact, that God is the universal agent, but not irrespective of the actions done by living beings, is proved by the current verse[5]—

"This ignorant *jīvātman*, incapable of its own true pleasures or pains, if it were only under God's direction [and its own merits not taken into account], would always go to heaven or always to hell"[6].

न च स्वातन्त्र्यविहृतिरिति वाच्यम् । करणापेक्षया कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यविहृतेरनुपलम्भात् । कोषाध्यक्षापेक्षस्य राज्ञः प्रसादादिना दानवत् । यथोक्तं सिद्धगुरुभिः—

स्वतन्त्रस्याप्रयोज्यत्वं करणादिप्रयोक्तृता ।
कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यमेतद्धि न कर्माद्यनपेक्षता ।। इति ।।

Nor can you object that this opinion violates God's independence, since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that he does not act irrespectively of means; just as we say that the kings's bounty shows itself in gifts, but these are not irrespective of his treasurer. As has been said by the Siddha Guru—

"It belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to employ means, etc.;

"This is an agent's true independence, and not the acting irrespectively of works, etc."

तथा च तत्तत्कर्माशयवशाद् भोग-तत्साधन-तदुपादानादि-विशेषज्ञः कर्तानुमानादिसिद्ध इति सिद्धम् । तदिदमुक्तं तत्रभवद्भिर्बृहस्पतिभिः—

इह भोग्यभोगसाधनतदुपादानादि यो विजानाति ।
तमृते भवेन्न हीदं पुंस्कर्माशयविपाकज्ञम् ।। इति ।

अन्यत्रापि—

विवादाध्यासितं सर्वं बुद्धिमत्कर्तृपूर्वकम् ।
कार्यत्वादावयोः सिद्धं कार्यं कुम्भादिकं यथा ।। इति ।

And thus we conclude that inference (as well as Śruti) establishes the existence of an agent who knows the various fruits of the various individual merits. This has been thus declared by the venerable Bṛhaspati—

"He who knows the fruits to be enjoyed, their means and material causes,—

"Apart from him this world knows not how the desert that resides in accumulated actions should ripen".—

"The universe is the subject of our argument, and it must have had an intelligent maker,

"This we maintain from its being an effect, just as we see in any other effect as jars, etc."

सर्वकर्तृत्वादेवास्य सर्वज्ञत्वं सिद्धम् । अज्ञस्य करणासंभवात् । उक्तं च श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रैः—

सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वात्साधनाङ्गफलैः सह ।
यो यज्जानाति कुरुते स तदेवेति सुस्थितम् ।। इति ।

God's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with everything, and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot produce a thing.[7] This has been said by the illustrious Mṛgendra[8]—

"He is omniscient from his being the maker of all things : for it is an established principle."

"That he only can make a thing who knows it with its means, parts, end".

अस्तु तर्हि स्वतन्त्रः ईश्वरः कर्ता । स तु नाशरीरः । घटादिकार्यस्य शरीरवता कुलालादिना क्रियमाणत्वदर्शनात् । शरीरवत्त्वे चास्मदादिवदीश्वरः । क्लेशयुक्तोऽसर्वज्ञः परिमितशक्ति प्राप्नुयादिति चेत्—मैवं मंस्थाः । अशरीरस्याप्यात्मनः स्वशरीरवन्दादौ कर्तृत्वदर्शनात् ।

अभ्युपगम्यापि ब्रूमहे । शरीरवत्त्वेऽपि भगवतो न प्रागुक्तदोषानुषङ्गः । परमेश्वरस्य हि मलकर्मादिपाशजालासंभवेन प्राकृतं शरीरं न भवति, किं तु शाक्तम् । शक्तिरूपैरीशानादिभिः पञ्चभिः मन्त्रैः मस्तकादिकल्पनायाम्—ईशानमस्तकः, तत्पुरुषवक्त्रः, अघोरहृदयः, वामदेवगुह्यः, सद्योजातपादः ईश्वरः—इति प्रसिद्धया यथाक्रमानुग्रहतिरोभावादानलक्षणस्थितिलक्षणोद्भवलक्षणाकृत्यपञ्चककारणं, स्वेच्छानिर्मितं तच्छरीरं न चास्मच्छरीरसदृशम् । तदुक्तं श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रैः—

मलाद्यसंभवाच्छाक्तं वपुर्नैतादृशं प्रभोः ।। इति ।

अन्यत्रापि—

तद्वपुःपञ्चभिर्मन्त्रैः पञ्चकृत्योपयोगिभिः ।
ईशतत्पुरुषाघोरवामाद्यैर्मस्तकादिमत् ।। इति ।।

"Well", our opponents may say, "we concede that God is an independent maker, but then he has no body.[9] Now experience shows that all effects, as jars, etc., are produced by beings, possessed of bodies, as potters, etc.; but if God were possessed of a body, then he would be like us subject to trouble, and no longer be omniscient or omnipotent".

We, however, deny this, for we see that the incorporeal soul does still produce motion, etc., in its associated body; moreover,

even though we conceded that God *did* possess a body, we should still maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue. The Supreme Being, as he has no possible connection with the fetters of matter, such as, *mala*[10] action, etc., cannot have a material body, but only a body of pure energy (Śākta),[11] since we know that his body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of Śakti, according to the well-known text : "The Supreme has the *Iśāna* as his head, the *Tatpuruṣa* as his mouth, the *Aghora* as his heart, the *Vāmedeva* as his secret parts, and the *Sadyojāta* as his feet."[12] And this body, created according to his own will, is not like our bodies, but is the cause of the five operations of the Supreme, which are respectively grace, obscuration, destruction, preservation, and production[13]. This has been said in the Śrīmat Mṛgendra—

> "From the impossibility of its possessing *mala*, etc., the body of the Supreme is of pure energy, and not like ours."

And it has also been said elsewhere—

> "His body is composed of the five mantras which are subservient to the five operations,"
>
> "And his head, etc., are formed out of the Īsa, Tatpuruṣa, Aghora, Vāma, and other hymns."[3]

ननु पञ्चवक्त्रस्त्रिपञ्चदृगित्यादिनागमेषु परमेश्वरस्य मुख्यत एव शरीरेन्द्रियादियोग: श्रूयत इति चेत् --सत्यम्, निराकारे ध्यानपूजाद्यसंभवेन भक्तानुग्रहकारणाय तत्तदाकारग्रहणाविरोधात् ।

तदुक्तं श्रीमत्पौष्करे—

If you object to this view that "such passages in Āgamas as 'He is five-faced and fifteen-eyed', assert prominently the fact that the Supreme Being is endowed with a body organs, etc.," we conced what you say, but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants, since meditation, worship, ete., are impossible towards a Being entirely destitute of form. This has been said in the Paushkara—

> "This form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the devotee."

And similarly elsewhere—

> "Thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of form;"
>
> "For the understanding cannot reach to a formless object."

Bhojarāja[14] has thus detailed the five operations—

"Fivefold are his operations, creation, preservation, destruction, and obscuration,"

"And to these must be added the active grace of him who is eternally exalted."

साधकस्य तु रक्षार्थं तस्य रूपमिदं स्मृतम् । इति ।

अन्यत्रापि—

आकारवांस्त्वं नियमादुपास्यो
न वस्त्वनाकारमुपैति बुद्धिः ।। इति ।

कृत्यपञ्चकं च प्रपञ्चितं भोजराजेन—

पञ्चविधं तत्कृत्यं सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारतिरोभावः ।
तद्वदनुग्रहकरणं प्रोक्तं सततोदितस्यास्य ।। इति ।

एतच्च कृत्यपञ्चकं शुद्धाध्वविषये साक्षाच्छिवकर्तृकं कृच्छ्राध्वविषये त्वनन्तादिद्वारेणेति विवेकः । तदुक्तं श्रीमत्करणे—

शुद्धेऽध्वनि शिवः कर्ता प्रोक्तोऽनन्तोऽहिते प्रभोः ।। इति ।

Now these five operations, in the view of the pure Path, are held to be performed directly by Śiva but in that of the toilsome Path they are ascribed to Ananta,[15] as is declared in the Śrīmat Karaṇa[16]—

"In the Pure Path Śiva is declared to be the only agent, but Ananta in that which is opposed to the One Supreme."

एवं च शिवशब्देन शिवत्वयोगिनां मन्त्रमन्त्रेश्वरमहेश्वरमुक्तात्मशिवानां सवाचकानां शिवत्वप्राप्तिसाधनेन दीक्षादिनोपायकलापेन सह पतिपदार्थसंग्रहः कृत इति बोद्धव्यम् । तदित्थं पतिपदार्थो निरूपितः ।

It must here be understood that the word Śiva includes in its proper meaning "the Lord", all those who have attained to the state of Śiva, as the Lords of the Mantras, Maheśvara, the emancipated souls who have become Śivas, and the inspired teachers (*vāchakas*), together with all the various means, as initiation, etc., for obtaining the state of Śiva. Thus has been explained the first category, the Lord (*pati*).

संप्रति पशुपदार्थो निरूप्यते—अनणुः क्षेत्रज्ञादिपदवेदनीयो जीवात्मा पशुः । न तु चार्वाकादिवद् देहादिरूपः । 'नान्यदृष्टं स्मरत्यन्यः' इति न्यायेन प्रतिसंधानानु-

पपत्तेः । नापि नैयायिकादिवत्प्रकाश्यः । अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । तदुक्तम्—

आत्मा यदि भवेन्मेयस्तस्य माता भवेत्परः ।
पर आत्मा तदानीं स्यात्स परो यदि दृश्यते ॥ इति ।

We now proceed to explain the second category, the soul (*paśu*). The individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic,[17] the *Kṣetrajña*, or knower of the body,[18] etc., is the *Paśu*. For we must not say with the Cārvākas that it is the same as the body, since on this view we could not account for memory, as there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen. Nor may we say with the Naiyāyikas that it is cognisable by perception,[19] as this would involve an *ad infinitum* regressus. As has been said—

"It the soul were cognisable, there would need to be again a second knower;"[20]
"And this would require another still, if the second were itself to be known."

न च जैनवदव्यापकः नापि बौद्धवत्क्षणिकः । देशकालाभ्यामनवच्छिन्नत्वात् । तदप्युक्तम्—

अनवच्छिन्नसद्भावं वस्तु यद्देशकालतः ।
तन्नित्यं विभु चेच्छन्तीत्यात्मनो विभुनित्यता ॥ इति ।

Nor must we hold it non-pervading with the Jainas, nor momentary with the Buddhas, since it is not limited by space or time. As has been said—

"That object which is unlimited in its nature by space or time;"
"They hold to be eternal and pervading,—hence the soul's all-pervadingness and eternity."

नापि अद्वैतवादिनामिवैकः । भोगप्रतिनियमस्य पुरुषबहुत्वज्ञापकस्य संभवात् । नापि सांख्यानामिवाकर्ता । पाशजालापोहने नित्यनिरतिशयदृक्क्रियारूपचैतन्यात्मकशिवत्वश्रवणात् । तदुक्तं श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रैः—'पाशान्ते शिवताश्रुतेः' इति ।

चैतन्यं दृक्क्रियारूपं तदस्त्यात्मनि सर्वदा ।
सर्वतश्च यतो मुक्तौ श्रूयते सर्वतोमुखम् । इति ।

तत्त्वप्रकाशेऽपि—

मुक्तात्मानोऽपि शिवाः किं त्वेते यत्प्रसादतो मुक्ताः ।
सोऽनादिमुक्त एको विज्ञेयः पञ्चमन्त्रतनुः ॥ इति ।

Nor may we say with the Vedāntin that it is only one, since the apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many individual souls; nor with the Sānkhyas that it is devoid of action, since, when all the various "fetters" are removed, Śruti informs us of a state of identity with Śiva, which consists in intelligence in the form of an eternal and infinite vision and action.[21] This has been declared in the Śrīmat Mṛgendra—

> "It is revealed that Identity with Śiva results when all fetters are removed."

And again—

> "Intelligence consists in vision and action, and since in his soul."

> "This exists always and on every side, therefore, after liberation, Śruti calls it that which faces every way."

It is also said in the Tattva-prakāśa—

> "The liberated souls are themselves Śivas, but these are liberated by his favour;"

> "He is to be known as the one eternally liberated, whose body is the five Mantras."

पशुस्त्रिविध:—विज्ञानाकल-प्रलयाकल-सकलभेदात् । तत्र प्रथमो विज्ञान-योगसंन्यासैर्भोगेन वा कर्मक्षये सति कर्मक्षयार्थस्य कलादिभोगबन्धस्य अभावात् केवल-मलमात्रयुक्तो 'विज्ञानाकल' इति व्यपदिश्यते । द्वितीयस्तु प्रलयेन कलादेरुपसंहा-रान्मलकर्मयुक्त: 'प्रलयाकल' इति व्यवह्रियते । तृतीयस्तु मलमायाकर्मात्मबन्धत्रय-सहित: 'सकल' इति संलिप्यते ।

Now the souls are threefold, as denominated *vijñānākalāḥ*, *pralayākalāḥ*, and *sakalāḥ*.[22] (*a*) The first are those who are under. the influence of *mala* only, since their actions are cancelled by receiving their proper fruits, or by abstraction, contemplation, and knowledge, and since they have no "fetters in the form of enjoyments, such as *kalā*, ete. (which fetters would, however, be the cause of cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit). (*b*) The second are those who are under the influence of *mala* and *karman*, since in their case *kalā*, etc., are destroyed by mundane destructions, hence their name *pralayākala*. (*c*) The third are those who are bound in the three fetters of *mala*, *māyā*, and *karman*, hence their name *sakala*.

तत्र प्रथमो द्विप्रकारो भवति—समाप्तकलुषासमाप्तकलुषभेदात् । तत्राद्यान् कालुष्यपरिपाकवतः पुरुषधौरेयानधिकारयोग्यान् अनुगृह्य अनन्तादिविद्देश्वराष्टपदं प्रापयति । तद्विद्येश्वराष्टकं निर्दिष्टं बहुदैवत्ये—

अनन्तश्चैव सूक्ष्मश्च तथैव च शिवोत्तमः ।
एकनेत्रस्तथैवैकरुद्रश्चापि त्रिमूर्त्तिकः ॥
श्रीखण्डश्च शिखण्डी च प्रोक्ता विद्येश्वरा इमे । इति ।

The first class are again subdivided into *samāptakalushāh* and *asamāpta-kaluṣāh*, according as their inherent corruption is perfectly exhausted or not. The former,—having received the mature penalities of their corruptions,—are now, as foremost of men and worthy of the privilege, raised by Śiva's favour to the rank of the Lords of Knowledge (the Vidyeśvaras), Ananta, and the rest. This ogdoad of the Lords of Knowledge is described in the Bahu-daivatya—

"Ananta, and Sūkṣma, and Śivottama,"
"Ekanetra, and again Ekarudra and Trimūrttika,"
"Śrīkaṇṭha and Śikhaṇḍin,—these are declared to be the Vidyeśvaras."

अन्या (न्त्या)न्सप्तकोटिसंख्यातान्मन्त्राननुग्रहकरणान्विधत्ते । तदुक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे—

पशवस्त्रिविधाः प्रोक्ता विज्ञानप्रलयकेवलौ सकलः ।
मलयुक्तस्तत्राद्यो मलकर्मयुतो द्वितीयः स्यात् ॥
मलमायाकर्मयुतः सकलस्तेषु द्विधा भवेदाद्यः ।
आद्यः समाप्तकलुषोऽसमाप्तकलुषो द्वितीयः स्यात् ॥
आद्याननुगृह्य शिवो विद्येशत्वे नियोजयत्यष्टौ ।
मन्त्रांश्च करोत्यपरांस्ते चोक्ताः कोटयः सप्त ॥ इति ।

सोमशंभुनाप्यभिहितम्—

विज्ञानाकलनामैको द्वितीयः प्रलयाकलः ।
तृतीयः सकयः शास्त्रेऽनुग्राह्यस्त्रिविधो मतः ॥
तत्राद्यो मलमात्रेण युक्तोऽन्यो मलकर्मभिः ।
कलादिभूमिपर्यन्ततत्त्वैस्तु सकलो युतः ॥ इति ।

The latter Śiva, in his mercy, raises to the rank of the seventy million Mantras.[23] All this is explained in the Tattva-prakāśa.[24] Similarly Soma-Śambhu has said—

"One class is named *vijñānākala*, the second *pralayākala*, "
"The third *sakala*,—these are the three whom the Śāstra regards as objects of mercy."
"The first is united to *mala* alone, the second of *mala* and *karma*,"
"The third are united to all the tattvas beginning with *kalā* and ending with "earth."[25]

प्रलयाकलोऽपि द्विविधः—पक्वपाशद्वयस्तद्विलक्षणश्च । तत्र प्रथमो मोक्षं प्राप्नोति । द्वितीयस्तु पुर्यष्टकयुतः कर्मवशान्नानाविधजन्मभाग्भवति । तदप्युक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे---

प्रलयाकलेषु येषामपक्वमलकर्मणी व्रजन्त्येते ।
पुर्यष्टकदेहयुता योनिषु निखिलासु कर्मवशात् ।। इति ।

The *Pralayākalāḥ* are also twofold, as being *pakvapāśadvaya* or not, i.e, those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured, and those in whom they are not. The former attain liberation, but the latter, by the power of *karman*, are endowed with the *puryashṭaka*[26] body, and pass through various births. As has been said in the Tattva-prakāśa—

"Those among the Pralayākalas whose *karman* and *mala* are immature,"
"Go, unit d with the *puryaṣṭaka* body, into many births by the power of *karman*."

The *puryashṭaka* is also thus described in the same work—

"The *puryashṭaka* is composed of the internal organ, thought (*dhi*), *karman*, and the instruments."

पुर्यष्टकमपि तत्रैव निर्दिष्टम्—

स्यात्पुर्यष्टकमन्तःकरणं धीकर्मकरणानि । इति ।

विवृतं चाघोरशिवाचार्येण—पुर्यष्टकं नाम प्रतिपुरुषं नियतः, सर्गादारभ्य कल्पान्तं मोक्षान्तं वा स्थितः, पृथिव्यादिकलापर्यन्तस्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकः, सूक्ष्मो देहः । तथा चोक्तं तत्त्वसंग्रहे—

वसुधाद्यस्तत्त्वगणः प्रतिपुंनियतः कलान्तोऽयम् ।
पर्यटति कर्मवशाद् भुवनजदेहेष्वयं च सर्वेषु ।। इति ।

This is thus explained by Aghora Śiva Ācārya, "the *puryaṣṭaka* is a subtile body apportioned to each individual soul, which

continues from the creation until the close of the kalpa or until liberation: it is composed of the thirty[27] tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending with *kalā*." As has been said in the Tattva-saṅgraha—

> "This set of tattvas, commencing with 'earth' and ending with '*kalā*' is assigned to each soul,"
>
> "And wanders by the law of *karman* through all the bodies produced by the world:—

तथा चायमर्थः समपद्यत—अन्तःकरणशब्देन मनोबुद्धयहंकारवाचिनाऽन्यान्यपि पुंसो भोगक्रियायामन्तरङ्गाणि कला-काल-नियत-विद्या-राग-प्रकृति-गुणाख्यानि सप्त तत्त्वान्युपलक्ष्यन्ते । धीकर्मशब्देन ज्ञेयानि पञ्चभूतानि तत्कारणानि च तन्मात्राणि विवक्ष्यन्ते । करणशब्देन ज्ञानकर्मेन्द्रियदशकं संगृह्यते ।

The following is the full meaning of this passage—The word "*internal organ*", which properly includes "mind", "intelligence", "egoism", and ""reason",[28] includes also the seven tattvas which enter into the production of enjoyment [or experience], viz., those called *kalā*, time, fate, knowledge concupiscence, nature, and quality;[29] the words "*thought*" (*dhī*) and *karman* signify the five cognisable gross elements, and their originators, the subtile rudiments. By the word "*instruments*" are comprehended the ten organs of sense and action.

ननु श्रीमत्कालोत्तरे—

शब्दः स्पर्शस्तथा रूपं रसो गन्धश्च पञ्चकम् ।
बुद्धिर्मनस्त्वहंकारः पुर्यष्टकमुदाहृतम् ॥

इति श्रूयते । तत्कथमन्यथा कथ्यते ? अद्धा, अत एव च तत्रभवता रामकण्ठेन तत्सूत्रं त्रिंशत्तत्त्वपरतया व्याख्यायीत्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन ।

तथापि कथमस्य पुर्यष्टकत्वम् ? भूततन्मात्रबुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मेन्द्रियान्तःकरणसंज्ञैः पञ्चभिर्वर्गैः तत्कारणेन प्रधानेन कलादिपञ्चकात्मना वर्गेण चारब्धत्वादित्यविरोधः ।

But is it not declared in the Śrīmat Kālottara that "The set of five, sound, touch, form, taste and smell, intelligence, mind and egoism, these constitute the *puryaṣṭaka* ?"

How, then, can any different account be maintained ? We grant this, and hence the venerable Rāma Kaṇṭha has explained that sūtra in its literal meaning [i.e., as *puryaṣṭaka* is derived from

*ashṭa*, "eight"], so why should we be prolix in the discussion ? Still, if you ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal definition of *puryashṭaka*, we reply that there is really no contradiction, as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in the following manner—(1) The five elements; (2) the five rudiments (3) the five organs of knowledge; (4) those of action; (5) the fourfold internal organ; (6) their instrument;[30] (7) nature [prakṛti]; and (8) the class composed of the five, beginning with *kalā*, which form a kind of case.[31]

तत्र पुर्यष्टकयुतान्विशिष्टपुण्यसंपन्नान् कांश्चिदनुगृह्य भुवनपतित्वमत्र महेश्वरोऽनन्तः प्रयच्छति । तदुक्तम्—

कांश्चिदनुगृह्य वितरति भुवनपतित्वं महेश्वरस्तेषाम् ॥ इति ।

Now in the case of some of those souls who are joined the *puryaṣṭaka* body, Maheśvara Ananta having compassionated them as possessed of peculiar merit, constitutes them here as lords of the world; as has been said—

"Maheśvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the world."

सकलोऽपि द्विविधः । पक्वकलुषापक्वकलुषभेदात् । तत्राद्यान्परमेश्वरस्तत्परिपाकपरिपाट्या तदनुगुणशक्तिपातेन मण्डल्याद्यष्टादशोत्तरशतमन्त्रेश्वरपदं प्रापयति । तदुक्तम् ·

शेषा भवन्ति सकलाः कलादियोगादहर्मुखे काले ।
शतमष्टादश तेषां कुरुते स्वयमेव मन्त्रेशान् ॥
तत्राष्टौ मण्डलिनः क्रोधाद्यास्तत्समाश्च वीरेशः ।
श्रीकण्ठ शतरुद्राः शतमित्यष्टादशाभ्यधिकम् ॥ इति ।

The class called *sakala* is also divided into two, as *pakvakaluṣa* and *apakvakaluṣa*. As for the former, the Supreme Being, in conformity with their maturity (*paripāka*), puts forth a power agreeable thereto, and transfers them to the position of the hundred and eighteen Lords of the Mantras, signified by the words Maṇḍalī, etc., as has been said—

"The rest are denominated *sakala*, from their connection with *Kalā*, etc., seized by time whose mouths are days;"

"The Supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen of these the Lords of the Mantras."

"Eight of these are called *Maṇḍalines*; eight again are Krodha, etc.;

"Vīreśa, Śrīkaṇṭa, and the hundred Rudras,—these together are the hundred and eighteen."

तत्परिपाकाधिक्यानुरोधेन शक्त्युपसंहारेण दीक्षाकरणेन मोक्षप्रदो भवत्याचार्यमूर्तिमास्थाय परमेश्वरः । तदप्युक्तम्—

परिपक्वमलानेतानुत्सादनहेतुशक्तिपातेन ।
योजयति परे तत्त्वे स दीक्षयाचार्यमूर्तिस्थः ।। इति ।

श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रेऽपि—

पूर्वं व्यत्यासितस्याणोः पाशजालमपोहति ।। इति ।

In their case again, the Supreme, having assumed the form of a teacher, stopes the continued accession of maturity and contracts his manifested power, and ultimately grants to them liberation by the process of initiation; as has been said—

"These creatures whose *mala* is matured, by putting forth a healing power,"
"He, assuming the form of a teacher, unites by initiation to the highest principle."

It is also said in the Srīmad Mṛgendra—

"He removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which previously exerted a contrary influence over it."[32]

व्याकृतं च नारायणकण्ठेन । तत्सर्वं तत एवावधार्यम् । अस्माभिस्तु विस्तरभिया न प्रस्तूयते । अपक्वकलुषान्बद्धानणून्भोगभाजो विधत्ते परमेश्वरः कर्मवशात् । तदप्युक्तम्—

बद्धाञ्छेषानपरान् विनियुङ्क्ते भोगभुक्तये पुंसः ।
तत्कर्मणामनुगमादित्येवं कीर्तिताः पशवः ।। इति ।

All this has been explained at great length by Nārāyaṇa-Kaṇṭha, and there it is to be studied; but we are obliged to pass on through fear of prolixity.

But as for the second class, or those called *apakvakalusha*, the Supreme Being, as impelled by the desert of their respective actions, appoints them, as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies, to enjoy the rewards of their previous action.[33] As has been said—

"The other souls, bound [in their material bound] the appoints to enjoy their various deserts,"

"According to their respective actions : such are the various kinds of souls."

अथ पाशपदार्थः कथ्यते । पाशश्चतुर्विधः—मलकर्ममायारोधशक्तिभेदात् । ननु—

शैवागमेषु मुख्यं पतिपशुपाशा इति क्रमान्त्रितयम् ।
तत्र पतिः शिव उक्तः पशवो ह्यणवोऽर्थपञ्चकं पाशाः ।।

इति पाशः पञ्चविधः कथ्यते । तत्कथं चतुर्विध इति गण्यते ?

We now proceed to describe the third category, matter (or *pāśa*), This is fourfold, *mala*,[34] *karman*, *māyā*, and *rodha-śakti*.[25] But it may be objected, "Is it not said in the Śaiva Āgamas that the chief things are the Lord, souls and matter ? Now the Lord has been shown to mean Śiva, 'souls' mean atoms (or beings endowed with atomic bodies), and matter (or 'bond') is said to be the pentad,[31] hence matter will be fivefold. How then is it now reckoned to be only fourfold ?"

उच्यते—विन्दोर्मायात्मनः शिवतत्त्वपदवेदनीयस्य शिवपदप्राप्तिलक्षणपरममुक्त्यपेक्षया पाशत्वेऽपि तद्योगस्य विद्येश्वरादिपदप्राप्तिहेतुत्वेन अपरमुक्तित्वात्पाशत्वेनानुपादानम् इत्यविरोधः । अत एवोक्तं तत्त्वप्रकाशे—'पाशाश्चतुर्विधाः स्युः' इति । श्रीमन्मृगेन्द्रेऽपि—

प्रावृतीशो बलं कर्ममायाकार्यं चतुर्विधम् ।
पाशजालं समासेन धर्मा नाम्नैव कीर्तिताः ।। इति ।

To this we reply as follows:—Although the *vindu* or nasal dot, which is the germinal atom of *māyā*, is called a Śiva-tattva, may be well regarded as material in comparison with the highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of Śiva, still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the state of such deities as Vidyeśvara, etc. Thus we see there is no contradiction. Hence it has been said in the Tattva-prakāśa—

"The bonds of matter will be fourfold."

And again in the Srīmad Mṛgendra—

"The envelop?r-controller (*mala*), the overpowerer (*rodha*), action, and the work of Māyā,"

"These are the four 'bonds', and they are collectively called by the name of 'merit.'

अस्यार्थः—प्रावृणोति प्रकर्षेणाच्छादयत्यात्मनः स्वाभाविक्यौ दृक्क्रिये इति प्रावृतिरशुचिर्मलः । स च ईष्टे स्वातन्त्र्येणेति ईशः । तदुक्तम्—

एको ह्यनेकशक्तिदृ्क्रिययोश्छादको मल: पुंस: ।
तुषतण्डुलवज्ज्ञेयस्ताम्राश्रितकालिकावद्वा ॥ (१) ।

The following is the meaning of this couplet—

(1) "Enveloping", because *mala* exceedingly obscures and veils the soul's powers of vision and action; "controlling", because *mala*, a natural impurity, controls the soul by its independent influence. As has been said—

"*Mala*, though itself one, by manifold influence interrupts the soul's vision and action;"

"It is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on copper".[63]

बलं रोधशक्ति: । अस्या: शिवशक्ते: पाशाधिष्ठानेन पुरुषतिरोधायकत्वादुपचारेण पाशत्वम् । तदुक्तम्—

तासामहं वरा शक्ति: सर्वानुग्राहिका शिवा ।
धर्मानुवर्तनादेव पाश इत्युपचर्यते ॥ (२)

(2) The "overpowerer" is the obscuring power; this is called a "bond" [or matter] in a metaphorical sense, since this energy of Śiva obscures the soul by superintending matter [rather than by itself partaking of the nature of matter].

Thus is has been said—

"Of these I am the chief energy, and the gracious friend of all,"

"I am metaphorically called *pāśa*[37] because I follow desert."

क्रियते फलार्थिभिरिति कर्म धर्माधर्मात्मकं बीजाङ्कुरवत्प्रवाहरूपेणानादि । यथोक्तं श्रीमत्किरणे—

यथानादिर्मलस्तस्य कर्माल्पकमनादिकम् ।
यद्यनादि न संसिद्धं वैचित्र्यं केन हेतुना ॥ (३)

(3) Action [or rather its consequences *karman*] as being performed by those who desire the fruit. It is in the form of merit or demerit, like the seed and shoot, and it is eternal ina never-beginning series. As has been said in the Śrīmat Kiraṇa—

"As *Mala* has no beginning, its least actions are beginningless :"

"If an eternal character is thus established, then what cause could produce any change therein ?"

मात्यस्यां शक्त्यात्मना प्रलये सर्वं जगत्सृष्टौ व्यक्तिमायातीति माया । यथोक्तं श्रीमत्सौरभेये—

शक्तिरूपेण कार्याणि तल्लीनानि महाक्षये ।
विकृतौ व्यक्तिमायाति सा कार्येण कलादिना ।। (४)

(4) "*Māyā*", because herein as an energy of the Divine Being all the world is potentially contained (*māti*) at a mundane destruction, and again at a creation it all comes (*yāti*) into manifestation, ence the derivation of the name. This has been said in the Śrīmat Saurabheya—

"The effects, as a form of the Divine energy, are absorbed therein at a mundane destruction,"

"And again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form of effects as *kalā*, etc."[38]

यद्यप्यत्र बहु वक्तव्यमस्ति तथापि ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुपरम्यते । तदित्थं पतिपशुपाशपदार्थास्त्रयः प्रदर्शिताः ।

पतिविद्ये तथाविद्या पशुः पाशश्च कारणम् ।
तन्निवृत्ताविति प्रोक्ताः पदार्थाः षट् समासतः ।।

इत्यादिना प्रकारान्तरं ज्ञानरत्नावल्यादौ प्रसिद्धम् । सर्वं तत एवागन्तव्यमिति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे शैवदर्शनम् ।।

Although much more might be added on this topic, yet we stop here through fear of extending this treatise too far. Thus have the threc categories been declared,—the Lord, the soul, and matter.

A different mode of treating the subject is found in the Jñānaratnāvalī, etc., in such lines as—

"The Lord, knowledge, ignorance, the soul, matter, and the cause."

"Of the cessation thereof,—these are collectively the six categories."

But our readers must seek for full information from the work itself. Thus our account of the system is complete. E.B.C.

*NOTES*

1. Colebrooke speaks of the *Paśupati-sāstra* (*Maheśvara-siddhānta* or *Sivāgama*), as the text-book of the Pāśupata sect. The

Āgamas are said to be twenty-eight (see their names in the Rev. T. Foulkes' "Catechism of the Saiva Religion")

2. There must be three eternal entities, Deity, soul, matter;" "as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with the water, so soul is co-eternal with the Deity, and *pāśa* is eternally co-existent with soul" (J. A. O. S. iv. pp. 67, 85). We find the *advaita* of the Vedānta attacked. It is said that the soul is eternally entangled in matter, and God carries on his five operations (see *infra*) to disentangle it, bringing out all that is required for previous desert.

3. These four feet are the four stages of religious life (see J.A.O.S. iv. pp. 135, 180), called in Tamil *sarithei kirikei*, *yokam*, and *gnānam*. The first is the stage of practical piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites; the second is that of the "confirmatory sacrament" and the five purifications, involved in true *pūjā*; the third is that of the eight observances of the yogin; the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for intimate union with God.

4. Cf. Colebrooke, *Essays* (2nd ed.), vol. i. p. 315.

5. *Nyāyena* may here mean "argument".

6. *Scil.* if there were only one cause there would be only one invariable effect. The very existence or various effects proves that there must be other concurrent causes (as human actions) necessary. The argument seems to me to require here this unnatural stress to be laid on *eva*, but this is certainly not the original meaning of the passage; it occurs Mahābhārata. iii. 1144 (cf. Gauḍapāda, S. Kār. 61).

7. *Infra*, I read *Karaṇāsambhavācca.*

8. This may be the same with the Meykāṇḍa of the Tamil work in J.A.O.S. His poem was called the *Mṛgendra* (?).

9. Should we read *tāvad anaśarīraḥ* ?

10. I retain this word, see *Infra.*

11. "*Māyā* (or Prakṛti) is the material, Śakti the instrumental, and Deity the efficients cause" (J.A.O.S. iv. p. 55).

12. These are the five first names of the eleven mantras which are included in the five *Kalās* (J.A.O.S. iv. pp. 238-243). The Śivalinga (the visible object of worship for the enlightened) is composed of mantras, and is to be regarded as the body of Śiva (see J.A.O.S. iv p. 101). These five mantras are given in the inverse order in Taitt. Āraṇyaka, x. 43-47 (cf. *Nyāyamālāvist.* p. 3).

13. These are the operations of the five manifestations of Śiva (see J.A.O.S. iv. 8, 18) which in their descending order are *Sāthākkiyam* (*i.e.*, *Sadākṣaya* ?) or *Sadā-Śiva*, who is Śiva and Śakti combined, and the source of grace to all souls; *Iccuran* or *Mayesuran*, the obscure; *Suttavittei* (*Śuddhavidyā*) which is properly the Hindu triad, *Rudra*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Brahmā*. They are respectively symbolised by the *nāda*, *vindu*, *m*, *u*, and *a* of Om.

14. In Wilson's Mackenzie Cat. i. p. 138, we find a Tāntrik work, the *Narupati-jaya-caryā*, ascribed to Bhoja the king of Dhār.

15. Ananta is a name of Śiva in the Atharva-śiras Upaniṣad (see Indische Stud. i. 385).

16. This is the fourth of the twenty-eight Agamas (see Foulkes' Catechism).

17. *Aṇu* ? "The soul, when clothed with these primary things (desire, knowledge, action, etc.), is an exceedingly small body" Foulkes). Ananu is used as an epithet of Brahman in Bṛhad Ar. Up. iii. 8.8.

18. See Ind. Studien, i. 301.

19. The mind or internal sense perceives soul (see Bhāshā Parichchheda, śloka 49).

20. Dele the *iti* in *infra.*

21. Cf. the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas, p. 76, 4.

22. For these three classes see J.A.O.S. iv. pp. 87, 137. They are there described as being respectively under the influence of *āṇavam malam only*, or this with *kanmam malam*, or these with *mayei malam.* The *āṇavam* is described as original sin, or that

source of evil which was always attached to the soul; *kanmam* is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its deserts; *mayei* is matter in its obscuring or entangling power, the source of the senses. Mādhava uses "*kalā*", etc., for *māyā*. The reason is to be found in J.A.O.S. p. 70, where it is said that the five *vidyatattvas* (*kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *niyati*, and *kāla*) and the twenty-four *ātmātattvas* (*sc.* the gross and subtile elements, and organs of sense and action, with the intellectual faculties *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *chita*), are all developed from *māyā*. This exactly agrees with the quotation from Soma Sambhu, *infra*.. We may compare with it what Mādhava says. in his account of the Nakulīśa Pāśupatas, where he describes, *kalā* as unintelligent, and composed of the five elements, the five *tanmātras*, and the ten organs, with *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas*.

23. See J.A.O.S. iv. p. 137. I red *anugrahakaraṇāt*.

24. I omit the quotation, as it only repeats the preceding. It, however, names the three classes as *vijñāna-kevala*, *pralaya-kevala*, and *Sakala*.

25. *i.e.*, thus including five of the *vidyātattvas* and all the twenty-four *ātmatattvas*.

26. This term seems to be derived from *puri*, "body" (cf. *puriśaya* for *purusha*, Bṛhad Ār. Up. ii. 5, 18), and *aṣṭaka*.(cf. also the Sānkhya Pravachana Bhāṣya, p. 135).

27. Or rather thirty-one ?

28. *Manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṇkāra*, *chitta*.

29. These are the seven *vidyā tattvas*, *kalā*, *niyati* (fate), *vidyā*, *rāga*, *prakṛti*, and *gṇa*, Hoisingoton, however, puts *purushan* "the principle of life", instead of *guṇa*, which seems better, as the three *guṇas* are included in *prakṛiti* He translates *kalā* by "continency", and describes it as "the power by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into subjection."

30. This "instrument" (*karṇa*) seems to mean what Hoisington calls *purushan* or "the principle of life which establishes or supports the whole system in its operation ;" he makes it one of the seven *vidyātattvas.* According to Mādhva, it should be what he calls *guṇa.*

31. The thirty-one *tattvas* are as follows :—Twenty-four *ātma-tattvas*, five elements, five *tanmātras* ten organs of sense and action, four organs of the *antaḥkaraṇa* and seven *vidyāttvas* as enumerated above. (See J.A.O.S. iv, pp. 16-17.)

32. I take *aṇu* in this verse as the soul, but it may mean the second kind of *mala* mentioned by Hoisington. The first kind of *mala* is the *māyā-mala*, the second *āṇava-mala* the third *karma-mala* (*karman*).

33. "The soul, when clothed with these primary things (desire, knowledge, action, the *kalādipanthaka* etc.,) is an exceedingly small body" (Foulkes). One of the three *malas* is called *āṇava* and is described as the source of sin and suffering to souls.

34. The first three are the three kinds of *mala* in the J.A.O.S., viz., *āṇavam*, *kanmam*, and *māyei*, the last is the "obscuring" power of Māyesuran (cf vol. iv. pp. 13, 14). The Śaivas hold that Pāśa, like the Sānkhya Prakṛiti, is in itself eternal, although its connection with any particular soul is temporary (see J.A. O.S. iv. p. 228).

35. These are the five, *vindu*, *mala*, *karman*, *māyā*, and *rodhaśakti.* *Vindu* is described in Foulkes' translation of the Śiva-prakāśa-patalai : "A sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable *om* ; ...and is that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed. From this atom are developed the four sounds, the fifty-one Sanskrit letters, the Vedas, Mantras, etc. the bodily, intellectual, and external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence, and have been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge ; after these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed, to be enjoyed

by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious deeds, or have devoted themselves to the service of God or the abstract contemplation of the Deity, viz., (1) the enjoyment of the abode of Śiva; (2) that or near approach to him; (3) that of union with him." *Vindu* is similarly described, J.A.O.S. iv. pp. 152, 153 (cf. also Weber, *Rāmatāpanīya Up.* pp. 312-315).

36. See the same illustrations in J.A.O.S. iv. p. 150.

37. Some forced derivation seems here intended as of *pāśa* from *paśchāt*.

38. Read *sā kāryeṇa*.

# CHAPTER VIII

## THE PRATYABHIJÑA-DARŚANA OR RECOGNITIVE SYSTEM

अत्रापेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां कारणत्वं दुष्यतीत्यपरितुष्यन्तो, मतान्तरमन्विष्यन्तः, परमेश्वरेच्छावशादेव जगन्निर्माणं परिघुष्यन्तः, स्वसंवेदनोपपत्त्या आगमसिद्धप्रत्यगात्मतादात्म्ये नानाविधमानमेयादिभेदाभेदशालिपरमेश्वरोऽनन्यमुखप्रेक्षित्वलक्षणस्वातन्त्र्यभाक् स्वात्मदर्पणे भावान्प्रतिबिम्बवद् अवभासयतीति भणन्तो, बाह्याभ्यन्तरचर्याप्राणायामादिक्लेशप्रयासकलापवैधुर्येण सर्वसुलभमभिनवं प्रत्यभिज्ञामात्रं परापरसिद्ध्युपायमभ्युपगच्छन्तः, परे माहेश्वराः प्रत्यभिज्ञाशास्त्रमभ्यस्यन्ति ।

तस्येयत्तापि न्यरूपि परीक्षकैः—

सूत्रं वृत्तिर्विवृतिर्लघ्वी बृहतीत्युभे विमर्शिन्यौ ।
प्रकरणविवरणपञ्चकमिति शास्त्रं प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः ॥

Other Māheśvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the Śaiva system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things causality (in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating spirits). They therefore seek another system, and proclaim that the construction of the world (or series of environments of those spirits) is by the mere will of the Supreme Lord. They pronounce that this Supreme Lord, who is at once other than and the same with the several cognitions and *cagnita*, who is identical with the transcendent self posited by one's own consciousness by rational proof, and by revelation, and who possesses independence, that is, the power of witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior gives manifestation, in the mirror of one's own soul, to all entities[1] as if they were images reflected upon it. Thus looking upon recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the highest end, available to all men alike, without any the slightest trouble and exertion, such as external and internal worship, suppression of the breath, and the like, these Māheśvaras set forth the system of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). The extent of this system is thus described by one of their authorities—

"The aphorisms, the commentary, the gloss, the two explications, the greater and the less,

"The five topics, and the expositions,—such is the system of recognition."

तत्रेदं प्रथमं सूत्रम्—

कथंचिदासाद्य महेश्वरस्य
दास्यं जनस्याप्युपकारमिच्छन् ।
समस्तसंपत्समवाप्तिहेतुं
तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि ॥ इति ।

The first aphorism in their text-book is as follows[1] :—

"Having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of Maheśvara, and wishing also to help mankind,"

"I set forth the recognition of Maheśvara, as the method of attaining all felicity."

कथंचिदिति—परमेश्वराभिन्नगुरुचरणारविन्दयुगलसमाराधनेन परमेश्वरघटितेन एवेत्यर्थः । आसाद्येति—आ समन्तात्परिपूर्णतया सादयित्वा, स्वात्मोपभोग्यतां निरर्गलां गमयित्वा । तदनेन विदितवेद्यत्वेन परार्थशास्त्रकरणेऽधिकारो दर्शितः । अन्यथा प्रतारणमेव प्रसज्येत ।

[This aphorism may be developed as follows] :—

"Somehow or other," by a propitiation, effected by God, of the lotus feet of a spiritual director identical with God, "having reached," having fully attained, this condition, having made it the unintercepted object of fruition to myself. Thus knowing that which has to be known, he is qualified to construct a system for others : otherwise the system would be a mere imposture.

मायोत्तीर्णा अपि महामायाधिकृता विष्णुविरिञ्च्याद्या यदीयैश्वर्यलेशेन ईश्वरीभूताः स भगवाननवच्छिन्नप्रकाशानन्दस्वातन्त्र्यपरमार्थो महेश्वरः ।

Maheśvara is the reality of unintermitted self luminousness, beatitute, and independence, by portions of whose divine essence Vishṇu Viriñchi, and other deities are deities, who, though they transcend the fictitious world are yet implicated in the infinite illusion.

तस्य दास्यम् । दीयतेऽस्मै स्वामिना सर्वं यथाभिलषितमिति दासः । परमेश्वरस्वरूपस्वातन्त्र्यपात्रमित्यर्थः ।

The condition of being a slave to Maheśvara is the being a recipient of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the divine nature, a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things according to his will and pleasure (i.e , *dāsya*, from *dā*).

जनशब्देनाधिकारिविषयनियमाभावः प्रादर्शि । यस्य यस्य ह्रीदं स्वरूपकथनं तस्य तस्य महाफलं भवति । प्रज्ञानस्यैव परमार्थफलत्वात् । तथोपदिष्टं शिवदृष्टौ परमगुरुभिर्भगवत्सोमानन्दनाथपादैः—

एकवारं प्रमाणेन शास्त्राद्वा गुरुवाक्यतः ।
ज्ञाते शिवत्वे सर्वस्थे प्रतिपत्त्या दृढात्मना ।।
करणेन नास्ति कृत्यं क्वापि भावनयापि वा ।
ज्ञाते सुवर्णे करणं भावानां वा परित्यजेत् ।। इति ।

The word *mankind*, imports that there is no restriction of the doctrine to previously qualified students. Whoever he may be to whom this exposition of the divine nature is made, he reaps its highest reward, the emanatory *principium* itself operating to the highest end of the transmigrating souls. It has been accordingly laid down in the Śivadṛiṣṭi by that supreme guide the revered Somānandanātha—

"When once the nature of Śiva that resides in all things has been known with tenacious recognition, whether by proof or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director.

"There is no further need of doing aught, or of any further reflection. When he knows Suvarṇa (or Śiva) a man may cease to act and to reflect."

अपिशब्देन स्वात्मनस्तदभिन्नतामाविष्कुर्वता पूर्णत्वेन स्वात्मनि परार्थसंपत्त्यतिरिक्तप्रयोजनान्तरावकाशश्च पराकृतः । परार्थश्च प्रयोजनं भवत्येव । तल्लक्षणयोगात् । न ह्ययं देवशापः 'स्वार्थ एव प्रयोजनं न परार्थ' इति । अत एवोक्तमक्षपादेन 'यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम्' (गौ० सू० १।१।२४) इति ।

The word *also* excludes the supposition that there is room in self which has recognised the nature of Maheśvara, and which manifests to itself its own identity with him, and is therefore fully satisfied, for any other motive than felicity for others. The well being of others is a motive, whatever may be said, for the definition of a motive applied to it : for there is no such divine curse laid upon man that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclu-

sion of a regard for others. Akshapāda defines a motive: A motive is that object towards which a man energises.

उपशब्दः सामीप्यार्थः । परमेश्वरसमीपताकरणमात्रं फलम् । अत एवाह—समस्तेति । तेन जनस्य परमेश्वरतालाभे हि सर्वाः संपदस्तन्निष्यन्दमय्यः संपन्ना एव, रोहणाचललाभे रत्नसंपद इव । एवं परमेश्वरतालाभे किमन्यत्प्रार्थनीयम् ? तदुक्तमुत्पलाचार्यैः—

भक्तिलक्ष्मीसमृद्धानां किमन्यदुपयाचितम् ।
एतया वा दरिद्राणां किमन्यदपयाचितम् ॥ इति ॥

The preposition *upa* in *upapādayami* (I set forth) indicates proximity : the result is the bringing of mankind near unto God.

Hence the word *all* in the phrase *the method of attaining all felicities*. For when the nature of the Supreme Being is attained, all felicities, which are but the efflux thereof, are overtaken as if a man acquired the mountain Rohana (Adam's peak), he would acquire all the treasures it contains. If a man acquire the divine nature, what else is there that he can ask for ? Accordingly Utapalāchārya says—

"What more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion ? What else can they ask who are poor in this ?"

इत्थं षष्ठीसमासपक्षे प्रयोजनं निर्दिष्टम् । बहुव्रीहिपक्षे तूपपादयामः । समस्तस्य बाह्याभ्यन्तरस्य नित्यसुखादेर्या संपत्सिद्धिः तथात्वप्रकाशः, तस्याः सम्यगवाप्तिर्यस्याः प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः हेतुः सा तथोक्ता । तस्य महेश्वरस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञा, प्रति आभिमुख्येन, ज्ञातम् । लोके हि स एवायं चैत्र इति प्रतिसंधानेनाभिमुखीभूते वस्तुनि ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञेति व्यवह्रियते । इहापि प्रसिद्धपुराणसिद्धागमानुमानादिज्ञातपरिपूर्णशक्तिके परमेश्वरे सति स्वात्मनि अभिमुखीभूते तच्छक्तिप्रतिसंधानेन ज्ञानमुदेति नूनं स एवेश्वरोऽहमिति ।

We have thus explained the motive expressed in the words *the method of attaining all felicities*, on the supposition that the compound term is a Tat-puruṣa genitively constructed. Let it be taken as a Bahuvrīhi or relative compound. Then the recognition of Maheśvara, the knowing him through vicarious idols, has for its motive the full attainment the manifestation, of all felicities, of every external and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature. In the language of everyday life, recognition is a cognition relative to an object represented in memory: for example. This (perceived) is the same (as the remembered) Chaitra. In the reco-

gnition propounded in this system,—there being a God whose omnipotence is learnt from the accredited legendaries, from accepted revelation, and from argumentation,—there arises in relation to my presented personal self the cognition that I am that very God,—in virtue of my recollection of the powers of that God.

तामेतां प्रत्यभिज्ञामुपपादयामि । उपपत्तिः संभवः । संभवतीति तत्समर्थाचरणेन प्रयोजकव्यापारेण संपादयामीत्यर्थः ।

This same recognition I set forth. To set forth is to enforce. I establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it convincing. [Such is the articulate development of the first aphorism of the Recognitive Institutes ]

यदीश्वरस्वभाव एवात्मा प्रकाशते, तर्हि किमनेन प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रदर्शनप्रयासेनेति चेत्—तत्रायं समाधिः । स्वप्रकाशतया सततमवभासमानेऽप्यात्मनि मायावशाद् भागेन प्रकाशमाने पूर्णतावभाससिद्धये दृक्क्रियात्मकशक्त्याविष्करणेन प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रदर्श्यते ।

Here it may be asked : If soul is manifested only as consubstantial with God, why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition ? The answer is this :—The recognition is thus exhibited, because though the soul is, as you contend, continually manifested as self-luminous (and therefore identical with God), it is neverthless under the influence of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial, and therefore the recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as total (the self being to the natural man a part, to the man of insight the whole, of the divine pleroma). Thus, then, the syllogism :

तथा च प्रयोगः 'अयमात्मा परमेश्वरो भवितुमर्हति । ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिमत्त्वात् । यो यावति ज्ञाता कर्ता च स तावतीश्वरः प्रसिद्धेश्वरवद्राजवद्वा । आत्मा च विश्वज्ञाता कर्ता च । तस्मादीश्वरोऽयम्' इति । अवयवपञ्चकस्याश्रयणं मायावदेव नैयायिकमतस्य कक्षीकारात् । तदुक्तमुदयाकरसूनुना—

कर्तरि ज्ञातरि स्वात्मन्यादिसिद्धे महेश्वरे ।
अजडात्मा निषेधं वा सिद्धिं विदधीत कः ॥
किं तु मोहवशादस्मिन्दृष्टेऽप्यनुपलक्षिते ।
शक्त्याविष्करणेनेयं प्रत्यभिज्ञोपदर्श्यते ॥

This self must be God, because it possesses cognitive and active powers ; for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active, to that extent he is a lord, like a lord in the world of everyday life, or like a king, therefore the soul is God. The five-membered syllogism is here employed, because so long as we deal with the illusory order of things, the teaching of the Naiyayikas may be accepted. It has thus been said by the son of Udayākara—

"What self-luminous self can affirm of deny that self-active and cognitive is Maheśvara the primal being ?

"Such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the powers, the self being cognised under illusion, and imperfectly discerned."

तथा हि—

सर्वेषामिह भूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया ।
ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ।।
तत्र ज्ञानं स्वतःसिद्धं क्रिया कार्यश्रिता सती ।
परैरप्युपलक्ष्येत तथान्यज्ञानमुच्यते ।। इति ।

या चैषां प्रतिभा तत्तत्पदार्थक्रमरूपिता ।
अक्रमानन्दचिद्रूपः प्रमाता स महेश्वरः ।। इति च ।

And again—

"The continuance of all living creatures in this transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory *involucrum* ; knowledge and action are accounted the life of living creatures."

"Of these, knowledge is spontaneously developed, and action (or ritual), which is best at *Kāśi*,"

"Is indicated by others also : different from these is real knowledge."

And also—

"The knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those things :"

"The knower, whose essence is beatitude and knowledge without succession, is Maheśvara."

सोमानन्दनाथपादैरपि—

सदा शिवात्मना सदा वेत्ति मदात्मना । इत्यादि ।

ज्ञानाधिकारपरिसमाप्तावपि—

तदैक्येन विना नास्ति सविदां लोकपद्धतिः ।
प्रकाशैक्यात्तदेकत्वं मातैकः स इति स्थितिः ॥
स एव विमृशत्वेन नियतेन महेश्वरः ।
विमर्श एव देवस्य शुद्धे ज्ञानक्रिये यतः ॥ इति ।

Somānanda-nātha also says—

"He always knows by identity with Śiva : he always knows by identity with the real."

Again at the end of the section on knowledge—

"Unless there were this unity wito Śiva, cognitions could not exist as facts of daily life :"

"Unity with God is proved by the unity of light. He is the one knower (or illuminator of cognitions)."

"He is Maheśvara, the great Lord, by reason of the unbroken continuity of objects :"

"Pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the deity."

विवृतं चाभिनवगुप्ताचार्यैः । तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं, तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति' (काठक० २।२) इति श्रुत्या प्रकाशचिद्रूपमहिम्ना सर्वस्य भावजातस्य भासकत्वमभ्युपेयते । ततश्च विषयप्रकाशस्य नीलप्रकाशः पीतप्रकाश इति विषयोपरागभेदाद्भेदः । वस्तुतस्तु देशकालाकारसंकोचवैकल्यादभेद एव । स एव चैतन्यरूपः प्रकाशः प्रमातेत्युच्यते । तथा च पठितं शिवसूत्रेषु—'चैतन्यमात्मा' (१।१) इति । तस्य चिद्रूपत्वमनवच्छिन्नविमर्शत्वमनन्योन्मुखत्वमानन्दैकघनत्वं माहेश्वर्यमिति पर्यायः ।

The following is an explanation of Abhinava-gupta :—

The text, "After that as it shines the all of things, by the light of that shines diversely this All," teaches that God illumines the whole around of things by the glory of His, luminous intelligence, and that the diversity of plurality of the object world, whereby the light which irradiates objects is a blue, a yellow light, and the like arises from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object. In reality, God is without plurality or difference, as transcending all limitations of space, time and figure. He is pure intelligence, self-luminousness, the manifester ; and thus we may read in the Śaiva aphorisms, "Self is intelligence." His synonymous titles are Intelligential Essence, Unintermitted Cognition, Irrespective Intuition,

Existence as a mass of Beatitude, Supreme Domination. This self-same existing self is knowledge.

स एव ह्ययं भावात्मा विमर्शः शुद्धे पारमार्थिक्यौ ज्ञानक्रिये तत्र प्रकाशरूपता ज्ञानम् । स्वतो जगन्निर्मातृत्वं क्रिया ।

तच्च निरूपितं क्रियाधिकारे—

एष चानन्तशक्तित्वादेवमाभासयत्यमून् ।
भावानिच्छावशादेषां क्रिया निर्मातृतास्य सा ॥ इति ।

By pure knowledge and action (in the passage of Somānandanātha cited above) are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity. Of these, the cognition is self-luminousness, the activity is energy constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory experience. This is described in the section on activity—

"He by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects, through the efficacy of his will : this activity is creativeness."

उपसंहारेऽपि—

इत्थं तथा घटपटाद्याकारजगदात्मना ।
तिष्ठासोरेवमिच्छैव हेतुकर्तृकृता क्रिया ॥ इति ।
तस्मिन्सतीदमस्तीति कार्यकारणताऽपि या ।
साप्यपेक्षाविहीनानां जडानां नोपपद्यते ॥

इति न्यायेन यतो जडस्य न कारणता न वाऽनीश्वरस्य चेतनस्यापि, तस्मात्तेन तेन जगद्गतजन्मस्थित्यादिभावविकारतत्तद्भेदक्रियासहस्ररूपेण स्थातुमिच्छोः स्वतन्त्रस्य भगवतो महेश्वरस्येच्छैव उत्तरोत्तरमुच्छूनस्वभावा क्रिया विश्वकर्तृत्वं वोच्यत इति ।

And at the close of the same section—

"The mere will of God, when he wills to become the world under its forms of jar, of cloth, and other objects, is his activity worked out by motive and agent.

"This process of essence into emanation, whereby if this be that comes to be, cannot be attributed to motiveless, insentient things."

According to these principles, causality not pertaining either to the insentient or to the non-divine intelligence, the mere will of Maheśvara, the absolute Lord, when he wills to emanate into thousands of forms, as this or that difference, this or that action,

this or that modification of entity, of birth, continuance, and the like, in the series of transmigratory environments,—his mere will is his progressively higher and higher activity, that is to say, his universal creativeness.

इच्छामात्रेण जगन्निर्माणमित्यत्र दृष्टान्तोऽपि स्पष्टं निर्दिष्टः—

योगिनामपि मृद्बीजे विनैवेच्छावशेन यत् ।
घटादि जायते तत्तत्स्थिरभावक्रियाकरम् ।। इति ।

इति घटादिकं प्रति मृदाद्येव परमार्थतः कारणं स्यात्तर्हि कथं योगीच्छामात्रेण घटादिजन्म स्यात् ? अथोच्येत—अन्य एव मृद्बीजादिजन्या घटाङ्कुरादयो; योगीच्छाजन्यास्त्वन्य एवेति । तत्रापि बोध्यसे—सामग्रीभेदात्तावत्कार्यभेद इति सर्वजनप्रसिद्धम् ।

How he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the following illustration—

"The tree or jar produced by the mere will of thaumaturgists without clay, without seed, continues to serve its proper purpose as tree or jar."

If clay and similar materials were really the substantial causes of the jar and the rest, how could they be produced by the mere volition of the thaumaturgist ? If you say : Some jars and some plants are made of clay, and spring from seeds, while others arise from the bare volition of the thaumaturgists ; then we should inform you that it is a fact notorious to all the world that *different* things must emanate from different materials.

ये तु वर्णयन्ति नोपादानं विना घटाद्युत्पत्तिरिति, योगी त्विच्छया परमाणून्व्यापारयन् संघटयतीति तेऽपि बोधनीयाः । यदि परिदृष्टकार्यकारणभावविपर्ययो न लभ्येत तर्हि घटे मृद्दण्डचक्रादि देहे स्त्रीपुरुषसंयोगादि सर्वमपेक्ष्येत । तथा च योगीच्छासमनन्तरसंजातघटदेहादिसंभवो दुःसमर्थ एव स्यात् ।

As for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without materials to make it of, and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he dose so by putting atoms in motion by his will, and so composing it : they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation of the causal relation *all* the co efficients, without exception, must be desiderated ; to make the jar there must be the clay, the potter's staff, the potter's wheel, and all the rest of it ; to make a body there must be the congress of the male and female,

and the successive results of the congress. Now, if that be the case, the genesis of a jar, a body, or the like, upon the mere volition of the thaumaturgist, would be hardly possible.

चेतन एव तु तथा भाति, भगवान् भूरिभगो महादेवो नियत्यनुवर्तनोल्लङ्घनघनतरस्वातन्त्र्य इति पक्षे न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । अत एवोक्तं वसुगुप्ताचार्यैः—

निरुपादानसंभारमभित्तावेव तन्वते ।
जगच्चित्रं नमस्तस्मै कलानाथाय शूलिने ॥ इति ।

On the other hand, there is no difficulty in supposing that Mahādeva, amply free to remain within or to overstep any limit whatever, the Lord, manifold in his operancy, the intelligent principle, thus operates. Thus it is that Vasuguptāchārya says—

"To him that painted this world-picture without materials, without appliances, without a wall to paint it on,—to him be glory, to him resplendent with the lunar digit, to him that bears the trident."

ननु प्रत्यगात्मनः परमेश्वराभिन्नत्वे संसारसंबन्धः कथं भवेदिति चेत्—तत्रोक्तमागमाधिकारे—

एष प्रमाता मायान्धः संसारी कर्मबन्धनः ।
विद्यादिज्ञापितैश्वर्यश्चिद्घनो मुक्त उच्यते ॥ इति ।

It may be asked: If the supersensible self be no other than God, how comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions? The answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution—

"This agent of cognition, blinded by illusion, transmigrates through the fatality of works;

"Taught his divine nature by science, as pure intelligence, he is enfranchised."

ननु प्रमेयस्य प्रमात्रभिन्नत्वे बद्धमुक्तयोः प्रमेयं प्रति को विशेषः ? अत्राप्युत्तरमुक्तं तत्त्वार्थसंग्रहाधिकारे—

मेयं साधारणं मुक्तः स्वात्माभेदेन मन्यते ।
महेश्वरो यथा बद्धः पुनरत्यन्तभेदवत् ॥ इति ।

It may be asked: If the subject and the object are identical, what difference can there be between the self bound and the self

liberated in regard to the objects cognisable by each ? The answer to this question is given in a section of the Tatt.artha-Saṅgraha—

"Self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical with itself, like Maheśvara free from bondage: the other (or unliberated) self has in it infinite plurality."

ननु आत्मनः परमेश्वरत्वं स्वाभाविकं चेन्नार्थः प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रार्थनया । न हि बीजमप्रतिज्ञातं सति सहकारिसाकल्येऽङ्कुरं नोत्पादयति । तस्मात्कस्माद्वात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञाने निर्बन्ध इति चेत्—

उच्यते । शृणु तावदिदं रहस्यम् । द्विविधा ह्यर्थक्रिया—बाह्याङ्कुरादिका, प्रमातृविश्रान्तिचमत्कारसारा प्रीत्यादिरूपा च । तत्राद्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानं नापेक्षते । द्वितीया तु तदपेक्षत एव ।

इहाप्यहमीश्वर इत्येवंभूतचमत्कारसारा परापरसिद्धिलक्षणजीवात्मैकत्वशक्तिविभूतिरूपार्थक्रियेति स्वरूपप्रत्यभिज्ञानमपेक्षणीयम् ।

An objection may be raised : If the divine nature is essential the soul, there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition ; for if all requisites be supplied, the seed does not fail to germinate because it is unrecognised. Why, then, this toilsome effort for the recognition of the soul ? To such an objection we reply : Only listen to the secret we shall tell you. All activity about objects is of two degrees, being either external, as the activity of the seed in developing the plant, or internal, as the activity which determines felicity, which consists in an intuition which terminates in the conscious self. The first degree of activity presupposes no such recognition as the system proposes, the second does presuppose it. In the Recognitive System the peculiar activity is the exertion of the power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit, a power which is the attainment of the highest and of mediate ends, the activity consisting in the intuition I am God. To this activity a recognition of the essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite.

ननु प्रमातृविश्रान्तिसारार्थक्रिया प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन विना अदृष्टा सती तस्मिन्दृष्टेति क्व दृष्टम् ? अत्रोच्यते—नायकगुणगणसंश्रवणप्रवृद्धानुरागा काचन कामिनी मदनविह्वला विरहक्लेशमसहमाना मदनलेखावलम्बनेन स्वावस्थानिवेदनानि विधत्ते । तथा वेगात्तन्निकटमटन्त्यपि तस्मिन्नवलोकितेऽपि तदवलोकनं तदीयगुणपरामर्शाभावे जनसाधारणत्वं प्राप्ते हृदयङ्गमभावं न लभते । यदा तु दूतीवचनात् तदीयगुणपरामर्शं करोति तदा तत्क्षणमेव पूर्णभावमभ्येति ।

एवं स्वात्मनि विश्वेश्वरात्मना भासमानेऽपि तन्निर्भासनं तदीयगुणपरामर्श-

विरहसमये पूर्णभावं न संपादयति । यदा तु गुरुवचनादिना सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वादि-लक्षणपरमेश्वरोत्कर्षपरामर्शो जायते तदा तत्क्षणमेव पूर्णात्मलाभः ।

It may be urged that peculiar activiy terminating in the conscious self is observed independent of recognition. To this it is replied: A certain damsel, hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant, fell in love with him before she had seen him, and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him, wrote to him a love letter descriptive of her condition He at once came to her, but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about; he appeared much the same as any other man, and she found no gratification in his society. So soon, however, as she recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them out, she was fully gratified.

In like manner, though the personal self be manifested as identical with the universal soul, its manifestation effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of those attributes; but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director to recognise in itself the perfections of Maheśvara, his omniscience, omnipotence, and other attributes, it attains the whole pleroma of being.

तदुक्तं चतुर्थे विमर्शे—

तैस्तैरप्युपयाचितैरुपनतस्तस्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके
कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा ।
लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणः स्वात्मापि विश्वेश्वरो
नैवायं निजवैभवाय तदियं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ॥

(ई० प्र० ४।२।२) इति

अभिनवगुप्तादिभिराचार्यैर्विहितप्रतानोऽप्यमर्थः संग्रहमुपक्रममाणैरस्माभि-र्विस्तरभिया न प्रतानिति इति सर्वं शिवम् ॥

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनम् ॥

It is therefore said in the fourth section—

"As the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as like all other men, so long as he is unrecognised, though he humble himself before her with all manner of importunities: In like manner the personal self of mankind, though it be the universal soul, in which there is no perfection unrealised, attains not its own glorious nature; and therefore this recognition thereof must come into play."

This system has been treated in detail by Abhinavagupta and other teachers, but as we have in hand a summary exposition, of systems, we cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become too prolix. This then may suffice.[3] A.E.G.

*NOTES*

1. Read *bhāvān* for *bhāvāt.*
2. Cf. *supra*, p. 113. Mādhava here condenses Abhinava Gupta's commentary; Abhinava Gupta lived in the beginning of the eleventh century (see Bühler's Tour in Cashmere, pp. 66, 80).
3. [I have seen in Culcutta a short Comm. on Śiva sūtras by Utpala, the son of Udayākara (cf. pp. 130, 131).—E. B.C.]

# CHAPTER IX

## THE RASEŚVARA DARŚANA
## OR
## MERCURIAL SYSTEM[1]

अपरे माहेश्वराः परमेश्वरतादात्म्यवादिनोऽपि, पिण्डस्थैर्ये सर्वाभिमता जीवन्मुक्तिः सेत्स्यतीत्यास्थाय, पिण्डस्थैर्योपायं पारदादिपदवेदनीयं रसमेव संगिरन्ते। रसस्य पारदत्वं संसारपरपप्राणहेतुत्वेन। तदुक्तम्—

संसारस्य परं पारं दत्तेऽसौ पारदः स्मृतः। इति।

रसार्णवेऽपि—

पारदो गदितो यस्मात्परार्थं साधकोत्तमैः।
सुप्तोऽयं मत्समो देवि! मम प्रत्यङ्गसम्भवः।
मम देहरसो यस्माद्रसस्तेनायमुच्यते ॥ इति ॥

Other Māheśvara there are who, while they hold the identity of self with God, insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily frame, and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver as a means of strengthening the system. Mercury is called *pārada*, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states. Thus it has been said—

"It gives the farther shore of metempsychosis: it is called *pārada*."

And again in the Rasārṇava—

"It is styled *pārada* because it is employed for the highest end by the best votaries."

"Since this in sleep identical with me, goddess, arises from my members, and is the exudation of my body, it is called *rasa*."

ननु प्रकारान्तरेणापि जीवन्मुक्तियुक्तौ नेयं वाचोयुक्तियुक्तिमतीति चेन्न, षट्स्वपि दर्शनेषु देहपातानन्तरं मुक्तेरुक्ततया तत्र विश्वासानुपपत्त्या निर्विचिकित्सप्रवृत्तेरनुपपत्तेः। तदप्युक्तं तत्रैव—

षड्दर्शनेऽपि मुक्तिस्तु दर्शिता पिण्डपातने।
करामलकवत्सापि प्रत्यक्षा नोपलभ्यते।
तस्मात्तं रक्षयेत्पिण्डं रसैश्चैव रसायनैः ॥ इति।

It may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is incorrect, the liberation in this life being explicable in another manner. This objection is not allowable, liberation being set out in the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body, and upon this there can be no reliance, and consequently no activity to attain to it free from misgivings. This is also laid down in the same treatise—

"Liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the death of the body."

"Such liberation is not cognised in perception like an emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand."

"Therefore a man should preserve that body by means of mercury and of medicaments."

गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यैरपि—

इति धनशरीरभोगान्मत्वानित्यान्सदैव यतनीयम् ।
मुक्तौ सा च ज्ञानात्तच्चाभ्यासात्स च स्थिरे देहे ॥ इति ।

Govinda-bhagavat also says—

"Holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are not permanent, one should strive."

"After emancipation; but emancipation results from knowledge, knowledge from study, and study is only possible in a healthy body."

ननु विनश्वरतया दृश्यमानस्य देहस्य कथं नित्यत्वमवसीयत इति चेत्—मैवं मंस्थाः । षाट्कौशिकस्य शरीरस्यानित्यत्वेऽपि रसाभ्रकपदाभिलप्यहरगौरीसृष्टिजातस्य नित्यत्वोपपत्तेः—

तथा च रसहृदये—

ये चात्यक्तशरीरा हरगौरीसृष्टिजां तनुं प्राप्ताः ।
मुक्तास्ते रससिद्धा मन्त्रगणः किंकरो येषाम् ॥ (१।७) इति ।

The body, some one may say, is seen to be perishable, how can its permanency be effected? Think not so, it is replied, for though the body, as complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul, is dissoluble, yet the body, as created by Hara and Gaurī under the names of mercury and miça, may be perdurable. Thus it is said in the Rasahṛdaya—

"They who, without quitting the body, have attained to a new body, the creation of Hara and Gaurī,"

"They are to be lauded, perfected by mercury, at whose service is the aggregate of magic texts."

तस्माज्जीवन्मुक्तिं समीहमानेन योगिना प्रथमं दिव्यतनुर्विधेया। हरगौरीसृष्टिसंयोगजनितत्वं च रसस्य हरजत्वेनाभ्रकस्य गौरीसंभवत्वेन तत्तदात्मतत्वमुक्तम्—

अभ्रकस्तव बीजं तु मम बीजं तु पारदः।
अनयोर्मेलनं देवि मृत्युदारिद्र्यनाशनम् ॥ इति।

The ascetic therefore, who aspires to liberation in this life should first make to himself a glorified body. And inasmuch as mercury is produced by the creative conjunction of Hara and Gaurī, and mica is produced from Gaurī, mercury and mica are severally identified with Hara and Gaurī in the verse—

"Mica is thy seed, and mercury is my seed;"

"The combination of the two, O goddess, is destructive of death and poverty."

अत्यल्पमिदमुच्यते। देवदैत्यमुनिमानवादिषु बहवो रससामर्थ्याद्दिव्यं देहमाश्रित्य जीवन्मुक्तिमाश्रिताः श्रूयन्ते रसेश्वरसिद्धान्ते—

देवाः केचिन्महेशाद्या दैत्याः काव्यपुरस्सराः।
मुनयो बालखिल्याद्या नृपाः सोमेश्वरादयः॥
गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्यो गोविन्दनायकः।
चर्वटिः कपिलो व्यालिः कापालिः कन्दलायनः॥
एतेऽन्ये बहवः सिद्धा जीवन्मुक्ताश्चरन्ति हि।
तनुं रसमयीं प्राप्य तदात्मककथाचणाः॥ इति।

This is very little to say about the matter. In the Raseśvara-siddhānta many among the gods, the Daityas, the Munis and mankind, are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver.

"Certain of the gods, Maheśa and others; certain Daityas, Śukra and others;

"Certain Munis, the Bālakhilyas and others; certain kings, Someśvara and others;"

"Govinda-bhagavat, Govinda-nāyaka,"

"Charvati, Kapila, Vyāli, Kāpāli, Kandalāyana,"
"These and many others proceed perfected, liberated while alive,"
"Having attained to a mercurial body, and therewith identified."

अयमेवार्थः परमेश्वरेण परमेश्वरीं प्रति प्रपञ्चितः —

कर्मयोगेण देवेशि प्राप्यते पिण्डधारणम् ।
रसश्च पवनश्चेति कर्मयोगो द्विधा स्मृतः ॥
मूर्च्छितो हरति व्याधीन्मृतो जीवयति स्वयम् ।
बद्धः खेचरतां कुर्याद्रसो वायुश्च भैरवि ॥ इति ।

The meaning of this, as explicated by Parameśvara to Parameśvarī, is as follows :—

"By the method of works is attained, O supreme of goddess, the preservation of the body ;"
"And the method of works is said to be twofold, mercury and air,"
"Mercury and air swooning carry off diseases, dead they restore to life,"
"Bound they give the power of flying about."

मूर्च्छितस्वरूपमुक्तम्—

नानावर्णो भवेत्सूतो विहाय घनचापलम् ।
लक्षणं दृश्यते यस्य मूर्च्छितं तं वदन्ति हि ॥
आर्द्रत्वं च घनत्वं च तेजो गौरवचापलम् ।
यस्यैतानि न दृश्यन्ते तं विद्यान्मृतसूतकम् ॥ इति ।

The swooning state of mercury is thus described—
"They say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived, as characterised thus—"
"Of various colours, and free from excessive volatility."
"A man should regard that quicksilver as dead, in which the following marks are seen—"
"Wetness, thickness, brightness, heaviness, mobility."

अन्यत्र बद्धस्वरूपमप्यभ्यधायि—

अक्षतस्य लघुद्रावी तेजस्वी निर्मलो गुरुः ।
स्फोटनं पुनरावृत्तौ बद्धसूतस्य लक्षणम् ॥ इति ।

The bound condition is described in another place as follows : –

"The character of bound quicksilver is that it is—"

"Continuous, fluent, luminous, pure, heavy and that it parts asunder under friction."

ननु हरगौरीसृष्टिसिद्धौ पिण्डस्थैर्यमास्थातुं पार्यते, तत्सिद्धिरेव कथमिति चेत्—न । अष्टादशसंस्कारवशात्तदुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—

तस्य प्रसाधनविधौ सुधिया प्रतिकर्मनिर्मलाः प्रथमम् ।
अष्टादश संस्कारा विज्ञातव्याः प्रयत्नेन ।। इति ।

Some one may urge : If the creation of mercury by Hara and Gaurī were proved, it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent ; but how can that be proved ? The objection is not allowable, inasmuch as that *can* be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration. Thus it is stated by the authorities—

"Eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully discriminated,"

"In the first place, as pure in every process for perfecting the adepts."

ते च संस्कारा निरूपिताः—

स्वेदनमर्दनमूर्च्छनस्थापनपातननिरोधनियमाश्च ।
दीपनगमनग्रासप्रमाणमथ जारणपिधानम् ।।
गर्भद्रुतिबाह्यद्रुतिक्षारणसंरागसारणाश्चैव ।
क्रामणवेधौ भक्षणमष्टादशधेति रसकर्म ।। इति ।।

तत्प्रपञ्चस्तु गोविन्दभगवत्पादाचार्य-सर्वज्ञरामेश्वरभट्टारकप्रभृतिभिः प्राचीनैराचार्यैर्निरूपित इति ग्रन्थभूयस्त्वभयादुदास्यते ।

And these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus—

"Sweating, rubbing, swooning fixing, dropping, coercion, restraining,"

"Kindling, going, falling into globules, pulverising, covering,"

"Internal flux, external flux, burning, colouring, and pouring,"

"And eating it by parting and piercing it,—are the eighteen modes of treating quicksilver."

These treatments have been described at length by Govinda-bhagavat, Sarvajña-rāmeśvara and the other ancient authorities and are here omitted to avoid prolixity.

न च रसशास्त्रं धातुवादार्थमेवेति मन्तव्यम् । देहवेधद्वारा मुक्तेरेव परमप्रयोजनत्वात् । तदुक्तं रसार्णवे—

लोहवेधस्त्वया देव यदर्थमुपवर्णितः ।
तं देहमेधमाचक्ष्व येन स्यात्खेचरी गतिः ॥
यथा लोहे तथा देहे कर्तव्यः सूतकः सता ।
समानं कुरुते देवि प्रत्ययं देहलोहयोः ॥
पूर्वं लोहे परीक्षेत पश्चाद्देहे प्रयोजयेत् ॥इति ।

The mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of the metal, it being immediately, through the conservation of the body, a means to the highest end, liberation. Thus it is said in the Rasārṇava –

"Declare to me, O god, that supremely efficacious destruction of the blood, that destruction of the body, imparted by thee, whereby it attained the power of flying about in the sky Goddess (he replied), quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body. This makes the appearence of body and blood alike. A man should first try it upon the blood, and then apply it to the body."

ननु सच्चिदानन्दात्मकपरतत्त्वस्फुरणादेव मुक्तिसिद्धौ किमनेन दिव्यदेहसंपादनप्रयासेनेति चेत्—तदेतद्वार्तम् । अवार्तशरीरालाभे तद्वार्तया अयोगात् । तदुक्तं रसहृदये—

गलितानल्पविकल्पः सर्वाध्वविवक्षितश्चिदानन्दः ।
स्फुरितोऽप्यस्फुरिततनोः करोति किं जन्तुवर्गस्य ॥
(र० हृ० १।२०) इति ।

यज्जरया जर्जरितं कासश्वासादिदुःखविशदं च ।
योग्यं यन्न समाधौ प्रतिहतबुद्धीन्द्रियप्रसरम् ॥
(र० हृ० १।२६) इति ।

बालः षोडशवर्षो विषयरसास्वादलम्पटः परतः ।
यातविवेको वृद्धो मर्त्यः कथमाप्नुयान्मुक्तिम् ॥ इति ।

It will be asked : Why should we make this effort to acquire a celestial body, seeing that liberation is effected by the self-manifestation of the supreme principle, existence, intelligence, and beatitude ? We reply : This is no objection, such liberation being

inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body. Thus it is said in the Rasahṛdaya—

"The intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away,

"Though it manifest itself, what can it effect for beings whose bodies are unglorified ?

"He who is worn out with decrepituda, though he be free from cough, from asthma, and similar infirmities,

"He is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities of the cognitive organs are obstructed."

"A youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures,

"And old man in his dotage, how should either of these attain to emancipation ?"

ननु जीवत्वं नाम संसारित्वम् । तद्विपरीतत्वं मुक्तत्वम् । तथा च परस्पर-विरुद्धयोः कथमेकायतनत्वमुपपन्नं स्यादिति चेत्—तदनुपपन्नम् । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । मुक्तिस्तावत्सर्वतीर्थकरसंमता । सा किं ज्ञेयपदे निविशते न वा । चरमे शशविषाण-कल्पा स्यात् । प्रथमे न जीवनं वर्जनीयम् । अजीवतो ज्ञातृत्वानुपपत्तेः । तदुक्तं रसेश्वरसिद्धान्ते—

रसाङ्कमेयमार्गोक्तो जीवमोक्षोऽन्यथा तु न ।
प्रमाणान्तरवादेषु युक्तिभेदावलम्बिषु ॥
ज्ञातृज्ञेयमिदं विद्धि सर्वतन्त्रेषु संमतम् ।
नाजीवञ्ज्ञास्यति ज्ञेयं यदतोऽस्त्येव जीवनम् ॥ इति ॥

Some one will object : It is the nature of the personal soul to pass through a series of embodiments, and to be liberated is to be extricted from that series of embodiments ; how, then, can these two mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement ? The objection is invalid, as unable to stand before the following dilemmatic argument :—Is this extrication, as to the nature of which all the founders of institutes are at one, to be held as cognisable or as incognisable ? If it is incognisable, it is a pure chimera ; if it is cognisable, we cannot dispense with life, for that which is not alive cannot be cognisant of it. Thus it is said in the Rasasidhânta—

"The liberation of the personal soul is declared in the mercurial system, O subtile thinker."

"In the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity of arguments,"

"Know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all sacred texts ;"

"One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore there is and must be life "

न चेदमदृष्टचरमिति मन्तव्यम् । विष्णुस्वामिमतानुसारिभिर्नृपञ्चास्यशरीरस्य नित्यत्वोपपादनात् । तदुक्तं साकारसिद्धौ—

सच्चिन्नित्यनिजाचिन्त्यपूर्णानन्दैकविग्रहम् ।
नृपञ्चास्यमहं वन्दे श्रीविष्णुस्वामिसंमतम् ॥ इति ।

And this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented, for the adherents of the doctrine of Viṣṇu-svāmin maintain the eternity of the body of Viṣṇu half man and half-lion. Thus it is said in the Sākāra-siddhi—

"I glorify the man-lion set forth by Viṣṇu-svāmin,"

"Whose only body is existence, intelligence, and eternal and inconceivably perfect beatitude."

नन्वेतत्सावयवं रूपवदवभासमानं नृकण्ठीरवाङ्गं सदिति न संगच्छत इत्यादिनाक्षेपपुरःसरं सनकादिप्रत्यक्षं, 'सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः' (श्वे० ३।१४) इत्यादि श्रुति,—

तमद्भुतं वालकमम्बुजेक्षणं चतुर्भुजं शङ्खगदाद्युदायुधम् । (भाग० १०।३।९),

इत्यादिपुराणलक्षणेन प्रमाणत्रयेण सिद्धं नृपञ्चाननाङ्गं कथमसत्स्यादिति सदादीनि विशेषणानि गर्भश्रीकान्तमिश्रैर्विष्णुस्वामिचरणपरिणतान्तःकरणैः प्रतिपादितानि । तस्मादस्मदिष्टदेहनित्यत्वमत्यन्तादृष्टं न भवतीति पुरुषार्थकामुकैः पुरुषैरेष्टव्यम् । अत एवोक्तम् –

आयतनं विद्यानां मूलं धर्मार्थकाममोक्षाणाम् ।
श्रेयः परं किमन्यच्छरीरमजरामरं विहायैकम् ॥ इति ।

If the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion, which appears as composite and as coloured, is incompatible with real existence, it may be replied : How can the body of the man-lion be otherwise than really existent, proved as it is by three kinds of

proof: (1) by the intuition of Śanaka and others; (2) by Vedic texts such as, A thousand heads has Puruṣa (3) by Purāṇic texts such as, That wondrous child, lotus-eyed, four-armed, armed with the conch-shell, the club, and other weapons? Real existence and other like predicates are affirmed also by Śrīkāntamiśra, the devoted adherent of Viṣṇu-svāmin. Let, then, those who aspire to the highest end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation. It has thus been said—

"What higher beatitude is there tha a body undecaying, immortal."

"The repository of sciences, the root of merit, riches, pleasure, liberation?"

अजरामरीकरणसमर्थश्च रसेन्द्र एव । तदाह—

एकोऽसौ रसराजः शरीरमजरामरं कुरुते । इति ।
किं वर्ण्यते रसस्य माहात्म्यम् ।
दर्शनस्पर्शनादिनापि महत्फलं भवति ॥

It is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal, as it is said—

"Only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying and imperishable."

तदुक्तं रसार्णवे—

दर्शनात्स्पर्शनात्तस्य भक्षणात्स्मरणादपि ।
पूजनाद्रसदानाच्च दृश्यते षड्विधं फलम् ॥
केदारादीनि लिङ्गानि पृथिव्यां यानि कानिचित् ।
तानि दृष्ट्वा तु यत्पुण्यं तत्पुण्यं रसदर्शनात् ॥

इत्यादिना ।

Why describe the efficacy of this metal? Its value is proved even by seeing it, and by touching it, as it is said in the Rasārṇava—

"From seeing it, from touching it, from eating it, from merely remembering it,"

'From worshipping it, from tasting it, from imparting it appear its six virtues."

'Equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from seeing all the phallic emblems."

"On earth, those at Kedāra, and all others whatsoever."

अन्यत्रापि—

काश्यादिसर्वलिङ्गेभ्यो रसलिङ्गार्चनाच्छिव: ।
प्राप्यते येन तल्लिङ्गं भोगारोग्यामृतप्रदम् ॥ इति ।

In another place we read—

"The adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific than the worship of all the phallic emblems at Kāśi and elsewhere,"

"Inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment, health, exemption from decay, and immortality."

रसनिन्दाया: प्रत्यवायोऽपि दर्शित: —

प्रमादाद्रसनिन्दाया: श्रुतावेनं स्मरेत्सुधी: ।
द्राक्त्यजेन्निन्दकं नित्यं निन्दया पूरिताशुभम् ॥ इति ॥

The sin of disparaging mercury is also set out—

"The adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged should recall quicksilver to mind"

"He should at once shun the blasphemer, who is by his hemy for ever filled with sin."

तस्मादस्मदुक्त्या रीत्या दिव्यं देहं संपाद्य योगाभ्यासवशात्परतत्त्वे दृष्टे पुरुषार्थप्राप्तिर्भवति । तदा—

भ्रूयुगमध्यगतं यच्छिखिविद्युत्सूर्यवज्जगद्भासि ।
केषांचित्पुण्यदृशामुन्मीलति चिन्मयं ज्योति: ॥
परमानन्दैकरसं परमं ज्योति: स्वभावमविकल्पम् ।
विगलितसकलक्लेशं ज्ञेयं शान्तं स्वसंवेद्यम् ॥
तस्मिन्नाधाय मन: स्फुरदखिलं चिन्मयं जगत्पश्यन् ।
उत्सन्नकर्मबन्धो ब्रह्मत्वमिहैव चाप्नोति ॥

(र० हृ० १।२१-२३) ।

The attainment, then, of the highest end of the personal soul takes place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the

practice of union after the acquisition of a divine body in the manner we have described. Thereafter—

"The light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain men of holy vision,"

"Which, seated between the two eyebrows, illumines the universe, like fire, or lightning, or the sun :"

"Perfect beatitude, unalloyed, absolute, the essence whereof is luminousness, undifferenced,"

"From which all troubles are fallen away, knowable, tranquil, self-recognised :"

"Fixing the internal organ upon that, seeing the whole universe manifested, made of pure intelligence,"

"The aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute, his bondage to works annulled."

श्रुतिश्च—'रसो वै सः। रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' (तै० २।७।१) इति। तदित्थं भवदैन्यदुःखभरतरणोपायो रस एवेति सिद्धम्। तथा च रसस्य परब्रह्मणा साम्यमिति प्रतिपादकः श्लोकः—

य: स्यात्प्रावरणाविमोचनधियां साध्यः प्रकृत्या पुनः
संपन्नः सह तेन दीव्यति परं वैश्वानरे जाग्रति ॥
ज्ञातो यद्यपरं न वेदयति च स्वस्मात्स्वयं द्योतते
यो ब्रह्मेव स दैन्यसंसृतिभयात्पायादसौ पारदः ॥

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे रसेश्वरदर्शनम्।

A Vedic text also declares : That is Rasa (mercury), having obtained this he becomes beatitude.

Thus, then, it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains. And conformably we have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the supreme self -

"May that mercury, which is the very self, preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis,"

"Which is naturally to be applied again and again by those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion,"

"Which perfected endures, which plays not again when the soul awakes,"

"Which, when it arises, pains no other soul, which shines forth by itself from itself."

A. E. G.

*NOTES*

1. Cf. Macro Pole's account of the Indian yogis in Colonel Yule's edit. vol. ii. p. 300. *Pārada-pāna* is one of the practices of the Siddhopāsakas in the Śaṅkara-digvijaya. § 49, to obviate *apamṛtyu, akālamṛtyu* etc.

# CHAPTER X

## THE VAIŚEṢIKA OR AULŪKYA DARŚANA[1]

इह खलु निखिलप्रेक्षावान् निसर्गप्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया निखिलात्मसंवेदनसिद्धं दुःखं जिहासुस्तद्धानोपायं जिज्ञासुः परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारमुपायमाकलयति ।

यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः ।
तदा शिवमविज्ञाय दुःखस्यान्तो भविष्यति ॥

इत्यादिवचननिचयप्रामाण्यात् ।

Whose wishes to escape the reality of pain, which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being, and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape,—learns that the knowledge of the Supreme Being is the true means thereof, from the authority of such passages as these (*Śvetāśvatara Upan.* vi 20)—

"When men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather,
"Then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of Śiva."

परमेश्वरसाक्षात्कारश्च श्रवणमननभावनाभिर्भावनीयः । यदाह—

आगमेनानुमानेन ध्यानाभ्यासबलेन च ।
त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन्प्रज्ञां लभते योगमुत्तमम् ॥ इति ।

तत्र मननमनुमानाधीनम् । अनुमानं च व्याप्तिज्ञानाधीनम् । व्याप्तिज्ञानं च पदार्थविवेकसापेक्षम् । अतः पदार्थषट्कम् 'अथातो धर्मं व्याख्यास्यामः' (वै० सू० १।१।१) इत्यादिकायां दशलक्षण्यां कणभक्षेण भगवता व्यवस्थापितम् ।

Now the knowledge of the Supreme is to be gained by hearing (*śravaṇa*) thought (*manana*), and reflection (*bhāvanā*); as it has been said—

"By scripture, by inference, and by the force of repeated meditation,—"
"By these three methods producing knowledge, he gains the highest union (*yoga*)."

तत्राह्निकद्वयात्मके प्रथमेऽध्याये समवेताशेषपदार्थकथनमकारि। तत्रापि प्रथमाह्निके जातिमन्निरूपणम्। द्वितीयाह्निके जातिविशेषयोर्निरूपणम्।

अह्निकद्वययुक्ते द्वितीयेऽध्याये द्रव्यनिरूपणम्। तत्रापि प्रथमेऽध्याये भूतविशेषलक्षणम्। द्वितीये दिक्कालप्रतिपादनम्।

अह्निकद्वययुक्ते तृतीय आत्मान्तःकरणलक्षणम्। तत्राप्यात्मलक्षणं प्रथमे। द्वितीयेऽन्तःकरणलक्षणम्। आह्निकद्वययुक्ते चतुर्थे शरीरतदुपयोगिविवेचनम्। तत्रापि प्रथमे तदुपयोगविवेचनम्। द्वितीये शरीरविवेचनम्।

Here thought depends on inference, and inference depends on the knowledge of the *vyāpti* (or universal proposition), and the knowledge of the *vyāpti* follows the right understanding of the categories ;—hence the saint Kaṇāda[2] establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise, commencing with the words, "Now, therefore, we shall explain duty."

In the first book, consisting of two daily lessons, he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation. In the first *āhnika* he defines those which possess "genus" (*jāti*), in the second "genus" (or "generality") itself and "particularity." in the similarly divided second book he discusses "substance" giving in the first *āhnika* the characteristics of the five elements, and in the second he establishes the existence of space and time. In the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense, the former in the first *āhnika*, the latter in the second. In the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts, the latter in the first *āhnika*, and the former in the second.

आह्निकद्वयवति पञ्चमे कर्मप्रतिपादनम्। तत्रापि प्रथमे शरीरसंबन्धिकर्मचिन्तनम्। द्वितीये मानसकर्मचिन्तनम्। आह्निकद्वयशालिनि षष्ठे श्रौतधर्मनिरूपणम्। तत्रापि प्रथमे दानप्रतिग्रहधर्मविवेकः द्वितीये चातुराश्रम्योचितधर्मनिरूपणम्।

तथाविधे सप्तमे गुणसमवायप्रतिपादनम्। तत्रापि प्रथमे बुद्धिनिरपेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनम्। द्वितीये तत्सापेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनं समवायप्रतिपादनं च।

अष्टमे निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणचिन्तनम्। नवमे बुद्धिविशेषप्रतिपादनम्। दशमेऽनुमानभेदप्रतिपादनम्।

In the fifth book he investigates action ; in the first *āhnika* he considers action as connected with the body, in the second as belonging to the mind. In the sixth book he examines merit and

demerit as revealed in Śruti ; in the first *āhnika* he discusses the merit of giving, receiving gifts, etc., in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life. In the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation ; in the first *āhnika* he considers the qualities independent of thought, in the second those qualities which are related to it, and also intimate relation. In the eighth book he examines "indeterminate" and "determinate" perception, and means of proof. In the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect. In the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of inference.[3]

तत्रोद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति त्रिविधास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः (वात्स्यायन० १।१।१) ननु विभागापेक्षया चातुर्विध्ये वक्तव्ये कथं त्रैविध्यमुक्तमिति चेत्—मैवं मंस्थाः। विभागस्य विशेषोद्देशरूपत्वात् उद्देश एवान्तर्भावात्। तत्र द्रव्य-गुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवाया इति षडेव ते पदार्था इत्युद्देशः।

किमत्र क्रमनियमे कारणम्? उच्यते? समस्तपदार्थायतनत्वेन प्रधानस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रथममुद्देशः। अनन्तरं गुणत्वोपाधिना सकलद्रव्यवृत्तेर्गुणस्य। तदनु सामान्य-वत्त्वसाम्यात्कर्मणः। पश्चात्तत्त्रितयाश्रितस्य सामान्यस्य। तदनन्तरं समवायाधि-करणस्य विशेषस्य। अन्तेऽवशिष्टस्य समवायस्येति।

The method of this system is said to be threefold, "enunciation," "definition," and "investigation."[4] But it may be objected, "ought we not to include 'division,' and so make the method four-fold, not threefold ?" We demur to this, because "division" is really included in a particular kind of enunciation. Thus when we declare that substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and intimate relation are the only six positive categories - this is an example of enunciation. If you ask "What is the reason for this definite order of the categories ?" we answer as follows :—Since "substance" is the chief, as being the substratum of all the categories we enounce this first ; next quality," since it resides in its generic "character in all substances [though different substances have different qualities] ; then "action," as it agrees with "substance" and "quality" in possessing "generality ;"[5] then "generality," as residing in these three ; then "particularity," inasmuch as it possesses "intimate relation ;"[6] lastly, "intimate relation" itself ; such is the principle of arrangement.

ननु षडेव पदार्था इति कथं कथ्यते ? अभावस्यापि सद्भावात् इति चेत्— मैवं वोचः। नञर्थानुल्लिखितधीविषयतया भावरूपतया षडेवेति विवक्षितत्वात्। तथापि कथं षडेवेति नियम उपपद्यते ? विकल्पानुपपत्तेः। नियमव्यवच्छेद्यं प्रमितं न वा। प्रमितत्वे कथं निषेधः ? अप्रमितत्वे कथंतराम् ?

न हि कश्चित्प्रेक्षावान्मूषिकविषाणं प्रतिषेद्धुं यतते। ततश्चानुपपत्तेर्न नियम इति चेत्—मैवं भाषिष्ठाः। सप्तमतया प्रमितेऽन्धकारादौ भावत्वस्य, भावतया प्रमिते शक्तिसादृश्यादौ सप्तमत्वस्य च निषेधादिति कृतं विस्तरेण।

If you ask, "Why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one ?" we answer : Because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories, i.e. as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea. "Still," the objector may retort, "how do you establish this definite number "only six' ? for either horn of the alternative fails. For, we ask, is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not ? If it is thoroughly ascertained, why do you exclude it ? and still more so, if it is not thoroughly ascertained ? What sensible man, pray, spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns ? Thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable." This, however, we cannot admit ; if darkness, etc., are allowed to form certainly a seventh category (as "non-existence"), we thus (by our definite number) deny it to be one of the six *positive* categories,— and if others attempt to include "capacity," "number," etc., which we allow to be certainly positive existences, we thus deny that they make a *seventh* category. But enough of this long discussion.

तत्र द्रव्यादित्रितयस्य द्रव्यत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम्। द्रव्यत्वं नाम गगनारविन्दसमवेतत्वे सति, सति, नित्यत्वे सति, गन्धासमवेतत्वम्।

Substaintiality, & etc. (*dravyatvādi*). *i.e.* the genera of substance, quality, and action, are the definition of the triad substance, quality, and action respectively. The genus of substance (*dravyatva*) is that which, while it alike exists with intimate relation in the (eternal) sky and the (transitory) lotus, is itself eternal,[7] and does not exist intimate relation in smell.[8]

गुणत्वं नाम समवायिकारणसमवेतासमवायिकारणभिन्नसमवेतसत्तासाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः। कर्मत्वं नाम नित्यासमवेतत्वसहितसत्तासाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः। सामान्यं

तु प्रध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वरहितमनेकसमवेतम् । विशेषो नामान्योन्याभावविरोधिसामान्य रहितः समवेतः । समवायस्तु समवायरहितः संबन्धः इति षण्णां लक्षणानि व्यवस्थितानि ।

The genus of quality (*guṇatva* is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause [9] The genus of action (*karmatva*) is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence, and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal [10] Generality (or genus *sāmānya*) is that which is found in many things with intimate relation, and can never be the counter-entity to emergent non-existence.[11] Particularity[12] (*viśesha*) exists with intimate relation but it is destitute of generality, which stops mutual non-existence.[13] Intimate relation. (*samavāya*) is that connection which itself has not intimate relation.[14] Such are the definitions of the six categories.

द्रव्यं नवविधं पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि इति । तत्र पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य पृथिवीत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् ।

पृथिवीत्वं नाम पाकजरूपसमानाधिकरणद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः । अप्त्वं नाम सरित्सागरसमवेतत्वे सति ज्वलनासमवेतं सामान्यम् । तेजस्त्वं नाम चन्द्रचामीकरसमवेतत्वे सति सलिलासमवेतं सामान्यम् । वायुत्वं नाम त्वगिन्द्रियसमवेतद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिः ।

Substance is ninefold,—earth, water fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The genera of earth, etc.(*Pṛthivitva*), are the definitions of the first four.

The genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance, and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking.[15]

The genus of water is that generally which is found with intimate relation in water, being also found in intimate relation in river and sea.

The genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire, being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold.

The genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance, and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin.[16]

आकाशकालदिशामेकैकत्वादपरजात्यभावे परिभाषिक्यस्तिस्रः संज्ञा भवन्ति । आकाशं कालो दिगिति ।

संयोगाजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणमाकाशम् । विभुत्वे सति दिगसमवेतपरत्वासमवायिकारणाधिकरणः कालः । अकालत्वे सति अविशेषगुणा महती दिक् ।

आत्ममनसोरात्मनस्त्वे । आत्मत्वं नामामूर्तसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजातिः । मनस्त्वं नाम द्रव्यसमवायिकारणत्वरहिताणुसमवेतद्रव्यत्वापरजातिः ।

As ether, space and time, from their being single, cannot be subordinate genera, their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations. Ether is the abode of particularity, and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal *(janya)* special quality which is not produced by contact.[17]

Time is that which, being a pervading substance, is the abode of the mediate cause[18] of that idea of remoteness *(paradva)* which is not found with intimate relation in space;[19] while space is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time.[20] The general terms *ātmatva* and *manastva* are the respesctive definitions of soul *(ātman)* and mind *(manas)*. The general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form[21] *(amūrtta)*. The general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance, being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom, but [unlike other atoms] not the intimate cause of any substance.

रूप-रस-गन्ध-स्पर्श-संख्या-परिमाण-पृथक्त्व-संयोगविभाग-परत्वापरत्व-बुद्धि-सुखदुःखेच्छा-द्वेष-प्रयत्नाश्च कण्ठोक्ताः सप्तदश, चशब्दसमुच्चिता गुरुत्व द्रवत्व-स्नेह-संस्कारादृष्ट-शब्दाः सप्तैवेत्येवं चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणाः ।

तत्र रूपादिशब्दान्तानां रूपत्वादिजातिर्लक्षणम् । रूपत्वं नाम नीलसमवेत-गुणत्वापरजातिः । अनया दिशा शिष्टानां लक्षणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

There are twenty-four qualities; seventeen are mentioned directly in Kaṇāda's Sūtras (i. 1, 6), "colour, taste, smell, touch, number, quantity, severality, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort;" and, besides these, seven others are understood in the word "*and*,"

viz, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, faculty merit, demerit, and sound. Their respective genera (*rūpatva*, etc.) are their several definitions. The class or genus of "colour" is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue. In the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest.

कर्म पञ्चविधम् । उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् । भ्रमण-रेचनादीनां गमन एवान्तर्भावः । उत्क्षेपणादीनामुत्क्षेपणत्वादिर्लक्षणम् । तत्रोत्क्षेप-णत्वं नामोर्ध्वदेशसंयोगासमवायिकारणसमवेतकर्मत्वापरजातिः । एवमपक्षेपणत्वा-दीनां लक्षणं कर्तव्यम् ।

"Action" is fivefold, according to the distinction of throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going: revolution, evacuating, etc, being included under "going." The genus of throwing upwards, etc., will be their respective definitions The genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action; it exists with intimate relation, and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with a higher place. In the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards, etc.

सामान्यं द्विविधं परमपरं च । परं सत्ता द्रव्यगुणसमवेता । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि तल्लक्षणं प्रागेवोक्तम् ।

विशेषाणामनन्तत्वात् समवायस्य चैकत्वाद् विभागो न संभवति तल्लक्षणं च प्रागेवावादि ।

Generality (or genus) is twofold, extensive and non-extensive; existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality, or in quality and action; substance, etc., are non-extensive. The definition of generality has been given before. Particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided,—in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities, in the later from intimate relation being but one; their definitions have been given before.

द्वित्वे च पाकजोत्पत्तौ विभागे च विभागजे ।
यस्य न स्खलिता बुद्धिस्तं वै वैशेषिकं विदुः ॥

इत्याभाणकस्य सद्भावाद् द्वित्वाद्युत्पत्तिप्रकारः प्रदर्श्यते ।

There is a popular proverb—

"Duality, change produced by baking, and disjunction

produced by disjunction,—he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true Vaiśeṣika;" and therefore we will now show the manner of the production of duality, etc.

तत्र प्रथमिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः (१)। तस्मादेकत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् (२)। ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिः (३)। ततो द्वित्वोत्पत्ति : (४)। ततो द्वित्वत्वसामान्यज्ञानम् (५)। तस्माद् द्वित्वगुणज्ञानम् (६)। ततो 'द्वे द्रव्ये' इति धीः (७)। ततः संस्कारः (८)। तदाह—

आदाविन्द्रियसंनिकर्षघटनादेकत्वसामान्यधी-
रेकत्वोभयगोचरा मतिरतो द्वित्वं ततो जायते ।
द्वित्वत्वप्रमितिस्ततो नु परतो द्वित्वप्रमाऽनन्तरं
द्वे द्रव्ये इति धीरियं निगदिता द्वित्वोदयप्रक्रिया ॥ इति ।

There is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object; thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity; then the distinguishing perception *apekṣābuddhi* [by which we apprehend "This is one," "this is one," etc.]; then the production of duality, *dvitva* (in the object);[22] then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality (*dvitvatva*) ; then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things ; then imagination[23] (*saṃskāra*).[24]

द्वित्वादेरपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यत्वे किं प्रमाणम् ? अत्राहुराचार्याः—अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्द्वित्वादेरुत्पादिका भवितुमर्हति । व्यञ्जकत्वानुपपत्तौ तेनानुविधीयमानत्वात् । शब्दं प्रति संयोगवदिति । वयं तु ब्रूमः—द्वित्वादिकमेकत्वद्वयविषयानित्यबुद्धिव्यङ्ग्यं न भवति । अनेकाश्रितगुणत्वात् पृथक्त्वादिवदिति ।

But it may here be asked what is the proof of duality, etc. being thus produced from *apekṣābuddhi ?* The great doctor (Udayana) maintained that *apekṣābuddhi* must be the producer of duality, etc., because duality is never found separated from it, while, at the same time, we cannot hold *apekṣābuddhi* as the cause only of its being known [and therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being produced[25]], just as contact is with regard to sound. We, however, maintain the same opinion by a different argument ; duality, etc., cannot be held to be made known (*jñāpya*) by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities (i.e., *apekṣābuddhi*), because these are qualities

which resides in a plurality of subjects [and not in any one individual[26]] just as "severality" does [and, therefore, as *apekshābuddhi* is not their *jñāpaka*, it must be their *janaka*].

निवृत्तिक्रमो निरूप्यते—अपेक्षाबुद्धित एकत्वसामान्यज्ञानस्य द्वित्वोत्पत्तिसमकालं निवृत्तिः। अपेक्षाबुद्धेर्द्वित्वत्वसामान्यज्ञानाद् द्वित्वगुणबुद्धिसमसमयम्। द्वित्वस्यापेक्षाबुद्धिनिवृत्तेर्द्रव्यबुद्धिसमकालम्। गुणबुद्धेर्द्रव्यबुद्धितः संस्कारोत्पत्तिसमकालम्। द्रव्यबुद्धेस्तदनन्तरं संस्कारादिति।

तथा च संग्रहश्लोकाः—

आदावपेक्षाबुद्ध्या हि नश्येदेकत्वजातिधीः।<br>
द्वित्वोदयसमं पश्चात् सा च तज्जातिबुद्धितः॥<br>
द्वित्वाख्यगुणधीकाले, ततो द्वित्वं निवर्तते।<br>
अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशेन द्रव्यधीजन्मकालतः॥<br>
गुणबुद्धिर्द्रव्यबुद्ध्या संस्कारोत्पत्तिकालतः।<br>
द्रव्यबुद्धिश्च संस्कारादिति नाशक्रमो मतः॥ इति।

Next we will describe the order of the successive destructions. From *apekshābuddhi* arises, simultaneously with the production of duality *(dvitva)*, the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity; next from the knowledge of the genus of duality *(dvitvatva)* arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality, the destruction of *apekshābuddhi*; next from the destruction of *apekshābuddhi* arises, simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances, the destruction of the duality; next from the knowledge of the two substances arises, simultaneously with the production of imagination *(saṁskāra)*, the destruction of the knowledge of the quality; and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances.

बुद्धेर्बुद्ध्यन्तरविनाश्यत्वे संस्कारविनाश्यत्वे च प्रमाणम्—विवादाध्यासितानि ज्ञानान्युत्तरोत्तरकार्यविनाश्यानि क्षणिकविभुविशेषगुणत्वाच्छब्दवत्। क्वचिद् द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगप्रतिद्वन्द्विविभागजनककर्मसमकालमेकत्वसमकालचिन्तयाऽऽश्रयनिवृत्तेरेव द्वित्वनिवृत्तिः। कर्मसमकालमपेक्षाबुद्धिचिन्तनादुभाभ्यामिति संक्षेपः।

The evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another, and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination, is to be found in the following argument; these knowledges

themselves which are the subjects of the discussion *are* successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them, because knowledge, like sound, is a special quality of an all-pervading substance, and of momentary duration.[27] I may briefly add, that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves, producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole, in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding place (the two things); but where you have the separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of *apekṣābuddhi*, there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both.[28]

अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्नाम विनाशकविनाशप्रतियोगिनी बुद्धिरिति बोद्धव्यम् ।

*Apekshābuddhi* is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence (i.e destruction) which itself causes a subsequent destruction.[29]

अथ द्व्यणुकनाशमारभ्य कतिभिः क्षणैः पुनरन्यद् द्व्यणुकमुत्पद्य रूपादिमद्भवतीति जिज्ञासायामुत्पत्तिप्रकारः कथ्यते—नोदनादिक्रमेण द्व्यणुकनाशः । नष्टे द्व्यणुके परमाणवग्निसंयोगाच्छ्यामादीनां निवृत्तिः । निवृत्तेषु श्यामादिषु पुनरन्यस्मादग्निसंयोगाद् रक्तादीनामुत्पत्तिः ।

उत्पन्नेषु रक्तादिषु अदृष्टवदात्मसंयोगात्परमाणौ द्रव्यारम्भणाय क्रिया । तया पूर्वदेशाद्विभागः । विभागेन पूर्वदेशसंयोगनिवृत्तिः । तस्मिन्निवृत्ते परमाण्वन्तरेण संयोगोत्पत्तिः । संयुक्ताभ्यां परमाणुभ्यां द्व्यणुकारम्भः । आरब्धे द्व्यणुके कारणगुणादिभ्यः कार्यगुणादीनां रूपादीनामुत्पत्तिरिति यथाक्रमं नव क्षणाः ।

दशक्षणादिप्रकारान्तं विस्तरभयान्नेह प्रतन्यते । इत्थं पीलुपाकप्रक्रिया पिठरपाकप्रक्रिया नैयायिकधीसंमता ।

Next we will inquire in how many moments, commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms (the *dvyaṇuka*), another compound of two atoms is produced, having colour, etc. In the course of this investigation the mode of production will be explained. First, the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire;[30] secondly, from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black, etc., in the single atom; thirdly, from another

conjunction of fire arises the production of red, etc., in the atom; fourthly, from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action[31] in the atom for the production of a substance; fifthly, by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place; sixthly, there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place; seventhly, is produced the conjunction with another atom; eighthly, from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms; ninthly, from the qualities, etc., of the causes (i.e., the atoms) are produced colour, etc., the qualities of the effect (i.e., the *dvyaṇuka*). Such is the order of the series of nine moments. The other two series,[32] that of the ten and that of the eleven moments, are omitted for fear of prolixity. Such is the mode of production, if we hold (with the Vaiśeshikas) that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar.[33] The Naiyāyikas, however, maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar.

विभागजविभागो द्विविध:—कारणमात्रविभागज: कारणाकारणविभागजश्च । तत्र प्रथम: कथ्यते—

"Disjunction produced by disjunction" is twofold,—that produced by the disjunction of the intimate [or material] causes only, and that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause [i.e., the place]. We will first describe the former kind.

कार्यव्याप्ते कारणे कर्मोत्पन्नं यदाऽवयवान्तराद्विभागं विधत्ते, न तदाऽऽकाशादिदेशाद्विभाग: । यदा त्वाकाशादिदेशाद्विभाग:, न तदाऽवयवान्तरादिति स्थितिनियम: ।

कर्मणो गगनविभागाकर्तृत्वस्य द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगविरोधिविभागारम्भकत्वेन धूमस्य धूमध्वजवर्गेणेव व्यभिचारानुपलम्भात् । ततश्चावयकर्मावयवान्तरादेव विभागं करोति नाकाशादिदेशात् । तस्माद्विभागाद् द्रव्यारम्भकसंयोगनिवृत्ति: । तत: कारणाभावात्कार्याभाव इति न्यायादवयवनिवृत्ति: ।

It is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the [material] cause which is inseparably connected with the effect [i.e. in one of the two halves of the pot], and produces a disjunction from the other half, there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot; and, again,

when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the pot, the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it, but has already taken place.

For just as we never see smoke without its cause, fire, so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space,[34] without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was brought into being.

Therefore the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another, but not the disjunction from the point of space; next this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence; and thence arises the destruction of the pot, according to the principle, *cessante causā cessat effectus*.

निवृत्तेऽवयविनि तत्कारणयोरवयवयोः वर्तमानो विभागः कार्यविनाशविशिष्टं कालं स्वतन्त्रं वायवयमपेक्ष्य सक्रियस्यैवावयवस्य कार्यसंयुक्तादाकाशदेशाद्विभागमारभते न निष्क्रियस्य । कारणाभावात् ।

The pot being thus destroyed, that disjucntion, which resides in both the halves (which are the material or intimate causes of the pot) during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half, initiates, in the case of that half where the breaking began, a disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the pot; but not in the case of the other half, as there is no cause to produce it[35]

द्वितीयस्तु हस्ते कर्मोत्पन्नम् अवयवान्तराद्विभागं कुर्वत् आकाशादिदेशेभ्यो विभागानारभते । ते कारणाकारणविभागाः कर्म यां दिशं प्रति कार्यारम्भाभिमुखं, तामपेक्ष्य कार्याकार्यविभागमारभन्ते । यथा हस्ताकाशविभागाच्छरीराकाशविभागः ।

But the second kind is as follows :—As action which arises in the hand, and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact, initiates a disjunction[36] from the points of space in which the original conjunction took place; and this is "the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause." When the action in the hand produces an effect in relation to any points of space, initiates also in the same direction disjunction of the intimate effect and the

non-effect; thus the disjunction of the body [the intimate effect] and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of space [the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body, but the points of space being not a cause.]

न चासौ शरीरक्रियाकार्यः । तदा तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात् । नापि हस्तक्रियाकार्यः व्यधिकरणस्य कर्मणो विभागकर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः । अतः पारिशेष्यात् कारणाकारण-विभागस्तस्य कारणमङ्गीकरणीयम् ।

This second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body, because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive; nor is it produced by the action of the hand, because it is impossible that an action residing in some other place [as the hand] should produce the effect of disjunction [in the body]. Therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view—that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause[37] which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of space.

यदवादि—'अन्धकारादौ भावत्वं निषिध्यते' इति तदसंगतम् । तत्र चतुर्धा विवादसंभवात् । तथाहि—द्रव्यं तम इति भाट्टा वेदान्तिनश्च भणन्ति । आरोपितं नीलरूपमिति श्रीधराचार्याः । आलोकज्ञानाभावः इति प्राभाकरैकदेशिनः । आलोकाभाव इति नैयायिकादय इति चेत्—

But an opponent may here object that "what you formerly stated as to existence being denied of darkness, etc., is surely unreasonable; for, in fact, there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point,—thus (*a*) the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins hold that darkness is a substance; (*b*) Śridhara Ācārya[38] holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed [and thus darkness will be a quality]; (*c*) some of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light; (*d*) the Naiyāyikas, etc., hold that it is the absence of light."

तत्र द्रव्यत्वपक्षो न घटते । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः । द्रव्यं भवदन्धकाराख्यं पृथिव्याद्यन्यतममन्यद्वा । नाद्यः । यत्रान्तर्भावोऽस्य तस्य यावन्तो गुणास्तावद्गुणकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न द्वितीयः । निर्गुणस्य तस्य द्रव्यत्वासंभवेन द्रव्यान्तरत्वस्य सुतरामसंभवात् ।

In reply, we assert that as for the first alleged opinion (*a*) it is quite out of the question, as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives; for it darkness is a substance, it must

either be one of the nine well-known substa. ces, earth, e:c.,[39] or some different one. But it cannot be any one the nine, since, under whichever one you would place it, all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it; nor can you, on the other hand, assert that it is some substance different from these nine, since, being in itself destitute of qualities, it cannot properly be a substance at all [the very definition of substance being "that which is the substratum of qualities"] and therefore, of course, it cannot be a different substance from the nine.

ननु तमालश्यामलत्वेनोपलभ्यमानं तमः कथं निर्गुणं स्यादिति चेत्—तदसारम् । गन्धादिव्याप्तस्य नीलरूपस्य तन्निवृत्तौ निवृत्तेः ।

अथ नीलं तम इति गतेः का गतिरिति चेत्—नीलं नभ इतिवद् भ्रान्तिरेवेत्यलं वृद्धवीवधया । अत एव नारोपितरूपं तमः । अधिष्ठानप्रत्ययमन्तरेणारोपायोगात् । बाह्यालोकसहकारिरहितस्य चक्षुषो रूपारोपे सामर्थ्यानुपलम्भाच्च ।

But you may ask, ' How can you say that darkness is destitute of qualities, when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamāla blossom ?" We reply, that this is merely an error, as when men say that the [colourless] sky is blue. But enough of this onslaught on ancient sages[40] (*b*) Hence it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it, since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it;[41] and again, we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause, the external light.

न चायमचाक्षुषः प्रत्ययः । तदनुविधानस्यानन्यथासिद्धत्वात् । अत एव नालोकज्ञानाभावः । अभावस्य प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वनियमेन मानसत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

तस्मादालोकाभाव एव तमः । न च विधिप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वेनाभावत्वायोग इति सांप्रतम् । प्रलयविनाशावसानादिषु व्यभिचारात् । न चाभावे भावधर्माध्यारोपो दुरुपपादः । दुःखाभावे सुखत्वारोपस्य संयोगाभावे विभागत्वाभिमानस्य च दृष्टत्वात् ।

न चालोकाभावस्य घटाद्यभाववद् रूपवदभावत्वेनालोकसापेक्षचक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयत्वं स्यादित्येषितव्यम् यद्ग्रहे यदपेक्षं चक्षुः, तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षत इति न्यायेनालोकग्रहं आलोकापेक्षाया अभावेन तदभावग्रहेऽपि तदपेक्षाया अभावात् ।

Nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye [i.e., produced by the internal sense, mind], because the con-

currence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced. Nor can you maintain that "absence or non-existence (*abhaāva*[42]) is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes [and, therefore, as we *do* use such phrases as *tenebroe oriuntur*, darkness cannot be a mere non-existence"]; because your assertion is too broad, as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse, destruction, inattention,[43] etc., [and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past, present, or future, and yet all are cases of *abhāva*] (*c*). Hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light, since, by the well-known rule that organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence, it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind [since it is the mind which perceives cognitions].[44] Hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one, viz., that darkness is only the absence of light. And it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence for we all see that the quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain, and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction. And you need not assert that "this absence of light must be the object of cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light, since it is the absence of an object possessing colour,[45] as we see in the case of a jar's absence," because by the very rule on which you reply, viz., that on which the eye depends to perceive an object, it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence, it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light, it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence.

न चाधिकरणग्रहणावश्यंभावः । अभावप्रतीतावधिकरणग्रहणावश्यंभावानङ्गीकारात् । अपरथा, 'निवृत्तः कोलाहलः' इति शब्दप्रध्वंसः प्रत्यक्षो न स्यात्—इति अप्रामाणिकं परवचनम् । तत्सर्वमभिसंधाय भगवान्कणादः प्रणिनाय सूत्रं—'द्रव्यगुणकर्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः' (वै० सू० ५।२।१९) इति ।

Nor need our opponent retort that "the cognition of darkness [as the absence of light] necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides [and *this* will require light]," as such an assertion is quite untenable, for we cannot admit that in

order to have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides, else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound, as is implied in such an expression as "the tumult has ceased."[46] Hence, having all these difficulties in his mind, the venerable Kaṇāda uttered his aphorism [as an *ipse dixit* to settle the question] : "*Dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād abhāvas tamas*" (*Vaiś. Sūt.* v. 2, 19), "Darkness is realy non-existence, since it is dissimilar to the production of substances qualities, or actions." The same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eyes[47] [without light, whereas all substances, if perceptible at all, require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible].

अभावस्तु निषेधमुखप्रमाणगम्यः सप्तमो निरूप्यते । स चासमवायत्वे सत्य-समवायः ।

संक्षेपतो द्विविधः—संसर्गाभावान्योन्याभावभेदात् । संसर्गाभावोऽपि त्रिविधः—प्राक्प्रध्वंसात्यन्ताभावभेदात् । तत्रानित्योऽनादितमः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तिमान-विनाशी प्रध्वंसः । प्रतियोग्याश्रयोऽभावोऽत्यन्ताभावः । अत्यन्ताभावव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति अनवधिरभावोऽन्योन्याभावः ।

Non-existence (*abhāva*) is considered to be the seventh category, as established by negative proofs. It may be concisely defined as that which, itself not having intimate relation is *not* intimate relation;[48] and this is twofold, "relative non-existence"[49] and "reciprocal non existence." The former is again divided into "antecedent," "emergent," and "absolute." "Antecedent" is that non-existence which, though without any beginning is not everlasting; "emergent" is that which, though having a beginning, is everlasting; "absolute" is that non-existence which abides in its own counterentity;[50] "reciprocal non-existence" is that which, being different form "absolute," has yet no defined limit [i.e no *terminus ad quem* nor *terminus a quo*, as "antecedent" and "emergent" have].

ननु अन्योन्याभाव एवात्यन्ताभाव इति चेत्—अहो राजमार्ग एव भ्रमः । अन्योन्याभावो हि तादात्म्यप्रतियोगिकः प्रतिषेधः । यथा घटः घटात्मा न भवतीति । संसर्गप्रतियोगिकः प्रतिषेधोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा वायौ रूपसम्बन्धो नास्तीति ।

न चास्य पुरुषार्थौपयिकत्वं नास्तीत्याशङ्कनीयम् । दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदापरपर्यायनिःश्रेयसरूपत्वेन परमपुरुषार्थत्वात् ।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे औलूक्यदर्शनम् ।।

If you raise the objection that "reciprocal non-existence" is really the same as "absolute non-existence," we reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's highroad; for "reciprocal non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity, as "a jar is not cloth;" but "absolute non-existence" is that negation whose opposite is connection, as "there is no colour in the air."[51]

Nor need you here raise the objection that "*abhāva* can never be a means of producing any good to man," for we maintain that it is his *summum bonum*, in the form of final beautitude, which is only another term for the absolute abolition of all pain [and therefore comes under the category of *abhāva*]. E.B.C.

*NOTES*:

1. The Vaiśeṣikas are called Aulūkyāḥ in Hemachandra's *Abhidhāna cintāmaṇi*; in the Vāyu-purāṇa (quoted in Aufrecht's *Catal.* p. 53 *b* 1. 23) Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka, and Vatsa are called the son of Śiva.
2. He is here called by his synonym Kaṇabhakṣa,
3. It is singular that this is inaccurate. The ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible, contact, etc., and inference. The tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul, and the three causes.
4. For this extract from the old *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, see Colebrooke's *Essays* (new edition) vol. i. p. 285.
5. Cf. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, śloka 14.
6. "Particularity" (*viśeṣa*) resides by "intimate relation" in the eternal atoms, etc,
7. This clause is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "duality" and "conjunction."
8. This is added, as otherwise the definition would apply to "existence" (*sattā*), which is the *summun genus*, to which substance, quality, and action are immediately subordinate.

9. Existence (*sattā*) is the genus of *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *kriyā*. *Dravya* alone can be the intimate cause of anything; and all actions are the mediate (or non-intimate) cause of conjunction, and disjunction. *Some* qualities (as *saṁyoga*, *rūpa*, etc.) may be mediate causes, but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence of *guṇa*, as many guṇas can never be mediate causes.
10. As all karmas are transitory, *karmatva* is only found in the *anitya*, I correct *nityāsamavetatva*; this is the reading of the MS. in the Calcutta Sanskrit College library.
11. *i.e*., it can never be destroyed. Indestructibility, however, is found in time, space, etc. ; to exclude these, therefore, the former clause of the definition is added.
12. "Particularity" (whence the name Vaiśeṣika) is not "individuality, as of this particular flash of lightning",—but it is the individuality either of those eternal subtances which, being single, have no genus, as ether, time, and space; or of the different atomic minds; or of the atoms of the four remaining substances, earth, water, fire, and air, these atoms being supposed to be the *ne plus ultra*, and as they have no parts, they are what they are by their own indivisible nature. Ballantyne translated *viśeṣa* as "ultimate difference." I am not sure whether the individval soul has *viśeṣa*.
13. Mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) exits between two notions which have no property in common, as a "pot is not cloth;" but the genus is the same in two pots, both alike being pots.
14. *Saṁavāyasambandhābhāvāt samavāyo na jātiḥ*," Siddh. Mukt. (*Sawyoga* being a *guṇa* has *guṇatva* existing in it with intimate relation).
15. The fell or touch of earth is said to be "neither hot nor cold, and its colour, taste, smell, and touch are changed by union with fire" (Bhaṣāpariccheda, *sl* 103, 104).
16. The organ of touch is an acrial integument—*Colebrooke*.
17. Sound is twofold,—"produced from contact," as the *first* sound, and "produced from sound," as the *second*. *Janya* is added to exclude God's knowledge, while *saṁyogājanya*

exclude the soul's, which is produced by contact, as of the soul and m nd, mind and the senses, etc.

18. The mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body, etc., existing in time,—this latter is the intimate cause, while the knowledge of revolution of the sun is the instrumental cause. Read *adhikaraṇam.*

19. *Paratva* being of two kinds, *daiśika* and *kālika.*

20. Time, space, and mind have no special qualities; the last, however, is not pervading but atomic.

21. The three other *padārthas* beside soul, which are *amūrtha,*—time, ether, and space,—are not genera.

22. All numbers, from duality upwards, are artificial, i.e., they are made by our minds, unity alone exists in things themselves—each being *one* ; and they only become two, etc., by our choosing to regard them so, and thus joining them in thought.

23. *Saṃskāra* is here the idea, conceived by the mind—created, in fact, by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind. [Cf. the tables in p. 153 (see 223.)]

24. Here and elsewhere I omit the metrical summary of the original, as it adds nothing new to the previous prose.

25. Every cause must be either *jñāp ka* or *janaka*; *apekṣābhuddhi,* not being the former, must be the latter.

26. *Apekṣābuddhi* apprehends "this is one," "this is one," etc. ; but duality, for instance, does not reside in either of these, but in *both* together.

27. The Vaiśeṣika held that the jivātman and space are each and all-pervading substance, but the individual portions of each have different special qualities; hence one man knows what another is ignorant of, and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not. Dr. Roer, in his version of the Bhāṣā Pariccheda, has mistranslated an important Sūtra which bears on this point. It is said in Sūtra 26—

*—athākāśaśarīriṇāmā*
*avyāpyavṛttiḥ kṣaṇiko viśeṣaguṇa iṣyate,*

which does not mean "the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration," but "the special qualities of ether and soul (i.e., sound, knowledge, etc.,) are limited to different portions and of momentary duration."

28. The author here mentions two other causes of the destruction of *dvitva* besides that already given (*apekṣābuddhi-nāśa*) viz., *āśrayanāśa*, and the united action of *both* :—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Ekatva-jñāna. . . | Avayava-kriyā . . | ......... |
| 2. Apekṣābuddhi. . | Avayana-vibhāga . . | Avayava-kriyā. |
| 3. Dvitvotpatti and ekatva-jñāna-nāśa . . | Avayava-saṃyoga-nāśa ....... | Avayava-vibhāga. |
| 4. Dvitvatvajñāna. . | Dvitvādhārasya (i.e., avayavinaḥ) nāśaḥ | Avayava-saṃyoga nāśa. |
| 5 Dvitvaguṇa-buddhi and apekṣā-buddhināśa . . | Dvitva-nāśa (i.e , of avayavin) .... | Ādhāra-nāśa (of avayavin). |
| 6. Dvitva-nāśa and dravya-buddhi . . | ...... | Dvitva-nāśa. |

The second and third columns represent what takes place when, in the course of the six steps of *ekatvajñāna*, etc., one of the two parts is itself divided either at the *first* or the *second* moment. In the first case, the *dvitva* of the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment, and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding *dvitvādhāra-nāśa*, or, as Mādhava calls it, *āśrayanivṛtti*. In the second case, the *nāśa* arrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns (1) and (3), and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes, *apekṣābuddhi-nāśa* and *ādhāra-nāśa*. Any *kriyā* which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant, as the *nāśa* of the *dvitva* of the whole would take place by the original sequence in column (1) in the sixth moment; and in this way it would be too late or affect that result.

29. *i.e.*, from the destruction of *apekṣābudhi* follows the destruction of *dvitva* ; but the other destructions previously described were followed by the production,—thus the knowledge of *dvitvatva* arose from the destruction of *ekatvajñāna*, etc. (cf. Siddh. Mukt. p. 107). I may remind the reader that in Hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself.
30. From the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar ; thence a separation of one atom from another; thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black (or unbacked) jar ; thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms.
31. i.e., a kind of initiative tendency.
32. These are explained at full length in the Siddhānta Muktāvali pp. 104, 105. In the first series we have – 1. the destruction of the *dvyaṇuka* and simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction (of the parts) ; 2. the destruction of the black colour in the *dvyaṇuka,* and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the *dvyaṇuka* with that place ; 3. the production of the red colour in the atoms, and the simultaneous conjunction with another place ; 4. the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire. The remaining 5-10 agree with the 4-9 above.
33. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that when a jar is baked, the old black jar is *destroyed*, its several compounds of two atoms, etc., being destroyed ; the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms, and, joining these into new compounds, eventually produces a new red jar. The exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars. The followers of the Nyāya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms, and without any destruction of the old jar produces its effects on these compounds, and thereby changes not the jar but its colour, etc.,—it is still the same jar, only it is red,not black.
34. I read *gaganavibhāgakartṛtvasya.*

35. The Siddhānta Muktāvalī, p. 112, describes the series of steps :—1. An action, as of breaking, in one of the halves ; 2. the disjunction of the two halves ; 3. the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot ; 4. the destruction of the pot ; 5. by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place ; 6. the destruction of the conjunction with that old place ; 7. the conjunction with the new place; 8. the cessation of the original impulse of fracture. Here the seeond disjunction (viz., of the half of the pot and the place) is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves, the intimate causes of the pot.

36. The original has a plural *vibhāgān, i.e.,* disjunctions from the several points.

37. i.e., disjunction of the hand and the points of space.

38. The author of a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā.

39. For *dravyādi* read *pṛithivyādi.*

40. I am not sure that it would not be better to read *viddhavevidhayā* rewounding the wounded, instead, of *vṛiddhavivadhayā.*

41. Unless you *see* the rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent.

42. Read *bhāve.*

43. Read *anavadānādiṣu. Vidhipratyaya* properly means an imperative or potential affix implying "compound;" but the pandit takes *vidhi* here as *bhāvabodhaka-kriyā.* It has that meaning in Kāvyaprakāśa, V. (p. 114, 1.I).

44. The mind perceives *āloka-jñāna,* therefore it would perceive its absence, i.e., darkness, but this last is perceived by the *eye.*

45. i.e., light possesses colour, and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark.

46. Sound resides in the imperceptible ether, and cessation is the *dhvaṁsābhāva,* or "emergent non-existence."

47. The reading *pratyayavedyatvena* seems supported by p. 1ı0, last line, but it is difficult to trace the argument ; I have therefore, ventured hesitatingly to read *pratyakshavedyatvena*, and would refer to the commentary (Vaiś. Sūt p. 250), "*yadi hi nila-rūpavān nīlaṁ rūpaṁ eva vā tamaḥ syāt*, ı*ahyālokapragraham antareṇa cakṣuṣā na grihyeta.*"

48. Intimate relation has also no intimate relation.

49. "Relative non-existence" (*saṁsargābhāva*) is the negation of a relation ; thus "the jar is not in the house" is "absolute non-existence," "it was not in the house" is "antecedent," and "it will not be in the house" is "emergent," non-existence.

50. i.e. the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar, as, of of course, the jar does not resides in the jar, but in the spot of ground,—it is *jāti ghaṭatva* which resides in the jar.

51. The opposite is "there *is* colour in the air".

# CHAPTER XI

## THE AKṢAPĀDA (OR NYĀYA) DARŚANA

तत्त्वज्ञानाद् दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदलक्षणं निःश्रेयसं भवतीति समानतन्त्रेऽपि प्रतिपादितम् । तदाह सूत्रकारः—प्रमाणप्रमेयेत्यादितत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयमाधिगमः (न्या० सू० १।१।१) इति । इदं न्यायशास्त्रस्यादिमं सूत्रम् ।

The principle that final bliss, i.e., the absolute abolition of pain, arises from the knowledge of the truth [though in a certain sense universally accepted], is established in a special sense as a particular tenet[1] of the Nyāya school, as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words "proof, that which is to be proved, etc ,—from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of final bliss." This is the first aphorism of the Nyāya Śāstra.

न्यायशास्त्रं च पञ्चाध्यायात्मकम् । तत्र प्रत्यध्यायमाह्निकद्वयम् । तत्र प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमाह्निके भगवता गौतमेन प्रमाणादिपदार्थनवकलक्षणनिरूपणं विधाय द्वितीये वादादिसप्तपदार्थलक्षणनिरूपणं कृतम् । द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे संशयपरीक्षणं प्रमाणचतुष्टयाप्रमाण्यशङ्कानिराकरणं च । द्वितीयेऽर्थापत्त्यादेरन्तर्भावनिरूपणम् ।

Now the Nyāya Śāstra consists of five books, and each book contains two "daily portions." In the first daily portion of the first book the venerable Gotama discusses the definitions of nine categories, beginning with "proof," and in the second those of the remaining seven, beginning with "discussion" (*vāda*). In the first daily portion of the second book he examines "doubt," discusses the four kinds of "proof," and refutes the suggested objections to their being instruments of right knowledge; and in the second he shows that "presumption," etc., are really included in the four kinds of "proof" already given [and therefore need not be added by the Mīmāṁsakas as separate ones].

तृतीयस्य प्रथम आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये बुद्धिमनःपरीक्षणम् । चतुर्थस्य प्रथमे प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गपरीक्षणम् । द्वितीये दोषनिमित्तक(त) त्वनिरूपणमवयव्यादिनिरूपणं च । पञ्चमस्य प्रथमे जातिभेदनिरूपणम् । द्वितीये निग्रहस्थानभेदनिरूपणम् ।

In the first daily portion of the third book he examines the soul, the body, the senses, and their objects; in the second, "understanding" (*buddhi*), and "mind" (*manas*). In the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines "volition" (*pravṛitti*), the "faults," "transmigration," "fruit" [of actions], "pain," and "final liberation;" in the second he investigates the truth[2] as to the causes of the "faults,"and also "whole" and "parts." In the first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds of futility (*jāti*), and in the second the various kinds of "occasion for rebuke" (*nigrahasthāna* or "unfitness to be argued with").

मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिरिति न्यायेन प्रमाणस्य प्रथममुद्देशे तदनुसारेण लक्षणस्य कथनीयतया प्रथमोद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य प्रथमं लक्षणं कथ्यते—साधनाश्रयाव्यतिरिक्तत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणम् ।

एवं च प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तसिद्धं परमेश्वरप्रामाण्यं संगृहीतं भवति । यदचकथत् सूत्रकारः—मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात् (न्या० सू० २।१।६८) इति ।

In accordance with the principle that "to know the thing to be measured you must first know the measure," "proof" (*pramāṇa*) is first enunciated, and as this must be done by defining it, we have first a definition of "proof." "Proof" is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge, and is at the same time not disjoined from the proper instruments [as the eye, etc.], and from the site of knowledge [i.e., the soul][3] and this definition thus includes the peculiar tenet of the Nyāya School that God is a source of right knowledge,[4] as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared (ii. 68), "and the fact of the Veda's being a cause of right knowledge, like spells and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one who gave the Veda was a source of right knowledge.'

तथा च न्यायनयपारावारपारदृश्वा विश्वविख्यातकीर्तिरुदयनाचार्योऽपि न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलौ चतुर्थे स्तबके—

मितिः सम्यक्परिच्छित्तिस्तद्वत्ता च प्रमातृता ।
तदयोगव्यवच्छेदः प्रामाण्यं गौतमे मते ।। (४।५) इति ।
साक्षात्कारिणि नित्ययोगिनि परद्वारानपेक्षस्थितौ
भूतार्थानुभवे निविष्टनिखिलप्रस्ताविवस्तुक्रमः ।
लेशादृष्टिनिमित्तदुष्टिविगमप्रभ्रष्टशङ्कातुषः
शङ्कोन्मेषकलङ्किभिः किमपरैस्तन्मे प्रमाणं शिवः ।
(न्या० कु० ४।६) इति ।

And thus too bath the universally renowned teacher Udayana, who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of logic, declared in the fourth chapter of the Kusumāñjali :

"Right knowledge is accurate comprehension, and right knowing is the possession thereof; authoritativeness is according to Gotama's school, the being separated from all absence thereof.

"He in whose intuitive unerring perception, inseparably united to him and dependent on no foreign inlets, the succession of all the various existing objects is contained,—all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in Him,—He, Śiva, is my authority ; what have I to do with others, darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts ?"

तच्चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दभेदात् । प्रमायां यद्धि प्रतिभासते तत्प्रमेयम् । तच्च द्वादशप्रकारम्—आत्म-शरीरेन्द्रियार्थ-बुद्धि-मनः-प्रवृत्ति-दोष-प्रत्यभाव-फल-दुःखापवर्गभेदात् ।

"Proof" is fourfold, as being divided into perception, inference, analogy, and testimony. The "thing to be proved" [or the "object of right notion"] is of twelve kinds, viz., soul, body, the senses, their objects, understanding mind, volition, faults, transmigrations, fruit, pain, and final liberation.

अनवधारणात्मकं ज्ञानं संशयः । स त्रिविधः—साधारणधर्मासाधारणधर्म-विप्रतिपत्तिलक्षणभेदात् । यमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तन्ते पुरुषास्तत्प्रयोजनम् । तद् द्विविधम्—दृष्टादृष्टभेदात् । व्याप्तिसंवेदनभूमिर्दृष्टान्तः । स द्विविधः—साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यभेदात् ।

"Doubt" is a knowledge whose nature is uncertainty; and this is threefold, as being caused by the object's possessing only

qualities which are common to other things also, and therefore not distinctive,—or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own which do not help us in determining the particular point in question,[5]—or by conflicting testimony. The thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act, is "a motive" *(prayojana)* ; this is twofold, i.e., visible and invisible. "An example" is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a general principle, and it may be either affirmative or negative.[6]

प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्तः । स चतुर्विधः—सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमभेदात् । परार्थानुमानवाक्यैकदेशोऽवयवः । स पञ्चविधः—प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनभेदात् ।

A "tenet" *(sidhānta)* is something which is accepted as being authoritatively settled as true ; it is of four kinds, as being "common to all the schools," "peculiar to one school," 'a pregnant assumption" [leading, if conceded, to a further, conclusion], and "an implied dogma." The "member" (of a demonstration) is a part of the sentence containing an inference for the sake of another ; and these are five, the proposition, the reason, the example, the application, and the conclusion.

व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्तर्कः । स चैकादशविधः । व्याघातात्माश्रयेतरेतराश्रय -चक्रकाश्रयानवस्थाप्रतिबन्धिकल्पनाकल्पनालाघवकल्पनागौरवोत्सर्गापवादवैजात्यभेदात् ।

"Confutation" *(tarka)* is the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major[7] and this is of eleven kinds, as *vyāghāta, ātmāśraya, itaretarāśraya*, etc.

यथार्थानुभवपर्यायो प्रमितिर्निर्णयः । स चतुर्विधः । साक्षात्कृत्यनुमित्युपमितिशाब्दभेदात् । तत्त्वनिर्णयफलः कथाविशेषो वादः । उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स्वपक्षस्थापनहीनः कथाविशेषो वितण्डा । कथा नाम वादिप्रतिवादिनोः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहः ।

"Ascertainment" *(nirṇaya)* is right knowledge or a perception of the real state of the case. It is of four kinds as produced by perception, inference, analogy, or testimony. "Discussion" *(vāda)* is a particular kind of conversation, having as its end the ascertainment of truth. "Wrangling" *( jalpa )* is the talk of a man only wishing for victory, who is ready to employ arguments for either

side of the question. "Cavilling" (*vitaṇḍā*) is the talk of a man who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question. "Dialogue" (*kathā*) is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants.

असाधको हेतुत्वेनाभिमतो हेत्वाभासः । स पञ्चविधः—सव्यभिचार-विरुद्ध-प्रकरणसम-साध्यसमातीतकालभेदात् ।

शब्दवृत्तिव्यत्ययेन प्रतिषेधहेतुश्छलम् । तत्त्रिविधम् । अभिधानतात्पर्योपचारवृत्तिव्यत्ययभेदात् ।

A "fallacy" is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to prove something, and this may be of five kinds, the "erratic," the "contradictory," the "uncertain," the "unproved," and the "precluded" or "mistimed." "Unfairness" (*chala*) is the bringing forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous sense ; this is of three kinds, as there may be fraud in respect of a term, the meaning, or a metaphorical phrase.

स्वव्याघातकमुत्तरं जातिः । सा चतुर्विंशतिधा । साधर्म्यवैधर्म्योत्कर्षापकर्ष-वर्ण्यावर्ण्य-विकल्प-साध्य-प्राप्त्यप्राप्ति-प्रसङ्गप्रतिदृष्टान्तानुत्पत्ति-संशय-प्रकरण-हेत्वर्थापत्त्यविशेषोपपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धि-नित्यानित्य-कार्यसमभेदात् ।

पराजयनिमित्तं निग्रहस्थानम् । तद् द्वाविंशतिप्रकारम् । प्रतिज्ञाहानि-प्रतिज्ञान्तर-प्रतिज्ञाविरोध-प्रतिज्ञासंन्यास-हेत्वन्तरार्थान्तर-निरर्थकाविज्ञातार्थापार्थकाप्राप्तकालन्यूनाधिक-पुनरुक्ताननुभाषणाज्ञानाप्रतिभा-विक्षेप-मतानुज्ञा-पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण-निरनुयोज्यानुयोगापसिद्धान्त-हेत्वाभासभेदात् ।

अत्र सर्वान्तर्गणिकस्तु विशेषस्तत्र शास्त्रे विस्पष्टोऽपि विस्तरभिया न प्रस्तूयते ।

"Futility" (*jāti*) is a self-destructive argument. This is of twenty-four kinds (as described in the fifth book of the Nyāya aphorisms (1—38). "Occasion for rebuke" is where the disputant loses his cause [by stupidity], and this is of twenty-two kinds (as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms, (44—67). We do not insert here all the minute sub-divisions through fear of being too prolix,—they are fully explained in the aphorisms.

ननु प्रमाणादिपदार्थषोडशके प्रतिपाद्यमाने कथमिदं न्यायशास्त्रमिति व्यपदिश्यते ? सत्यम् । तथाप्यसाधारण्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्तीति न्यायेन न्यायस्य परार्थानुमानापरपर्यायस्य सकलविद्यानुग्राहकतया सर्वकर्मानुष्ठानसाधनतया प्रधानत्वेन तथा व्यपदेशो युज्यते ।

तथाभाणि सर्वज्ञेन—'सोऽयं परमो न्यायो विप्रतिपन्नपुरुषं प्रति प्रतिपादकत्वात्। तथा प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच्च' (न्या० सू० वार्तिक १।१।१) इति। पक्षिलस्वामिना च—'सेयमान्वीक्षिकी विद्या प्रमाणादिभिः पदार्थैः प्रविभज्यमाना—

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम्।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे परीक्षिता॥

(न्या० सू० भाष्य १।१।१) इति।

But here an objector may say, "If these sixteen topics, proof, etc., are all thus fully discussed, how is it that it has received the name of the Nyāya Śāstra, [as reasoning, i.e., *Nyāya*, or logic, properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treat of?" We allow the force of the objection ; still as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason, we maintain that the name Nyāya was rightly applied to Gotama's system, since "reasoning," or inference for the sake of another, is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge, and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit. So it has been said by Sarvajña, "This is the pre-eminent science of Nyāya from its establishing our doctrines against opponents, and from its producing action ;"[8] and by Pakshila Swāmin, "This is the science of reasoning (*ānvīkṣikī*) divided into the different categories, 'proof,' etc. ; the lamp of all sciences, the means for aiding all actions, the ultimate appeal of all religious duties, well proved in the declarations of science."[9]

ननु तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसं भवतीत्युक्तम्। तत्र किं तत्त्वज्ञानादनन्तरमेव निःश्रेयसं संपद्यते? नेत्युच्यते। किन्तु तत्त्वज्ञानाद् 'दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः' (न्या० सू० १।१।२) इति।

तत्र मिथ्याज्ञानं नामानात्मनि देहादावात्मबुद्धिः। तदनुकूलेषु रागः। तत्प्रतिकूलेषु द्वेषः। वस्तुतस्त्वात्मनः प्रतिकूलमनुकूलं वा न किञ्चिद्वस्त्वस्ति। परस्परानुबन्धित्वाच्च रागादीनां मूढो रज्यति, रक्तो मुह्यति, मूढः कुप्यति, कुपितो मुह्यतीति।

But here an objector may say, "When you declare that final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth, do you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained ?" We reply, "No," for it is said in the second Nyāya aphorism, "Pain, birth, activity, faults false, notions,—on the

successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it," by means of this knowledge of the truth.

Now false notions are the thinking the body, etc., which are not the soul, to be the soul ; "faults" are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul, and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it,[10] though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the soul. And through the mutual reaction of these different "faults" the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid; the stupid man is angry, and the angry man is stupid.

ततस्तैर्दोषैः प्रेरितः प्राणी प्रतिषिद्धानि शरीरेण हिंसास्तेयादीनि आचरति। वाचा अनृतादीनि। मनसा परद्रोहादीनि। सेयं पापरूपा प्रवृत्तिरधर्मः। शरीरेण प्रशस्तानि दानपरपरित्राणादीनि। वाचा हितसत्यादीनि। मनसा अजिघांसादीनि। सेयं पुण्यरूपा प्रवृत्तिर्धर्मः।

Moreover the man, impelled by these faults, does those things which are forbidden: thus by the body he does injury, theft, etc.; by the voice, falsehood, etc.; by the mind, malevolence, etc.: and this same sinful "activity" produces demerit. Or, again, he may do laudable actions by his body, as alms, saving others, etc., truthful speaking, upright counsel, etc., by his voice, and guilelessness, etc., by his mind; and this same right activity produces merit.

सेयमुभयी प्रवृत्तिः। ततः स्वानुरूपं प्रशस्तं निन्दितं वा जन्म पुनः शरीरादेः प्रादुर्भावः। तस्मिन् सति प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया बाधनात्मकं दुःखं भवति। न ह्यप्रवृत्तस्य दुःखं प्रत्यापद्यत इति कश्चित्प्रपद्यते। त इमे मिथ्याज्ञानादयो दुःखान्ता अविच्छेदेन प्रवर्तमानाः संसारशब्दार्थो घटीचक्रवन्निरवधिरनुवर्तते।

यदा कश्चित्पुरुषधौरेयः पुराकृतसुकृतपरिपाकवशादाचार्योपदेशेन सर्वमिदं दुःखायतनं दुःखानुषक्तं च पश्यति, तदा तत्सर्वं हेयत्वेन बुध्यते। ततस्तन्निवर्तकमविद्यादि निवर्तयितुमिच्छति। तन्निवृत्त्युपायश्च तत्त्वज्ञानमिति।

कस्यचिच्चतसृभिर्विधाभिर्विभक्तं प्रमेयं भावयतः सम्यग्दर्शनपदवेदनीयतया तत्त्वज्ञानं जायते। तत्त्वज्ञानान्मिथ्याज्ञानमपैति। मिथ्याज्ञानापाये दोषा अपयान्ति। दोषापाये प्रवृत्तिरपैति। प्रवृत्त्यपाये जन्मापैति। जन्मापाये दुःखमत्यन्तं निवर्तते। सा आत्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिरपवर्गः। निवृत्तेरात्यन्तिकत्वं नाम निवर्त्यसजातीयस्य पुनस्तत्रानुत्पाद इति। तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रम्—दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः (न्या० सू० १।१।२) इति।

But both are forms of activity, and each leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation; and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of "pain," which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us. Now this series, beginning with "false notions" and ending with "pain," is continually going on, and is what we mean by the words "mundane" existence," which rolls on ceaselessly, like a waterwheel.

And whenever some pre-eminent man, by the force of his previous good deeds, obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with pain he recognises that it is all to be avoided, and desires to abolish the ignorance, etc., which are the causes that produced it.[11] Then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the knowledge of the truth; and as he meditates on the objects of right knowledge divided into the four science,[12] there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth, or in other words, a right view of things as they are ; and from this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear.

When false notions disappear, the "faults" pass away ; with them ceases "activity ;" and with it ceases "birth ;" and with the cessation of "birth" comes the entire abolition of "pain," and this absolute abolition is final bliss. Its absoluteness consists in this, that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive, as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the Nyāya Sūtras : "Pain, birth, activity, faults, false notions,—since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] final beatitude."

ननु दुःखात्यन्तोच्छेदोऽपवर्ग इत्येतदद्यापि कफोणिगुडायितं वर्तते । तत्कथं सिद्धवत्कृत्य व्यवह्रियते इति चेत्—मैवम् । सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामपवर्गदशायामात्यन्तिकी दुःखनिवृत्तिरस्तीत्यस्यार्थस्य सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तसिद्धतया घण्टापथत्वात् । तथा हि—आत्मोच्छेदो मोक्ष इति माध्यमिकमते दुःखोच्छेदोऽस्तीत्येतावत्तावदविवादम् ।

"But is not your definition of the *summum bonum*, liberation, i.e., 'the absolute abolition of pain,' after all as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue ;[13] why then is this

continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute ?" We reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do include there in the absolute abolition of pain, our definition, as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools, may well be called the royal highway[14] of philosophy. No one, in fact, maintains that pain is possible without the individual's activity. Thus even the Mādhyamika's opinion that "liberation consists in the abolition of soul," does not controvert our point, so far at any rate as that it is the abolition of pain.

अथ मन्येथा:—शरीरादिवदात्मापि दु:खहेतुत्वादुच्छेद्य इति तन्न संगच्छते । विकल्पानुपपत्ते: । किमात्मा ज्ञानसंतानो विवक्षितस्तदतिरिक्तो वा ? प्रथमे न विप्रतिपत्ति: । क: खल्वनुकूलमाचरति प्रतिकूलमाचरेत् ? द्वितीये तस्य नित्यत्वे निवृत्तिरशक्यविधानैव । अनित्यत्वे प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्ति: । व्यवहारानुपपत्तिश्चाधिकं दूषणम् । न खलु कश्चित्प्रेक्षावानात्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवतीति सर्वत: प्रियतमस्यात्मन: समुच्छेदाय प्रयतते । सर्वो हि प्राणी सति धर्मिणि मुक्त इति व्यवहरति ननु ।

But if you proceed to argue that the soul, as being the cause of pain, is to be abolished just like the body, etc., we reply that this does not hold, since it fails under either alternative. For do you mean by "the soul," *(a)* the continued succession of cognitions, or *(b)* something different therefrom ? *(a)* If the former, we make no objection, [since we Naiyāyikas allow that cognition is evanescent,[15] and we do desire to abolish cognition as a cause of *pravṛitti* or action[16]]. for who would oppose a view which makes for his own side ? *(b)* But if the latter, then, since it must be eternal,[17] its abolition is impossible; and, again, a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your supposed "*summum bonum* ;" for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate the soul, which is always the dearest of all, on the principle that "everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure ;" and, again, everybody uses such a phrase as "liberated," [and this very term refutes the idea cf annihilation or abolition].

धर्मिनिवृत्तौ निर्मलज्ञानोदयो महोदय इति विज्ञानवादिवादे सामग्र्यभाव: समानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तिश्च । भावनाचतुष्टयं हि तस्य कारणमभीष्टम् । तच्च क्षणभङ्गपक्षे स्थिरैकाधारासंभवात् लङ्घनाभ्यासादिवत् अनासादितप्रकर्षं न

स्फुटमभिज्ञानमभिजनयितुं प्रभवति सोपप्लवस्य ज्ञानसंतानस्य बद्धत्वे निरुपप्लवस्य च मुक्तत्वे यो बद्धः स एव मुक्त इति सामानाधिकरण्यं न संगच्छते ।

"But why not say with those Bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure intelligence [i. e., the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas[18]], that 'the *summum bonum*' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious subject ?" To this view we object that their is an absence of means ; and also it cannot be established that the locus [or subject] of the two states is the same. For the former, if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of Bauddha contemplations[19] are to be accepted as the cause, we answer that, as [according to the Bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all things] there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations, they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at irregular intervals, and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct recognition of the real nature of things.

And for the latter, since the continued series of cognitions when accompanied by the natural obstacles[20] is said to be "bound," and when freed from those obstacles is said to be "liberated," you cannot establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say that the very same being which *was* bound *is* now liberated.

आवरणमुक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति जैनमताभिमतोऽपि मार्गो न निसर्गतो निरर्गलः । अङ्ग, भवान्पृष्टो व्याचष्टां किमावरणम् । धर्माधर्मभ्रान्तय इति चेत्—इष्टमेव । अथ देहमेवावरणम् । तथा च तन्निवृत्तौ पञ्जरान्मुक्तस्य शुकस्येवात्मनः सततोर्ध्वगमनं मुक्तिरिति चेत्—तदा वक्तव्यम् ।

किमयमात्मा मूर्तोऽमूर्तो वा ? प्रथमे निरवयवः सावयवो वा ? निरवयवत्वे निरवयवो मूर्तः परमाणुरिति परमाणुलक्षणापत्त्या परमाणुधर्मवदात्मधर्माणामतीन्द्रियत्वं प्रसज्येत् । सावयवत्वे यत्सावयवं तदनित्यमिति प्रतिबन्धबलेनानित्यत्वापत्तौ कृतप्रणाशाकृताभ्यागमौ निष्प्रतिबन्धौ प्रसरेताम् ।

अमूर्तत्वे गमनमनुपपन्नमेव । चलनात्मिकायाः क्रियाया मूर्तत्वप्रतिबन्धात् ।

Nor do we find the path of the Jainas, viz., that "Liberation is the releasing from all 'obstructions,' a path entirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer. Pray, will our Jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by "obstruction" ?[21] If he answers "merit, demerit, and error," we readily grant what he says. But if he main-

tains that 'the body is the true obstruction, and hence Liberation is the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation, as of a parrot released from its cage," then we must inquire whether this said soul possesses form or not. If it possesses form, then has it parts or not? If it has no parts, then, since the well-known definition of an atom will apply here as "that which has form without parts," it will follow that the attributes of the soul are, like those of an atom, imperceptible to the senses.[22] If you say that it has parts, then the general maxim that "whatever has parts is non-eternal," would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal," and if this were conceded then two grand difficulties [against the Providental course of the world] would burst in unopposed, viz., that what the soul has done would, at its cessation, perish with it [and thus fail of producing the proper fruit], while it would have reaped during life the effects of what it had not done [as the good and evil which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a former birth]. If, on the other hand, the Jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all, then how can he talk of the soul's "upspringing," since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent possessing form ?[23]

'पारतन्त्र्यं बन्धः, स्वातन्त्र्यं मोक्षः' इति चार्वाकपक्षेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्यं दुःखनिवृत्तिश्चेत्—अविवादः। ऐश्वर्यं चेत्—सातिशयतया सदृक्षतया च प्रेक्षावतां नाभिमतम्।

Again, if we take the Cārvāka's view "that the only bondage is dependence on another, and therefore independence is the true liberation,"—if by "independence" he means the cessation of pain, we have no need to controvert it. But if he means autocratic power, then no sensible man can concede it, as the very idea of earthly power involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being equalled.[24]

प्रकृतिपुरुषान्यत्वख्यातौ प्रकृत्युपरमे पुरुषस्य स्वरूपेणावस्थानं मुक्तिरिति सांख्याख्यातेऽपि पक्षे दुःखोच्छेदोऽस्त्येव विवेकज्ञानं पुरुषाश्रयं प्रकृत्याश्रयं वेत्येतावद्वशिष्यते। तत्र पुरुषाश्रयमिति न श्लिष्यते। पुरुषस्य कौटस्थ्यावस्थाननिरोधापातात्। नापि प्रकृत्याश्रयः। अचेतनत्वात्तस्याः।

किं च प्रकृतिः प्रवृत्तिस्वभावा निवृत्तिस्वभावा वा ? आद्येऽनिर्मोक्षः। स्वभावस्यानपायात्। द्वितीये संप्रति संसारोऽस्तमियात्।

Again, the Sānkhya opinion, which first lays down that nature and soul are utterly distinct, and then holds that "liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after nature [on being known] has withdrawn,"—even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain ; but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in nature. It is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul, since the soul is held to be unchangeable, and this would seem to involve that previously it had been hampered by ignorance ; nor can we say that it reside in nature, since nature is always held to be unintelligent. Moreover, is nature spontaneously active or inactive ? If the former, then it follows that there can be no liberation at all, since the spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside ; and if the latter, the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on.

नित्यनिरतिशयसुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति भट्टसर्वज्ञाद्यभिमतेऽपि दुःखनिवृत्तिर-भिमतैव । परं तु नित्यसुखं न प्रमाणपद्धतिमध्यास्ते । श्रुतिस्तत्र प्रमाणमिति चेत्—न । योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधिते तदनवकाशात् । अवकाशे वा ग्रावप्लवेऽपि तथाभाव-प्रसङ्गात् ।

Again, we have the same recognition of our "abolition of pain" in the doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña and his followers, that "Liberation is the manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased ;" but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not come within the range of definite proof. If you allege Śruti as the proof, we reply that Śruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception ;[25] or if you allow its authority, then you will have to concede the existence of such things as floating stones.[26]

ननु सुखाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिरिति पक्षं परित्यज्य दुःखनिवृत्तिरेव मुक्तिरिति स्वीकारः क्षीरं विहायारोचकग्रस्तस्य सौवीररुचिमनुभावयतीति चेत्—तदेतन्ना-टकपक्षपतितं त्वद्वच इत्युपेक्ष्यते । सुखस्य सातिशयतया सदृक्षतया बहुप्रत्यनीका-क्रान्ततया साधनप्रार्थनपरिक्लिष्टतया च दुःखाविनाभूतत्वेन विषानुषक्तमधुवद् दुःखपक्षनिक्षेपात् ।

"But if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of happiness," and then accept such a view as that which holds

it to be only the cessation of pain, does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour rice-gruel ?" Your satire, however, falls powerless, as fitter for some speech in a play [rather than for a grave philosophical argument]. The truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of pain, since, like honey mixed with poison, it is always accompanied by pain, either as admitting of increase,[27] or as being an object of perception or as being exposed to many hostile influences, or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for its production.

नन्वेकमनुसंधित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवत इति न्यायेन दुःखवत्सुखमप्युच्छिद्यत इत्यकाम्योऽयं पक्ष इति चेत्—मैवं मंस्थाः। सुखसंपादने दुःखसाधनबाहुल्यानुषङ्गनियमेन तप्तायःपिण्डे तपनीयबुद्धया प्रवर्तमानेन साम्यापातात्। तथा हि—न्यायोपार्जितेषु विषयेषु वियन्तः सुखखद्योताः कियन्ति दुःखदुर्दिनानि। अन्यायोपार्जितेषु तु, यद्द् भविष्यति तन्मनसापि चिन्तयितुं न शक्यमिति।

Nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the proverb of "seeking one thing and dropping another in the search," since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental pain, and, at the same time, our own favourite alternative is one which no one can consider desirable. For the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness as the *summum bonum*, since it is inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain, is only like the man who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that it was gold. In the case of objects of enjoyment got together by rightful means, we may find many firefly-like pleasures; but then how many are the rainy days to drown them? And in the case of those got together by wrong means, the mind cannot even conceive the future issue which will be brought about.

एतत्स्वानुभवमप्रच्छादयन्तः सन्तो विदांकुर्वन्तु विदां वरा भवन्तः। तस्मात्परिशेषात् परमेश्वरानुग्रहवशात् श्रवणादिक्रमेण आत्मतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारवतः पुरुषधौरेयस्य दुःखनिवृत्तिरात्यन्तिकी निःश्रेयसमिति निरवद्यम्।

Let our intelligent readers consider all this, and nor attempt to disguise their own conscious experience. Therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for him, pre-eminent among his fellows who through the favour of the Supreme Being, has, by the regular

method of listening to the revealed Śruti, etc., attained upto the knowledge of the real rature of the soul, for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true Liberation.

नन्वीश्वरसद्भावे किं प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमागमो वा । न तावदत्र प्रत्यक्षं क्रमते । रूपादिरहितत्वेनातीन्द्रियत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानम् । तद्व्याप्तलिङ्गाभावात् । नागमः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किं नित्योऽवगमयति अनित्यो वा ? अद्येऽपसिद्धान्तापातः । द्वितीये परस्पराश्रयापातः । उपमानादिकमशक्यशङ्कम् । नियतविषयत्वात् । तस्मादीश्वरः शशविषाणावत इति चेत्—।

But it may be objected, "Is there any proof at all for the existence of a Supreme Being, i.e., perception, inference, or Śruti ? Certainly perception cannot apply here, since the Deity, as devoid of form, etc., must be beyond the senses. Nor can inference hold, since there is no universal proposition or true middle term which can apply.[28] Nor can Śruti, since neither of the resulting alternatives can be sustained ; for is it supposed to reveal, as being itself eternal, or as non-eternal ? Under the former view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted [viz., that the Veda is non-eternal] ; under the latter, we should be only arguing in a circle.[29] As for comparison and any other proof which might be adduced [as that sometimes called presumption, etc.], they need not be thought of for a moment, as their object matter is definitely limited, and cannot apply to the present case.[30] Therefore the Supreme Being seems to be as a unreal as a hare's horn."

तदेतन्न चतुरचेतसां चेतसि चमत्कारमाविष्करोति । विवादास्पदं नगसागरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्कुम्भवत् । न चायमसिद्धो हेतुः । सावयवत्वेन तस्य सुसाधनत्वात् । ननु किमिदं सावयवत्वम् ? अवयवसंयोगित्वमवयवसमवायित्वं वा ? नाद्यः । गगनादौ व्यभिचारात् । न द्वितीयः तन्तुत्वादावनैकान्त्यात् ।

But all this elaborate disputation need excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent, as it can be at once met by the old argument, "The mountain, seas, etc., must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar." *(a)* Nor can our middle term [possessing the nature of effects] be rejected as unproved (*asiddha*), since it can be established beyond a doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts. "But what are we to understand by this 'possessing parts' ? Is it 'existing in contact with

parts,' or 'in intimate relation with parts'? It cannot be the first, since this would equally apply to such eternal things as ether,[31] etc.; nor can it be the second, since this would prove too much, as applying to such cases as the [eternal] species, thread, which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads.

तस्मादनुपपन्नमिति चेत्—मैवं वादीः समवेतद्रव्यत्वं सावयवत्वमिति निरुक्तेर्वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। अवान्तरमहत्त्वेन वा कार्यत्वानुमानस्य सुकरत्वात्।

It therefore fails as a middle term for your argument." We reply, that it holds if we explain the "possessing parts" as "belonging to the class of those substances which exist in intimate relation."[32] Or we may adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the "possessing the nature of effects" from the consideration of their posssessing intermediate magnitude.[33]

नापि विरुद्धो हेतुः। साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तेरभावात्। नाप्यनैकान्तिकः। पक्षादन्यत्र वृत्तेरदर्शनात्। नापि कालात्ययापदिष्टः। बाधकानुपलम्भात्। नापि सत्प्रतिपक्षः। प्रतिभटादर्शनात्।

*(b)* Nor can our middle term be rejected as "contradictory" *(viruddha)*,[34] since there is no such acknowledged universal proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism [i.e., that they must have had no maker]. *(c)* Nor is our middle term too general *(anaikānta)*, since it is never found in opposite instances [such as the lake, which is the *vipaksha* in the argument, "The mountain has fire because it has smoke"]. *(d)* Nor again is it precluded (*bādhita* or *kālātyayāpadishṭa)*, for there is no superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power. *(e)* Nor is it counterbalanced (*sat-pratipakshita*), for there does not appear to be any such equally valid antagonist.

ननु नगादिकमकर्तृकं शरीराजन्यत्वाद् गगनवदिति चेत्—नैतत्परीक्षाक्षममीक्ष्यते। न हि कठोरकण्ठीरवस्य कुरङ्गशावः प्रतिभटो भवति। अजन्यत्वस्यैव समर्थतया शरीरविशेषणवैयर्थ्यात्।

If you bring forward an antagonistic syllogism, "The mountains, etc., cannot have had a maker, from the fact that they were not produced by a body, just as is the case with the eternal ether,"—this pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion;

for the additional words "by a body" are useless, since "from the fact that they were not produced" would be a sufficient middle term by itself [and the argument thus involves the fallacy called *vyāpyatvāsiddhi*].[35]

तर्ह्यजन्यत्वमेव साधनमिति चेत्—न । असिद्धेः । नापि सोपाधिकत्वशङ्काकलङ्काङ्कुरः संभवी । अनुकूलतर्कसंभवात् ।

यद्ययमकर्तृकः स्यात्कार्यमपि न स्यात् । इह जगति नास्त्येव तत्कार्यं नाम यत्कारकचक्रमवधीर्यात्मानमासादयेदित्येतदविवादम् । तच्च सर्वं कर्तृविशेषोपहितमर्यादम् । कर्तृत्वं चेतरकारकाप्रयोज्यत्वे सति सकलकारकप्रयोक्तृत्वलक्षणं ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नाधारत्वम् । एवं च कर्तृव्यावृत्तेस्तदुपहितसमस्तकारकव्यावृत्तौ अकारणककार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इति स्थूलः प्रमादः । तथा निरटङ्कि शङ्करकिङ्करेण—

अनुकूलेन तर्केण सनाथे सति साधने ।
साध्यव्यापकताभङ्गात्पक्षे नोपाधिसंभवः ॥ इति ।

Nor can you retort, "Well, let this then be our middle term;" for you cannot establish it as a real fact. Nor again is it possible to raise the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable to limitation by any suggested condition (*upādhi*),[36] [such as "the being produced by a corporeal agent," to limit our old reason "from having the nature of effects"], because we have on our side a valid line of argument to establish our view, viz., "If the mountains, etc., had no maker, then they would not be effects" [but all do acknowledge that they have the nature of effects], for in this world that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes. And this series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker ; and I mean by "being a maker" the being possessed of that combination of volition, desire to act, and knowledge of the proper means, which sets in motion all other causes, but is itself set in motion by none. And hence we hold that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown the necessity of the action of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown, since these are dependent thereon ; and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all. There is a rule laid down by Śaṅkara-kiṅkara which applies directly to the present case—

"When a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to establish its validity,

"Then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the [supposed] non-invariable concomitance of the major term."

यदीश्वरः कर्ता स्यात्तर्हि शरीरी स्यादित्यादिप्रतिकूलतर्कजातं जागर्तीति चेत्—ईश्वरसिद्धयसिद्धिभ्यां व्याघातः । तदुदितमुदयनेन—

आगमादेः प्रमाणत्वे बाधनादिनिषेधनम् ।
आभासत्वे तु सैव स्यादाश्रयासिद्धिरुद्धता ॥

(न्या० कु० ३।५) इति ।

If you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments, such as "If the Supreme Being were a maker, He would be possessed of a body," etc., we reply, that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent, whether we allow that Supreme Being's existence to be established or not.[37] As has been said by Udayana Āchārya [in the Kusumāñjali, iii. 5]—

"If Śruti, etc. have any authority, your negative argument fails from being precluded ; if they are fallacious, our old objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than ever."

न च विशेषविरोधः शक्यशङ्कः । ज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वविकल्पपराहतत्वात् ।

स्यादेतत् । परमेश्वरस्य जगन्निर्माणे प्रवृत्तिः किमर्था ? स्वार्था परार्था वा ? आद्येऽपि, इष्टप्राप्त्यर्थाऽनिष्टपरिहारार्था वा ? नाद्यः । अवाप्तसकलकामस्य तदनुपपत्तेः । अत एव न द्वितीयः । द्वितीये प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । कः खलु परार्थं प्रवर्तमानं प्रेक्षावानित्याचक्षीत ?

अथ करुणया प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरित्याचक्षीत कश्चित्, तं प्रत्याचक्षीत । तर्हि सर्वान् प्राणिनः सुखिन एव सृजेदीश्वरः । न दुःखशबलान् । करुणाविरोधात् । स्वार्थमनपेक्ष्य परदुःखप्रहाणेच्छा हि कारुण्यम् । तस्मादीश्वरस्य जगत्सर्जनं न युज्यते । तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः—

प्रयोजनमनुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तते ।
जगच्च सृजतस्तस्य किं नाम न कृतं भवेत् ॥ इति ।

Nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our argument, since it would be overthrown by either alternative of God's being known or unknown.[38]

"Well, let all this be granted ; but the activity of God in creating the world, what end did it have in view ? His own advan-

tage or some other being's ? If it was for the former end, was it in order to attain something desired, or to avoid something not desired ? It could not be the first, because this would be quite incongruous in a being who possesses every possible desire gratified ; and for the same reason too it could not be the second. If it was for the latter end [the advantage of another] it would be equally incongruous ; for who would call that being "wise" who busied himself in acting for another ?

If you replied that His activity was justified by compassion, any one would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have rather induced Him to create all living beings happy, and not checkered with misary, since this militates against His compassion ; for we define compassion as the disinterested with to avoid causing another pain. Hence we conclude that it is not befitting for God to create the world. This has been said by Bhaṭṭācārya—

"Not even a fool acts without some object in view ;

"Suppose that God did not create the world, what end would be left undone by him ?"—

अत्रोच्यते—नास्तिकशिरोमणे ! तावदीर्ष्याकषायिते चक्षुषी निमील्य परिभावयतु भवान्। करुणया प्रवृत्तिरस्त्येव । न च निसर्गतः सुखमयसर्गप्रसङ्गः । सृज्यप्राणिकृतदुष्कृतसुकृतपरिपाकविशेषाद् वैषम्योपपत्तेः । न च स्वातन्त्र्यभङ्गः शङ्कनीयः । स्वाङ्गं स्वव्यवधायकं न भवतीति न्यायेन प्रत्युत तन्निर्वाहात् । 'एक एव रुद्रो न द्वितीयोऽवतस्थे' इत्यादिरागमस्तत्र प्रमाणम् ।

We reply, O thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school, be pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes, and to consider the following suggestions. His action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion ; but the idea of a creation which shall consists only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things, since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created. Nor need you object that this would interfere with God's own independence [as He would thus seems to depend on others' actions], since there is the well-known saying, One's own body does not hinder one ;" nay rather it elps to carry

out one's aims;[39] and for this there is authority in such passages of the Veda as that (in the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad, iii. 2), "There is one Rudra only ; he admits[40] not of a second," etc.

यद्येवं तर्हि परस्पराश्रयबाधव्याधिं समाधत्स्वेति चेत्—तस्यानुत्थानात् । किमुत्पत्तौ परस्पराश्रयः शङ्क्यते ज्ञप्तौ वा । नाद्यः । आगमस्येश्वराधीनोत्पत्तिकत्वेऽपि परमेश्वरस्य नित्यत्वेनोत्पत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । नापि ज्ञप्तौ । परमेश्वरस्यागमाधीनज्ञप्तिकत्वेऽपि तस्यान्यतोऽवगमात् । नापि तदनित्यत्वज्ञप्तौ । आगमानित्यत्वस्य तीव्रादिधर्मोपेतत्वादिना सुगमत्वात् । यस्मान्निवर्तकधर्मानुष्ठानवशादीश्वरप्रसादसिद्धावभिमतेष्टसिद्धिरिति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहेऽक्षपाददर्शनम् ॥

"But then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle? [for you have to prove the Veda by the authority of God, and then again you have to prove God's existence by the Veda"]. We reply, that we defy you to point out any reasoning a circle in our argument. Do you suspect this "reciprocal dependence of each," which you call "reasoning in a circle," in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known?[41] It cannot be the former, for though the production of the Veda is dependent on God, still as God Himself is eternal, there is no possibility of *His* being produced ; nor can it be in regard to their being known, for even if our knowledge of God were dependent on the Veda, the Veda might be learned from some other source ; nor, again, can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the Veda, for the non-eternity of the Veda is easily perceived by any *yogin* with the transcendent faculties (*tivra*, etc.)

Therefore, when God has been rendered propitions by the performance of duties which produce His favour, the desired end, Liberation, is obtained ; thus everything is clear. E B C.

## NOTE ON PAGES 240-241

We have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or *hetvābhāsas* of the modern Hindu logic (cf. *Siddhāntamukt.*; 71 *Tarkasaṁgr.*, *dhita*, and *pratipakṣita* or *sat-pratipakṣa*. The four of these generally correspond to the *savyabhicāra* or "erratic," *viruddha* "contradictory," *sādhyasama* or "unproved," and *atitakāla* or "mistimed," i.e., "precluded," as given in the list of fallacies of

the older logic in p. 164; but *pratipakṣita* corresponds imperfectly to *prakaraṇasama*. The *prakaraṇasama* or "uncertain" reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides, as e.g., the argument, "Sound is eternal because it is audible," which could be met by the equally plausible argument, "Sound is non-eternal because it is audible ;" or, according to other authorities, it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question, as, e.g., "sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it ;" here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question, "Is sound eternal ?" But the *pritipakṣita* reason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason, as "Sound is eternal because it is audible," and "Sound is non-eternal because it is a product."

*NOTES*

1. Cf. Nyāyā Sūtras, i. 29.
2. In p. 112, line 16, of the Calcutta edition, I read *doṣanimittatattva* for *doṣanimittakatva* (compare Nyāya Sūt. iv. 68).
3. Without this last clause the definition might include the objects (*viṣaya*), as these are, of course, connected with right knowledge.
4. Iśvara is a course of right knowledge *(pramāṇa)* according to the definition, because he is *pramāyā āśrayaḥ*.
5. On this compare Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 115.
6. On these compare my note to Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i, p. 315.
7. Our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire, while we *see* the smoke, is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill" (*Ballantyne*). Or, in other words, "the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke (*vyāpaka*) if it has the absence-of-fire (the false *vyāpya*")."
8. Action (*pravṛitti*) follows after the ascertainment of the truth by *nyāya*.
9. Cp. Vātsyāyana's Comment., p. 6. The Calcutta edition reads *prakirtitā* for *parikṣitā*.

10. The printed text omits the third fault, "a stupid indifference, *moha*," which is however referred to presently.

11. I would read *tannirvartakam* for *tannivartakam*.

12. This refers to the couplet so often quoted in Hindu authors, "Logic, the three Vedas, trade and agriculture, and the eternal doctrine of polity,—these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world" (cf. Manu, vii. 43). It occurs in Kāmandaki's *Nitisāra*, ii. 2 and seems to be referred to in Vātsyāyana's Com. p. 3, from which Mādhava is here borrowing.

13. Compare the English proverb, "As soon as the cat can lick her ear."

14. Literally the "bell-road," i.e., "the chief road through a village, or that by which elephants, etc., decorated with tinkling ornaments, proceed."—*Wilson's Dict.*

15. The cognition is produced in the first moment, remains during the second, and ceases in the third.

16. See Nyāya Sūt. i. 2.

17. As otherwise why should we require liberation at all? Or rather the author probably assumes that other Naiyāyikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents.

18. See *supra*, pp. 32-42.

19. All, is momentary, all is pain, all is *sui generis*, all is unreal.

20. In the form of the various *kleśas* or "afflictions."

21. *Āvaraṇa*, cf. pp. 55, 58.

22. But the Nyāya holds that the attributes of the soul, a happiness, desire, aversion, etc., are perceived by the internal sense, mind (Bhāṣā p. 83).

23. The reading *mūrtapratibandhāt* is difficult, but I believe that *pratibandha* means here *vyāpti*, as it does in Sānkhya Sūtras, i. 100.

24. The True *summum bonum* must be *niratiśaya*,—incapable of being added to.

25. *Yogyānupalabdhi* is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, as the eye, light, etc.

26. Alluding to the Vedic phrase, "*grāvāṇaḥ plavanti*," see Uttara Naiṣadha, xvii. 37. The phrase *aśmānaḥ plavanti* occurs in Shaḍv. Br. 5, 12.

27. Or perhaps "capable of being surpassed."

28. Since the Supreme being is single instance.

29. Since the Veda, if non-eternal, must [to be authoritative] have been created by God, and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of God.

30. The Nyāya holds presumption to be included under inference, and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named.

31. Since ether is connected by contact with the parts of everything, as e.g , a jar.

32. The whole (as the jar) resides by intimate relation in its parts (as the jar's two halves). But the eternal substances, ether, time, the soul, mind, and the atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, do not thus reside in anything, although, of course, the category *viśeṣa* does reside in them by intimate relation. The word "substances" excludes *tantutva*, and "existing in intimate, relation" excludes ether, etc.

33. Intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal, all eternal substances being the one or the other.

34. The *viruddha-hetu* is that which is never found where the major term is.

35. This and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the Kusumāñjali. v. 2, and I extract my note on the passage there. The order Naiyāikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke,' involved the fallacy of vyāpyatvāsiddhi, because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted (see Siddhānta Muktāv.

p. 77). The moderns, however, more wisely consider it as a harmless error and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term."

36. For the *upādhi* cf. p. 14.
37. As in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion ; and in the latter you would be liable to the fault of *āśrayāsiddhi*, a "baseless inference," since your subject (or minor term), being itself non existent, cannot be the locus or subject of a negation (cf. Kusumāñjali, 2). "Just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal, so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation."
38. If God is known, then His existence must be granted ; if He is not known, how can we argue about Him ? I read lines 15, 16, in p. 120 of the Calcutta edition, *vikalpaparāhatatvāt*, and then begin the next clause with *syād etat*. The printed text, *vikalpaprāhataḥ syāt tad etat*, seems unintelligible.
39. The aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes Hiraṇyagarbha, or the supreme soul viewed in His relation to the world as creator, while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body (virāj).
40. The usual reading is *tasthur* for *tasthe*.
41. For these divisions of the *anyonyāśraya* fallacy, see *Nyāyasūtra vṛitti*. i. 39.
42. For *tivra* cf. *Yoga sūtras*, i. 21, 22.

## CHAPTER XII

# THE JAIMINI-DARŚANA

ननु धर्मानुष्ठानवशादभिमतधर्मसिद्धिरिति जेगीयते भवता । तत्र धर्मः किंलक्षणकः किंप्रमाणक इति चेत्—उच्यते । श्रूयतामवधानेन । अस्य प्रश्नस्य प्रतिवचनं प्राच्यां मीमांसायां प्रादर्शि जैमिनिना मुनिना । सा हि मीमांसा द्वादशलक्षणी ।

An objector may here ask, "Are you not continually repeating that merit (*dharma*) comes from the practice of duty (*dharma*), but how is duty to be defined or proved ?" Listen attentively to my answer. A reply to this question has been given in the older[1] Mīmāṁsā by the holy sage Jaimini. Now the Mīmāṁsā consists of twelve books.[2]

तत्र प्रथमेऽध्याये विध्यर्थवादमन्त्रस्मृतिनामधेयार्थकस्य शब्दराशेः प्रामाण्यम् । द्वितीये उपोद्घातकर्मभेदप्रमाणापवादप्रयोगभेदरूपोऽर्थः । तृतीये श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यादिविरोधप्रतिपत्तिकर्मानारभ्याधीतबहुप्रधानोपकारकप्रयाजादियाजमानचिन्तनम् ।

In the first book is discussed the autoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (*vidhi*), "explanatory passage" (*arthavāda*), hymn (*mantra*) tradition (*smṛti*), and "name." In these second, certain subsidiary discussions [as e.g., on *apūrva*] relating to the difference of various rites, refutation of (erroneously alleged) proofs, and difference of performance [as in "constant" and "voluntary" offerings]. In the third, *Śruti*, "sign" or "sense of the passage" (*linga*), "context" (*vākya*), etc., and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another, the ceremonies called *pratipatti-karmāṇi*, things mentioned incidentally (*anārbhyādhita*), things accessory to several main objects, as *prayājas*, etc., and duties of the sacrifice.

चतुर्थे प्रधानप्रयोजकत्वाप्रधानप्रयोजकत्वजुहूपर्णतादिफलराजसूयगतजघन्याङ्गाक्षद्यूतादिचिन्ता । पञ्चमे श्रुत्यादिक्रम-तद्विशेषवृद्धयवर्धनप्राबल्यदौर्बल्यचिन्ता । षष्ठेऽधिकारितद्धर्मद्रव्यप्रतिनिध्यर्थलोपनप्रायश्चित्त-सत्रदेयवह्निविचारः । सप्तमे प्रत्यक्षवचनातिदेशशेषनामलिङ्गातिदेशविचारः ।

In the fourth, the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites, the fruit caused by the *juhū* being made of the *butea frondosa*, etc., and the dice-playing, etc., which form subordinate parts of the *rājasūya* sacrifice. In the fifth, the relative order of different passages of *Śruti*, etc., the order of different parts of a sacrifice [as the seventeen animals at the *vājapeya*], the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of *Śruti*, order of mention, etc., in determining the order of performance. In the sixth, the person qualified to offer sacrifices their obligations, the substitutes for enjoined materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the *sattra* offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fires. In the seventh. transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, and then as inferred by "name" or "sign."

अष्टमे स्पष्टास्पष्टप्रबललिङ्गातिदेशापवादविचारः । नवमे ऊहविचारारम्भसामोहमन्त्रोहतत्प्रसङ्गातविचारः । दशमे बाधहेतुद्वारलोपविस्तारबाधकारणकार्यैकत्वसमुच्चयग्रहादिसामप्रकीर्णनञर्थविचारः । एकादशे तन्त्रोपोद्घाततन्त्रावापतन्त्रप्रपञ्चनावापप्रपञ्चनचिन्तनानि । द्वादशे प्रसङ्गतन्त्रिनिर्णयसमुच्चयविकल्पविचारः ।

In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed "sign," or by the predominant "sign," and cases where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection (*ūha*), the adaptation of *sāmans* and *mantras*, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth, the discussion of occasion where the non-performance of the primary rite, involves the "preclusion" and non-performance of the dependent rites, and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result, discussions connected with the *graha* offerings, certain *sāmans*, and various other things, and a discussion on the different kinds of negation. In the eleventh, the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of *tantra*[3] [where several acts are combined into one], and *āvāpa* [or the performing an act more than once]. In the twelfth, a discussion on *prasaṅga* [where the rite is performed for the chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference], *tantra*, cumulation of concurrent rites (*samuchchaya*) and option.

तत्राथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा (जै० सू० १।१।१) इति प्रथममधिकरणं पूर्वमीमांसारम्भोपपादनपरम्। अधिकरणं च पञ्चावयवामाचक्षते परीक्षकाः। ते च पञ्चावयवा विषयसंशयपूर्वपक्षसिद्धान्तसंगतिरूपाः।

Now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā arises from the aphorism, "Now therefore a desire to know duty [is to be entertained by thee"]. Now the learned describe a "topic" as consisting of five members, and these are *(a)* the subject, *(b)* the doubt, *(c)* the *primā facie* argument, *(d)* the demonstrated conclusion, and *(e)* the connection (*saṅgati*).

तत्राचार्यमतानुसारेणाधिकरणं निरूप्यते। 'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्येतद्वाक्यं विषयः। 'चोदनालक्षणोऽर्थो धर्मः' (जै० सू० १।१।२) इति आरभ्य 'अन्वाहार्ये च दर्शनात्' (जै० सू० १२।४।४७) इत्येतदन्तं जैमिनीयं धर्मशास्त्रमनारभ्यमारभ्यं वेति संदेहः अध्ययनविधेरदृष्टार्थत्वदृष्टार्थत्वाम्।

The topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system. Thus the "subject" to be discussed is the sentence, "The Veda is to be read." Now the "doubt" which arises is whether the study of Jaimini's *śāstra* concerning duty, beginning with the aphorism, "Duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage," and ending with "and from seeing it in the *anvāhārya*," is to be commenced or not.

तत्रानारभ्यमिति पूर्वः पक्षः। अध्ययनविधेरर्थविबोधलक्षणदृष्टफलकत्वानुपपत्तेः। अर्थविबोधार्थमध्ययनविधिरिति वदन् वादी प्रष्टव्यः—किमत्यन्तमप्राप्तमध्ययनं विधीयते किं वा पाक्षिकमवघातवन्नियम्यत इति ?

The *primā facie* argument is that it is not to be commenced, whether the injunction to read the Veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit. (*a*) If you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit, and this can be no other[4] than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read, we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of, or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional, as we see in the rule for shelling rice.[5]

न तावदाद्यः। विवादपदं वेदाध्ययनमर्थविबोधहेतुरध्ययनत्वाद्, भारताध्ययनवत्—इत्यनुमानेन विध्यनपेक्षतया प्राप्तत्वात्। अस्तु तर्हि द्वितीयो यथा नखविद-

लनादिना तण्डुलनिष्पत्तिसंभवात् पक्षिकोऽवघातोऽवश्यं कर्तव्य इति विधिना नियम्यते, तथा लिखितपाठेनार्थज्ञानसंभवात्पाक्षिकमध्ययनं विधिना नियम्यत इति चेत् ।

नैतच्चतुरस्रम् । दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैधर्म्यसंभवात् । अवघातनिष्पन्नैरेव तण्डुलैः पिष्टपुरोडाशादिकरणेऽवान्तरापूर्वद्वारा दर्शपूर्णमासौ परमापूर्वमुत्पादयतो नापरथा । अतोऽपूर्वमवघातस्य नियमहेतुः । प्रकृते लिखितपाठजन्येनाध्ययनजन्येन वार्थविबोधेन क्रत्वनुष्ठानसिद्धेरध्ययनस्य नियमहेतुर्नास्त्येव । तस्मादर्थविबोधहेतु विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वं नास्तीति ।

It cannot be the former, for the reading of the Veda is means of knowing the sense there of from its very nature as reading, just in the parallel instance of reading the Mahābhārata; and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction. Well, then, let it be the latter alternative ; just as the baked flour cake called *puroḍāsa* is made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar, when, but for the injunction, it might have been unhusked by the fingure-nails. There, however, the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their, unseen effect, which is the principal *apūrva*, by means of the various minor effects or subordinate *apūrvas*, produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony ; and consequently the minor *apūrva* of the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction. But in the case which we are discussing, there is no such reason for any such restriction, as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the Veda's meaning by reading a written book, or by studying under an authorised teacher. Hence we conclude that there is no injunction to study the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā as a means of knowing the sense of the Veda.

तर्हि श्रूयमाणस्य विधेः का गतिरिति चेत्—स्वर्गफलकोऽक्षरग्रहणमात्रविधिरिति भवान्परितुष्यतु । विश्वजिन्न्यायेनाश्रुतस्यापि स्वर्गस्य कल्पयितुं शक्यत्वात् । यथा 'स स्वर्गः सर्वान्प्रत्यविशिष्टत्वात्' (जै० सू० ४।३।१५) इति विश्वजिति अश्रुतमप्यधिकारिणं संपादयता, तद्विशेषणं स्वर्गः फलं युक्त्या निरणायि तद्वदध्ययनेऽप्यस्तु । तदुक्तम्—

विनापि विधिना दृष्टलाभान्न हि तदर्थता ।
कल्प्यस्तु विधिसामर्थ्यात्स्वर्गो विश्वजिदादिवत् ॥

(*b*) "What, then, becomes of the Vedic injunction, 'The Veda is to be read'?" Well, you must be content with the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its [future] fruit, although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the Vedic text [without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey], since heaven, though not expressly mentioned, is to be assumed as the fruit, according to the analogy of the Viśvajit offering. Just as Jaimini, in his aphorism (iv. 3, 15), "Let that fruit be heaven, since it equally applies to all," establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the Viśvajit sacrifice, and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven, so let us assume it to be in the present case also. As it has been said—

"Since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction, this cannot be its sole object; we must rather suppose heaven to be that fruit from the injunction's significance, after the analogy of the Viśvajit, etc."

एवं च सति वेदमधीत्य स्नायादिति स्मृतिरनुगृहीता भवति। अत्र हि वेदाध्ययनसमावर्तनयोरव्यवधानमवगम्यते। तावके मते त्वधीतेऽपि वेदे धर्मविचाराय गुरुकुले वस्तव्यम्। तथा सत्यव्यवधानं बाध्येत। तस्माद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वाभावात्पाठमात्रेण स्वर्गसिद्धेः समावर्तनशास्त्राच्च धर्मविचारशास्त्रमनारम्भणीयमिति पूर्वपक्षसंक्षेपः।

Thus, too, we shall keep the Smṛti rule from being violated: "Having read the Veda, let him bathe." For this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the Veda and the student's return to his home; while, according to your opinion, after he had read the Veda, he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the Mīmāṁsā discussions, and thus the idea of no interval between would be contradicted. Therefore for these three reasons, (*a*) that the study of Mīmāṁsā is not enjoined, (*b*) that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text, and (*c*) that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled, we maintain that the study of the Mīmāṁsā discussions on duty is not to be commenced.

The "authoritative conclusion" (*siddhānta*), however, is as follows:—

सिद्धान्तस्त्वन्यतः प्राप्तत्वादप्राप्तविधित्वं मास्तु । नियमविधित्वपक्षस्तु वज्रहस्तेनापि नापहस्तयितुं पार्यते । तथा हि—'स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः' (तै० आ० २।१५) इति तव्यप्रत्ययः प्रेरणापरपर्यायां पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरूपार्थभावनाभाव्यामभिधाभावानां प्रत्याययति । सा ह्यर्थभावना भाव्यमाकाङ्क्षति ।

We grant that it cannot be a case of *vidhi*, for it might have been adopted on other grounds ; but not even Indra with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case of *niyama*. In the sentence, "The Veda is to be read" the affix *tavya* expresses an enforcing power in the word'[6] which is to be rendered visible by a corresponding action in man bringing a certain effect into existence; and this enforcing power seeks some corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort.

न तावत्समानपदोपात्तमध्ययनं भाव्यत्वेन परिमते । अध्ययनशब्दार्थस्य स्वाधीनोच्चारणक्षमत्वस्य वाङ्मनसव्यापारस्य क्लेशार्थकस्य भाव्यत्वासंभवात् । नापि समानवाक्योपात्तः स्वाध्यायः । स्वाध्यायशब्दार्थस्य वर्णराशेर्नित्यत्वेन विभुत्वेन चोत्पत्त्यादीनां चतुर्णां क्रियाफलानामसंभवात् ।

Now it cannot be the act itself of reading, as suggested by the whole word *adhyetavya*, which it thus seeks as an end; for this act of reading, thus expressed by the word, could never be regarded as an end, since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind, consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read. Nor could the portion read, as suggested by the whole sentence, be regarded as the end. For the mass of words called "Veda" which is what we really mean by the words "portion read," being eternal and omnipresent, could never fulfil the conditions of the four "fruits of action," production, etc.[7]

तस्मात्सामर्थ्यप्राप्तोऽवबोधो भाव्यत्वेनावतिष्ठते । अर्थी समर्थो विद्वानधिक्रियत इति न्यायेन दर्शपूर्णमासादिविषयः स्वविषयावबोधमपेक्षमाणाः स्वार्थबोधे स्वाध्यायं विनियुञ्जते । अध्ययनविधिश्च लिखितपाठादिव्यावृत्त्याऽध्ययनसंस्कृतत्वं स्वाध्यायस्यावगमयति ।

Therefore the only true end which remains to us is the knowledge of the meaning, as obtained by carrying out the sense of the words of the injunction. According to the old rule, "He has the

right who has the want, the power, and the wit," those who are aiming to understand certain things, as the new and full moon sacrifices, use their daily reading to learn the truth about them. And the injunction for reading, since it virtually excludes the reading of written books, etc. [from the well-known technical sense of the word "read" when used in this connection], conveys the idea that the reading the Veda enjoined has a consecrated character [as taught by a duly authorised teacher].

तथा च यथा दर्शपूर्णमासादिजन्यं परमापूर्वमवघातादिजन्यस्यावान्तरापूर्वस्य कल्पकं तथा समस्तक्रतुजन्यमपूर्वजातं क्रतुज्ञानसाधनाध्ययननियमजन्यमपूर्वं कल्पयिष्यति । नियमादृष्टानिष्टौ विधिश्रवणवैफल्यमापद्येत । न च विश्वजिन्न्यायेन फलकल्पनावकल्प्यते । अर्थविबोधे दृष्टे फले सति फलान्तरकल्पनाया अयोगात् । तदुक्तम्—

लभ्यमाने फले दृष्टे नादृष्टफलकल्पना ।
विधेस्तु नियमार्थत्वान्नानर्थक्यं भविष्यति ।। इति ।

Therefore, as the principal *apūrva*, produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices, necessitates and establishes the subordinate *apūrvas* produced by the inferior sacrificial acts, as unhusking the rice, etc., so the mass of *apūrva* produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous *apūrva* produced by the restricting injunction (*niyama*), which prescribes reading the Veda as the means to know how to perform these sacrifices. If you hesitate to concede that a *niyama* could have this future influence called *apūrva*, the same doubt might equally invalidate the efficacy of a *vidhi* [as the two stand on the same level as to their enjoining power]. Nor is the supposition a valid one that heaven is the fruit, according to the analogy of the *Viśvajit* offering, since, if there is a present and visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text, it is improper to suppose any other future unseen fruit. Thus it has been said—

"Where a seen fruit is obtained, you must not suppose an unseen one; but if a *vidhi* has the restricting meaning of a *niyama*, it does not thereby become meaningless."

ननु वेदमात्राध्यायिनोऽर्थविबोधानुदयेऽपि साङ्गवेदाध्यायिनः पुरुषस्यार्थविबोधसंभवाद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैफल्यमिति चेत्—तदसमञ्जसम् । बोधमात्रसंभवेऽपि

निर्णयस्य विचाराधीनत्वात् । तद्यथा—'अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति' (तै० ब्रा० ३।१२।५) इत्यत्र घृतेनैव न तैलादिना इत्ययं निर्णयो व्याकरणेन निगमेन निरुक्तेन वा न लभ्यते । विचारशास्त्रेण तु तेजो वै घृतमिति वाक्यशेषवशादर्थनिर्णयो लभ्यते । तस्माद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वं सिद्धम् ।

"But an objector may say 'Although a man who reads the simple text of the Veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning, still, as he who reads the Veda with its *aṅgas*, grammar etc., may attain to this knowledge, the study of Mīmāṁsā will be useless." But this is not true: for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the literal meaning, all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of dicussion. For instance, when it is said, "He offers anointed gravel," neither grammer nor *nigama*[8] nor *nirukta* will determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not with oil, etc., ; it is only by a Mīmāṁsā discussion that the true meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage, "Verily, ghee is brightness."[9] It is therefore established that the study of Mīmāṁsā is enjoined.

ते च वेदमधीत्य स्नायादिति शास्त्रं गुरुकुलनिवृत्तिपरं व्यवधानप्रतिबन्धकं बाध्येतेति मन्तव्यम् । 'स्नात्वा भुङ्क्ते' इतिवत् पूर्वापरीभावसमानकर्तृकत्वमात्र-प्रतिपत्त्या अध्ययनसमावर्तनयोर्नैरन्तर्याप्रतिपत्तेः । तस्माद्विधिसामर्थ्यादेवाधिकरण-सहस्रात्मकं पूर्वमीमांसाशास्त्रमारम्भणीयम् ।

इदं चाधिकरणं शास्त्रेणोपोद्घातत्वेन संबध्यते । तदाह—

चिन्तां प्रकृतिसिद्ध्यर्थामुपोद्घातं प्रचक्षते । इति ।

Nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the passage of Smṛiti, "Having read the Veda, let him bathe," which implies that he should now leave his teacher's house, and prohibits any further delay; as the words do not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having read the Veda, but only that it is to follow it at some time, and that both actions are to be done by the same person, just as we see in the common phrase, "Having bathed, he eats." Therefore from the purport of the injunction we conclude that the study of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, śāstra consisting of a thousand "topics,"[10] is to be commenced. This topic is connected with the main subject of the Śāstra as

being a subsidiary digression, as it is said, "They call that a subsidiary digression which helps to establish the main subject."[11]

इदमेवाधिकरणं गुरुमतमनुसृत्योपन्यस्यते । अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनीयत, तमध्यापयीतेत्यत्राध्यापनं नियोगविषयः प्रतिभासते । नियोगश्च नियोज्यमपेक्षते । कश्चात्र नियोज्य इति चेत्—आचार्यककाम एव । संमानन—' (पा० सू० १।३।३६) इत्यादिना पाणिन्यनुशासनेनाचार्यके गम्यमाने नयतेर्धातोरात्मनेपदस्य विधानात् । उपनयने यो नियोज्यः स एवाध्यापनेऽपि तयोरेकप्रयोजनत्वात् ।

अत एवोक्तं मनुना मुनिना—

उपनीय तु यः शिष्यं वेदमध्यापयेद् द्विजः ।
साङ्गं च सरहस्यं च तमाचार्यं प्रचक्षते ॥

(मनु० २।१४०) इति ।

I now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same "topic" in accordance with the teaching of the Guru Prabhākara.

In the Smṛiti rule,[12] "Let him admit as a pupil the Brahman lad when eight years old (by investing him with the sacred cord), let him instruct him" the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction. Now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed; and if you ask who is here to be directed, I reply, "He who desires to be a teacher," since, by Pāṇini's rule (i. 3, 36), the root *nī* is used in the *ātmanepada* when honour, etc., are implied, i.e., here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils. He who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him, since both are the object of one and the same command. Hence the inspired sage Manu has said (ii. 140), "The Brāhman who girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the Veda, with its subsidiary *aṅgas* and mystic doctrines, they call a spiritual teacher *(ācārya)*."

ततश्चाचार्यकर्तृकमध्यापनं माणवककर्तृकेनाध्ययनेन विना न सिध्यतीत्यध्यापनविधिप्रयुक्त्यैवाध्ययनानुष्ठानं सेत्स्यति । प्रयोज्यव्यापारमन्तरेण प्रयोजकव्यापारस्यानिर्वाहात् ।

तर्हि 'अध्येतव्यः' (तै० आ० २।१५) इत्यस्य विधित्वं न सिध्यतीति चेत्—मा सैत्सीत्का नो हानिः? पृथगध्ययनविधेरभ्युपगमे प्रयोजनाभावात् । विधिवाक्यस्य नित्यानुवादत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेः । तस्मादध्ययनविधिमुपजीव्य पूर्वमुपन्यस्तौ पूर्वोत्तरपक्षौ प्रकारान्तरेण प्रदर्शनीयौ ।

विचारशास्त्रमवैधत्वेनानारब्धव्यमिति पूर्वपक्षः । वैधत्वेनारब्धव्यमिति राद्धान्तः ।

Now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot, be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of the pupila and therefore the very injunction to teach implies and establishes we corresponding obligation to learn, since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be influenced. If you object that this view does not make reading the Veda the object of definite injunction I reply, What matters it to us if it is not ? For even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading the Veda, it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a duty, because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual *anuvāda* or "supplementary repetition."[18] Therefore the former *primā facie* argument and its answer, which were given before under the idea that there was a definite injunction to read the Veda, must now be discussed in another way to suit this new view.

Now the *primā facie* argument was that the study of Mīmāṃsā, not being authoritatively enjoined, is not to be commenced ; the "conclusion" was that it is to be commenced as being thus authoritatively enjoined.

तत्र वैधत्वं वदता वदितव्यं—किमध्यापनविधिर्माणवकस्यार्थविबोधमपि प्रयुङ्क्ते, किं वा पाठमात्रम् ? नाद्यः, विनाप्यर्थविबोधेनाध्यापनसिद्धेः । न द्वितीयः । पाठमात्रे विचारस्य विषयप्रयोजनयोरसंभवात् । आपाततः प्रतिभातः संदिग्धोऽर्थो विचारशास्त्रस्य विषयो भवति । तथा सति यत्रार्थावगतिरेव नास्ति तत्र सन्देहस्य का कथा ? विचारफलस्य निर्णयस्य प्रत्याशा दूरत एव ।

Now the upholders of the former or *primā facie* view argue as follows :—"We put to the advocates of the conclusion the following dilemma : Does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning of what is read, or does it only refer to the bare reading ? It cannot be the former, for obviously the act of teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupilis understanding what is taught [as this will depend on this ability as a recipient] ; and the latter will not help you, as, if the bare reading is sufficient, the Mīmāṃsā discussion in question will have no subject or use. For their proper subject is a point in the Veda which is doubted about from having been only looked at in a

rough and impromptu way; if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all, why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious discussion ?

तथा च यदसंदिग्धमप्रयोजनं, न च तत्प्रेक्षावत्प्रतिपित्सागोचरः । यथा समनस्केन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टः स्पष्टालोकमध्यमध्यासीनो घट इति न्यायेन विषयप्रयोजनयोरसंभवेन विचारशास्त्रमनारम्भ्यमिति पूर्वः पक्षः ।

And therefore in accordance with the wellknown principle, "That which is a thing of use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent man, as, for instance, a jar which is in broad light and in contact with the external and internal senses, as there is in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon, or a useful end to be attained by it, we maintain that the study of Mīmāṁsā is not to be commenced."

अध्यापनविधिनाऽर्थविबोधो मा प्रयोजि । तथापि साङ्गवेदाध्यायिनो गृहीतपदपदार्थसंगतिकस्य पुरुषस्य पौरुषेयेष्विव प्रबन्धेष्वाम्नायेऽप्यर्थविबोधः प्राप्नोत्येव । ननु यथा 'विष भुङ्क्ष्व' इत्यत्र प्रतीयमानोऽप्यर्थो न विवक्ष्यते । 'मास्य गृहे भुङ्क्थाः' इति भोजनप्रतिषेधस्य मातृवाक्यतात्पर्यविषयत्वात् । तथाम्नायार्थस्याविवक्षायां विषयाद्यभावदोषः प्राचीनः प्रादुःष्यात् इति चेत्—

We grant, in reply, that the injunction to teach does not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning; still when a man has read the Veda with its subsidiary *aṅgas*, and has comprehended the general connection of the words with their respective meanings, this will imply an understanding of the meaning of the Veda, just as it would in any ordinary human compositions. "But may we not say that, just as in the case of the mother who said to her son, 'Eat poison', the meaning literally expressed by the words was not what she wished to convey, since she really intended to forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house ; so if the literal meaning of the Veda does not express its real purport, the old objection will recur with full force that the study of Mīmāṁsā will have neither subject nor end [as there will be no use in understanding the literal meaning, since, as in the mother's case, it may only lead astrary, and so common sense must be toe ultimrte judge"].

मैवं वोचः, दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोर्वैषम्यसंभवात् । विषभोजनवाक्यस्याप्तप्रणीतत्वेन मुख्यार्थपरिग्रहे बाधः स्यादिति विवक्षा नाश्रीयते । अपौरुषेये तु वेदे प्रतीयमानोऽर्थः कुतो न विवक्ष्यते । विवक्षिते च वेदार्थे यत्र यत्र पुरुषस्य संदेहः स सर्वोऽपि विचारशास्त्रस्य विषयो भविष्यति । तन्निर्णयश्च प्रयोजनम् । तस्मादध्यापनविधिप्रयुक्तेनाध्ययनेनावगम्यमानस्यार्थस्य विचारार्हत्वाद्विचारशास्त्रस्य वैधत्वेन विचारशास्त्रमारम्भणीयमिति राद्धान्तसंग्रहः ।

We reply, that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not really parallel. In the supposed illustration the primary meaning of the words would be obviously precluded, because a direction to eat poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker like a mother, and you would know at once that this could not be what she wished to say; but in the case of the Veda, which is underived from any personal author, why should not the literal meaning be the one actually intended? And it is just the doubts that arise, as they occasionally will do, in reference to this intended meaning, which will be the proper "subject" of Mīmāṁsā discussion; and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper "end." Therefore, whenever the true meaning of the Veda is not obtained[14] by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction to a Brahman to teach, it will be a proper subject for systematic discussion; and hence we hold that the study of Mīmāṁsā *is* enjoined, and should be commenced.

स्यादेतत् । वेदस्य कथमपौरुषेयत्वमभिधीयते ? तत्प्रतिपादकप्रमाणाभावात् । अथ मन्येथाः 'अपौरुषेया वेदाः, संप्रदायाविच्छेदे सत्यस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वादात्मवत्' इति । तदेतन्मन्दम् । विशेषणासिद्धेः । पौरुषेयवेदवादिभिः प्रलये संप्रदायविच्छेदस्य कक्षीकरणात् । किं च किमिदमस्मर्यमाणकर्तृकत्वं नामाप्रमीयमाणकर्तृकत्वमस्मरणगोचरकर्तृकत्वं वा ?

"Well,[15] be it so" [say the followers of the Nyāya], "but how can the Vedas be said to be underived from any personal author, when there is no evidence to establish this? Would you maintained that they have no personal author because, although there is an unbroken line of tradition, there is no remembrance of any author, just as is the case with the soul"?[16] This argument is weak, because the alleged characteristics [unbroken tradition, etc.] are not proved; for those who hold the human origin of the Vedas

maintain tha the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe. And, again, what is meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered ? Is it (1) that no author is believed, or (2) that no author is remembered ? The first alternative cannot be accepted, since we hold that God is proved to have been the author. Nor can the second, because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma, viz., is it meant (*a*) that no author of the Veda is remembered by some one person, or (*b*) by any person whatever ?

न प्रथमः कल्पः । परमेश्वरस्य कर्तुः प्रमितेरभ्युपगमात् । न द्वितीयः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथा हि—किमेकेनास्मरणमभिप्रेयते सर्वैर्वा ? नाद्यः, 'यो धर्मशीलो जितमानरोषः' इत्यादिषु मुक्तकोक्तिषु व्यभिचारात् । न द्वितीयः, सर्वास्मरणस्यासर्वज्ञदुर्ज्ञानत्वात् । पौरुषेयत्वे प्रमाणसंभवाच्च । वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणिवाक्यत्वात् कालिदासादिवाक्यवत् । वेदवाक्यान्याप्तप्रणीतानि प्रमाणत्वे सति वाक्यत्वान्मन्वादिवाक्यवदिति ।

The former supposition breaks down, as it would prove too much, since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as "He who is religious and has overcome pride and anger," etc.[17] And the latter supposition is inadmissible, since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the Veda was recollected by any person whatever. Moreover, there is actual proof that the Veda had a personal author, for we argue as follows :—The sentences of the Veda must have originated from a personal author, since they have the character of sentences like those of Kālidāsa and other writers. And, again, the sentences of the Veda have been composed by a competent person, since, while the posses authority, they have, at the same time, the character of sentences, like those of Manu and other sages.

ननु—

वेदस्याध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
वेदाध्ययनसामान्यादधुनाध्ययनं यथा । (श्लो० वा० ७।३६६)

इत्यनुमानं प्रतिसाधनं प्रगल्भत इति चेत्—तदपि न प्रमाणकोटिं प्रवेष्टुमीष्टे ।

भारताध्ययनं सर्वं गुर्वध्ययनपूर्वकम् ।
भारताध्ययनत्वेन सांप्रताध्ययनं यथा ॥
इत्याभाससमानयोगक्षेमत्वात् ।

But [ask the Mīmāṁsakas] may it not be assumed that "all study of the Veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor, since the study of the Veda must always have had one common character which was the same in former times as now," and therefore this uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the Veda? This reasoning, however [the Naiyāyikas answer], cannot rise to the hight of proof, for it has no more validity than such obviously reasoning as.

"All study of the Mahābhārata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil" preceptor, since it is the study of the Māhābhārata, which must have been the same in former times as now."

ननु तत्र व्यासः कर्तेति स्मर्यते—
को ह्यन्यः पुण्डरीकाक्षान्महाभारतकृद्भवेत् ।
इत्यादाविति चेत्—तदसारम् ।
ऋचः सामानि जज्ञिरे
छन्दांसि जज्ञिरे तस्माद्यजुस्तस्मादजायत ॥
(ऋ० १०।९०।९)
इति पुरुषसूक्ते वेदस्य सकर्तृकताप्रतिपादनात् ।

But [the Mīmāṁsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases, since] the Smṛiti declares that [Vishṇu incarnate as] Vyāsa was the author of the Mahābhārata, in accordance with the line, "Who else than the lotus-eyed Vishṇu could be the maker of the Mahābhārata ?" [while nothing of this sort is recorded in any Smṛiti in regard to the Veda]. This argument, however, is pithless, since those words of the Purushasūkta (Rig V., x. 90), "From him sprang the Ṛc and Sāman verses ; from him sprang the Metres; from him the Yajus arose;" prove that the Veda had a maker.

किं चानित्यः शब्दः सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद् घटवत् । नन्विदमनुमानं स एवायं गकार इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणप्रतिहतमिति चेत्—तदतिफल्गु । लूनपुनर्जातकेशकुन्दादाविव प्रत्यभिज्ञायाः सामान्यविषयत्वेन बाधकत्वाभावात् ।

Further [proceed the Naiyāyikas] we hold that sound is non-eternal[18] because it has genus, and is also perceptible to the external organs of beings such as ourselves, just as a jar is [19] "But," you may object, "is not this argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter *g* (for example) as the same we have heard before ?" This objection, however, is extremely weak, for the recognition in question is powerless to refute our argument, since it has reference only to identity of *species*, as in the ease of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again, or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh.

नन्वशरीरस्य परमेश्वरस्य ताल्वादिस्थानाभावेन वर्णोच्चारणासंभवात्कथं तत्प्रणीतत्वं वेदस्य स्यादिति चेत्—न तद्भद्रम् । स्वभावतोऽशरीरस्यापि तस्य भक्तानुग्रहार्थं लीलाविग्रहग्रहणसंभवात् । तस्माद्वेदस्यापौरुषेयत्ववाचोयुक्तिर्न युक्तेति चेत्—।

"But [asks the Mīmāṁsaka] how can the Veda have been uttered by the incorporeal Parameśvara, who has no palate or other organs of speech, and therefore cannot have pronounced the letters ?" "This objection [answers the Naiyāyika] is not happy, because, though Parameśvara is by nature incorporeal, he can yet assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worship-pears. Consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the Veda had no personal author are inconclusive."

तत्र समाधानमभिधीयते । किमिदं पौरुषेयत्वं सिसाधयिषितम् ? पुरुषादुत्पन्नत्वमात्रं यथास्मदादिभिरहरहरुच्चार्यमाणस्य वेदस्य ? प्रमाणान्तरेणार्थमुपलभ्य तत्प्रकाशनाय रचितत्वं वा यथास्मदादिभिरेव निबध्यमानस्य प्रबन्धस्य ?

I shall now [says the Mīmāṁsaka] clear up the whole question. What is ment by this *pauruṣeyatva* ["derivation from a personal author"] which it is sought to prove ? Is it (1) mere procession (*utpannatva*) from a person, like the procession of the Veda from persons such as ourselves, when we daily utter it ? or (2) is it the arrangement—with a view to its manifestation—of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof, as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves ?

प्रथमे न विप्रतिपत्तिः । द्वितीये किमनुमानबलात्तत्साधनमागमबलाद्वा ? नाद्यः । मालतीमाधवादिवाक्येषु सव्यभिचारत्वात् । अथ प्रमाणत्वे सतीति विशिष्यत इति चेत्—तदपि न विपश्चितो मनसि वैशद्यमापद्यते । प्रमाणान्तरा-

गोचरार्थप्रतिपादकं हि वाक्यं वेदवाक्यम् । तत्प्रमाणान्तरगोचरार्थप्रतिपादकमिति साध्यमाने मम माता वन्ध्येतिवद् व्याघातापातात् ।

It the first meaning be intended, there will be no dispute between us.[20] If the second sense be meant, I ask whether it is established (*a*) by inference,[2] or (*b*) by supernatural testimony? (*a*) The former alternative cannot be correct, because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the Mālatīmādhava [which, of course, being a work of fiction, has no authoritative character]. If you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause, "while they possess authority,"[22] even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher. For the sentences of the Veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence. But if you could establish that these Vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence, this definition would be at once contradicted, just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman.

किं च परमेश्वरस्य लीलाविग्रहपरिग्रहाभ्युपगमेऽप्यतीन्द्रियार्थदर्शनं न संजाघटीति । देशकालस्वभावविप्रकृष्टार्थग्रहणोपायाभावात् । न च तच्चक्षुरादिकमेव तादृक्प्रतीतिजननक्षममिति मन्तव्यम् । दृष्टानुसारेणैव कल्पनाया आश्रयणीयत्वात् । तदुक्तं गुरुभिः सर्वज्ञनिराकरणवेलायाम्—

यत्राप्यतिशयो दृष्टः स स्वार्थानतिलङ्घनात् ।
दूरसूक्ष्मादिदृष्टौ स्यान्न रूपे श्रोत्रवृत्तिता ॥ इति ।

And even if we granted that Parameśvara might assume a body in sport, in order to show kindness to his worshippers, it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses, from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place, in time, and in nature.[23] Nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge, for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience. This has been declared by the Guru [Prabhākara] when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author—

"Wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified,[24] it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects; thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very

distant or the very minute, but not in the ear's becoming cognisant of form."

अत एव नागमबलात्तत्साधनम् । यथा 'तेन प्रोक्तम्' (पा० सू० ४।३।१०१) इति पाणिन्यनुशासने जाग्रत्यपि काठक-कालाप-तैत्तिरीयमित्यादिसमाख्याध्ययन-संप्रदायप्रवर्तकविषयत्वेनोपपद्यते, तद्वदत्रापि संप्रदायप्रवर्तकविषयत्वेनाप्युपपद्यते ।

Hence *(b)* we also maintain that your position cannot be established by any supposed supernatural testimony [as that quoted above from Rig-Veda, "from him sprang the Ṛc and Sāman verses"]. For the rule of Pāṇini (iv. 3, 101) will still remain inviolate, that the grammatical affixes with which such names as Kāṭhaka, Kālāpa, and Taittiriya are formed, impart to those derivatives the sense of "uttered by" Kaṭha, Kalāpin, etc , though we maintain that these names have reference [not to those parts of the Veda as first composed by these sages, but] to the fact that these sages instituted certain schools of traditional study. And in the same way we hold [in reference to this verse from the Rig-Veda] that it only refers to the institution of certain schools of traditional study of these Vedas.

न चानुमानबलाच्छब्दस्यानित्यत्वसिद्धिः । प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधात् । न चासत्यप्येकत्वे सामान्यनिबन्धनं तदिति सांप्रतम् । सामान्यनिबन्धनत्वमस्य बलवद्बाधकोपनिपातादास्थीयते क्वचिद् व्यभिचारदर्शनाद्वा । तत्र क्वचिद् व्यभिचारदर्शने तदुत्प्रेक्षायामुक्तं स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादिभिः—

उत्प्रेक्षेत हि यो मोहादज्ञातमपि बाधनम् ।
स सर्वव्यवहारेषु संशयात्मा विनश्यति ।। इति ।

Nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound, because [as we said before] it is opposed to the evidence of our consciousness, [since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before]. Nor is it reasonable to reply that, although the letters are not the same, they seem to be so on account of their identity of species For here we ask our opponents a question—Is this idea that "the apparent sameness arises from identity of species" put forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same, or only [from an imagined fear of error] because experience shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous [as in the cases of the hair and

jasmine mentioned above] ? *(a)* If it arises from the latter reason, we Mīmāṁsakas, who hold that the Veda is its own evidence, have said in reference to this timid imagination—

> "He who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion, will go to utter ruin in every transaction of life, his mind a mass of doubts."

नन्विदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गत्वादिजातिविपयं न गादिव्यक्तिविपयम् । तासां प्रतिपुरुषं भेदोपलम्भात् । अन्यथा 'सोमशर्माधीते' इति विभागो न स्यादिति चेत्—तदपि शोभां न बिभर्ति । गादिव्यक्तिभेदे प्रमाणभावेन गत्वादिजातिविपयकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् । यथा गोत्वमजानत एकमेव भिन्नदेशपरिमाणसंस्थानव्यक्त्युपधानवशाद्भिन्नदेशमिवाल्पमिव महदिव दीर्घमिव वामनमिव प्रथते तथा गव्यक्तिमजानत एकापि व्यञ्जकभेदात् तत्तद्धर्मानुबन्धिनी प्रतिभासते ।

एतेन विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद् भेदसिद्धिरिति प्रत्युक्तम् । तत्र किं स्वाभाविको विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो भेदसाधकत्वेनाभिमतः प्रातीतिको वा ?

*(b)* "But [the Naiyāyikas will ask] does not this recognition of *g* and other letters [as the same which we heard before] refer to the species which exists the same in each, and not to the several individual letters, since, in fact, we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons, otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say 'Somaśarman is reading' ?" This objection, however, has as little brilliancy as its predecessors, for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual *g*'s, there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species *g* ; and we maintain that, just as to the man who does not understand [the Naiyāyika doctrine of] the species *g*, the one species [in the Naiyāyika view] will by the influence of distinction of place, magnitude, form, and individual sounds, appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place, as small, as great, as long, as short ; so to the man who does not understand our [Mīmāṁsaka doctrine of] one individual *g*, the one *g* (in our view) will by the diversity of "manifesters,"[25] appear to him associated with their respective peculiarities ; and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed [to the letter *g*], there is a fallacious appearance of distinction [between different *g*'s]. But does this

ascription of contrary characters, which is thus regarded as creating a difference [between the *g*'s], result (1) from the nature of the thing, or (2) from our imagination ?

प्रथमेऽसिद्धिः । अपरथा स्वाभाविकभेदाभ्युपगमे 'दश गकारानुदचारयच्चैत्रः' इति प्रतिपत्तिः स्यान्न तु दशकृत्वोगकार इति । द्वितीये तु न स्वाभाविकभेदसिद्धिः । न हि परोपाधिभेदेन स्वाभाविकमैक्यं विहन्यते । मा भून्नभसोऽपि कुम्भाद्युपाधिभेदात्स्वाभाविको भेदः । तत्र व्यावृत्तव्यवहारो नादनिदानः । तदुक्तमाचार्यैः :—

प्रयोजनं तु यज्जातेस्तद्वर्णादेव लप्स्यते ।
व्यक्तिलभ्यं तु नादेभ्य इति गत्वादिधीर्वृथा ॥

तथा च—

प्रत्यभिज्ञा यदा शब्दे जागर्ति निरवग्रहा ।
अनित्यत्वानुमानानि सैव सर्वाणि बाधते ॥ इति ।

There is no proof of the former alternative ; for, if it were true, as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between different *g*'s, we should have to say, "Chaitra has uttered ten *g*'s" and not "Chaitra has uttered the same *g* ten times." On the latter supposition, there is no proof of any inherent distinction between *g*'s, for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises. Thus we must not conceive, from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars, etc., that there iscnayinherent distinction, as of parts, in the one indivisible ether. The current use of the rejected phrase [i.e., "different" as applied to the *g*'s] is really caused by the *noise*, which in case is different. This has been said by the great teacher—

"The object which the Naiyāyikas seek by supposing a species is, in fact, gained from the letter itself ; and the object which they aim at by supposing and individuality in letters, is attained from audible noises ;[26] so that the assumption of species is useless."

And again—

"Since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of recognition is always awake within us, it precludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's non-eternity."

एतेनेदमपास्तं यदवादि वागीश्वरेण मानमनोहरे—'अनित्यः शब्दः, इन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणत्वाच्चक्षूरूपवदिति' ।

शब्दद्रव्यत्ववादिनं प्रत्यसिद्धेः । ध्वन्यंशे सिद्धसाधनत्वाच्च । अश्रावणत्वोपाधिबाधितत्वाच्च । उदयनस्तु आश्रयाप्रत्यक्षत्वेऽप्यभावस्य प्रत्यक्षतां महता प्रबन्धेन प्रतिपादयन्निवृत्तः कोलाहलः, उत्पन्नः शब्द इति व्यवहाराचरणे कारणं प्रत्यक्षं शब्दानित्यत्वे प्रमाणयति स्म ।

This at once refutes the argument given in the [Naiyāyika] treatise by Vāgīśvara, entitled *Māna-manohara*, "sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense[27] (*sc.* the ear), just as colour is to the eye."

We can also refute it in the following ways : (*a*) If we follow the [Sāṅkhya and Vedānta] view that sound is a substance, it is evidently overthrown[28] [as in that case sound cannot be a quality]; (*b*) if we take it as referring to the *noise*, not the *sound*, we have no dispute, as it only establishes what we ourselves allow; and (*c*) the inference is overthrown by the "limiting condition" [*upādhi*] of *aśrāvaṇatva*, or "the not causing audition."[29] So Udayana tries at great length to establish that, althouh ether, the site of sound, is imperceptible, the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible ; and he then brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of sound, that sense perception which causes the use of such common expressions as "The tumult is stopped," "The sound has arisen."[30]

सोऽपि विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गस्यौपाधिकत्वोपपादनन्यायेन दत्तरक्त बलिवेतालसमः । यो हि नित्यत्वे सर्वदोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गो न्यायभूषणकारोक्तः, सोऽपि ध्वनिसंस्कृतस्योपलम्भाभ्युपगमात्प्रतिक्षिप्तः । यत्तु युगपदिन्द्रियसंबन्धित्वेन प्रतिनियतसंस्कारकसंस्कार्यत्वाभावानुमानं तदात्मन्यैकान्तिकमित्यलमतिकलहेन । ततश्च वेदस्यापौरुषेयतया निरस्तसमस्तशङ्काकलङ्काङ्कुरत्वेन स्वतःसिद्धं धर्मे प्रमाण्यमिति सुस्थितम् ।

But he is sufficiently answered[31] by our old reply that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed, just as, in the story, the demon Tāla went away [as well as Betāla] when the offering of blood was given to the latter.[32] And as for the objection raised by the author of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*,[33] that, if sound were eternal, the

conclusion must follow that it would be either always perceptible or always imperceptible, this also is obviated by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our articulate noise.[34] And as for the (Naiyāyika) argument against the existence[35] of such a constant relation as this which is supposed between the manifested "sound" and the manifesting "noise," since they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing, this is invalid, as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of the soul.[36]

Therefore as the Veda is thus proved to have not originated from any personal author, and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to duty.

स्यादेतत् ।

प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्याः समाश्रिताः ।
नैयायिकास्ते परतः, सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः ॥
प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रमाण्यं, वेदवादिनः ।
प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् ॥

इति वादिविवाददर्शनात्कथंकारं स्वतः धर्मे प्रमाण्यमिति सिद्धवत्कृत्य स्वीक्रियते ?

"Well" [say our opponents], "let this question rest ; but how about another well-known controversy ? It is said—

"The Sāṅkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are self-proved; the followers of the Nyāya hold that both are proved by something else [as inference, etc.] ; the Buddhists holds that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else ; the teachers of the Veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by something eles.' Now we ask, amidst all this discussion, how do the Mīmāṁsakas accept as established their tenet that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved ?

किं च किमिदं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं नाम ? किं स्वत एव प्रामाण्यस्य जन्म ? आहो स्वित् स्वाश्रयज्ञानजन्यत्वम् ? किमुत स्वाश्रयज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वम् ? उताहो ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीजन्यज्ञानाविशेषाश्रितत्वम् ? किं वा ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीमात्रजन्यज्ञानविशेषाश्रितत्वम् ?

And what is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness ? Is it (*a*) that authoritativeness springs from itself ? or (*b*) that is springs from the right knowledge in which it resides ? or (*c*) that it springs from the instrumental causes [as the eye, etc.] which produced the right knowledge in which it resides ? or (*d*) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge ?[37] or (*e*) that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes *only* which produced the right knowledge ?

तत्राद्यः सावद्यः । कार्यकारणभावस्य भेदसमानाधिकरणत्वेन एकस्मिन्नसंभवात् । नापि द्वितीयः । गुणस्य सतो ज्ञानस्य प्रमाण्यं प्रतिसमवायिकारणतया द्रव्यत्वापातात् ।

नापि तृतीयः प्रमाण्यस्योपाधित्वे जातित्वे वा जन्मायोगात् । स्मृतित्वानधिकरणस्य ज्ञानस्य बाधात्यन्ताभावः प्रामाण्योपाधिः । न च तस्योत्पत्तिसंभवः । अत्यन्ताभावस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अत एव न जातेरपि जनिर्युज्यते ।

"(*a*) It cannot be the *first*, because wherever the relation of cause and effect is found there must be a difference, and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject [i.e., authoritativeness cannot cause itself]. (*b*) It cannot be the *second*, because if knowledge, which is a quality, were the cause of authoritativeness, it would have to be a substance, as being an intimate cause.[38] (*c*) It cannot be the *third*, because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly be 'produced' at all,[39] whether we call it a general characteristic (*upādhi*) or a species (*jāti*);[40] for if we call it an *upādhi*, it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any contradicrion to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess the nature of recollection ;[41] and this cannot be produced, for we all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal ; and still less can we speak of its being produced, if we regard it as a species.

नापि चतुर्थः । ज्ञानविशेषो ह्यप्रमा । विशेषसामग्र्यां च सामान्यसामग्री अनुप्रविशति शिंशपासामग्र्यामिव वृक्षसामग्री । अपरथा तस्याकस्मिकत्वं प्रसज्येत । तस्मात्परतस्त्वेन स्वीकृताप्रामाण्यं विज्ञानसामान्यसामग्रीजन्याश्रितमित्यतिव्याप्तिरापद्येत ।

(*d*) Nor can it be the *fourth*, for wrong knowledge [as well as right knowledge] is a particular kind of knowledge, and the

instrumental causes which produce the general are included in those which produce the particular,[42] just as the general idea 'seed,' as applied to 'tree', is included in the particular seed of any special tree, as, e.g., the Dalbergia Sisu; otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all. Your definition would therefore extend too far [and include erroneous as well as true knowledge]; for non-authoritativeness, which Vedāntists and most Mīmāṁsakas allow to be produced by something external, must also be considered as residing in a particular knowledge [i.e., a wrong knowledge] produced [in part] by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge.

पञ्चमविकल्पं विकल्पयामः । किं दोषाभावसहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वमेव ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रजन्यत्वं किं वा दोषाभावासहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वम् ? नाद्यः । दोषाभावसहकृतज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वमेव परतः प्रामाण्यवादिभिरुररीकरणात् ।

(*c*) As for your *fifth* view, we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental causes *only* which produced right knowledge, you mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect'? It cannot be the former alternative; because the followers of the Nyāya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by something external [as inference, etc.], would at once grant that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect.'

नापि द्वितीयः दोषाभावसहकृतत्वेन सामग्र्यां सहकृतत्वे सिद्धेऽनन्यथासिद्धावन्वयव्यतिरेकसिद्धतया दोषाभावस्य कारणताया वज्रलेपायमानत्वात् । अभावः कारणमेव न भवतीति चेत्तदा वक्तव्यभावस्य कार्यत्वमस्ति न वा ? यदि नास्ति तदा घटप्रध्वंसानुत्पत्त्या घटस्य नित्यताप्रसङ्गः । अथास्ति, किमपराद्धं कारणत्वेनेति सेयमुभयतस्पाशा रज्जुः ।

तदुदितमुदयनेन—

भावो यथा तथाभावः कारणं कार्यवन्मतः । इति ।

(न्या० कु० १।१०)

Neither can it be the latter alternative; for, inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a 'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes, this absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of right knowledge, since right

knowledge will always accompany its presence, and be absent if it is absent,[43] and it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition.[44] If you object that non-existence (or absence) cannot be a cause, we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not? If it cannot, then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal, as its "emergent non-existence" or destruction would be impossible. If it can be an effect, then why should it not be a cause also? So this rope binds you at both ends. This has also been said by Udayana [in his Kusumāñjali, i. 10]—

"As existence, so too non-existence is held to be a cause as well as an effect."

तथा च प्रयोगः—विमतं प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीनं कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषाश्रितत्वादप्रामाण्यवत् । प्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायते अनभ्यासदशायां सांशयिकत्वादप्रामाण्यवत् । तस्मादुत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च परस्त्वे प्रमाणसंभवात्स्वतः सिद्धं प्रामाण्यमित्येतत्पूतिकुष्माण्डायत इति चेत्—।

"The argument, in my opinion, runs as follows :— Right knowledge depends on some cause[45] other than the common causes of knowledge, from the very fact that, while it is an effect, it is also knowledge, just as wrong knowledge does.[46] Authoritativeness is known through something external to itself [e.g., inference] because doubt arises in regard to it in an unfamiliar case, as we also see in non-authoritativeness.

"Therefore, as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognised by means of something external, the Mīmāṁsā tenet that 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and rotten."

तदेतदाकाशमुष्टिहननायते । विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तहेत्वजन्यत्वं प्रमायाः स्वतस्त्वमिति निरुक्तिसंभवात् । अस्ति चात्रानुमानम्—विमता प्रमा विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति । अप्रमात्वानधिकरणत्वात् । घटादिप्रमावत्

This long harangue of our opponent, however, is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist; for (*a*) we mean by our phrase "self-proved" that while right knowledge is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge, it is not produced by any other cause (as "defect," etc.) The following is our argument as drawn out in full :—Right knowledge is not produced by

any other instrumental causes than those of knowledge, while, at the same time, it is produced by these, because it is not the site of wrongness of knowledge,—just like a jar.[47]

न चौदयनमनुमानं परतस्त्वसाधकमिति शङ्कनीयम् । प्रमादोषव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तजन्या न भवति ज्ञानत्वादप्रमावदिति प्रतिसाधनग्रहग्रस्तत्वात् । ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रादेव प्रमोत्पत्तिसंभवे तदतिरिक्तस्य गुणस्य दोषाभावस्य वा कारणत्वकल्पनायां कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

Nor can Udayana's[48] argument be brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on something external, for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the equally potent contradictory argument. "Right knowledge is not produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect,'[49] from the very fact of its being knowledge—like wrong knowledge." Again, since right knowledge can arise from the causes of knowledge *per se*, it would be a needless complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause, whether you call it a *guṇa* as the absence of a "defect" (*doṣa*)[50].

ननु दोषस्याप्रमाहेतुत्वेन तदाभावस्य प्रमां प्रति हेतुत्वं दुर्निवारमिति चेन्न । दोषाभावस्याप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वेनान्यथासिद्धत्वात् ।

तस्माद् गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभावस्तदभावतः ।
अप्रामाण्यद्वयासत्त्वं तेनोऽसर्गोऽपवोदितः ॥ इति ।

"But surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong knowledge, it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of right knowledge ?" We meet this, however, by maintaining that the absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause, as it only acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge. As it has been said—

> "Therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of *guṇas* the absence of 'defects,'[51] from their absence the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness,[52] and from this the general conclusion."[53]

तथा प्रमाज्ञप्तिरपि ज्ञानज्ञापकसामग्रीत एव जायते । न च संशयानुदयप्रसङ्गो बाधक इति युक्तं वक्तुम् । सत्यपि प्रतिभासपुष्कलकारणे प्रतिबन्धकदोषादिसमवधानात्तदुपपत्तेः ।

किं च तावकमनुमानं स्वतः प्रमाणं न वा ? आद्येऽनैकान्तिकता । द्वितीये तस्यापि परतः प्रामाण्यमेव तस्य, तस्यापीत्यनवस्था दुरवस्था स्यात् ।

(*b*) We mantain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced by the same causes only which make us perceive the first knowledge[54] [*sc.* the eye, mind, etc.] Nor can you object that this view is precluded, because it would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt; for we answer that doubt arises in cases where, although all the cases which produce knowledge are present, there is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause, as a "defect," etc.

As for your argument [O Naiyāyika ! given *supra*, in p. 272], I ask, Is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself or not ? If it is, it proves too much [for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof, whereas you hold it to be independent of such]; and if it is not we should have a case of *regressus infinitum*, for it will want some other proof to confirm its authoritativeness, and this too in its turn will want some fresh proof, and so on for ever.

यदत्र कुसुमाञ्जलावुदयनेन झटिति प्रचुरप्रवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनत्वाभावमापादयता प्रण्यगादि—'प्रवृत्तिर्हीच्छामपेक्षते । तत्प्राचुर्यं चेच्छाप्राचुर्यम् । इच्छा चेष्टसाधनताज्ञानम् । तच्चेष्टजातीयत्वलिङ्गानुभवम् । सोऽपीन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षम् । प्रामाण्यग्रहणं तु न क्वचिदुपयुज्यते' इति ।

As for the argument urged by Udayana[55] in the Kusumāñjali, when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainly as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting : "Action depends on wish, its vehemence on that of the wish,[56] wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is a means to attain some wished-for end, and this is only ascertained by an inference based on some "sign" which proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished for end, and this inference depends on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses; but throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the Mīmāṁsā idea of the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of action."

तदपि तस्करस्य पुरस्तात्कक्षे सुवर्णमुपेत्य सर्वाङ्गोद्घाटनमिव प्रतिभाति । यतः समीहितसाधनताज्ञानमेव प्रमाणतयावगम्यमानमिच्छां जनयतीत्यत्रैव स्फुट

एव प्रामाण्यग्रहणस्योपयोगः । किं च क्वचिदपि चेन्न विचिकित्सा प्रवृत्तिः संशयादुपपद्येत, तर्हि सर्वत्र तथाभावसंभवात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो निरर्थकः स्यात् ।

तथोक्तम्—अनिश्चितस्य सत्त्वमेव दुर्लभमिति । यदि सत्त्वं सुलभं भवेत्तदा प्रामाण्यं दत्तजलाञ्जलिकं भवेदित्यलमतिप्रपञ्चेन । यस्मादुक्तम्—

तस्माद्सद्बोधकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ।। इति ।

All this appears to us simple bluster, like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me, when I had actually found the gold under his armpit. It is only the knowledge that the thing is a means to attain the desired end, and this knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge, which causes the definite volition to arise at all; and in this we can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of authoritativeness [whose existence he so vehemently pretended to deny]. If unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt, then, as it might always arise so in every given case, all ascertainment of authoritativeness would be useless; and as the very existence of what is unascertained is rendered uncertain, poor authoritativeness would have to be considered as dead and buried ! But enough of this prolix controversy; since it has been said—

"Therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition, which (authoritativeness) presented itself as representing a real fact may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect,' which perception is produced by some sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition and the fact."[67]

तस्माद्धर्मे स्वतःसिद्धप्रमाणभावे 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत' इत्यादिविध्यर्थवादमन्त्रनामधेयात्मके वेदे 'यजेत' इत्यत्र तप्रत्ययः प्रकृत्यर्थोपरक्तां भावनामभिधत्ते—इति सिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिमभ्युपगच्छतामभिहितान्वयवादिनां भट्टाचार्याणां सिद्धान्तः । यागविषयं नियोगमिति कार्ये व्युत्पत्तिमनुसरतामन्विताभिधानवादिनां प्रभाकरगुरूणां सिद्धान्त इति सर्वमवदातम् ।।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे जैमिनिदर्शनम् ।।

Now with regard to the Veda, which is the self-proved and authoritative criterion in regard to duty, [we have the following divergency between the two great Mīmāṁsā schools] :—The Veda is composed of three portions, respectively called "hymns"

(*mantra*) "explanatory passage" *arthavāda*), and "injunctions" (*vidhi*) ; and by "injunction" we mean such sentences as "Let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the jyotishṭoma." Here *ta*, the affx of the third person singular, denotes an enjoining power, which is "coloured" [or rendered definite] by the meaning of the root, according to the opinion of the follcwers of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila, who maintain that words signify[58] something definite by themselves [apart from the sentence]. The followers of Guru Prabhākara, on the countary, hold that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice, as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done.[59] Thus all has been made plain. E.B.C.

*NOTES*

1. Mādhava here calls it the *prāci Mīmāṁsā.*
2. Cf. *J. Nyāyamālāvistra*, pp. 5—9.
3. Thus it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to Agni, a parti-coloured one to Soma. and a black-necked one to Agni. Should this be a case for *tantra* or not ? By *tantra* one offering to Agni would do for both; but as the offering to Soma comes between, they cannot be united, and thus it must be a case of *āvāpa*; i.e. offering the two separately (*J. Nyāyamālā*, xi. 1, 13).
4. I read *vilakṣaṇa-dṛiṣṭaphala.*
5. In the farmer case would be a *vidhi*, in the latter a *niyama.* Cf. the lines *vidhir atyantam aprāpto niyamaḥ pākṣika sati, tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisaṁkhyā vidhiyate.*
6. The Mīmāṁsā holds that the potential and similar affixes, which constitute a *vidhi*, have a twofold power; by the one they express an active volition of the agent, corresponding to the root-meaning (*arthabhāvanā*); by the other an enforcing power in the word (*śabda-bhāvanā*). Thus in *svargakāmo yajeta*, the *eta* implies "let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice posessing a certain mystic influence;" next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself (as it is the word of the self-existent Veda

and not of God) which sets the hearer upon this course of action.

7. These four "fruits of action" are obscure, and I do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere. I was told in India that they were a things coming into being, growing declining, and perishing. If so, they are the second, third, fifth and sixth of the six *vikāras* mentioned in the Śaṅkara's Vajrasūchi, 2, i.e. *asti, jāyate, vardhate, vipariṇamate, apakṣīyate, naśyati.* I do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of *apūrva*, sc. *phala, samudaya, utpatti,* and *aṅga,* described in Nyāya M.V. ii. 1, 2.
8. The *nigamas* are the Vedic quotations in Yāska's *nīrukta.*
9. See Nyāya-mālā-vistara, i. 4, 19.
10. The exact number is 915.
11. This is to explain the last of the five members, the *saṁgati.*
12. Cf. Aśvalāyana's Gṛhya Sūtras, i. 19, 1.
13. The *anuvāda*, of course, implies a previous *vidhi*, which it thus repeats and supplements, and so carries with it an equal authority. The *anuvāda* in present case is the passage which mentions that the Veda is to be read, as it enforces the pervious *vidhi* as to teaching.
14. I read *anavagamyamānasya*, and so the recension given in the Nyāya M.V: p. 14, *na budhyamānasya.*
15. In the next two or three pages I have frequently borrowed from Dr. Muir's translation in his *Sanskrit Texts*, vol. iii. p. 88.
16. The soul may be traced back through succesive transmigrations, but you never get back to its beginning.
17. Mādhava means that the author of this stanza, though unknown to many people, was not necessarily unknown to all, as his contemporaries no doubt, knew who wrote it, and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact. In this case, therefore, we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin, but which, nevertheless, had a human author. The stanza in question is quoted in full in Bohtlingk's Indische Sprüche, No. 5598,

from the MS. anthology called the *Subhāṣitārṇava*. For *muktaka*, see *Sāh. Darp*. p. 558.

18. The eternity of the Veda depends on this tenet of the Mīmāṁsā that sound is eternal.
19. Eternal things (as the atoms of earth, fire, water and air, minds, time, space, ether, and soul) have *viśeṣa*, not *sāmānya* or genus, and they are all imperceptible to the senses. Genera are themselves eternal (though the individuals in which they reside are not), but they have not themselves genus. Both these arguments belong rather to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika school than to the Nyāya.
20. The Mīmāṁsaka allow that the *uccaraṇa* or utterance is non-eternal.
21. The inference will be as follows : "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, with a view to their manifestation, from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences, just like the compositions of Manu, etc."
22. The argument will now run, "The Vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof, because, while they possess authority, they still have the nature of sentences, like the composition of Manu, etc."
23. In assuming a material body, he would be subject to material limitations.
24. The Jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments *(atiśayāḥ)* in their saints.
25. Jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air "manifest" the always existing sound.
26. "What is meant by 'noise' (*nāda*) is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions,' occasioned by the vibrations of the air."—*Ballantyne*, *Mīmāṁsā Aphorisms*, i. 17.
27. The Nyāya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether; and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether each will, of course, have its corresponding special quality.
28. I read *pratyakṣāsidheḥ*.

29. Cf. my note p. 14. (on the Cārvāka-darśana) for the *upādhi.* The *upādhi* or "condition" limits a too general middle term; it is defined as "that which always accompanies the major term, but does not always accompany the middle". Thus if the condition "produced from wet fuel" is added to "fire" the argument "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," is no longer a false one. Here, in answer to the Nyāya argument in the text, our author objects that its middle term ("from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense" is too wide, i.e., it is sometimes found where the major term "non-eternal" is not found, as, e.g., *sound* itself, according to the Mīmāṁsā doctrine. To obviate this he proposes to add the 'condition," "not causing audition," as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which *while not causing audition*, are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense, as, e.g., colour. But I need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory. In fact, the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound, as their points of view are so totally different.
30. In the former case we have the *dhvaṃsa* of sound, in the latters its *prāgabhāva.*
31. I read *samapauhi* for *samāpohi,* i.e., the passive aorist of *sam +apa+ūh*
32. I do not know this legend. Tāla and Betāla are the two demons who carry Vikramāditya on their shoulders in the Siṁhāsan-battīsi. It appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents.
33. This is probably a work by Bhāsarvajña (see Dr. Hall's *Bibl. Index*, p. 26).
34. *Dhvani*, or our "articulate noise" produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound. There is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on, which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations. I take *saṃskṛita* here as equivalent to *abhivyakta.*
35. I read *saṃskārakasaṃskāryabhāvābhāvānumānam.*

36. It would be a case of *vyabhicāra*. The Naiyāyika argument would seem to be something as follows :—Sound is not thus manifested by noise, since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses, just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species; these are both perceived together, but the individual is not manifested by the species. But the Mīmāṁsā rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge; as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously, and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul, which is contrary to experience. But I am not sure that I rightly understand the argument.

37. This is Prabhākara's view (see Siddh. Muktāv., p. 118). The first knowledge is in the form "This is a jar ," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the jar ;" and this latter produces authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*), which resides in it as its characteristic.

38. Substances are "intimate causes" to their qualities, and only substances have qualities , now if authoritativeness, which is a characteristic of right knowledge, were caused by it, it would be a quality of it, that is right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance.

39. The eye, etc., would be its instrumental causes.

40. The first three categories "substance," "quality," and "action," are called *jātis* or species ; the last four, "genus" "*viśeṣa*" "intimate relation," and "non-existence," are called *upādhi* or "general characteristics "

41. The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā denies that recollection is right knowledge.

42. Wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes (as the eye, etc.) which produced right knowledge, but by these *together with a "defect,"* as biliousness, distance, etc.

43. *Scil.* if there be *doṣābhāva* there is *pramā* if not, not. I read *doṣābhāvatvena* for *doṣābhāvasahakṛītatvena.*

44. *Anyathāsiddhatvam* means *niyatapūrvavartive sati anāvaśyakatvam.*

45. *Scil.* or the absence of "defect," *doṣābhāva.*

46. Wrong knowledge has *doṣabhāva* or the presence of a "defect" as its cause, in addition to the common causes.

47. Wrongness of knowledge (*apramātva)* can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof; it cannot reside in a jar. The jar is, of course, produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge (as, e.g., the potter's stick, etc.) but it is not produced by these other causes *in combination* with being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge with which it has nothing directly to do); and so by a quibble, which is less obvious in Sanskrit than in English, this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster. The jar is not produced - by - any - other-instrumental-causes-then-those-of-knowledge,-while-at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these.

48. I suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long pūrva-pakṣa.

49. These words "and is other than defect" *(doṣa-vyatīrikta)* are, of course, meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned they are simply added to enable the author to bring in; "wrong knowledge" as an example. Wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledge *plus* "defect;" right knowledge by the former alone.

50. The Nyāya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a "defect," as jaundice, etc , in the eye, and right knowledge by a *guṇa* or "virtue" (as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object), or by the absence of a "defect."

51. The *guṇa* of an organ is not properly a cause of *pramā* but rather *doṣābhāva-bodhaka.*

52 *Scil.* "doubtful" *(sandigdha)* and "ascertained non-authoritativeness" *(niścitāprāmāṇya).*

53. *Utsarya* is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case ; but here it means the conclusion that "right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge, the eye," etc.

54. The first knowledge is "This is a jar," the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form "I perceive the

jar ;" and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception, i.e., its authoritativeness or *prāmāṇya*.

55. This seems to be a quotation of Udayana's own words, and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the Kusumāñjali, a specimen of which I printed in the preface to my edition. This passage must come from the fifth book (v. 6 ?)

56. I read *tat-prācuryam* for *tatprācurye.*

57. This stanza affirms that according to the Mīmāṁsā school while authoritativeness is self-proved, non-authoritativeness is proved from something else (as inference, etc.)

58. I take *vyutpatti* as used for *śakti* ; *siddhe* means *ghaṭādau*.

59. These are the two great Mīmāṁsā schools. The former, called *abhihitānvaya-vādinaḥ*, hold (like the Naiyāyika school) that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the function *abhidhā* or "denotation ; " these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter, called *anvitābhidhāna-vādinaḥ*, hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other; they only mean an action or something connected with an action. In *gām, ānaya, gām* does not properly mean *gotva*, but *ānayanānvita gotva*, i.e., the bovine genus as connected with "bringing". We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb, and *vice-versā*. Cf. Waitz, as quoted by Professor Sayce (*Comparative Philology*, page 136) : "We do not think in words but in sentences; hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences, not of words. But a sentence is formed not of single independent words, but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner, like the corresponding thought, which does not consists of single independent ideas, but of such as, connected, form a whole, and determine one another mutually."

# CHAPTER XIII

## THE PĀṆINI-DARŚANA.[1]

नन्वयं प्रकृतिभागोऽयं प्रत्ययभाग इति प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययविभागः कथमवगम्यत इति चेत्—पीतपातञ्जलजलानामेतच्चोद्यं चमत्कारं न करोति। व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागप्रतिपादनपरतायाः प्रसिद्धत्वात्।

If any one asks, "Where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say, 'This part is the original root and this is an affix," may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of Patañjali this question produces no confusion, since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes ?

तथा हि पतञ्जलेर्भगवतो महाभाष्यकारस्येदमादिमं वाक्यम्—'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' (पात० म० भा० १।१।१) इति। अस्यार्थः—अथेत्ययं शब्दोऽधिकारार्थः प्रयुज्यते। अधिकारः प्रस्तावः। प्रारम्भ इति यावत्। शब्दानुशासनशब्देन च पाणिनिप्रणीतं व्याकरणशास्त्रं विवक्ष्यते। शब्दानुशासनमित्येतावत्यभिधीयमाने संदेहः स्यात्। किं शब्दानुशासनं प्रस्तूयते न वेति। तथा मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदित्यथशब्दं प्रायुङ्क्त। अथ शब्दप्रयोगबलेनार्थान्तरव्युदासेन प्रस्तूयत इत्यस्याभिधीयमानत्वात्।

Thus the very first sentence of the venerable Patañjali, the author of the "Great Commentary", is "*atha śabdānuśāsanam*", "Now comes the exposition of words," The particle *atha* ("now") is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement; and by the phrase, "exposition of words," is meant the system of grammer put forth by Pāṇini. Now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not; and it is to obviate any such doubt that the employed the particle *atha*, since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else.

अनेन हि वैदिकाः शब्दाः 'शं नो देवीरभिष्टये' (अथर्व० सं० १।१, ऋ० सं० १०।९।४) इत्यादयस्तदुपकारिणो लौकिकाः शब्दाः 'गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती शकुनिः'

इत्यादयश्चानुशिष्यन्ते, व्युत्पाद्य संस्क्रियन्ते प्रकृतिप्रत्ययविभागवत्तया बोध्यन्त इति शब्दानुशासनम् ।

अत्र केचित्पर्यनुयुञ्जते—अनुशासिक्रियायाः सकर्मकत्वात्कर्मभूतस्य शब्दस्य कर्तृभूतस्याचार्यस्य प्राप्तौ सत्याम् 'उभयप्राप्तौ कर्मणि' (पा० सू० २।३।६६) इत्यनुशासनबलात् कर्मण्येषा षष्ठी विधातव्या । तथा च 'कर्मणि च' (पा० सू० २।२।१४) इति समासप्रतिषेधसंभवाच्छब्दानुशासनुशब्दो न प्रमाणपथमवतरतीति ।

The word "exposition" (*anuśāsana*), as here used, implies that thereby Vedic words, such as those in the line *aṁ śno devīr abhishṭaye*,[21] etc., and secular words as ancillary to these, as the common words for "cow," "horse," "man," "elephant," "bird," etc., are made the subject of the exposition, i e., are deduced from their original roots and properly formed, or in other words, are explained as divided into root and affix.

We must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object [*śabdānuśāsanam* standing for *śabdasyā-nuśāsanam*], and as there is a rule of Pāṇini (*karmaṇi cha*, ii 2, 14) which prohibits composition in such a construction, we are forced to concede that the phrase *śabdāntśāsanam* does not come before us as a duly authorised compound.

अत्रायं समाधिरभिधीयते—यस्मिन्कृत्प्रत्यये कर्तृकर्मणोरुभयोः प्राप्तिरस्ति, तत्र कर्मण्येव षष्ठीविभक्तिर्भवति न कर्तरीति बहुव्रीहिविज्ञानबलान्नियम्यते । तद् यथा—आश्चर्यो गवां दोहोऽशिक्षितेन गोपालकेनेति । शब्दानुशासनमित्यत्र तु शब्दानामनुशासनं नार्थानामित्येतावतो विवक्षितस्यार्थस्याचार्यस्य कर्तुरुपादानेन विनापि सुप्रतिपादत्वादाचार्योपादानमकिञ्चित्करम् ।

तस्मादुभयप्राप्तेरभावादुभयप्राप्तौ कर्मणीत्येषा षष्ठी न भवति । किन्तु 'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृति' (पा० सू० २।३।६५) इति कृद्योगे कर्तरि कर्मणि च षष्ठी-विभक्तिर्भवतीति कृद्योगलक्षणा षष्ठी भविष्यति । तथा च इध्मप्रव्रश्चन-पलाश-शातनादिवत्समासो भविष्यति ।

कर्तर्यपि षष्ठी भवतीति केचिद् ब्रुवते । अत एवोक्तं काशिकावृत्तौ (२।३।६६, पृ० १२२)—केचिदविशेषेणैव विभाषामिच्छन्ति, शब्दानामनुशासन-माचार्येणाचार्यस्य वेति ।

अथवा शेषलक्षणेयं षष्ठी । तत्र किमपि चोद्यं नावतरत्येव । यद्येवं तर्हि शेषलक्षणायाः षष्ठ्याः सर्वत्र सुवचत्वात् षष्ठीसमासप्रतिषेधसूत्राणामानर्थक्यं प्राप्नु-यादिति चेत्—सत्यम् । तेषां स्वरचिन्तायामुपयोगो वाक्यपदीये हरिणा प्रादर्शि ।

Here, however, arises a discussion [as to the true application of the alleged rule of Pāṇini], for we hold that, by ii. 3, 66, wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a kṛit affix, there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent;[3] this limitation arising from our taking *ubhayaprāpti* in the sūtra as a *bahuvṛhi* compound.[4] Thus we must say, "Wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd." We may, however, remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive (as well as the object); hence we find it stated in theKāśikā Commentary: "Some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction, and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words *of* the teacher' or '*by* the teacher." Inasmuch, however, as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the "exposition" intended relates to *words* and not to *things*, and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent, i.e. the teacher, any such mention would be plainly superfluous; and therefore as the object and the agent are *not* both expressed in one and the same sentence, this is not an instance of the genitive of the object (coming under ii. 3, 66, and ii 2, 14), but rather an instance of quite another rule, viz., ii. 3, 65, which directs that an agent or an object, in connection with a word endidg with a kṛit affix is to be put in the genitive [which in this instance is expressed by the *tatpuruṣa* compound]; and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as *idhma-pravraśchana*, *palāśa-śātana*, etc.[5]

Or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this *shaṣṭhītatpurusha* is one of the class called "residual," in accordance with Pāṇini's rule (ii. 3, 50), 'Let the genitive be used in the residuum," [i.e, in the other constructions not provided for by special rules];[6] and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack. "But," it might be replied. "your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere, and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory." This we readily grant, and hence Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the *accent*.[7]

तदाह महोपाध्यायवर्धमानः -

लौकिकव्यवहारेषु यथेष्टं चेष्टतां जनः ।
वैदिकेषु तु मार्गेऽषु विशेषोक्तिः प्रवर्तताम् ॥
इति पाणिनिसूत्राणामर्थवत्त्वमसौ यतः ।
जनिकर्तुरिति ब्रूते तत्प्रयोजक इत्यपि ॥ इति ।

तथा च शब्दानुशासनापरनामधेयं व्याकरणशास्त्रमारब्धं वेदितव्यमिति वाक्यार्थः संपद्यते ।

To this effect are the words of great doctor Vardhamāna—

"In secular utterances men may proceed as they will,

"But in Vedic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed.

"Thus have they explained the meaning of Pāṇini's sūtras, since.

"He himself uses such phrases as *janikartuḥ* and *tatprayojakaḥ*.[8]

Hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question (of the *Mahābhāṣya*) is that 'it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning word's are now commenced.''

तस्यार्थस्य झटिति प्रतिपत्तये 'अथ व्याकरणम्' इत्येवाभिधीयताम् । अथ शब्दानुशासनमित्यधिकाक्षरं मुधाभिधीयत इति । मैवम् । शब्दानुशासनमित्यन्वर्थ-समाख्योपादने तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकप्रयोजनान्वाख्यानसिद्धेः । अन्यथा प्रयोज-नानभिधाने व्याकरणाध्ययनेऽध्येतॄणां प्रवृत्तिरेव न प्रसजेत् ।

"Well, then, for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning, it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammer,' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters, This objection cannot, however, be allowed, since the employment of such a words as *śabdānuśāsanam* the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology, proves that he author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammer is a subordinate study (*aṅga*) to the Veda.[9] Otherwise, if there were no such end set forth, there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar.

ननु 'निष्कारणो धर्मः षडङ्गो वेदोऽध्येतव्यः' इत्यध्येतव्यः विधानादेव प्रवृत्तिः सेत्स्यति इति चेत्—मैवम् । तथा विधानेऽपि तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादक-

प्रयोजनानभिधाने तेषां प्रवृत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । तथा हि—पुराकिल वेदमधीत्याध्येतारस्त्वरितं वक्तारो भवन्ति । वेदान्नो वैदिकाः शब्दाः सिद्धा लोकाच्च लौकिकाः ।
तस्मादनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति ।

Nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study, "the Veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any (special) end,"[10] because, even though there be such an injunction, it will not follow that students will apply to this study, if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an *aṅga* of the Veda. Thus in old times the students, after reading the Veda, used to be in haste to say—

"Are not Vedic words established by the Veda and secular by common life,
' And therefore grammar is useless ?"

तस्माद्वेदाङ्गत्वं मन्यमानास्तदध्ययने प्रवृत्तिमकार्षुः । ततश्च इदानींतनानामपि तत्र प्रवृत्तिर्न सिध्येत् । सा मा प्रसाङ्क्षीदिति तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकं प्रयोजनमन्वाख्येयमेव ।

Therefore it was only when they understood it to be an *aṅga* of the Veda that they applied themselves to its study. So in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either. It is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall, at the same time, establish that grammar is an *aṅga* of the Veda.

यद्यन्वाख्यातेऽपि प्रयोजने न प्रवर्तेरंस्तर्हि लौकिकशब्दसंस्कारज्ञानरहितास्ते याज्ञे कर्मणि प्रत्यवायभाजो भवेयुः धर्माद्धीयेरन् । अत एव याज्ञिक पठन्ति—आहिताग्निरपशब्दं प्रयुज्य प्रायश्चित्तीयां सारस्वतीमिष्टिं निर्वपेत् (पात० म० भा० पस्पश० ) इति ।

If, when the end is explained, they should still not apply themselves, then, being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words, they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrifical acts, and would consequently lose their religious merit. Hence the followers of sacrifice read, "One who keeps up a sacrificial fire, on using an incorrect word, should offer an expiatory offering to Sarasvati."

अतस्तदीयवेदाङ्गत्वप्रतिपादकप्रयोजनान्वाख्यानार्थमथ शब्दानुशासनमित्येव कथ्यते, नाथ व्याकरणमिति । भवति च शब्दसंस्कारो व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनम् ।

तस्माच्छब्दानुशिष्टिः संस्कारपदवेदनीया शब्दानुशासनस्य प्रयोजनम् ।

Now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an *aṅga* of the Veda that he uses the words *atha śabdānuśāsanam* and not *atha vyākaraṇam*. Now the rules of grammar must have an end, and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto. Just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven, heaven is the end ; in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words, i.e., propriety of speech.

नन्वेवमप्यभिमतं प्रयोजनं न लभ्यते । तदुपायाभावात् । अथ प्रतिपदपाठ एवाभ्युपाय इति मन्येथास्तर्हि स ह्यनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठो भवेत् । शब्दापशब्दभेदेनानन्त्याच्छब्दानाम् । एवं हि समाम्नायते—बृहस्पतिरिन्द्राय दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रं प्रतिपदपाठविहितानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच । नान्तं जगाम । बृहस्पतिश्च प्रवक्ता । इन्द्रोऽध्येता । दिव्यं वर्षसहस्रमध्ययनकालः । न च पारावाप्तिरभूत् । किमुताद्य यश्चिरं जीवति स वर्षशतं जीवति । अधीतिबोधाचरणप्रचारणैश्चतुर्भिरूपायैर्विद्योपयुक्ता भवति । तत्राध्ययनकालेनैव सर्वमायुरुपयुक्तं स्यात् । तस्मादनभ्युपायः शब्दानां प्रतिपत्तौ प्रतिपदपाठ इति प्रयोजनं न सिध्येदिति चेत्—

"But," an objector may say, "will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it ? Nor can it be said that reading the Veda word by word is the true means; for this can not be a means for the understanding of words, since their number is infinite, as divided into proper and improper words.[11] Thus there is a tradition that Bṛhaspati for a thousand divine years taught to Indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the Veda is read word by word,[12] and still he came not to the end. Here the teacher was Bṛhaspati, the pupil was Indra, and the time of study a thousand years of the gods; and yet the termination was not reached,—how much less, then, in our day, let a man live ever so long ? Learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means,—reading, understanding, practising, and handing it on to others ; but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading ; therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words, and consequenty, as we said at first, the desired end is not established."

मैवम्, शब्दप्रतिपत्तेः प्रतिपदपाठसाध्यत्वानाङ्गीकारात् । प्रकृत्यादिविभाग-कल्पनावत्सु लक्ष्येषु सामान्यविशेषरूपाणां लक्षणानां पर्जन्यवत्सकृदेव प्रवृत्तौ बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनोपलम्भाच्च ।

We reply, however, that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word. And again, since general and special rules apply at once to many examples, when these are divided into the artifical parts called roots, etc. (just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground), in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words.

तथा हि । 'कर्मण्यण्' (पा० सू० ३।२।१) इत्येकेन सामान्यरूपेण लक्षणेन कर्मोपपदाद्धातुमात्रादणप्रत्यये कृते, 'कुम्भकारः' 'काण्डलावः' इत्यादीनां बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनमुपलभ्यते । एवम्, 'आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः' (पा० सू० ३।२।१८) इत्येकेन विशेषलक्षणेनाकारान्ताद्धातोः कप्रत्यये कृते, 'धान्यदः' 'धनदः' इत्यादीनां बहूनां शब्दानामनुशासनमुपलभ्यते । बृहस्पतिरिन्द्रायेति प्रतिपदपाठस्याशक्यत्व-प्रतिपादनपरोऽर्थवादः ।

Thus, for instance, by the general rule (iii. 2, 1) *karmaṇi* the affix *aṇ* is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it; and by this rule we learn many words, as *kumbhakāra*, "a potter,'! *kāṇḍalāva*, "a cutter of stems," etc. But the supplementary special rule (iii 2, 3), *āto nupas..rge kaḥ*, directing that the affix *ka* is to be used after a root that ends in long *ā* when there is no *upasarga*, shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be [since it would never teach us how to distinguish an *upasarga*].

नन्वन्येष्वप्यङ्गेषु सत्सु किमित्येतदेवाद्रियते ? उच्यते—प्रधानं च षट्स्वङ्गेषु व्याकरणम् । प्रधाने च कृतो यत्नः फलवान्भवति । तदुक्तम्—

आसन्नं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसामुत्तमं तपः ।
प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गमाहुर्व्याकरणं बुधाः ॥
(वा० प० १।११) इति ।

"But since there are other *aṅgas*, why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour ?" We reply, that among the six *aṅgas* the principal one is grammar, and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit. Thus it has been said—

"Nigh unto Brahman himself, the highest of all religious austerities"

"The wise have called grammar the first *aṅga* of the Veda."

तस्माद् व्याकरणशास्त्रस्य शब्दानुशासनं भवति साक्षात्प्रयोजनम् । पारंपर्येण तु वेदरक्षादीनि । अत एवोक्तं भगवता भाष्यकारेण—रक्षोहागमलघ्वसंदेहा प्रयोजनम् । (पा० म० भा० पस्पश) इति । साधुशब्दप्रयोगवशादभ्युदयोऽपि भवति । तथा च कथितं कात्यायनेन—शास्त्रपूर्वके प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयस्तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देनेति । अन्यैरप्युक्तम्—एकः शब्दः सम्यग् ज्ञातः सुष्ठु प्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवतीति । तथा—

नाकमिष्टसुखं यान्ति सुयुक्तैर्बड्वागथैः ।
अथ पत्काषिणो यान्ति ये चिक्कमितभाषिणः ॥

Hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar, but its indirect end is the preservation, etc., of the Veda. Hence it has b en said by the worshipful author of the great Commentary [quoting a Vārttika] "the end (or motive) is preservation, inference, scripture, facility, and assurance,"[13] Moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word ; thus Kātyāyana has said, "There is prosperiry in the employment of a word according to the *śāstra* ; it is equal to the words of the Veda itself" Others also have said that "a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in Swarga the desire-milking cow." Thus (they say)—

"They proceed to heaven, with every desired happiness, in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech ;

"But those who use such false forms as *acīkramata* must trudge thither on foot."[14]

नन्वचेतनस्य शब्दस्य कथमीदृशं सामर्थ्यमुपपद्यत इति चेत्—मैवं मन्येथाः । महता देवेन साम्यश्रवणात् । तदाह श्रुतिः—

चत्वारि शृङ्गास्त्रयो अस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासो अस्य ।
त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यां आ विवेश ॥

(ऋ० सं० ४।५८।३) इति ।

Nor need you ask "how can an irrational word posses such power ?" since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god. For the Śruti says, 'Four are its horns, three its feet,

two its heads, and seven its hands,—roars loudly the threefold-bound bull, the great god enters mortals" (Rig-Veda, iv. 58, 3).

व्याचकार च भाष्यकारः—चत्वारि शृङ्गाणि चत्वारि पदजातानि, नामाख्यातोपसर्गनिपाताः । त्रयो अस्य पादा लडादिविषयास्त्रयो भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानकालाः । द्वे शीर्षे द्वौ शब्दात्मनौ नित्यः कार्यश्च । व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभेदात् । सप्त हस्तासो अस्य तिङा सह सप्त सुब्विभक्तयः । त्रिधा बद्धः त्रिषु स्थानेषु उरसि कण्ठे शिरसि च बद्धः । वृषभ इति प्रसिद्धवृषभत्वेन रूपणं क्रियते । वर्षणात् । वर्षणं च ज्ञानपूर्वकानुष्ठानेन फलप्रदत्वम् । रोरवीति शब्दं करोति । रौति शब्दकर्मा ।

इह शब्दशब्देन प्रपञ्चो विवक्षितः । महो देवो मर्त्यां आविवेश । महान् देवः शब्दो मर्त्यां मरणधर्माणो मनुष्यास्तानाविवेशेति । महता देवेन परेण ब्रह्मणा साम्यमुक्तं स्यात् (महाभाष्यम्, पृ० ३) इति ।

The great commentator thus explains it :—The "four horns" are the four kinds as words—nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles; its "three feet" mean the three times, past, present, and future, expressed by the tense-affixes, *laṭ* etc. the "two heads," the eternal and temporary (or produced) words, distinguished as the "manifested" the "manifester;" its "seven hands" are the seven case affixes, including the conjugational terminations ; "threefold bound," as enclosed in the three organs—the chest, the throat, and the head. The metaphor "bull" *(vṛṣabha)* is applied from its 'pouring forth' ( *varṣaṇa* ), *i. e.*, formits giving fruit when used with knowledge. "Loudly roars," *i. e.*, utters sound, for the root *ru* means "sound ;" here by the word "sound" developed speech (or language)[2] is implied ; "the great god enters mortals,"—the "great god," i. e., speech,—enters mortas, i. e , men endowed with the attribute of mortality. Thus is declared the likeness [of speech][16] to the supreme Brahman.

जगन्निदानं स्फोटाख्यो निरवयवो नित्यः शब्दो ब्रह्मैवेति हरिणाभाणि ब्रह्मकाण्डे—

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं तदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ।।

(वाक्यप० १।१) इति ।

The eternal word, called *sphoṭa*, without parts, and the cause of the word, is verily Brahman ; thus it has been declared by Bhartṛihari in the part of his book called the Brahmakāṇḍa—

"Brahman, without beginning or end, the indestructible essence of speech,"

"Which is developed in the form of things, and whence springs the creation on the world."

ननु नामाख्यातभेदेन पदद्वैविध्यप्रतीतेः कथं चातुर्विध्यमुक्तमिति चेत्—मैवम् । प्रकारान्तरस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् । तदुक्तं प्रकीर्णके—

द्विधा कैश्चित्पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।
अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिवत् ।। इति ।

"But since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs, how comes this fourfold division ?" We reply, because this, too, is well known. Thus it has been said in the Prakīrṇaka—

"Some make a twofold division of words, some a fourfold or a fivefold,

"Drawing them up from the sentences as root, affix, and the like."

कर्मप्रवचनीयेन वै पञ्चमेन सह पदस्य पञ्चविधत्वमिति हेलाराजो व्याख्यातवान् । कर्मप्रवचनीयास्तु क्रियाविशेषोपजनितसंबन्धावच्छेदहेतव इति संबन्धविशेषद्योतनद्वारेण क्रियाविशेषद्योतनादुपसर्गेष्वेवान्तर्भवन्तीत्यभिसन्धाय पदचातुर्विध्यं भाष्यकारेणोक्तं युक्तमिति विवेक्तव्यम् ।

Helārāja interprets the fivefold division as including *karmapravacanīyas*.[17] But the fourfold division, mentioned by the great commentator, is proper, since *karmapravacanīyas* distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb, and thus, as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb they are really included in compounded prepositions (*upasargas*).[18]

ननु भवता स्फोटात्मा नित्यः शब्द इति निजागद्यते । तन्न मृष्यामहे । तत्र प्रमाणाभावादिति केचित् । अत्रोच्यते । प्रत्यक्षमेवात्र प्रमाणम् । गौरित्येकं पदमिति नानावर्णातिरिक्तैकपदावगतेः सर्वजनीनत्वात् । न ह्यसति बाधके पदानुभवः शक्यो मिथ्येति वक्तुम् । पदार्थप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्यापि स्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।

"But," say some "why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called *sphoṭa* ? This we do not concede, since there is no proof that there is such a thing." We reply that our own perception is the proof. Thus there is one word "cow," since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it You cannot say, in the absence of any manifest contradiction, that this perception of the word is a false perception. Hence you must concede that there is such a thing as *sphoṭa*, as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word.

न च वर्णेभ्य एव तत्प्रत्ययः प्रादुर्भवतीति परीक्षाक्षमम् । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किं वर्णाः समस्ता व्यस्ता वार्थप्रत्ययं जनयन्ति ? नाद्यः, वर्णानां क्षणिकानां समूहासंभवात् । नान्त्यः, व्यस्तवर्णेभ्योऽर्थप्रत्ययासंभवात् । न च व्याससमासाभ्यामन्यः प्रकारः समस्तीति । तस्माद्वर्णानां वाचकत्वानुपपत्तौ यद्बलादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः स स्फोटः । वर्णातिरिक्तो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्योऽर्थप्रत्यायको नित्य शब्दः स्फोट इति तद्विदो वदन्ति ।

For the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination, since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma : —Are the letters supposed to produce the cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity ? Not the first, for the letters singly exist only for a moment, and therefore cannot form a united whole at all ; and not the second, since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning [which the word is to convey]. There is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity; and therefore it follows (say the wise in these matters) that, as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning, there must be a *sphoṭa* by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning; and this *sphoṭa* is an eternal sound, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which causes the cognition of the meaning.

अत एव स्फुटयते व्यज्यते वर्णैरिति स्फोटो वर्णाभिव्यङ्ग्यः, स्फुटतिस्फुटीभवत्यस्मादर्थं इति स्फुटोऽर्थप्रत्यायक इति स्फोटशब्दार्थमुभयथा निराहुः । तथा चोक्तं भगवता पतञ्जलिना महाभाष्ये—'अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः ? येनोच्चारितेन सास्नालाङ्गूल-ककुद-खुर-विषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति, स शब्दः' (महाभा० पृ० १) इति ।

"It is disclosed *(sphuṭyate)* of revealed by the letters," hence it is called *sphoṭa*, as revealed by the letters; or "from it is disclosed the meaning" hence it is called *sphoṭa* as causing the knowledge of the meaning,—these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word. And thus it hath been said by the worshipful Patañjali in the great Commentary, "Now what is the word '*cow*' *gauḥ* ? It is that word by which, when pronounced, there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns."

विवृतं च कैयटेन—'वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति वर्णानां वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गादित्यादिना तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः' इत्यन्तेन प्रबन्धेन ।

This is expounded by Kaiyaṭa in the passage commencing, "Grammarians maintain that it is the word, as distinct from the letters, which expresses the meaning, since, if the letters expressed it, there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones [as the first would have already conveyed all we wished]," and ending, "The *Vākyapadīya* has established at length that is the *sphoṭa*, which, distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound expresses the meaning."[19]

ननु स्फोटस्याप्यर्थप्रत्यायकत्वं न घटते । विकल्पासहत्वात् । किमभिव्यक्तः स्फोटोऽर्थं प्रत्याययत्यनभिव्यक्तो वा ? न चरमः । सर्वदार्थप्रत्ययलक्षणकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्गात् । स्फोटस्य नित्यत्वाभ्युपगमेन निरपेक्षस्य हेतोः सदा सत्त्वेन कार्यस्य विलम्बायोगात् ।

Here, however, an objector may urge, "But should we not rather that say the *sphoṭa* has no power to convey the meaning, as it fails under either of the following alternatives, for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested ? Not the latter, because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced, since, as *sphoṭa* is supposed to be eternal, and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids, the effect could not possibly fail to appear.

अथैतद्दोषपरिजिहीर्षयाऽभिव्यक्तः स्फोटोऽर्थं प्रत्याययतीति कक्षीक्रियते, तथाप्यभिव्यञ्जयन्तो वर्णाः किं प्रत्येकमभिव्यञ्जयन्ति संभूय वा? पक्षद्वयेऽपि वर्णानां वाचकत्वपक्षे भवता ये दोषा भाषितास्त एव स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकत्वपक्षे व्यावर्तनीयाः। तदुक्तं भट्टाचार्यैर्मीमांसाश्लोकवार्तिके—

यस्यानवयवः स्फोटो व्यज्यते वर्णबुद्धिभिः।
सोऽपि पर्यनुयोगेन नैकेनापि विमुच्यते ॥ इति।

Therefore, to avoid this fault, we must allow the other alternative, viz, that *sphoṭa* conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested. Well, then, do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined? Whichever alternative you adopt, the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning, will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest *sphoṭa*. This has been said by Bhaṭṭa in his Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika—

"The grammarian who holds that *sphoṭa* is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended, though itself one and indivisible, does not thereby escape from a singal difficulty."

विभक्त्यन्तेष्वेव वर्णेषु 'सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्' (पा० सू० १।४।१४) इति पाणिनिना, 'ते विभक्त्यन्ताः पदम्' (न्या० सू० २।२।६०) इति गौतमेन च पदसंज्ञाया विहितत्वात्संकेतग्रहेणानुग्रहवशाद्वर्णेष्वेव पदबुद्धिर्भविष्यति। तर्हि सर इत्येतस्मिन्पदे यावन्तो वर्णास्तावन्त एव रस इत्यत्रापि। एवं 'वनं नवं' 'नदी दीना' 'रामो मारो' 'राजा जारे' त्यादिष्वर्थभेदप्रतीतिर्न स्यादिति चेत्—न। क्रमभेदेन भेदसंभवात्। तदुक्तं तौतातितैः—

यावन्तो यादृशा ये च यदर्थप्रतिपत्तये।
वर्णाः प्रज्ञातसामर्थ्यास्ते तथैवावबोधकाः ॥ इति।

तस्माद्यश्चोभयोः समो दोषो न तेनैकश्चोद्यो भवतीति न्यायाद्वर्णानामेव वाचकत्वोपपत्तौ नातिरिक्तस्फोटकल्पनावकल्पत इति चेत्—।

The truth is, that, as Pāṇini (i.4, 14) and Gotama (Sūt. ii. 123) both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they hove an affix at the end, it is the letters which convey thew ord's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help.[20] If you object that as there are the same letters is *rasa*, as in *sara*, in *nava* as in *vana*, in *dīnā* as in

*nadī*, in *māra* as in *rāma*, in *rāja* as in *jāra*, etc., these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning, we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning. This has been said by Tautātita—

> "As are the letters in number and kind, whose power is perceived in conveying and given meaning of a word, so will be the meaning which they convey."

Therefore, as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone, we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate things called *sphoṭa* is unnecessary, as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning [your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant]"

तदेतत्काशकुशावलम्बनकल्पनम् । विकल्पानुपपत्तेः किं वर्णमात्रं पदप्रत्ययावलम्बनं वर्णसमूहो वा ? नाद्यः । परस्परविलक्षणवर्णमालायामभिन्नं निमित्तं पुष्पेषु विना सूत्रं मालाप्रत्ययवदित्येकं पदमिति प्रतिपत्तेरनुपपत्तेः । नापि द्वितीयः । उच्चरितप्रध्वस्तानां वर्णानां समूहभावासंभवात् ।

तत्र हि समूहव्यपदेशो ये पदार्था एकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सहावस्थिततया बहवोऽनुभूयन्ते । यथैकस्मिन्प्रदेशे सहावस्थिततयानुभूयमानेषु धवखदिरपलाशादिषु समूहव्यपदेशो यथा वा गजनरतुरगादिषु । न च ते वर्णास्तथानुभूयन्ते । उत्पन्नप्रध्वस्तत्वात् । अभिव्यक्तिपक्षेऽपि क्रमेणैवाभिव्यक्तेः समूहासंभवात् ।

All this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw;[21] for either of the alternatives is impossible, whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word. It cannot be the former, because a collection of separate letters, without any one pervading cause,[22] could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string. Nor can it be the latter, because the letters, being separately pronounced and done with, cannot combine into an aggregate.

For we use the term "aggregate" where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place ; thus we apply it to a Grislea tomentosa, an Acacia catechu, a Butea frondosa, etc., or to an elephant, a man, a horse etc., seen together in one place ;

but these letters are not perceived thus united together, as they are severally produced and pass away ; and even on the hypothesis of their having a "manifesting" power, they can have no power to form an aggregate, as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously.

नापि वर्णेषु काल्पनिकः समूहः कल्पनीयः । परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । एकार्थप्रत्यायकत्वसिद्धौ तदुपाधिना वर्णेषु पदत्वप्रतीतिस्तत्सिद्धावेकार्थप्रत्यायकत्वसिद्धिरिति । तस्माद्वर्णानां वाचकत्वासंभवात्स्फोटोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः ।

ननु स्फोटव्यञ्जकतापक्षेऽपि प्रागुक्तविकल्पप्रसरेण घट्टकुटीप्रभातायितमिति चेत्—तदेतन्मनोराज्यविजृम्भणम् । वैषम्यसंभवात् । तथा हि—अभिव्यञ्जकोऽपि प्रथमो ध्वनिः स्फोटमस्फुटमभिव्यनक्ति । उत्तरोत्तराभिव्यञ्जकक्रमेण स्फुटं स्फुटतरं स्फुटतमम् । यथा स्वाध्यायः सकृत्पठ्यमानो नावधार्यते । अभ्यासेन तु स्फुटावसायः । यथा वा रजतत्वं प्रथमप्रतीतौ स्फुटं न चकास्ति । चरमे चेतसि यथावदभिव्यज्यते ।

Nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters, because this would involve a "mutual dependence" (or reasoning in a circle) ; for, on the one hand, the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established; and, on the other hand their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled. Therefore, since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning, we must accept the hypothesis of *sphoṭa*. 'But even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called *sphoṭa* which expresses the meaning, the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before ; and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by.'"[28] This, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases. For the first letter, in its manifesting power, reveals the invisible *sphoṭa*, and each successive letter makes this *sphoṭa* more and more manifest, just as the Veda, after one reading, is not retained, but is made sure by repetition; or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance, but is definitely manifested at the final examination.

नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

(वाक्यप० १।८४)

इति प्रामाणिकोक्तेः । तस्मादस्माच्छब्दार्थं प्रतिपद्यामह इति व्यवहारवशाद्वर्णानामर्थवाचकत्वानुपपत्तेः । प्रथमे काण्डे तत्रभवद्भिर्भर्तृहरिभिरभिहितत्वान्निरवयवमर्थप्रत्यायकं शब्दतत्त्वं स्फोटाख्यमभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति । एतत्सर्वं परमार्थसंविल्लक्षणसत्ता जातिरेव सर्वेषां शब्दानामर्थं इति प्रतिपादनपरे जातिसमुद्देशे प्रतिपादितम् ।

This is in accordance with the authoritative saying (of the teacher): "The seed is implanted by the sounds, and, when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition, the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter." Therefore, since Bhartṛihari has shown in his first book that the *letters* of a word [being many and successive] cannot manifest the meaning of the word, as is implied by the very phrase, "We gain such and such a meaning from such and such a *word*," we are forced to assume the existence[24] of an indivisible *sphoṭa* as a distinct category, which has the power to manifest the word's meaning. All this has been established in the discussion (in the Mahābhāṣya) on "genus" *(jāti)*, which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that *summum genus*, i.e., that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality[25] (Brahman).

यदि सत्तैव सर्वेषां शब्दानामर्थस्तर्हि सर्वेषां शब्दानां पर्यायता स्यात् । तथा च क्वचिदपि युगपत्त्रिचतुरपदप्रयोगायोग इति महच्चातुर्यमायुष्मतः । तदुक्तम्—

पर्यायाणां प्रयोगो हि यौगपद्येन नेष्यते ।
पर्यायेणैव ते यस्माद्वदन्त्यर्थं न संहता ॥ इति ।

तस्मादयं पक्षो न क्षोदक्षम इति चेत्—।

"But if all words mean only that supreme existence, then all words will be synonyms, having all the same meaning; and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time! Thus it has been said—

"The employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned; for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination."

"Therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting."

तदेतद्गगनरोमन्थकल्पम् । नीललोहितपीताद्युपरञ्जकद्रव्यभेदेन स्फटिकमणेरिव संबन्धिभेदात्सत्तायास्तदात्मना भेदेन प्रतिपत्तिसिद्धौ, गोसत्तादिरूपगोत्वादिभेदनिबन्धनव्यवहारवैलक्षण्योपपत्तेः । तथा चाप्तवाक्यम्—

स्फटिकं विमलं द्रव्यं यथा युक्तं पृथक्पृथक् ।
नीललोहितपीताद्यैस्तद्वर्णमुपलभ्यते ॥ इति ।

All this is only the ruminating of empty ether; for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue, red, yellow, etc., so, since the *summum genus*, Brahman, is variously cognised through its connection with different things, as severally identified with each, we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species,[26] as cow, etc., these being "existence" (the *summum genus*) as found in the individual cow, etc. To this purport we have the following authoritative testimony—

"Just as crystal, that colourless substance, when severally joined with blue, red, or yellow objects, is seen as possessing that colour."

तथा हरिणाप्युक्तम्—

संबन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु ।
जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥
(वाक्य० ३।१।३३) ।
तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते ।
सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः ॥
(वाक्यप० ३।१।३४) इति ।

And so it has been said by Hari, "Existence [pure and simple] being divided, when found in cows, etc., by reason of its connection with different subjects, is called this or that species, and on it all words depend. This they call the meaning of the stem and of the root. This is existence, this the great soul; and it is this which the affixed *tva*, *tal*, etc., express" (Pāṇini v. 1, 119).

आश्रयभूतैः संबन्धिभिर्भिद्यमाना कल्पितभेदा गवाश्वादिषु सत्तैव महा-सामान्यमेव जातिः। गोत्वादिकमपरं सामान्यं परमार्थतस्ततो भिन्नं न भवति। गोसत्तैव गोत्वं, नापरमन्वयि प्रतिभासते। एवमश्वसत्ताऽश्वत्वमित्यादि वाच्यम्। एवं च तस्यामेव गवादिभेदभिन्नायां सत्तायां जातौ सर्वे गोशब्दादयो वाचकत्वेन व्यवस्थिताः।

प्रतिपदिकार्थश्च सत्तेति प्रसिद्धम्। भाववचनो धातुरिति पक्षे भावः सत्तैवेति धात्वर्थः सत्ता भवत्येव। क्रियावचनो धातुरिति पक्षेऽपि 'जातिमन्ये क्रियामाहुरनेक-व्यक्तिवर्त्तिनीम्' इति क्रियासमुद्देशे (वा० प० ३।८) क्रियाया जातिरूपत्वप्रति-पादनाद्धात्वर्थः सत्ता भवत्येव।

"Existence" is that great *summum genus* which is found in cows, horses, etc., differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides ; and the inferior species, "cow," 'horse," etc., are not really different from it , for the species "cow" and "horse" (*gotva* and *aśvatva*) are not really new subjects, but each is "existence" as residing in the subject "cow" and "horse." Therefore all words, as expressing definite meanings, ultimately rest on that one *summum genus* existence, which is differentiated by the various subjects, cows, etc., in which it resides ; and hence "existence" is the meaning of the stem-word (*prātipadika*). A "root" is sometimes defined as that which expresses *bhāva* ;[27] now, as *bhāva* is "existence," the meaning of a root is really existence.[28] Others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses "action" (*kriyā*) ; but here again the meaning of a root will really be "existence," since this "action" will be a genus, as it is declared to reside in many subjects, in accordance with the common definition of a genus, in the line—

> "Others say that action (*kriyā*) is a genus, residing in many individuals."

'तस्य भावस्त्वतलौ' (पा० सू० ५।१।११९) इति भावार्थे त्वतलादीनां विधानात्सत्तावाचित्वं युक्तम्। सा च सत्ता उदयव्ययवैधुर्यान्नित्या। सर्वस्य प्रपञ्चस्य तद्विवर्ततया देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्च परिच्छेदराहित्यात्सा सत्ता महानात्मेति व्यपदिश्यत इति कारिकाद्वयार्थः।

द्रव्यपदार्थवादिनोऽपि नये संविल्लक्षणं तत्त्वमेव सर्वशब्दार्थ इति सम्बन्ध-समुद्देशे समर्थितम्—

सत्यं वस्तु तदाकारैरसत्यैरवधार्यते ।
असत्योपाधिभिः शब्दैः सत्यमेवाभिधीयते ॥

(वा० प० ३।१।२)

So, too, if we accept Pāṇini's definition (v. 1, 119), "Let the affixes *tva* and *tal* come after a word [denoting anything], when we speak of the nature (*bhāva*) thereof," it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in *tva* or *tā* [as *aśvatva* and *aśvatā*] are used in the sense of *bhāva*, that they do express 'existence." "Thus is pure existence" from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be ; it is eternal, since, as all phenomena are developments thereof, it is devoid of any limit in space, time, or substance : this existence is called ' the great soul." Such is the meaning of Hari's two *kārikās* quoted above. So, too, it is laid down in the discussion on *sambandha* [in Hari's verses] that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word Substance.

अध्रुवेण निमित्तेन देवदत्तगृहं यथा ।
गृहीतं गृहशब्देन शुद्धमेवाभिधीयते ॥

भाष्यकारेणापि 'सिद्धे शब्दार्थसंबन्धे' इत्येतद्वार्तिकव्याख्यानावसरे द्रव्यं हि नित्यमित्यनेन ग्रन्थेनासत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यं सर्वशब्दार्थ इति निरूपितम् ।

"The true Reality is ascertained by its illusory forms ; the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises ; as the object, 'Devadatta's house,' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination,[29] but by the word 'house' itself, the pure idea [without owners] is expressed."[30]

So, too, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, when explaining the Vārttika,[31] "a word, its meaning and its connection being fixed," in the passage beginning "substance is eternal," has shown that the meaning of all words is Brahman, expressed by the word "substance" and determined by various unreal[32] conditions [as "the nature of horse," etc ]

जातिशब्दार्थवाचिनो वाजप्यायनस्य मते गवादयः शब्दा भिन्नद्रव्यसमवेतजातिमभिदधति । तस्यामवगाह्यमानायां तत्संबन्धाद् द्रव्यमवगम्यते । शुक्लादयः

शब्दा गुणसमवेतां जातिमाचक्षते । गुणे तत्संबन्धप्रत्ययः । द्रव्ये सम्बन्धि-सम्बन्धात् ।

संज्ञाशब्दानामुत्पत्तिप्रभृत्या विनाशाच्छैशवकौमारयौवनाद्यवस्थादिभेदेऽपि स एवायमित्यभिन्नप्रत्ययबलात्सिद्धा देवदत्तत्वादिजातिरभ्युपगन्तव्या । क्रियास्वपि जातिरालक्ष्यते । सैव धातुवाच्या । पचतीत्यादावनुवृत्तप्रत्ययस्य प्रादुर्भावात् ।

According to the opinion of Vājapyāyana, who maintains that all words mean a genus, words like "cow," etc.,[33] denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances; and when this genus is apprehended, through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides. Words like "white," etc, denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities; through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality, and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance. So in the case of words expressing particular names, in consequence of the recognition that "this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction, in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood, youth, adolescence, etc.," we must accept a fixed genus as Devadattahood,[34] etc. [as directly denoted by them]. So, too, in words expressing "action" a genus is denoted; this is the root-meaning as in *pathati*, "he reads," etc., since we find here a meaning common to all who read.

द्रव्यपदार्थवादिव्याडिनये शब्दस्य व्यक्तिरेवाभिधेयतया प्रतिभासते । जातिस्तूपलक्षणतयेति नानन्त्यादिदोषावकाशः ।

In the doctrine of Vyāḍi, who maintained that words meant individual things [and not classes or general], the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted, while the genus is implied [as a characteristic mark]; and he thus avoids the alleged faults of "indefiniteness," and "wandering away from its proper subject."[35]

पाणिन्याचार्यस्योभयं संमतम् । यतो जातिपदार्थमभ्युपगम्य 'जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन्बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम्' (पा० सू० १।२।५८) इत्यादिव्यवहारः । द्रव्यपदार्थमङ्गीकृत्य 'सरूपाणामेकशेष एकविभक्तौ' (पा० सू० १।२।६४) इत्यादिः । व्याकरणस्य सर्वपार्षदत्वान्मतद्वयाभ्युपगमे न कश्चिद्विरोधः । तस्माद्द्वयं सत्यं परं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सर्वशब्दार्थं स्थितम् ।

Both views are allowed by the great teacher Pāṇini ; since in i. 2, 58, he accepts the theory that a word means the genus, where he says that "when the singular if used to express the class the plural may be optionally used" [as in the sentence. "A Brāhmans is to be honoured which may equally run, "Brāhmans are to be honoured"] ; while in i 2. 64, he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing, where he says, "In any individual case there is but one retained of thing similar in form" [i e., the dual means Rāma and Rāma, and the plural means Rāma, and Rāma ; but we retain only one, adding a dual or plural affix]. Grammar, in fact, being adapted to all assemblies can accept both theories without being compromised, Therefore both theories are in a sence true ;[36] but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the supreme Brahman.

तदुक्तम् (वा० प० ३।३।८७)—

तस्माच्छक्तिविभागेन सत्य: सर्व: सदात्मक: ।
एकोऽर्थ: शब्दवाच्यत्वे बहुरूप: प्रकाशते ।। इति ।

सत्यस्वरूपमपि हरिणोक्तं सम्बन्धसमुद्देशे (७२)—

यत्र द्रष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं चाविकल्पितम् ।
तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वमाहुस्त्रय्यन्तवेदिन: ।। इति ।

द्रव्यसमुद्देशेऽपि (वा० प० ३।२।१५)—

विकारापगमे सत्यं सुवर्णं कुण्डले यथा ।
विकारापगमो यत्र तमाहु: प्रकृतिं पराम् ।। इति ।

As it has been said—

"Therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words, one true universal meaning, identical with the one existent, shines out in many forms as the thing denoted."

Hari also, in his chapter discussing *sambandha*, thus describes the nature of this true meaning—

"That meaning in which the subject, the object, and the perception [which units them] are insusceptible of doubt,[37] *that* only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three Vedas."

So too in his description of substance, he says—

"*That* which remains as the Real during the presence of modification, as the gold remains under the form of the earring,—*that* wherein change comes and goes, *that* they call the Supreme Nature."

अभ्युपगताद्वितीयत्वनिर्वाहाय वाच्यवाचकयोरविभागः प्रदर्शितः (वा० प० ३।२।१६)—

वाच्या सा सर्वशब्दानां शब्दाच्च न पृथक्ततः ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि संबन्धस्तयोर्जीवात्मनोरिव ॥ इति ।

तत्तदुपाधिपरिकल्पितभेदबहुलतया व्यवहारस्याविद्यामात्रकल्पितत्वेन प्रतिनियताकारोतधीयमानरूपभेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सर्वशब्दविषयः । अभेदे च पारमार्थिके संवृतिवशाद् व्यवहारदशायां स्वप्नावस्थावदुच्चावचः प्रपञ्चो विवर्तत इति कारिकार्थः ।

The essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy.

"This [Supreme Nature] is the thing denoted by all words, and it is identical with the word ; but the relation of the two, while they are thus ultimately identical, varies as does the relation of the two souls."[38]

The meaning of this Kārikā is that Brahman is the one object denoted by all words ; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form ; but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance. Non-duality is the true state ; but through the power of "concealment"[39] [exercised by illusion] at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place, just as is the case during sleep.

तदाहुर्वेदान्तवादनिपुणाः—

यथा स्वप्नप्रपञ्चोऽयं मयि मायाविजृम्भितः ।
एवं जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चोऽपि मयि मायाविजृम्भितः ॥ इति ।

तदित्थं कूटस्थे परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणि सच्चिदानन्दरूपे प्रत्यगभिन्नेऽवगतेऽनाद्यानिद्यानिवृत्तौ तादृग्ब्रह्मात्मनावस्थानलक्षणं निःश्रेयसं सेत्स्यति ।

'शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं ब्रह्माधिगच्छति' (महाभारत, शा०प०अ०२७०) इत्यभियुक्तोक्तेः। तथा च शब्दानुशासनशास्त्रस्य निःश्रेयसाधनत्वं सिद्धम्।

Thus those skilled in Vedānta lore tell us—

'As all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me, so this extended wakin ; world is a development of illusion like-wise."

When the unchangeable Supreme Brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul, and when primeval ignorance is abolished, final bliss is accomplished, which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this Brahman according to the text, "He who is well versed in the Word-Brahman attains to the Supreme Brahman."[40] And thus we establish the fact that the "exposition of words" is the means to final bliss.

तदुक्तम्—

तद् द्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम्।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रचक्षते॥
(वाक्यपदीयम् १।१४) इति।

तथा—

इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम्।
इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्मा राजपद्धतिः।
(वाक्य० १।१६) इति।

तस्माद् व्याकरणशास्त्रं परमपुरुषार्थसाधनतयाऽध्येतव्यमिति सिद्धम्।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पाणिनिदर्शनम्॥

Thus it has been said—

"They call it the door of emancipation, the medicine of the diseases of speech, the purifier of all sciences, the science of sciences."[41]

And so again—

"This is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss, this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation."

Therefore our final conclusion is that the Śāstra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man. E B.C.

*NOTES* :

1. Mādhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted any fully developed the idea of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school that sound is eternal. He therefore treats of *sphoṭa* here, and not in his Jaimini chapter.
2. Rig-Veda x. 9, 4.
3. *Śabdānuśāsana* if judged by the apparent sense of Pāṇini, ii. 2, 14, would be a wrong compound ; but it is not so, because ii. 2, 14 must be interpreted in this sense of ii 3, 66, whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed *as well as* an object, i.e., if such a word as *ācāryeṇa* followed. In the example given we cannot say *āścaryo godoho śīkṣitena gopālena* (as it would violate ii. 2, 14), neither can we say (*āścaryo gavāṃ doho śikṣitasya gapālasya* (as it would violate ii. 3, 66).
4. That is, the *ubhayaprāpti* of ii. 3, 66, is a *bahuvrīhi* agreeing with *kṛti* in ii. 3, 65. These points are all discussed at some length in the Commentaries on Pāṇini.
5. These actually occur in the Commentaries to Pāṇini, ii. 2, 8 ; iii. 3, 417, etc.
6. This takes in all cases of relation, *sambandha* (*i.e.*, *ṣaṣṭhī-sambandha*).
7. As in such rules as vi. 2, 139.
8. These compounds occur in Pāṇini's own sūtras (i. 4, 30, and i. 4, 55), and would violete his own rule in ii. 2, 15, if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as *ṣaṣṭhi śeshe.*
9. The very word *śabda* in *śabdānuśāsanam* implies the Veda, since this is pre-eminently *śābda.*
10. Compare Max Muller, *Sansk. Liter.*, p. 113. It is quoted as from the Veda in the Mahābhāṣya.

11. In the Calcutta text, p. 138, dele *daṇḍa* in line 3 after *bhavet*, and insert it in line 4 after *śabdānām*.
12. As in the so-called *pada* text.
13. See Ballantyne's *Mahābhāṣya*, pp. 12, 64.
14. *Acikramata* seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of *kram* for *acaṅkramyata*.
15. Or it may mean "the developed universe." Compare the lines of Bhartṛhari which immediately follow.
16. One would naturally supply *śabdasya* after *sāmyam*, by the Mahābhāṣya has *naḥ sāmyam* (see Ballantyne's ed., p. 27).
17. i.e., prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own, and not (as usually in Sanskrit) in composition.
18. The *karmapravacanīyas* imply a verb other than the one expressed, and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb. Thus in the example, *Śākalyasaṁhitām anu prāvarṣat*, "he rained after the Śākalya hymns," *anu* implies an understood verb *niśamya*, "having heard," and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain. This *anu* is said to determine this relation.
19. See Ballantyne's ed., p. 10.
20. This is not very clear, the *anu* in *anugraha* might mean *krameṇa*, and so imply the successive order of the letters.
21. In the Calcutta edition, p. 142, line 11, I read *kalpam* for *kalpanam*.
22. I add *vinā* after *nimittam*.
23. The ghaṭṭa is the place where dues and taxes are collected. Some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night, but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught. Hence the proverb means *uddeśyāsiddhi*.
24. In p. 143, line 13, I read *sphoṭakabhāvam* for *sphoṭābhāvam*.
25. Cf. Ballantyne's Transl. of the Mahābhāṣya, pp. 9, 32.
26. The Mīmāṁsā holds that a word means the genus (*jāti*) and not the individual (*vyakti*); the Nyāya holds that a word

means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus (or species).

27. Cf. Ṛg-Veda Prātiś. xii. 5.
28. He here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms.
29. Since Devadatta is only its transient owner.
30. So by the words "horse," "caw," etc., Brahman is really meant, the one abiding existence.
31. Cf. Ballantyne's Mahābhāṣya, pp. 44, 50.
32. Read *asatya* for *aśvattha*.
33. We have here the well-known four grammatical categories, *jāti*, *guṇa*, *dravya* or *sañjnā*, and *kriyā*.
34. But cf. Siddh. Muktāv., p 6, line 12.
35. Thus we read in the Siddhānta Muktāvali, p. 82, that the Mīmāṁsā holds that a word means the genus and not the individual, since otherwise there would be *vyabhicāra* and *ānantya* (cf. also Maheśachandra Nyāyaratna's note, Kāvya-prakāśa, p. 10). If a word is held to mean only *one* individual, there will be the first fault, as it will "wander away" and equally express others which it should not include ; if it is held to mean *many* individuals, it will have an endless variety of meanings and be "indefinite."
36. This seems the meaning of the text as printed *tasmāt dvayam satyam*, but I should prefer to read conjecturally *tasmād advayam satyam*, "therefore non-duality is the truth."
37. *Scil.* they can only be the absolute Brahman who alone exists.
38. *Scil* the individual soul (*jīva*) and Brahman.
39. The *Saṁvṛtī* of the text seems to correspond to the *āvaraṇa* so frequent in Vedānta books.
40. This passage is quoted in the Maitri Upaniṣad, vi. 22.
41. *Adhividyam* occurs in Taitt. Upaniṣad, i. 3, 1, where it is explained by Śaṁkara as *vidyāsv adhi yad darśanam tad adhividyam*.

# CHAPTER XIV

## THE SĀNKHYA-DARŚANA

अथ सांख्यैराख्याते परिणामवादे परिपन्थिनि जागरूके कथंकारं विवर्तवादः आदरणीयो भवेत् । एष हि तेषामाघोषः । संक्षेपेण हि सांख्यशास्त्रे चतस्रो विधाः संभाव्यन्ते कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिद्विकृतिप्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिद्विकृतिरेव, कश्चिदनुभय इति ।

But how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation [thus held by the grammarians, following the guidance of the *pūrva* and *uttara* Mīmāṁsā schools], when the system of development propounded by the Sāṅkhyas is still alive to oppose it ?" Such is their loud vaunt, Now the Śāstra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four several kinds of existences, viz., that which is evolvent[1] only, that which is evolute only, that which is both evolute and evolvent, and that which is neither.

तत्र केवला प्रकृति प्रधानपदेन वेदनीया मूलप्रकृतिः । नासावन्यस्य कस्यचित् विकृतिः । प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिरिति व्युत्पत्त्या सत्त्वरजस्तमोगुणानां साम्यावस्थाया अभिधानात् । तदुक्तं—'मूलप्रकृतिरविकृति' (सां० का० ३) इति । मूलं चासौ प्रकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतिः ।

महदादेः कार्यकलापस्यासौ मूलं न त्वस्य प्रधानस्य मूलान्तरमस्ति । अनवस्थापातात् । न च बीजाङ्कुरवदनवस्थादोषो न भवतीति वाच्यम् । प्रमाणाभावादिति भावः ।

(*a*) Of these the first is that which is only evolvent, called the root-evolvent or the primary; it is not itself the evolute of anything else. It evolves, hence it is called the evolvent (*prakṛti*) since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the three qualities, goodness, activity, and darkness. This is expreseed [in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā], "the root-evolvent is no evolute." It is called the root-evolvent, as being both root and evolute" it is the root of all the various effects, as the so-called "great one," etc , but of it, as the primary, there is no root, as otherwise we should ha ve

a *regressus ad infinitum.* Nor can you reply that such a *regressus ad infinitum* is no objection, if, like the continued series of seed and shoot, it can be proved by the evidence of our senses,[2]— because here there is no evidence to establish the hypothesis.

विकृतयश्च प्रकृतयश्च महदहंकारतन्मात्राणि । तदप्युक्तं 'महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त' (सां० का० ३) इति । अस्यार्थः—प्रकृतयश्च ता विकृतयश्चेति प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त महदादीनि तत्त्वानि । तत्रान्तःकरणादिपदवेदनीयं महत्तत्वमहंकारस्य प्रकृतिः । मूलप्रकृतेस्तु विकृतिः ।

एवमहंकारतत्त्वमभिमानापरनामधेयं महतो विकृतिः । प्रकृतिश्च तदेवाहंकारतत्त्वं तामसं सत्पञ्चतन्मात्राणां सूक्ष्माभिधानाम् । तदेव सात्त्विकं सत्प्रकृतिरेकादशेन्द्रियाणां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनात्वगाख्यानां कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वाक्यपाणिपादपायूपस्थाख्यानामुभयात्मकस्य मनसश्च । रजसस्तूभयत्र क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेण कारणत्वमस्तीति न वैयर्थ्यम् ।

(*b*) The "evolutes and evolvents" are the great one, egoism, and the subtile elements,—thus the Sāṅkhya Kārikā 3), "the seven, the great one, etc., are evolute-evolvents." The seven are the seven principles, called the great one, etc., Among these the great principle, called also the intellect,[3] etc., is itself the evolute of nature and the evolvent of egoism ; in the same manner the principle egoism, called also "self-consciousness" (*abhimāna*), is the evolute of the great one, intellect ; but this same principle, as affected by the quality of darkness, is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile elements ; and, as affected by the quality of goodness, it is the evolvent of the eleven organs, viz., the five organs of perception, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin ; the five organs of action, the voice, hands, feet, anus, and generative organ ; and the mind, partaking of the character of both ; nor can you object that in our arrangement the third quality, activity, is idle, as it acts as a cause by producing action in the others.

तदुक्तमीश्वरकृष्णेन—

अभिमानोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकरणगणस्तन्मात्रापञ्चकं चैव ॥
सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥
बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥
उभयात्मकमत्र मनः संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ॥
(सा० का० २४-२७) इति ।

This has been thus declared by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa in his Kārikās[4] (24—27), "Self-consciousness is egoism. Thence proceeds a twofold creation, the elevenfold set and the five elemental rudiments. From modified[5] egoism originates the class of eleven imbued with goodness ; from egoism as the source of the elements orginate the rudimentary elements, and these are affected by darkness ; but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the one and the other rise. The intellectual organs are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin ; those of action are the voice, feet, hands, anus, and organ of generation In this set is mind, which has the character of each; it determines, and is an organ (like the other ten) from having a common property with them."[6]

All this has been explained at length by the teacher Vācaspati Miśra in the Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī.

विवृतं च तत्त्वकौमुद्यामाचार्यवाचस्पतिभि :—

केवला विकृतिस्तु वियदादीनि पञ्च महाभूतानि, एकादशेन्द्रियाणि च । तदुक्तं—'षोडशकस्तु विकारः'(सा० का० ३) इति । षोडशसंख्यावाच्छिन्नो गणः षोडशको विकारः एव, न प्रकृतिरित्यर्थः । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादयो गोघटादीनां प्रकृतिस्तथापि न ते पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरमिति न प्रकृतिः । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं चेह प्रकृतित्वमभिमतम् । गोघटादीनां स्थूलत्वेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वयोः समानत्वेन तत्त्वान्तरत्वाभावः ।

तत्र शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धतन्मात्रेभ्यः पूर्वपूर्वसूक्ष्मभूतसहितेभ्यः पञ्च महाभूतानि वियदादीनि क्रमेणैकद्वित्रिचतुष्पञ्चगुणानि जायन्ते । इन्द्रियसृष्टिस्तु प्रागेवोक्ता । तदुक्तम्—

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहंकारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥
(सां० का० २२) इति ।

(*c*) The "evolute only" means the five gross elements, ether, etc., and the eleven organs, as said in the Kārikā, "The evolute consists of sixteen," that is, the set of sixteen is evolute only, and not evolvent. Although it may be said that earth, etc., are the evolvents of such productions as cows, jars, etc., yet these are not a different "principle" (*tattva*) from earth, etc., and therefore earth, etc., are not what we term "evolvents;" as the accepted idea of an evolvent is that which is the material cause of a separate principle; in cows, jars, etc., there is absence of being any such first principle, in consequence of their being all alike gross [i e, possessed of dimensions] and perceptible to the senses. The five gross elements, ether, etc., are respectively produced from sound, touch, form, taste, and smell, each subtile element being accompanied by all those which precede it, and thus the gross elements will have respectively one, two, three, four, and five qualities.[7] The creation of the organs has been previously described. This is thus propounded in the Sāñkhya Kārikā (No. 22)—

> "From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen proceed the five gross elements."

अनुभयात्मकः पुरुषः । तदुक्तं—'न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः' (सा० का० ३) इति । पुरुषस्तु कूटस्थनित्योऽपरिणामी न कस्यचित्प्रकृतिर्नापि विकृतिः कस्यचिदित्यर्थः ।

एतत्पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वसाधकत्वेन प्रमाणत्रयमभिमतम् तदप्युक्तम्—

> दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
> त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥
>
> (सां० का० ४) इति ।

(*d*) The soul is neither,—as is said in the Kārikā, "The soul is neither evolvent, nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Kārikā (No. 4).

"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof, for they comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that which is to be proved."

इह कार्यकारणभावे चतुर्धा विप्रतिपत्तिः प्रसरति । असतः सज्जायत इति सौगताः संगिरन्ते । नैयायिकादयः सतोऽसज्जायत इति । वेदान्तिनः सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तुसदिति । सांख्या पुनः सतः सज्जायत इति ।

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and effect. The Saugatas[8] maintain that the existent is produced from the non-existent; the Naiyāyikas, etc., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent; the Vedāntins, that all effects are an illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really existent; while the Sāṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from the existent.

तत्रासतः सज्जायत इति न प्रामाणिकः पक्षः । असतो निरुपाख्यस्य शशविषाणवत्कारणत्वानुपपत्तेः । तुच्छातुच्छयोस्तादात्म्यानुपपत्तिश्च ।

(*a*) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be identical.

नापि सतोऽसज्जायते । कारकव्यापारात्प्रागसतः शशविषाणवत्सत्तासंबन्धलक्षणोत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हि नीलं निपुणतमेनापि पीतं कर्तुं पार्यते । ननु सत्त्वासत्त्वे घटस्य धर्माविति चेत्—तदचारु । असति धर्मिणि तद्धर्म इति व्यपदेशानुपपत्त्या धर्मिणः सत्त्वापत्तेः ।

(*b*) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since it is impossible that which, previous to the operation of the originating cause, was an non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be produced, i.e., become connected with existence; for not even the cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[9] If you say, "But are not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that the subject itself did exist.

तस्मात्कारकव्यापारात्प्रागपि कार्यं सदेव । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपद्यते । यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्य, दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु पयसः । असतः करणे किमपि निदर्शनं न दृश्यते ।

Hence we conclude that the effect is existent even previously to the operation of the cause. which only produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove the production of a thing previously non-existent.

किं च कार्येण कारणं सम्बद्धं तज्जनकमसम्बद्धं वा । प्रथमे कार्यस्य सत्त्वमायातम् । सतोरेव सम्बन्ध इति नियमात् । चरमे सर्वं कार्यजातं सर्वस्माज्जायेत । असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषात् ।

तदाख्यायि सांख्याचार्यैः—

असत्त्वान्नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।
असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः ॥

Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected with it or not connected, in the former alternative the effect's existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between two existent things ; in the latter, any and every effect might arise from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sāṅkhya teacher :—"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have no connection with causes which always accompany existence ; and to him who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an utter want of determinateness."

अथैवमुच्येत—'असंबद्धमपि तत्तदेव जनयति यत्र यच्छक्तम् । शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनोन्नेयेति ।' तन्न संगच्छते । तिलेषु तैलजननशक्तिरित्यत्र तैलस्यासत्त्वे संबद्धत्वासंबद्धत्वविकल्पेन तच्छक्तिरिति निरूपणायोगात् ।

If you rejoin that "the cause, though not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be allowed, since in

such a case as "there is a capacity for producing oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds, whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally apply here].

कार्यकारणयोरभेदाच्च कारणात्पृथक्कार्यस्य सत्त्वं न भवति । पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते । तद्धर्मत्वात् । न यदेवं, न तदेवं यथा गोरश्वः । तद्धर्मश्च पटः । तस्मान्नार्थान्तरम् । तर्हि प्रत्येकं त एव प्रावरणकार्यं कुर्युरिति चेन्न । संस्थानभेदेनाविर्भूतपटभावानां प्रावरणार्थं क्रियाकारित्वोपपत्तेः । यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति; एवं कारणस्य तन्त्वादेः पटादयो विशेषा निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते । निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्तो विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते ।

न पुनरसतामुत्पत्तिः सतां वा विनाशः । यथोक्तं भगवद्गीतायाम्—

नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः ।

(गी० २।१६) इति ।

From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter [as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from its cause.[1] If you object that, if this were true, the separate threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing we reply, that the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed, and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, as cloth, etc., of a cause, as threads; etc., when they come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be destroyed but there is no such thing as the production the non-existent or the destruction of the existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gītā (ii. 16)—

"There is no existence, for the nor non-existent, nor non-existence for the existent."

ततश्च कार्यानुमानात्तत्प्रधानसिद्धिः । तदुक्तम्—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात्सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥

(सा० का० ९) इति ।

And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (*prakṛti*). This has been said [in the Kārikā, § 9]—

"Effect exists; for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence ; materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose ; everything is not be every means possible ; what is capable does that to which it is competent ; and like is produced from like."[2]

नापि सतो ब्रह्मतत्त्वस्य विवर्तः प्रपञ्चः । बाधानुपलम्भात् । अधिष्ठानारोप्ययोश्चिज्जडयोः कलधौतशुक्त्यादिवत्सारूप्याभावेनारोपासंभवाच्च ।

Nor can we say [with the Vedāntin] that the world is an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the *primā facie* belief that the external world is real [as we have in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover the error] ; and again, where the subject and the attributed nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one mistakes for each other].

ततश्च सुखदुःखमोहात्मकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य तथाविधकारणमवधारणीयम् । तथा च प्रयोगः—विमतं भावजातं सुखदुःखमोहात्मककारणकं तदन्वितत्वात् । यद्येनान्वीयते तत्तत्कारणकं यथा रुचकादिकं सुवर्णान्वितं सुवर्णकारणकम् । तथा चेदं, तस्मात्तथेति ।

Hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause similarly composed ; and our argument is as follows :—The subject of the

argument, viz, the external world, must have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, becau e it is itself endued therewith ; whatever is enduded with certain attributes must have a cause endued with the same,—thus a ring has gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes of gold ; our subject is a similar case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion.

तत्र जगत्कारणे येयं सुखात्मकता तत्सत्त्वं, या दुःखात्मकता तद्रजः, या च मोहात्मकता तत्तम इति त्रिगुणात्मककारणसिद्धिः । तथा हि——प्रत्येकं भावस्त्रैगुण्यवन्तोऽनुभूयन्ते । यथा मैत्रदारेषु सत्यवत्यां मैत्रस्य सुखमाविरस्ति । तं प्रतिसत्त्वगुणप्रादुर्भावात् । तत्सपत्नीनां दुःखम् । ताः प्रति रजोगुणप्रादुर्भावात् । तामलभमानस्य चैत्रस्य मोहो भवति । तं प्रति तमोगुणसमुद्भवात् ।

What we call "being composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of goodness ; the being composed of misery" is the quality of activity ; the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of darkness ; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities (i.e., *prakṛti*, Nature). And we see that individual objects are found by experience to have these three qualities ; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife Satyavatī, because the quality of "goodness" in her is manifested towards him ; but she is the misery of her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested towards them ; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is manifested.

एवमन्यदपि घटादिकं लभ्यमानं सुखं करोति । परैरपह्रियमाणं दुःखाकरोति । उदासीनस्योपेक्षाविषयत्वेनोपतिष्ठते । उपेक्षाविषयत्वं नाम मोहः । मुह वैचित्ये इत्यस्माद्धातोर्मोहशब्दनिष्पत्तेः । उपेक्षणीयेषु चित्तवृत्त्यनुदयात् । तस्मात्सर्वं भावजात सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं त्रिगुणप्रधानकारकमवगम्यते ।

So, too, in other cases also ; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us pleasure ; when seized by others it causes us pain , but it is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since the word *moha* is derived from the root *muh*, "to be confused," since no direct action of the mind arises

towards those object to which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause Nature, which consists of the three qualities.

तथा च श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि श्रूयते—

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां
बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः ।
अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते
जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥

(श्वे० ४।६) इति ।

अत्र लोहितशुक्लकृष्णशब्दाः रञ्जकत्वप्रकाशकत्वावरकत्वसाधर्म्यात् रजः-सत्त्वतमोगुणत्रयप्रतिपादनपराः ।

And so it is declared in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣed (iv. 5)—

"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one munborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed."

Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities "activity," "goodness," and "darkness," from their severally possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and concealing.

नन्वचेतनं प्रधानं चेतनानधिष्ठितं महदादिकार्ये न व्याप्रियते । अतः केन-चिच्चेतनेनाधिष्ठात्रा भवितव्यम् । तथा च सर्वार्थदर्शी परमेश्वरः स्वीकर्तव्यः स्यादिति चेत्—तदसंगतम् । अचेतनस्यापि प्रधानस्य प्रयोजनवशेन प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः ।

दृष्टं चाचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितं पुरुषार्थाय प्रवर्तमानं यथा वत्सविवृद्धयर्थम-चेतनं क्षीरं प्रवर्तते, यथा च जलमचेतनं लोकोपकाराय प्रवर्तते, तथा प्रकृतिरचेत-नापि पुरुषविमोक्षाय प्रवर्त्स्यति । तदुक्तम्—

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥

(सा० का० ५७) इति ॥

Here, however, it may be objected, 'But will not your unintelligent Nature, without the superintendence of something

intelligent fail to produce these effects, intellect, etc. ? therefore there must be some intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing, supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse ; and experience shows us that an unintelligent thing; without any intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures ; and so unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it has been said in the Kārikā (§ 57)—

> "As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."

यस्तु 'परमेश्वरः करुणया प्रवर्तकः' इति परमेश्वरास्तित्ववादिनां डिण्डिमः स गर्भस्रावेण गतः। विकल्पानुपपत्तेः। स किं सृष्टेः प्राक्प्रवर्तते सृष्ट्युत्तरकालं वा ? आद्ये शरीराद्यभावेन दुःखानुत्पत्तौ जीवानां दुःखप्रहाणेच्छानुपपत्तिः। द्वितीये परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गः। करुणया सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारुण्यमिति।

But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he act thus *before* or *after* creation ? If you say "before," we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, etc , there will be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of compassion] ; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting at all], and on the other hand" that He compassionated after He had created :

तस्मादचेतनास्यापि चेतनानधिष्ठितस्य प्रधानस्य महदादिरूपेण परिणामः पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्तः प्रधानपुरुषसंयोगनिमित्तः। यथा निर्व्यापारस्याप्ययस्कान्तस्य संनिधानेन व्यापारस्तथा निर्व्यापारस्य पुरुषस्य संनिधानेन प्रधानव्यापारो युज्यते। प्रकृतिपुरुषसंबन्धश्च पङ्ग्वन्धवत् परस्परापेक्षानिबन्धनः। प्रकृतिर्हि

भोग्यतया भोक्तारं पुरुषमपेक्षते । पुरुषोऽपि भेदाग्रहाद् बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्या तद्गतं दुःखत्रयं वारयमाणः कैवल्यमपेक्षते । तत्प्रकृतिपुरुषनिबन्धनं न च तदन्तरेण युक्तमिति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते ।

Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent Nature [even without any intelligent super-intendent]—in the order of the series intellect, self-consciouness, etc.,—is caused by the union of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just as there takes placc a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved Soul ; and this union of Nature and Soul is caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer ; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not recognising its own distinction therefrom." This final bliss [or absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it ; therefore Soul depends on Nature for its final bliss.

यथा खलु कौचित्पङ्ग्वन्धौ पथि सार्थेन गच्छन्तौ दैवकृतादुपप्लवात्परित्यक्तसार्थौ मन्दमन्दमितस्ततः परिभ्रमन्तौ भयाकुलौ दैववशात्संयोगमुपगच्छेताम् । तत्र चान्धेन पङ्गुः स्कन्धमारोपितः । ततः पङ्गुदर्शितेन मार्गेणान्धः समीहितं स्थानं प्राप्नोति, पङ्गुरपि स्कन्धाधिरूढः । तथा परस्परापेक्षप्रधानपुरुषनिबन्धनः सर्गः । यथोक्तम्—

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संबन्धस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥

(सां० का० २१) इति ।

Just as a lame man and a blind man," travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame man

also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually dependent. This has been said in the Kārikā (No. 21)—

"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."

ननु पुरुषार्थनिबन्धना भवतु प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः । निवृत्तिस्तु कथमुपपद्यत इति चेत्—उच्यते । यथा भर्त्रा दृष्टदोषा स्वैरिणी पुनर्भर्तारं नोपैति, यथा वा कृतप्रयोजना नर्तकी निवर्तते तथा प्रकृतिरपि । यथोक्तम्—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥
(सां० का० ५९) इति ।

एतच्च निरीश्वरसांख्यशास्त्रप्रवर्तककपिलादिमतानुसारिणां मतमुपन्यस्तम् ॥

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे सांख्यदर्शनम् ॥

"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of the saul, but how do you account for its ceasing to act?" I reply, that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in the Kārikā (No. 59)—

"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having manifested herself to Soul."

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder of the atheistic Sāṅkhya School, been propounded.

E.B.C.

*NOTES* :

1. I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.
2. Compare Kusumāñjali, i. 4.
3. One great defect in the Sāñkhya nomenclature is the ambiguity between the terms for intellect (*buddhi*) and those

for mind (*manas*). Mādhava here applies to the former term *avaḥkaraṇa* or "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I have ventured to alter it in the translation.

4. It is singular that this is Mādhava's principal Sāṅkhya authority, and not the Sāṅkhya Sūtras.

5. *Vaikṛta* is here a technical term meaning that goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Kārikā, comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sāṅkhya-sāra, pp. 30, 35.

6. As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The reading *saṁkalpavikalpātmakam* must be corrected by the Sāṅkhya, Kārikā.

7. Cf. Colebrocke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. The *tanmātras* will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross elements.

8. A name of the Buddhists.

9. i.e., the nature of a thing (*Svabhāva*) cannot be altered—a man cannot be made a cow, nor a women a man.

10. I take *arthāntaram* here as simply *bhinnam* cf. Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati's note, *Tattva Kaumudī*, p. 47.

11. Colebrooke's translation.

12. Or "passion," *rajas.*

13. In other words—on the one hand the existing misery of beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which caused their misery at all.

14. Bondage, etc , resides in the intellect, and are only *reflected* upon soul through its proximity (cf. *Śāṅkhyapravacana-bhāṣya*, i. 58).

15. This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It is found in the Babylonian Talmud, *Sanhedrim*, fol. 91, *b*, and in the Gesta Romanorum.

# CHAPTER XV

## THE PATAÑJALI-DARŚANA

साम्प्रतं सेश्वरसांख्यप्रवर्तकपतञ्जलिप्रभृतिमुनिमतमनुवर्तमानानां मतमुपन्यस्यते । तत्र सांख्यप्रवचनापरनामधेयं योगशास्त्रं पतञ्जलिप्रणीतं पादचतुष्टयात्मकम् । तत्र प्रथमे पादे 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' (यो० सू० १।१) इति योगशास्त्रप्रतिज्ञां विधाय 'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः' (यो० सू० १।२) इत्यादिना योगलक्षणमभिधाय समाधिं सप्रपञ्चं निरदिक्षद्भगवान्पतञ्जलिः ।

We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sāṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Śāstra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sāṅkhya Pravacana," or detailed explanation of the Sāṅkhya.[1] In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (*yoga*), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Śāstra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (*samādhi*).

द्वितीये 'तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः' (पात० यो० सू० २।१) इत्यादिना व्युत्थितचित्तस्य क्रियायोगं यमादीनि च पञ्च बहिरङ्गानि साधनानि । तृतीये 'देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा' (पात० यो० सू० ३।१) इत्यादिना धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमन्तरङ्गं संयमपदवाच्यं तदवान्तरफलं विभूतिजातम् ।

In the second chapter, in the series of aphorism commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part of *yoga* proper to him whose mind is not yet throughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients—attention,

contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (*saṁyana*), and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit.

चतुर्थे 'जन्मौषधिमन्त्रतपःसमाधिजाः सिद्धयः' (पात० यो० सू० ४।१) इत्यादिना सिद्धिपञ्चकप्रपञ्चनपुरस्सरं परमं प्रयोजनं कैवल्यम् । प्रधानादीनि पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वानि प्राचीनान्येव संमतानि । षड्विंशस्तु परमेश्वरः क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयैरपरामृष्टः पुरुषः स्वेच्छया निर्माणकायमधिष्ठाय लौकिकवैदिकसंप्रदायप्रवर्तकः संसाराङ्गारे तप्यमानानां प्राणभृतामनुग्राहकश्च ।

In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (*siddhis*). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Sāṅkhya], "Nature," etc. ; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vedic traditions,[2] and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.

ननु पुष्करपलाशवन्निर्लेपस्य तस्य तप्यभावः कथमुपपद्यते येन परमेश्वरोऽनुग्राहकतया कक्षीक्रियत इति चेत्—उच्यते । तापकस्य रजसः सत्त्वमेव तप्यं बुद्ध्यात्मना परिणतमिति सत्त्वे परितप्यमाने तदारोपवशेन तदभेदावगाहिपुरुषोऽपि तप्यत इत्युच्यते तदुक्तमाचार्यैः—

सत्त्वं तप्यं बुद्धिभावेन वृत्तं
भावा ये वा राजसास्तापकास्ते ।
तप्याभेदग्राहिणी तामसीं या
वृत्तिस्तस्यां तप्य इत्युक्त आत्मा ॥ इति ।

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf of a lotus be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity ; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have declared—

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,[3]
And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

पञ्चशिखेनाप्युक्तम्—अपरिणामिनी हि भोक्तृशक्तिरप्रतिसंक्रमा च परिणामिन्यर्थे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपततीति। भोक्तृशक्तिरिति चिच्छक्तिरुच्यते। सा चात्मैव। परिणामिन्यर्थे बुद्धितत्त्वे प्रतिसंक्रान्तेव प्रतिबिम्बितेव तद्वृत्तिमनुपततीति बुद्धौ प्रतिबिम्बिता सा चिच्छक्तिर्बुद्धिच्छायापत्त्या बुद्धिवृत्त्यनुकारवतीति भावः।

तथा शुद्धोऽपि पुरुषः प्रत्ययं बौद्धमनुपश्यति तमनुपश्यन्नतदात्मापि तदात्मक इव प्रतिभासत इति। इत्थं तप्यमानस्य पुरुषस्यादर-नैरन्तर्य-दीर्घकालानुबन्धि-यम नियमाद्यष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानेन परमेश्वरप्रणिधानेन च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातावनुपप्लवायां जातायामविद्यादयः पञ्च क्लेशाः समूलकाषं कषिता भवन्ति। कुशलाकुशलाश्च कर्माशयाः समूलघातं हताः भवन्ति। ततश्च पुरुषस्य निर्लेपस्य कैवल्येनावस्थानं कैवल्यमिति सिद्धम्।

It has been also said by Patañjali,[4] "The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."

Now the "power of enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and thus is the soul; and in an object which is "developed" and "transferred," or reflected,—i.e., in the thinking principle or the understanding,—it experiences the modifications thereof, i.e., the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it.

Thus the soul, through in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at secondhand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, etc., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded

recognistion of the distinction between the quality Goodness and Soul; and the five "affliction, ignorance," etc., are radically destroyed, and the various "stock's of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.

तत्र 'अथ योगानुशासनम्' (पा० यो० सू० १।१) इति प्रथमसूत्रेण प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यङ्गं विषयप्रयोजनसंबन्धाधिकारिरूपमनुबन्धचतुष्टयं प्रतिपाद्यते ।

The words of the first aphorism, Now is the exposition of "concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it.

अत्राथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थः स्वीक्रियते । अथशब्दास्यानेकार्थत्वे संभवति कथमारम्भार्थत्वपक्षे पक्षपातः संभवेत् ? अथशब्दस्य मङ्गलाद्यनेकार्थत्वं नामलिङ्गानुशासनेनानुशिष्टं—'मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकात्स्न्र्येष्वथो अथ ।' (अमरको० ३।३।२४६) इति । अत्र प्रश्नकात्स्न्र्ययोरसंभवेऽपि आनन्तर्यमङ्गलपूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षारम्भलक्षणानां चतुर्णामर्थानां सम्भवादारम्भार्थत्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्—।

The word "now" (*atha*) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, [as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may be objected, 'there are several possible significations of this word *atha*; why, then, should you show an unvarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive, meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender [The Amara Koṣa Dictionary] gives many such meanings. '*Atha* is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now (inceptive),—what? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness; but since there are four senses certainly suitable i.e., 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out the *last*."

मैवं मंस्थाः । विकल्पासहत्वात् । आनन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थ इति पक्षे यतः कुतश्चिदानन्तर्यं पूर्ववृत्तशमाद्यसाधारणात्कारणादानन्तर्यं वा ? न प्रथमः । 'न हि कश्चित्क्षणमपि जातु तिष्ठत्यकर्मकृत्' (गी० ३।५) इति न्यायेन सर्वो जन्तुरवश्यं किंचित्कृत्वा किंचित्करोत्येवेति तस्याभिधानमन्तरेणापि प्राप्ततया तदर्थाथशब्दप्रयोगवैयर्थ्यप्रसक्तेः ।

न चरमः । शमाद्यनन्तरं योगस्य प्रवृत्तावपि तस्यानुशासनप्रवृत्त्यनुबन्धत्वेनोपात्ततया शब्दतः प्राधान्याभावात् ।

This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after same definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation,[5] i.e., "previous existence [relatively to the effect]" ? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle *atha* to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter altternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity. etc., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance [which the presumed *cause* should have].

न च शब्दतः प्रधानभूतस्यानुशासनस्य शमाद्यानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः किं न स्यादिति वदितव्यम् । अनुशासनमिति हि शास्त्रमाह । अनुशिष्यते व्याख्यायते लक्षणभेदोपायफलसहितो योगो येन तदनुशासनमिति व्युत्पत्तेः ।

अनुशासनस्य च तत्त्वज्ञानचिख्यापयिषानन्तरभावित्वेन शमदमाद्यानन्तर्यनियमाभावात् । जिज्ञासाज्ञानयोस्तु शमाद्यानन्तर्यमाम्नायते—'तस्माच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत्' (बृ० उ० ४।४।२३) इत्यादिना । नापि तत्त्वज्ञानचिख्यापयिषानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थः । तस्य संभवेऽपि श्रोतृप्रतिपत्तिप्रवृत्त्योरनुपयोगेनानभिधेयत्वात् ।

"But why should we not hold that the word *atha* implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous transquillity of mind, etc. ?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" (*anuśāsana*), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by which the *yoga* is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results ; and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous transquillity of mind, etc., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a

profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others ; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, which should have quite of mind, etc., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Śruti : "Therefore having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent patient full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[6] Nor can the word *atha* imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others ; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not to be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student.

तथापि निःश्रेयसहेतुतया योगानुशासनं प्रमितं न वा ? आद्ये तदभावेऽपि उपादेयत्वं भवेत् । द्वितीये तद्भावेऽपि हेयत्वं स्यात् । प्रमितं चास्य निःश्रेयसनिदानत्वम् ।

अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं
मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ।
(का० २।१२) इति श्रुतेः ।

समाधावचला बुद्धिस्तदा योगमवाप्स्यसि । (गी० २।५३) इति स्मृतेश्च ।

Still [however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the exposition of the *yoga* ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not ? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent ; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[7] But it is clear that the exposition it question *is* such a cause, since we have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, ii. 12] : "By the acquirement of *yoga* or intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow ;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛti as that [in the Bhagavad Gītā, ii 53] : "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain *yoga*."

अत एव शिष्यप्रश्नतपश्चरणरसायनोपयोगाद्यानन्तर्यं पराकृतम् । 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र० सू० १।१।१) इत्यत्र तु ब्रह्मजिज्ञासाया अनधिकार्यत्वेनाधिकारार्थत्वं परित्यज्य साधनचतुष्टयसंपत्तिविशिष्टाधिकारिसमर्पणाय शमदमादिवाक्यविहिताच्छमादेरानन्तर्यमथशब्दार्थ इति शंकराचार्यैर्निरटङ्कि ।

Hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpret *atha* as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, etc. [to render the body strong].

But in the case of the Vedānta Sūtras, which open with the aphorism," "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Ācārya has declared that the inceptive meaning of *atha* must be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at will] ; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after," i.e , that this desire must follow a previous course of tranquillity, etc., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means".[8]

अथ मा नाम भूदानन्तर्यार्थोऽथशब्दः । मङ्गलार्थः किं न स्यात् ? मङ्गलस्य वाक्यार्थे समन्वयाभावात् । अगर्हिताभीष्टावाप्तिमङ्गलम् । अभीष्टं च सुखावाप्ति-दुःखपरिहाररूपतयेष्टम् । योगानुशासनस्य च सुखदुःखनिवृत्योरन्यतरत्वाभावान्न मङ्गलता । तथा च योगानुशासनं मङ्गलमिति न संपनीपद्यते ।

मृदङ्गध्वनेरिवाथशब्दश्रवणस्य कार्यतया मङ्गलस्य वाच्यत्वलक्ष्यत्वयोरसंभ-वाच्च । यथार्थिकार्थो वाक्यार्थे न निविशते तथा कार्यमपि न निविशते । अपदार्थत्वाविशेषात् । पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थे समन्वीयते । अन्यथा शब्दप्रमाणकानां शाब्दी ह्याकाङ्क्षा शब्देनैव पूर्यत इति मुद्राभङ्गः कृतो भवेत् ।

'Well, then, let us grant that *atha* cannot mean 'after;' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle !" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain ; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of *yoga*, since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[9] Therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of the *yoga* is auspicious ;" for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of *atha* or its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it

is its very sound which is in itself auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[10] We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy[11] can be fulfilled by *words* alone."

ननु प्रारिप्सितप्रबन्धपरिसमाप्तिपरिपन्थिप्रत्यूहव्यूहप्रशमनाय शिष्टाचार-परिपालनाय च शास्त्रारम्भे मङ्गलाचरणमनुष्ठेयम् । 'मङ्गलादीनि मङ्गलमध्यानि मङ्गलान्तानि च शास्त्राणि प्रथन्ते, आयुष्मत्पुरुषकाणि वीरपुरुषकाणि च भवन्ति' (पात० भाष्य० आह्नि० १) इत्यभियुक्तोक्तेः । भवति च मङ्गलार्थोऽथशब्दः—

ओंकारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा ।
कण्ठं भित्त्वा विनिर्यातौ तस्मान्माङ्गलिकावुभौ ॥

इतिस्मृतिसम्भवात् । तथा च 'वृद्धिरादैच्' (पा० सू० १।१।१) इत्यादौ वृद्ध्यादिशब्दवदथशब्दो मङ्गलार्थः स्यादिति चेत् —

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Śāstra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those śāstras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'[12] Now the word *atha* implies 'auspiciousness," since there is a Smṛti which says,

"The word *Om* and the word *atha*,—these two in the ancient time,
"Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious.'

"Therefore let the word *atha* stand here as signifying

'auspiciousness,' like the word '*vṛddhi*' used by Pāṇini in his opening sūtra '*vṛddhi ād aic.*'"

मैवं भाषिष्ठाः। अर्थान्तराभिधानाय प्रयुक्तस्याथशब्दस्य वीणावेण्वादिध्वनिवत् श्रवणमात्रेण मङ्गलफलत्वोपपत्तेः। अथार्थान्तरारम्भवाक्यार्थधीफलकस्याथशब्दस्य कथमन्यफलकतेति चेन्न। अन्यार्थं नीयमानोदकुम्भोपलम्भवत्तत्संभवात्। न च स्मृतिव्याकोपः। माङ्गलिकाविति मङ्गलप्रयोजनत्वविवक्षया प्रवृत्तेः।

This view, however is untenable; since the very word *atha*, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification just as the hearing the sound of lutes flutes, etc. [is auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How can the particle *atha* have any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" We reply that it certainly *can* have such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey." Nor does this contradict the smṛti, since the smṛti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.

नापि पूर्वप्रकृतापेक्षोऽथशब्दः। फलत आनन्तर्यव्यतिरेकेण प्रागुक्तदूषणानुषङ्गात्। किमयमथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थोऽथानन्तर्यार्थ इत्यादिविमर्शवाक्ये पक्षान्तरोपन्यासे तत्सम्भवेऽपि प्रकृते तदसम्भवाच्च।

Nor can the particle *atha* have here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particular *atha* means "the inceptive now" or "after," if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning.

तस्मात्पारिशेष्यादधिकारपदवेयनीयप्रारम्भार्थोऽथशब्द इति विशेषो भाष्यते। यथा 'अथैष ज्योतिरथैष विश्वज्योतिः' इत्यत्राथशब्दः क्रतुविशेषप्रारम्भार्थः परि-

गृहीत:, यथा च 'अथ शब्दानुशासनम्' (पात० भा० १।१) इत्यत्राथशब्दो व्याकरणशास्त्राधिकारार्थस्तद्वत् ।

Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the *atha* of the sūtra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1 ; xvi. 10, I], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now this is the Viśvajyotis," the particle *atha* is accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as the *atha* in the commencement of the Mahābhāṣya, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of Grammar.

तदभापि व्यासभाष्ये योगसूत्रविवरणपरे अथेत्ययमधिकारार्थ: प्रयुज्यते इति । तद् व्याचख्यौ वाचस्पति: । तदित्थम्—अमुष्याथशब्दस्याधिकारार्थत्वपक्षे शास्त्रेण प्रस्तूयमानस्य योगस्योपवर्तनात्समस्तशास्त्रतात्पर्यार्थव्याख्यानेन शिष्यस्य सुखावबोधप्रवृत्तिर्भवतीत्यथशब्दस्याधिकारार्थत्वमुपपन्नम् ।

This has been declared by Vyāsa in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "the *atha* in this opening aphorism idicates a commencement ;" and Vāchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss ; therefore it may be considered as settled that the *atha* here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view that this *atha* implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the śāstra through the attainment of the *yoga*, which is proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport.

ननु 'हिरण्यगर्भो योगस्य वक्ता नान्य: पुरातन:' इति याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृते: पतञ्जलि: कथं योगस्य शासितेति—अद्धा । अतएव तत्र तत्र पुराणादौ विशिष्य योगस्य विप्रकीर्णतयादुर्ग्राह्यार्थत्वं मन्यमानेन भगवता कृपासिन्धुना फणिपतिना सारं सजिघृक्षुणामनुशासनमारब्धं न तु साक्षाच्छासनम् ।

But here some one may say, "Does not the smṛti of Yājñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient sage ?' how then is Patañjali the teacher thereof ?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable

Patañjali,[16] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the Purāṇas, etc., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his *anuśāsana*,—the preposition *anu* implying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.

यदायमथशब्दोऽधिकारार्थस्तदैवं वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते—योगानुशासनं शास्त्रमधिकृतं वेदितव्यमिति । तस्मादयमथशब्दोऽधिकारद्योतको मङ्गलार्थश्चेति सिद्धम् । तत्र शास्त्रे व्युत्पाद्यमानतया योगः ससाधनः सफलो विषयः । तद्व्युत्पादनमवान्तरफलम् । व्युत्पादितस्य योगस्य कैवल्यं परमप्रयोजनम् । शास्त्रयोगयोः प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावलक्षणः संबन्धः । योगस्य कैवल्यस्य च साध्यसाधनभावलक्षणः संबन्धः । स च श्रुत्यादिप्रसिद्ध इति प्रागेवावादिषम् । मोक्षमपेक्षमाणा एवाधिकारिण इत्यर्थसिद्धम् ।

Since this *atha* in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the institute for the exposition of the *yoga* is now commenced." In this institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, is *yoga* [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption (*kaivalya*) is the highest "end" of the *yoga* when it is produced. The "connection" between the institute and *yoga* is that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between *yoga* and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Śruti and Smṛti and I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute.

न च 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' (ब्र० सू० १।१।१) इत्यादावधिकारिणोऽर्थतः सिद्धिराशङ्कनीया । तत्राथशब्देनानन्तर्याभिधानप्रणाडिकयाऽधिकारिसमर्पणसिद्धौ आर्थिकत्वशङ्कानुदयात् । अत एवोक्तं—श्रुतिप्राप्ते प्रकरणादीनामनवकाश इति । अस्यार्थः—यत्र हि श्रुत्यार्थो न लभ्यते तत्रैव प्रकरणादयोऽर्थं समर्पयन्ति नेतरत्र । यत्र तु शब्दादेवार्थस्योपलम्भस्तत्र नेतरस्य संभवः ।

शीघ्रबोधिन्या श्रुत्या विनियोगस्य बोधनेन निराकाङ्क्षतयेतरेषामनवकाशात् । किं च श्रुत्या बोधितेऽर्थे तद्विरुद्धार्थं प्रकरणादि समर्पयति, अविरुद्धं वा ? न प्रथमः । विरुद्धाथबोधकस्य तस्य बाधितत्वात् न चरणः । वैयर्थ्यात् । तदाह--'श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमथविप्रकर्षात्' (जै० सू० ३।३।१४) इति ।

बाधिकैव श्रुतिर्नित्यं समाख्या बाध्यते सदा ।
मध्यमानां तु बाध्यत्वं बाधकत्वमपेक्षया ।। इति च ।

Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedānta sūtras, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman ;" and lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedānta. For the word *atha*, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"] ; and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place."[17] The full meaning of this is as follows : Where a thing is not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise ; but whatever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant.

For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of "*śruti*"] already precluded from having any force ; and in the latter it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14] ; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' the 'relative position,' or 'the title'—when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more

remote"[18] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus summed up—

"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always precluded by any of the preceding modes;

"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself precludes, depends on circumstances."

तस्माद्विषयादिमत्त्वात् ब्रह्मविचारकशास्त्रवद्योगानुशासनमारम्भणीयमिति स्थितम् ।

ननु व्युत्पाद्यमानतया योग एवात्र प्रस्तुतो न शास्त्रमिति चेत्—सत्यम् । प्रतिपाद्यतया योगः प्राधान्येन प्रस्तुतः । स च तद्विषयेण शास्त्रेण प्रतिपाद्यत इति तत्प्रतिपादने कारणं शास्त्रम् । करणगोचरश्च कर्तृव्यापारो न कर्मगोचरतामाचरति ।

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other preliminaries, the study of the Śāstra, which teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the Vedānta, which discusses the nature of Brahman.

"But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not the Sāstra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śāstra, especially directed thereto, this Śāstra is the means for its production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end.

यथा छेत्तुर्देवदत्तस्य व्यापारभूतमुद्यमननिपातादिकर्म करणभूतपरशुगोचरं न कर्मभूतवृक्षादिगोचरम् । तथा च वक्तुः पतञ्जलेः प्रवचनव्यापारापेक्षया योगविषयस्याधिकृतता करणस्य शास्त्रस्य । अभिधानव्यापारापेक्षया तु योगस्यैवेति विभागः । ततश्च योगशास्त्रस्यारम्भः संभावनां भजते ।

अत्र चानुशासनीयो योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इत्युच्यते । ननु युजिर्योग इति संयोगार्थतया परिपठिताद् युजेर्निष्पन्नो योगशब्दः संयोगवचन एव स्यान्न तु निरोधवचनः अत एवोक्तं याज्ञवल्क्येन—

संयोगो योग इत्युक्तो जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः । इति ।

Just as the operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, i.e., his lifting his arm up and down, etc., relate rather to the instrument, i e., the axe, than to the object, i.e., the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali in his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śāstra, as his primary object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of denotation.

In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is that the commencing the Yogaśāstra is that which primarily claims our attention ; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modification of the mind, is what is to be expounded in this *Sāstra*. "But as we read in the lists of roots that the root *yuj* is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the word *yoga*, its derivative, mean 'conjunction,' and not 'restraint' And indeed this has been said by Yājñavalkya :[19]—

"The conjunction of the individual and the supreme soul is called *yoga*."

तदेतद्वातम् । जीवपरयोः संयोगे कारणस्यान्यतरकर्मादेरसंभवात् । अज-संयोगस्य कणभक्षाक्षचरणादिभिः प्रतिक्षेपाच्च । मीमांसकमतानुसारेण तदङ्गीकारेऽपि नित्यसिद्धस्य तस्य साध्यत्वाभावेन शास्त्रवैफल्यापत्तेश्च । धातूनामनेकार्थत्वेन युजेः समाध्यर्थत्वोपपत्तेश्च । तदुक्तम्—

निपाताश्चोपसर्गाश्च धातवश्चेति ते त्रयः ।
अनेकार्थाः स्मृताः सर्वे पाठस्तेषां निदर्शनम् ।। इति ।

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such action,[20] etc., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the Mīmāṁsā [or Vedānta], our Yogaśāstra would be rendered nugatory by this concession [and the very ground cut from under our fcet] ; bccause the identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to be produced by our Śāstra. And lastly

as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses,, the root *yuj* may very well be used here in the sense of "contemplation."[21] Thus it has been said—

> "Particles, prepositions, and roots—these there are all held to be of manifold meaning ; instances found in reading are their evidence."

अत एव केचन युजिं समाधावपि पठन्ति—'युज समाधौ' (पा० धातुपाठ, दि० ७१, आत्मने०) इति । नापि याज्ञवल्क्यवचनव्याकोपः तत्रस्थस्यापि योग-शब्दस्य समाध्यर्थत्वात् ।

> समाधिः समतावस्था जीवात्मपरमात्मनोः ।
> ब्रह्मण्येव स्थितिर्या सा समाधिः प्रत्यगात्मनः ।।

इति तेनोक्तत्वाच्च । तदुक्तं भगवता व्यासेन (योग भा० १।१) योगः समाधिरिति ।

Therefore some authors expressly give *yuj* in this sense, and insert in their lists "*yuj* in the sense of *samādhi.*" Nor does this contradict Yâjñavalkya's declaration, as the word *yoga*, used by him, may bear this meaning ; and he has himself said—

> "*Samādhi* is the state of identity of the individual and supreme souls ; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is the *samādhi* of the individual soul."

It has been also said by the venerable Vyāsa [in his Commentary on the Yoga-sūtras, i. 1], "*Yoga is samādhi.*"

नन्वेवमष्टाङ्गयोगे चरमस्याङ्गस्य समाधित्वमुक्तं पतञ्जलिना (पात० यो० सू० २।२९)—यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि योगस्य' इति । न चाङ्गी एवाङ्गतां गन्तुमुत्सहते । उपकार्योपकारकभावस्य दर्श-पूर्णमासप्रयाजादौ भिन्नायतनत्वेनात्यन्तभेदात् । अतः समाधिरिति न योगशब्दार्थो युज्यत इति चेत्—

An objection, however, may be here raised that "the term *samādhi* is used by Patañjali [in ii 29] in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts[22] of the eightfold concentration (or *yoga*) ; and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each other, as all their attendent circumstances must be different, just as we see in the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices and their

ancillary rites the *prayājas*, and therefore *samādhi* cannot be the meaning of *yoga*."

तन्न युज्यते । व्युत्पत्तिमात्राभिधित्सया 'तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः' (पात० यो० सू० ३।३) इति निरूपितचरमाङ्गवाचकेन समाधिशब्देनाङ्गिनो योगस्याभेदविवक्षया व्यपदेशोपपत्तेः । न च व्युत्पत्तिबलादेव सर्वत्रशब्दः प्रवर्तते । तथात्वे गच्छतीति गौरिति व्युत्पत्तेस्तिष्ठन्गौ न स्यात् । गच्छन्देवदत्तश्च गौः स्यात् ।

प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं च प्रागुक्तमेव—चित्तवृत्तिनिरोध इति । तदुक्तं—'योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः,' (पात० यो० सू० १।२) इति ।

We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for although the term *samādhi* is used for etymological reasons[23] to express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own ;" still the further use of this term to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used ; because if so, as the word *go*, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root *gam*, "to go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, would properly be called *go*, "a bull ;" and, moreover, the Sūtra, i. 2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that "concentration (*yoga*) is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The second or principal sense of *samādhi* will therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior].

ननु वृत्तीनां निरोधश्चेद्योगोऽभिमतस्तासां ज्ञानत्वेनात्माश्रयतया तन्निरोधोऽपि प्रध्वंसपदवेदनीयस्तदाश्रयो भवेत् । प्रागभावप्रध्वंसयोः प्रतियोगिसमानाश्रयत्वनियमात् । ततश्च—'उपयन्नपयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम्' इति न्यायेनात्मनः कौटस्थ्यं विहन्येतेति चेत्—

"But surely if *yoga* is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of

knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counterentity to these negations;[24] and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed."

तदपि न उटते । निरोधप्रतियोगिभूतानां प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृति-स्वरूपाणां वृत्तीनामन्तःकरणाद्यपरपर्यायचित्तधर्मत्वाङ्गीकारत् । कूटस्थनित्या चिच्छक्तिरपरिणामिनी विज्ञानधर्माश्रयो भवितुं नार्हत्येव ।

न च चितिशक्तेरपरिणामित्वमसिद्धमिति मन्तव्यम् । 'चितिशक्तिरपरिणा-मिनी सदा ज्ञातृत्वात्, न यदेवं यथा चित्तादि' इत्याद्यनुमानसंभवात् ।

This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindred,[25] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ (*citta*), since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception.

Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul[26] has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable as the internal organ, etc.

तथा यद्यसौ पुरुषः परिणामी स्यात्तदा परिणामस्य कादाचित्कत्वात्तासां चित्तवृत्तीनां सदा ज्ञातत्वं नोपपद्येत । चिद्रूपस्य पुरुषस्य सदैवाधिष्ठातृत्वेनाव-स्थितस्य यदन्तरङ्गं निर्मलं सत्त्वं तस्यापि सदैव स्थितत्वात् । येन येनार्थेनोपरक्तं भवति तस्य दृश्यस्य सदैव चिच्छायापत्त्या भानोपपत्त्या पुरुषस्य निःसङ्गत्वं संभ-वति । ततश्च सिद्धं तस्य सदा ज्ञातृत्वमिति न कदाचित्परिणामित्वशङ्कावतरति ।

And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance[27] which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the

soul, and so produces an impression ;[28] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is a mintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it.

चित्तं पुनर्येन विषयेणोपरक्तं भवति स विषयो ज्ञातः, येनोपरक्तं न भवति तदज्ञातमिति वस्तुनोऽयस्कान्तमणिकल्पस्य ज्ञानाज्ञानकारणभूतोपरागानुपरागधर्मित्वादयः सधर्मकं चित्तं परिणामीत्युच्यते ।

That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known ; that object by which it is not affected is not known ; for the understarding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge.

ननु चित्तस्येन्द्रियाणां चाहंकारिकाणां सर्वगतत्वात् सर्वविषयैरस्ति सदा संबन्धः । तथा च सर्वेषां सर्वदा सर्वत्र ज्ञानं प्रसज्येतेति चेत्—न । सर्वगतत्वेऽपि चित्तं यत्र शरीरे वृत्तिमत्, तेन शरीरेण सह संबन्धो येषां विषयाणां, तेष्वेवास्य ज्ञानं भवति, नेतरेषु—इत्यतिप्रसङ्गाभावात् । अत एवायस्कान्तमणिकल्पा विषया अयःसधर्मकं चित्तमिन्द्रियप्रणालिकयाऽभिसंबध्योपरञ्जयन्तीत्युक्तम् ।

"But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge every where and always of all things ?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding ; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses.

तस्माच्चित्तस्य धर्मा वृत्तयो नात्मनः । तथा च श्रुतिः—'कामः संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत्सर्वं मन एव' (बृ० १।५।३) इति । चिच्छक्तेरपरिणामित्वं पञ्चशिखाचार्यैराख्यायि—अपरिणामिनी भोक्तृशक्तिरिति । पतञ्जलिनापि—'सदा ज्ञाताश्चित्तवृत्तयस्तत्प्रभोः पुरुषस्यापरिणा-

मित्वात्, (पात० यो० सू० ४।१८) इति। चित्तपरिणामित्वेऽनुमानमुच्यते - चित्तं परिणामि ज्ञाताज्ञातविषयत्वात् श्रोत्रादिवदिति ।

Therefore, the "modifications' belong to the understanding not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañcaśikha declared the unchangeable;" nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense.

परिणामश्च त्रिविधः प्रसिद्धो धर्मलक्षणावस्थाभेदात् । धर्मिणश्चित्तस्य नीलाद्यालोचनं धर्मपरिणामः। यथा कनकस्य कटकमुकुटकेयूरादि । धर्मस्य वर्तमानत्वादिर्लक्षणपरिणामः । नीलाद्यालोचनस्य स्फुटत्वादिरवस्थापरिणामः । कटकादेस्तु नवपुराणत्वादिरवस्थापरिणामः । एवमन्यत्रापि यथासंभवं परिणामत्रितयमूहनीयम् । तथा च प्रमाणादिवृत्तीनां चित्तधर्मत्वात्तन्निरोधोऽपि तदाश्रय एवेति न किञ्चिदनुपपन्नम् ।

Now, this change is notoriously therefold, *i.e.*, a change of "property," of "aspect,"[29] and of "condition." When the subject, the understanding, perceives the colour "blue," etc., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a diadem, or as armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" when there is a manifestation or non-manifestion[30] of the perception, as of blue, etc., or, in the case of gold, the [relative] nowness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" and the other

modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

ननु वृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्यङ्गीकारे सुषुप्त्यादौ क्षिप्तमूढादिचित्तवृत्तीनां निरोधसंभवाद् योगत्वप्रसङ्गः । न चैतद्युज्यते । क्षिप्ताद्यवस्थासु क्लेशप्रहाणादेरसंभवान्निःश्रेयसपरिपन्थित्वाच्च । तथा हि—क्षिप्तं नाम तेषु तेषु विषयेषु क्षिप्यमाणमस्थिरं चित्तमुच्यते । तमःसमुद्रे मग्नं निद्रावृत्तिभावितं मूढमिति गीयते । क्षिप्ताद्विशिष्टं चित्तं विक्षिप्तमिति गीयते ।

विशेषो नाम—चञ्चलं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाथि बलवद् दृढम् (गी० ६।३४) इति न्यायेन स्थिरस्यापि मनसः कदाचित्कसमुद्भूतविषयस्थैर्यसंभवेन स्थैर्यम् । अस्थिरत्वं च स्वाभाविकं व्याध्याद्यनुशयजनितं वा । तदाह—'व्याधिस्त्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्याविरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमिकत्वानवस्थितत्वानि चित्तविक्षेपास्तेऽन्तरायाः ।' (पात० यो० सू० १।३०) इति ।

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.] "But if we accept your definition that '*yoga* is the suppression of the modifications of the *citta*,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension] of the modifications found in *kṣipta*, *vikṣpta*, *mūḍha*,[3] etc.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called *kṣipta*, etc., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of the *summum bonum*. Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding is called *kṣipta*, 'restless,' when it is restless [with an excess, of the quality *rajas*], as being tossed obout amidst various objects which engage it. It is called *mūḍha*, 'blinded', when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality *tamas*]. It is called *vikṣipta*, "unrestless" when it is different from the first state[32] [as filled with the quality *sattva*].

We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gītā (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Krișņa, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, etc., or othor consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the Yoga Sūtras, i. 30], 'Sickness,

languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind are called 'obstacles."

तत्र दोषत्रयवैषम्यनिमित्तो ज्वरादिर्व्याधिः । चित्तस्याकर्मण्यत्वं स्त्यानम् । विरुद्धकोटिद्वयावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः । समाधिसाधनानामभावनं प्रमादः । शरीरवाक्चित्तगुरुत्वादप्रवृत्तिरालस्यम् । विषयाभिलाषोऽविरतिः । अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिर्भ्रान्तिदर्शनम् । कुतश्चिन्निमित्तात्समाधिभूमेरलाभोऽलब्धभूमिकत्वम् । लब्धायामपि तस्यां चित्तस्याप्रतिष्ठाऽनवस्थितत्त्वमित्यर्थः । तस्मान्न वृत्तिनिरोधो योगपक्षनिक्षेपमर्हतीति चेत्—

Here 'sickness' means fever, etc., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours ; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity ; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives ; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation ; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speeeh, or mind ; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense ; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another ; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation ; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of *yoga*."

मैवं वोचः । हेयभूतक्षिप्ताद्यवस्थात्रये वृत्तिनिरोधस्य योगत्वासंभवेऽप्युपादेययोरेकाग्रनिरुद्धावस्थयोर्वृत्तिनिरोधस्य योगत्वसंभवात् । एकतानं चित्तमेकाग्रमुच्यते । निरुद्धसकलवृत्तिकं संस्कारमात्रशेषं चित्तं निरुद्धमिति भण्यते ।

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called *kṣipta*, *mūḍha*, and *vikṣipta*, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called *yoga*], this does not apply to the other two conditions called *ekāgra* and *niruddha*, which are to be pursued and attained ; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as

*yoga.* Now by *ekāgra* we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the *sattva* quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by *niruddha* we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or poentialities] remain.

स च समाधिर्द्विविधः—संप्रज्ञातासंप्रज्ञातभेदात् । तत्रैकाग्रचेतसि यः प्रमाणादिवृत्तीनां बाह्यविषयाणां निरोधः स संप्रज्ञातसमाधिः । सम्यक् प्रज्ञायतेऽस्मिन् प्रकृतेर्विविक्ततया ध्येयमिति व्युत्पत्तेः । स चतुर्विधः सवितर्कादिभेदात् ।

Now this *samādhi*, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is two-fold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" (*samprajñāta*), and "that in which distinct recognition is lost" (*asamprajñāta*) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18].[33] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," etc., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[34] is throughly recognised (*samyak prajñayate*) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, as *savitarka*, *savicāra*, *sānanda*, and *sāsmita.*

समाधिर्नाम भावना । स च भाव्यस्य विषयान्तरपरिहारेण चेतसि पुनः पुनर्निवेशनम् । भाव्यं च द्विविधम्—ईश्वरस्तत्त्वानि च । तान्यपि द्विविधानि जडाजडभेदात् । जडानि प्रकृतिमहदहंकारादीनि चतुर्विंशतिः । अजडः पुरुषः । तत्र तदा पृथिव्यादीनि स्थूलानि विषयत्वेनादाय पूर्वापरानुसंधानेन शब्दार्थोल्लेखसंभेदेन च भावना प्रवर्तते स समाधिः सवितर्कः । यदा तन्मात्रान्तःकरणलक्षणं सूक्ष्मं विषयमालम्ब्य देशाद्यवच्छेदेन भावना प्रवर्तते तदा सविचारः ।

यदा रजस्तमोलेशानुविद्धं चित्तं भाव्यते तदा सुखप्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्योद्रेकात्सानन्दः । यदा रजस्तमोलेशानभिभूतं शुद्धं सत्त्वमालम्बनीकृत्य या प्रवर्तते भावना तदा तस्यां सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावाच्चितिशक्तेरुद्रेकाच्च सत्तामात्रावशेषत्वेन सास्मितः समाधिः । तदुक्तं पतञ्जलिना—वितर्कविचारानन्दास्मितारूपानुगमात्संप्रज्ञातः (पात० यो० सू० १।१७) इति ।

Now this "meditation" is a kind of 'pondering" (*bhāvanā*), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either Iśvara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also

are of two kinds—senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, etc., are senseless ; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth etc., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[35] or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42] ; then the meditation is called "argumentative" (*savitarka*). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to space, time, etc., then the meditation is called "deliberative" (*savicāra*).

When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" (*sānanda*), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy.[36] When pondering is pursued, having as its object and pure element of goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" or "darkness" then that meditation is called "egoistical" (*sāsmita*), because here personal existence[37] only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].

सर्ववृत्तिविरोधे त्वसंप्रज्ञातः समाधिः । ननु सर्ववृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्युक्ते संप्रज्ञाते व्याप्तिर्न स्यात् । तत्र सत्त्वप्रधानाः सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिलक्षणया वृत्तेरनिरोधादिति चेत्—तदेतद्वार्तम् । क्लेशकर्मविपाकाशयपरिपन्थिचित्तवृत्तिनिरोधो योग इत्यङ्गीकारात् ।

But the meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications ? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking

power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts.[38]

क्लेशाः पुनः पञ्चधा प्रसिद्धाः—अविद्यास्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशाः क्लेशाः (पात० यो० सू० २।३) इति ।

नन्वविद्येत्यत्र किमाश्रीयते ? पूर्वपदार्थप्राधान्यममक्षिकं वर्तत इतिवत् । उत्तरपदार्थप्राधान्यं वा राजपुरुष इतिवत् । अन्यपदार्थप्राधान्यं अमक्षिको देश इतिवत् ।

The "afflictions" (*kleśa*) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. "But here a question is at once raised. In what sense is the word *avidyā*, "ignorance," used here ? Is it to be considered as an *avyayibhāva* compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board" ?[39] or is it a *tatpuruṣa* [or *karmadhāraya*] compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk" ? or is it a *bahuvrihi* compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed" ?

तत्र न पूर्वः । पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानत्वेऽविद्यायां प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधोपपत्तौ क्लेशादिकारकत्वानुपपत्तेः । अविद्याशब्दस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वाभावापत्तेश्च। न द्वितीयः । कस्यचिदभावेन विशिष्टाया विद्यायाः क्लेशादिपरिपन्थित्वेन तद्बीजत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound where predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in *avidyā* (i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or *prasajya-pratiṣedha*) ;[40] and consequently, as *avidyā* would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," etc., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (*a*+*vidyā*), opposes the "afflictions," etc., and cannot therefore be their source.

न तृतीयः । नञोऽस्त्यर्थानां बहुव्रीहिर्वा चोत्तरपदलोपश्चेति वृत्तिकारवचनानुसारेणाविद्यमाना विद्या यस्याः सा अविद्या बुद्धिरिति समासार्थसिद्धौ अविद्यायाः क्लेशादिबीजत्वानुपपत्तेः । विवेकख्यातिपूर्वकसर्ववृत्तिनिरोधसंपन्नायास्तस्याः तथात्वप्रसङ्गाच्च ।

Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛtti,[41] "there is a *bahuvrīhi* compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"[42]—we must explain this supposed *bahuvrihi* compound *avidyā* as follows: "That *buddhi* is to be characterised as *avidyā* (*sc.* an adjective), of which there is not a *vidyā* existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an *avidyā* could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[43] and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[44] even though it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[45] and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the *sāsmita* meditation].

उक्तं चास्मितादीनां क्लेशानामविद्यानिदानत्वम्—'अविद्या क्षेत्रमुत्तरेषां प्रसुप्ततनुविच्छिन्नोदाराणाम्' (पात० यो० सू० २।४) इति । तत्र प्रसुप्तत्वं प्रबोध-सहकार्यभावेनानभिव्यक्तिः । तनुत्वं प्रतिपक्षभावनया शिथिलीकरणम् । विच्छिन्नत्वं बलवता क्लेशेनाभिभवः । उदारत्वं सहकारिसंनिधिवशात्कार्यकारित्वम् ।

'Now it is said [in the Yoga Sūtras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field [or place of origin, i.e., source] of the others, whether they be dormant extenuated ietercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them.

तदुक्तं वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण व्यासभाष्यव्याख्यायाम्—

प्रसुप्तास्तत्त्वलीनानां तन्ववस्थाश्च योगिनाम् ।
विच्छिन्नोदाररूपाश्च क्लेशा विषयसङ्गिनाम् ॥

(तत्त्ववै० २।४) इति ।

द्वन्द्ववत्स्वतन्त्रपदार्थद्वयानवगमादुभयपदार्थप्रधानत्वं नाशङ्कितम् । तस्मात्पक्ष-त्रयेऽपि क्लेषादिनिदानत्वमविद्यायाः प्रसिद्धं हीयेतेति चेत्—

This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra in his Gloss on Vyāsa's commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—

'The dormant "afflictions' are found in those souls which are absorbed in the *tattvas* [i.e., not embodied, but existing in an interval of mundane destruction]: the 'extenuated'[46] are found in *yogins*; but the 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact with worldly objects."

"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound *avidyā* as a *dvandva* compound,[47] where both portions are equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. Therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives[48] the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown."

तदपि न शोभनं विभाति । पर्युदासशक्तिमाश्रित्याविद्याशब्देन विद्याविरुद्धस्य विपर्ययज्ञानस्याभिधानमिति वृद्धैरङ्गीकारात् । तदाह—

नामधात्वर्थयोगे तु नैव नञ् प्रतिषेधकः ।
वदत्यब्राह्मणाधर्मावन्यमात्रविरोधिनौ ॥ इति ।
वृद्धप्रयोगगम्यो हि शब्दार्थः सर्व एव नः ।
तेन यत्र प्रयुक्तो यो न तस्मादपनीयते ॥ इति ।

[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called *paryudāsa* [where the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that *avidyā* means a contradictory [or *wrong*] kind of knowledge, the reverse of *vidyā*; and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been said—

'The particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' [or 'non-existence'] when connected with a noun or a root; thus the words *abrāhmaṇa* and *adharma* respectively signify, 'what is other than a Brāhman' and 'what is contrary to justice.'"

And again—

"We are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of the ancient writers; therefore a word must not be wrested from the use in which it has been already employed."

वाचस्पतिमिश्रैरप्युक्तं—लोकाधीनावधारणो हि शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धः । लोके चोत्तरपदार्थप्रधानस्यापि नञ उत्तरपदाभिधेयोपमर्दकस्य तद्विरुद्धतया तत्र तत्रोपलब्धेरिहापि तद्विरुद्धे प्रवृत्तिरिति ।

Vācaspati also says,[49] 'The connection of words and their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty ; and since we occasionally see that a *tatpuruṣa* negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too [in *avidyā*] the real meaning is something contrary to *vidyā*" [i.e , the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the positive "ignorance".[50]].

एतदेवाभिप्रेत्तोक्तम्—'अनित्याशुचिदुःखानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्यातिरविद्या' (पा॰ यो॰ सू॰ २।५) इति । अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिर्विपर्यय इत्युक्तं भवति । तद्यथा—अनित्ये घटादौ नित्यत्वाभिमानः । अशुचौ कायादौ शुचित्वप्रत्ययः ।

स्थानाद्बीजादुपष्टम्भान्निष्यन्दान्निधनादपि ।
कायमाधेयशौचत्वात्पण्डिता ह्यशुचिं विदुः ॥ इति ।

It is with a view to this that it is said in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." *Viparyaya*, "misconception," is defined as "the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing," [i.e., in its opposite] ; as, for instance, the imagining the "eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, i.e., a jar, or the imagining the "pure" in the "impure" body,[52] when it has been declared by a proverbial couplet[53]—

"The wise recognise the body as impure, from its original place [the womb],—from its primal seed,—from its composition [of humours, etc.],—from perspiration,—from death [as even a Brahman's body defiles],—and from the fact that it has to be made pure by rites."

'परिणामतापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणवृत्त्यविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः' (पात॰ यो॰ सू॰ २।१५) इति न्यायेन दुःखे स्रक्चन्दनवनितादौ सुखत्वारोपः । अनात्मनि देहादावात्मबुद्धिः । तदुक्तम्—

अनात्मनि च देहादावात्मबुद्धिस्तु देहिनाम् ।
अविद्या तत्कृतो बन्धस्तन्नाशो मोक्ष उच्यते ॥ इति ।

So,—in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii. 15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[54] or through the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent impressions which it leaves behind,

and also from the mutual opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indefference],—ignorance transfers the idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, e.g., garlands, sandal-wood, women, etc.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul" e.g., the body, etc., as the "soul." As it has been said—

> "But ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of 'soul' to the 'non-soul,' as the body, etc.;
> "This causes bondage; but in the abolition thereof is liberation."

एवमियमविद्या चतुष्पदा भवति । नन्वेतेषु अविद्याविशेषेषु किंचिदनुगतं सामान्यलक्षणं वर्णनीयम् । अन्यथा विशेषस्यासिद्धेः तथा चोक्तं भट्टाचार्यैः—

सामान्यलक्षणं मुक्त्वा विशेषस्यैव लक्षणम् ।
न शक्यं केवलं वक्तुमतोऽप्यस्य न वाच्यता ।। इति ।

तदपि न वाच्यम् । अतस्मिंस्तद्बुद्धिरिति सामान्यलक्षणाभिधानेन दत्तोत्तरत्वात् ।

Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[55]

"But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance should there not be given some general definition applying to them all, as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumārila—

> 'Without some general definition, a more special definition cannot be given by itself; therefore it must not be even mentioned here.'

This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as "the imagining of a thing in its opposite."

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरहमस्मीत्येकताभिमानोऽस्मिता । तदप्युक्तं—'दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरेकात्मतेवास्मिता' (पात० यो० सू० २।६) इति । सुखाभिज्ञस्य सुखानुस्मृतिपूर्वकः सुखसाधनेषु तृष्णारूपो गर्धो रागः । दुःखाभिज्ञस्य तदनुस्मृतिपुरस्सरं तत्साधनेषु निवृत्तिर्द्वेषः । तदुक्तं—'सुखानुशयी रागः' (पात० यो० सू० २।७), 'दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः' (पात० यो० सू० २।८) इति ।

"Egoism" (*asmitā*) is the notion that the two separate things, the soul and the quality of purity,[56] are one and the same, as is

said (ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of sight." "Desire" (*rāga*) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, proceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (*dveṣa*) is the feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" "Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).

किमत्रानुशयिशब्दे ताच्छील्यार्थे णिनिरिनिर्वा मत्वर्थीयोऽभिमतः ? नाद्यः । 'सुप्यजातौ णिनिस्ताच्छील्ये' (पा० सू० ३।२।८८) इत्यत्र सुपीति वर्तमाने पुनः सुब्ग्रहणस्योपसर्गनिवृत्त्यर्थत्वेन सोपसर्गाद्धातोर्णिनेरनुत्पत्तेः । यथाकथंचित् तदङ्गीकारेऽपि 'अचो ञ्णिति' (पाणि० सू० ७।२।११५) इति वृद्धिप्रसक्तावतिशाय्यादिपदवत् अनुशायिपदस्य प्रयोगप्रसङ्गात् ।

Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this word *anuśayin* ('dwelling') as formed by the *kṛt* affix *ṇini* in the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the *taddhita* affix *ini* in the sense of *matup* ? It cannot be the former, since the affix *ṇini* cannot be used after a root compound with a preposition as *anuśī* ; for as the word *supi* has already occured in the Sūtra, iii. 2, 4, and has been exerting its influence in the following sūtras, this word must have been introduced a second time in the Sūtra, iii. 2, 78, *supy ajātau ṇinis tacchīlye*,[57] on purpose to exclude prepositions, as these have no case terminations ; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sūtra, vii. 2, 115, *acho ñṇiti*,[58] that the radical vowel must be subject to *vṛddhī*, and so the word must be *anuśāyin*, in accordance with the analogy of such words as *atiśāyin*, etc.

न द्वितीयः । 'एकाक्षरात्कृतो जातेः सप्तम्यां च न तौ स्मृतौ' इति तत्प्रतिषेधात् । अत्र चानुशयशब्दस्याजन्तत्वेन कृदन्तत्वात् । तस्मादनुशयिशब्दो दुरुपपाद इति चेत्—नैतत् भद्रम् । भावानवबोधात् । प्रायिकाभिप्रायमिदं वचनम् ।

Nor is the latter view tenable (i.e., that it is the *taddhita* affix *ini*[59]), since *ini* is forbidden by the technical verse—

> 'These two affixes[60] are not used after a monosyllable nor a *kṛt* formation nor a word meaning 'genus,' nor with a word in the locative case ;'

and the word *anuśaya* is clearly a *kṛt* formation as it ends with the affix *ach*[61] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so renders it insusceptible of the affix *ini*]. Consequently, the word *anuśayin* in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is very hard to justify."[4] This cavil, however, is not to be admitted ; since the rule, is only to be understood as applying generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of essential importance.

अत एवोक्तं वृत्तिकारेण—इतिकरणो विवक्षार्थः सर्वत्राभिसंबध्यते इति । तेन क्वचिद् भवति—कार्यी कार्यिकस्तण्डुली तण्डुलिकः इति । तथा च कृदन्ताज्जातेश्च प्रतिषेधस्य प्रायिकत्वम् । अनुशयशब्दस्य कृदन्ततया इनेरुपपत्तिरिति सिद्धम् ।

Hence the author of the Vṛtti has said --

"The word *iti*, as implying the idea of popular acceptation, is everywhere connected with the examples of this rule[5] [*i.e.*, it is not an absolute law]."

Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as *kāryin*, *kāryika* [where the affixes are added after a *kṛt* formation]. *taṇḍulin taṇḍulika* [where they are added after a word meaning "genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after *kṛt* formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of the affix *ini* is justified, although the word *anuśaya* is formed by a *kṛt* affix. This doubt therefore is settled.

पूर्वजन्मानुभूतमरणदुःखानुभववासनाबलात्सर्वस्य प्राणभृन्मात्रस्या कृमेरा च विदुषः संजायमानः शरीरविषयादेर्ममवियोगो मा भूदिति प्रत्यहं निमित्तं बिना प्रवर्तमानो भयरूपोऽभिनिवेशः पञ्चमः क्लेशः । मा न भूवं हि भूयासमिति प्रार्थनायाः प्रत्यात्ममनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । तदाह—'स्वरसवाही विदुषोऽपि तथा रूढोऽभिनिवेशः' (पात० यो० सू० २।९) इति । ते चाविद्यादयः पञ्च सांसारिकविविधदुःखोपहारहेतुत्वेन पुरुषं क्लिश्नन्तीति क्लेशाः प्रसिद्धाः ।

The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence". (*abhiniveśa*), is what prevails in the case of all living beings from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from the body, things sensible, etc.," through the force of the impression left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every individual has the wish, "May I not cease to

be," "May I be." This is declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the philosopher" [ii. 9] These five, "ignorance," etc., are well known as the "afflictions" (*kleśa*), since they afflict the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles.

कर्माणि विहितप्रतिषिद्धरूपाणि ज्योतिष्टोमब्रह्महत्यादीनि । विपाकाः कर्मफलानि जात्यायुर्भोगाः । आ फलविपाकाच्चित्तभूमौ शेरत इत्याशयाः धर्माधर्मसंस्काराः । तत्परिपन्थिचित्तवृत्तिनिरोधो योगः । निरोधो नाभावमात्रमभिमतम् । तस्य तुच्छत्वेन भावरूपसाक्षात्कारजननक्षमत्वासंभवात् । किंतु तदाश्रयो मधुमती-मधुप्रतीकाविशोका-संस्कारशेषाव्यपदेश्यश्चित्तस्यावस्थाविशेषः । निरुध्यन्तेऽस्मिन्प्रमाणाद्याश्चित्तवृत्तय इति व्युत्पत्तेरुपपत्तेः ।

[We next describe the *karmāśaya* of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or "merits" in the mind] "Works" (*karman*) consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, brāhmanicide, etc. "Stock" (*āśaya*) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own experience as rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].

Now "concentration" [*yoga*] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the operation of the "afflictions," etc.; and this "suppression" is not considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications [i.e., a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce positive impressions on the mind ; but it is rather the site of this non-existence,[64]—a particular state of the thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully described hereafter], *madhumatī madhupratīkā*, *viśokā*, and *saṃskāraśeṣatā*. The word *nirodha* thus corresponds to its etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the thinking principle, right notion, missonception, etc., are suppressed (*nirudhyante*).

'अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां वृत्तिनिरोधः । तत्र स्थितौ यत्नोऽभ्यासः ।' (पात० यो० सू० १।१२-१३) । वृत्तिरहितस्य चित्तस्य स्वरूपनिष्ठः प्रशान्तवाहिताख्यः परिणामविशेषः स्थितिः । तं निमित्तीकृत्य यत्नः पुनः पुनस्तथात्वेन चेतसि निवेशनमभ्यासः । 'चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति' इतिवत् निमित्तार्थे सप्तमीत्युक्तं भवति ।

This suppression of the modifications is produced by "exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13]. This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural state, unaffected by those modifications which at different time assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[65] "Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, *sthitau*, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its skin."[66]

'दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्' (पात० यो० सू० १।१५)। ऐहिकपारत्रिकविषयादौ दोषदर्शनान्निरभिलाषस्य 'ममैते विषया वश्याः' "नाहमेतेषां वश्यः' इति विमर्शो वैराग्यमित्युक्तं भवति। समाधिपरिपन्थिक्लेशतनूकरणार्थं च समाधिलाभार्थं प्रथमं क्रियायोगविधानपरेण योगिना भवितव्यम्। क्रियायोगसंपादनेऽभ्यासवैराग्ययोः संभवात्। तदुक्तं भगवता—

आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते।
योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शमः कारणमुच्यते॥ (गी० ६।३) इति।

"Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those that are heared of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from perceiving the imperfections attached to them.

Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and to attain meditation, the *yogin* must first direct his attention to practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛiṣṇa in the Bhagvad Gītā [vi. 3]—

"Action is the means to the sage who wishes tortoise to *yoga*;
"But to him who has risen to it, tranquillity is said to be the means."

क्रियायोगश्चोपदिष्टः पतञ्जलिना—'तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः' (पात० यो० सू० २।१) इति। तपःस्वरूपं निरूपितं याज्ञवल्क्येन—

विधिनोक्तेन मार्गेण कृच्छ्चान्द्रायणादिभिः ।
शरीरशोषणं प्राहुस्तपसां तप उत्तमम् ॥ इति ।

Patañjali has thus defined the practical *yoga* : "Practical concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yājñavalkya has described "mortification"—

"By the way prescribed in sacred rule, by the difficult cāndrāyaṇa fast, etc."

"Thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all mortification."[67]

प्रणवगायत्रीप्रभृतीनां मन्त्राणामध्ययनं स्वाध्यायः । ते च मन्त्रा द्विविधाः— वैदिकास्तान्त्रिकाश्च । वैदिकाश्च द्विविधाः—प्रगीताः अप्रगीताश्च । तत्र प्रगीताः सामानि । अप्रगीताश्च द्विविधाः—छन्दोबद्धास्तद्विलक्षणाश्च । तत्र प्रथमा ऋचः, द्वितीया यजूंषि । तदुक्तं जैमिनिना—'तेषामृग्यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था । गीतिषु समाख्या । शेषे यजुःशब्दः । (जै० सू० २।१।३३-३५) इति । तन्त्रेषु कामिककारणप्रपञ्चाद्यागमेषु ये ये वर्णितास्ते तान्त्रिकाः । ते पुनर्मन्त्रास्त्रिविधाः— स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकभेदात् । तदाह—

स्त्रीपुंनपुंसकत्वेन त्रिविधा मन्त्रजातयः ।
स्त्रीमन्त्रा वह्निजायान्ता नमोऽन्ताः स्युर्नपुंसकाः ॥
शेषाः पुमांसस्ते शस्ताः सिद्धा वश्यादिकर्मणि ॥ इति ।

"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the *gāyatrī*, etc. Now these *mantras* are of two kinds, Vaidik and Tāntrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not chanted. Those chanted are the *sāmans*; those not chanted are either in metre, i.e., the *ṛcas*, or in prose, i.e., the *yajūṁṣi*, as has been said by Jaimini.[68] "Of these, that in a *ṛc* in which by the force of the sense there is a definite division into *pādas* [or portions of a verse] ; the name *sāman* is applied to chanted portions; the word *yajus* is applied to the rest." Those *mantras* are called Tāntrik which are set forth in sacred books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[69] and these are again threefold, as female, male, and neuter ; as it has been said—

"The *mantras* are of three kinds, as female, male, and neuter:"

"The female are those which end in the wife of fire (i.e., the exclamation *svāhā*) ; the neuter those which end in *namas* ;"

"The rest are male, and considered the best. They are all-powerful in mesmerising another's will, etc."

जननादिसंस्काराभावेऽपि निरस्तसमस्तदोषत्वेन सिद्धिहेतुत्वात् सिद्धत्वम् । स च संस्कारो दशविधः कथितः शारदातिलके—

मन्त्राणां दश कथ्यन्ते संस्काराः सिद्धिदायिनः ।
निर्दोषतां प्रयान्त्याशु ते मन्त्राः साधु संस्कृताः ।।

They are called "all-powerful" (*siddha*) because they counteract all defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, etc., have been omitted.

Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (*saṁskāra*) are ten, and they have been thus described in the *Śāradātilaka*—

"There are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give to *mantras* efficacy :"
"These mantras are thus made complete ; they are thoroughly consecrated."

जननं जीवनं चैव ताडनं बोधनं तथा ।
अभिषेकोऽथ विमलीकरणाप्यायने पुनः ।।
तर्पणं दीपनं गुप्तिर्दशैता मन्त्रसंस्क्रियाः ।
मन्त्राणां मातृकायन्त्रादुद्धारो जननं स्मृतम् ।।
प्रणवान्तरितान्कृत्वा मन्त्रवर्णाञ्जपेत्सुधीः ।
मन्त्रार्णसंख्यया तद्धि जीवनं संप्रचक्षते ।।

"The 'begetting,' the 'vivifying,' the 'smiting,' the 'awakening,'
"The 'sprinkling,' the 'purifying,' the 'fattening,'
"The 'satisfying,' the 'illumining,' the 'concealing,'—these are the ten consecrations of *mantras*.
"The 'begetting' (*janana*) is the extracting of the mantra from its vowels and consonants.
"The wise man should mutter the several letters of the *mantra*, each united to Om,
"According to the number of the letters. This they call the 'vivifying' (*jīvana*).

मन्त्रवर्णान्समालिख्य ताडयेच्चन्दनाम्भसा ।
प्रत्येकं वायुबीजेन ताडनं तदुदाहृतम् ।।

विलिख्य मन्त्रवर्णास्तु प्रसूनैः करवीरजैः ।
मन्त्राक्षरेण संख्यातैर्हन्यात्तद्बोधनं स्मृतम् ॥
स्वतन्त्रोक्तविधानेन मन्त्री मन्त्रार्णसंख्यया ।
अश्वत्थपल्लवैर्मन्त्रमभिषिञ्चेद्विशुद्धये ॥
संचिन्त्य मनसा मन्त्रं ज्योतिर्मन्त्रेण निर्दहेत् ।
मन्त्रे मलत्रयं मन्त्री विमलीकरणं हि तत् ॥
तारव्योमाग्निमनुयुग्ज्योतिर्मन्त्र उदाहृतः ।
कुशोदकेन जप्तेन प्रत्यर्णं प्रोक्षणं मनोः ॥
वारिबीजेन विधिवदेतदाप्यायनं मतम् ।
मन्त्रेण वारिणा मन्त्रे तर्पणं तर्पणं स्मृतम् ॥
तारमायारमायोगो मनोर्दीपनमुच्यते ।
जप्यमानस्य मन्त्रस्य गोपनं त्वप्रकाशनम् ॥

"Having written the letters of the *mantra*, let him smite each with sandal-water,

"Uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air.[70] This is called the 'smiting' ( *tāḍana* ).

"Having written the letters of the *mantra*, let him strike them with oleander flowers.

"Each enumerated with a letter. This is called the 'awakening' (*bodhana*).

"Let the adept, according to the ritual prescribed in his own special *tantra*,

"Sprinkle the letters, according to their number, with leaves of the Ficus religiosa. This is the 'sprinkling' ( *abhiṣeka*).

"Having meditated on the *mantra* in his mind, let him consume by the *jyotir-mantra*,

"The threefold impurity of the *mantra*. This is the 'purification (*vimalī-karaṇa*).

"The utterance of the *jyotir-mantra*, together with Om, and the *mantras* of Vyoman and Agni,

"And the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch of kuśa grass,

"With the mystical seed of water[71] duly muttered,—this is held to be the 'fattening' (*āpyāyana*).

"The satiating libation over the *mantra* with *mantra* hallowed water is the 'satisfying' (*tarpaṇa*).

"The joining of the *mantra* with Om and the 'seeds' of Māyā[72] and Ramā[73] is called its 'illumining' (*dīpana*).

"The non-publication of the *mantra* which is being muttered—this is its 'concealing' ( *gopana* ).

संस्कारा दशमन्त्राणां सर्वतन्त्रेषु गोपिताः ।
यत्कृत्वा संप्रदायेन मन्त्री वाञ्छितमश्नुते ॥
रुद्धकीलितविच्छिन्नसुप्तशप्तादयोऽपि च ।
मन्त्रदोषाः प्रणश्यन्ति संस्कारैरेभिरुत्तमैः ॥ इति ।

तदलमकाण्डताण्डवकल्पेन तन्त्ररहस्योद्घोषणेन ।

"These ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all *tantras* ;

"And the adept who practises them according to the tradition obtains his desire ;

"And *ruddha, kīlita, vichinna, supta, śapta*, and the rest,

"All these faults in the *mantra* rites are abolished by these excellent consecrations."

But enough of this venturing to make public the *tantra* mysteries connected with *mantra*, which has suddenly led us astray like an unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[73]

ईश्वरप्रणिधानं नामाभिहितानामनभिहितानां च सर्वासां क्रियाणां परमेश्वरे परमगुरौ फलानपेक्षया समर्पणम् । यत्रेदमुक्तम्—

कामतोऽकामतो वापि यत्करोमि शुभाशुभम् ।
तत्सर्वं त्वयि विन्यस्तं त्वत्प्रयुक्तः करोम्यहम् ॥ इति ।

The third form of practical *yoga*, "resignation to the Lord" ( *īśvara-praṇidhāna* ), is the consigning all one's works, whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been said—

"Whatever I do, good or bad, voluntary or involuntary,
"That is all made over to thee ; I act as impelled by thee."

क्रियाफलसंन्यासोऽपि भक्तिविशेषापरपर्यायं प्रणिधानमेव । फलानभिसंधानेन कर्मकरणात् । तथा च गीयते गीतासु भगवता—

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।
मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भूर्मा ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥

(गी० २।४७) इति ।

फलाभिसंधेरुपघातकत्वमभिहितं भगवद्भिर्नीलकण्ठभारतीश्रीचरणैः—

अपि प्रयत्नसंपन्नं कामेनोपहृतं तपः ।
न तुष्टये महेशस्य श्वलीढमिव पायसम् ॥ इति ।

This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of the fruits of one's actions" and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is sung in the Bhagavad Gītā [ii. 47]—

"Let thy sole concern be with action and never with the fruits ;
"Be not attracted by the fruit of the action, nor be thou attached to inaction."

The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared by the venerable Nīlakaṇṭha-bhāratī—

"Even a penance accomplished by great effort, but vitiated by desire,
"Produces only disgust in the Great Lord, like milk which has been licked by a dog."

सा च तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानात्मिका क्रिया योगसाधनत्वाद्योग इति शुद्धसारोपलक्षणावृत्त्याश्रयणेन निरूप्यते, यथायुर्घृतमिति ।

शुद्धसारोपालक्षणा नाम लक्षणाप्रभेदः । मुख्यार्थबाधतद्योगाभ्यामर्थान्तर-प्रतिप्रपादनं लक्षणा । सा द्विविधा—रूढिमूला प्रयोजनमूला च । तदुक्तं काव्य-प्रकाशे—

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ॥
(का० प्र० ६।२) इति ।

Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and resignation is itself called *yoga*, because it is a means for producing *yoga*, this being an instance of the function of words called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, "Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new meaning with the former ; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on a motive. This has been declared in the *Kāvya-prakāśa* [ii. 9]—

"When, in consequence of the incompatibility of the principal meaning of a word, and yet in connection with it, another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive, this is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."

यच्छब्देन लक्ष्यत इत्याख्याते गुणीभूतं प्रतिपादनमात्रं परामृश्यते । सा लक्षणेति प्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानापेक्षया तच्छब्दस्य स्त्रीलिङ्गत्वोपपत्तिः । तदुक्तं कैयटैः—निर्दिश्यमानप्रतिनिर्दिश्यमानयोरैक्यमापादयन्ति सर्वनामानि पर्यायेण । तत्तल्लिङ्गमुपाददत इति । ।

Now the word "this" i.e., *tat* in the neuter which the neuter *yat* in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of the feminine *sā* would have signified some neuter word, like "implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is indicated." But *sā* is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree with *lakṣaṇā*], "this is indication," i.e., the neuter "this" is put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has been explained by Kaiyaṭa; "Of those pronouns which imply the identity of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the former, the latter of the latter."[74]

तत्र 'कर्मणि कुशलः' इत्यादि रूढिलक्षणाया उदाहरणम् । कुशाल्लातीति व्युत्पत्त्या दर्भादानकर्तरि यौगिकं कुशलपदं विवेचकत्वसारूप्यात्प्रवीणे प्रवर्तमानमनादिवृद्धव्यवहारपरम्परानुपातित्वेन अभिधानवत्प्रयोजनमनपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते । तदाह—

निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चित्सामर्थ्यादभिधानवत् । (त० वा०) इति ।

Now "expert (*kuśala*) in business" is an example of Indication from notoriety ; for the word *kuśala*, which is significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as *kuśaṁ*+*lāti*, "one who gathers kuśa grass for the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment ; and this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said—

"Some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from their immediate significance, just as is the case in 'denotation' [the primary power of a word]."

तस्माद्रूढिलक्षणाया: प्रयोजनापेक्षा नास्ति । यद्यपि प्रयुक्त: शब्द: प्रथमं मुख्यार्थं प्रतिपादयति, तेनार्थेनार्थान्तरं लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थधर्मोऽयं लक्षणा, तथापि तत्प्रतिपादके शब्दे समारोपित: सञ्शब्दव्यापार: इति व्यपदिश्यते । एतदेवाभिप्रेत्योक्तं—लक्षणारोपिता क्रियेति ।

Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive. Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that the author of the Kāvyaprakāśa used the expression, "This is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word."

प्रयोजनलक्षणा तु षड्विधा उपादानलक्षणा लक्षणलक्षणा गौणसारोपा गौणसाध्यवसाना शुद्धसारोपा शुद्धसाध्यवसाना चेति । कुन्ता: प्रविशन्ति, मञ्चा: क्रोशन्ति, गौर्वाहीक:, गौरयम्, आयुर्घृतम्, आयुरेवेदम्—इति यथाक्रममुदाहरणानि द्रष्टव्यानि ।

तदुक्तम्—

स्वसिद्धये पराक्षेप: परार्थं स्वसमर्पणम् ।
उपादानं लक्षणं चेत्युक्ता शुद्धैव सा द्विधा ।।
सारोपाऽन्या तु यत्रोक्तौ विषयी विषयस्तथा ।
विषय्यन्त: कृतेऽन्यस्मिन्सा स्यात्साध्यवसानिका ।।
भेदाविमौ च सादृश्यात्संबन्धान्तरतस्तथा ।
गौणौ शुद्धौ च विज्ञेयौ लक्षणा तेन षड्विधा ।।

(का० प्र० २।१०-१२) इति ।

तदलं काव्यमीमांसामर्मनिर्मन्थनेन ।

But the indication based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[76] as "the lances enter" [where we really mean "men *with* the lances"]; 2. indicative indiction, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators are meant *without* the benches]; 3. qualified[77] superimponent indication, as "the man of the Punjāb is an ox" [here the object is not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile]; 5, pure superimponent, as "*ghī* is

life ;" 6. pure introsusceptive indication, as "varily this is life." This has been all explained in the Kāvyaprakāśa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.

स च योगो यमादिभेदवशादष्टाङ्ग इति निर्दिष्टः । तत्र यमा अहिंसादयः । तदाह पतञ्जलिः—'अहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः' (पात० यो० सू० २।३०) इति । नियमाः शौचादयः । तदप्याह—'शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वर-प्रणिधानानि नियमाः' (पात० यो० सू० २।३२) इति ।

एते च यमनियमा विष्णुपुराणे दर्शिताः—

ब्रह्मचर्यमहिंसा च सत्यास्तेयापरिग्रहान् ।
सेवेत योगी निष्कामो योग्यतां स्वं मनो नयन् ॥
स्वाध्यायशौचसंतोषतपांसि नियतात्मवान् ।
कुर्वीत ब्रह्मणि तथा परस्मिन्प्रवणं मनः ॥
एते यमाः सनियमाः पञ्च पञ्च प्रकीर्तिताः ।
विशिष्टफलदाः कामे निष्कामाणां विमुक्तिदाः ॥

(वि० पु० ६।७।३६-३८) इति

This *yoga* has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it (*aṅga*) ; these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, Forbearance consists in not wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting" [ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment, mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. 32] ; and these are described in the Vishṇu Purāṇa [vi. 7, 36-38]—

"The sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining Brahman, practices, void of all desire,
"Continence, abstinence from injury, truth, non-stealing, and non-coveting ;
"Self-controlled, he should practise recitation of texts, purification, contentment, and austerity,
"And then he should make his mind intent on the Supreme Brahman.
"These are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and the five 'religious observances ;'

"They bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of reward, and eternal liberation to those void of desire."

स्थिरसुखमासनं (पात० यो० सू० २।४६) पद्मासनभद्रासन-वीरासन-स्वस्तिकासन-दण्डकासन-सोपाश्रय-पर्यङ्क-क्रौञ्चनिषदनोष्ट्रनिषदन - समसंस्थानभेदाद्दशविधम् ।

पादाङ्गुष्ठौ निबध्नीयाद्धस्ताभ्यां व्युत्क्रमेण तु ।
ऊर्वोरुपरि विप्रेन्द्र कृत्वा पादतले उभे ॥
पद्मासनं भवेदेतत्सर्वेषामभिपूजितम् ।

इत्यादिना याज्ञवल्क्यः पद्मासनादिस्वरूपं निरूपितवान् । तत्सर्वं तत एवावगन्तव्यम् ।

"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46] ; it is of ten kinds, as the *padma, bhadra, vīra, svastika, daṇḍaka, sopāśraya, paryaṅka, krauñchan shadana ushṭranishadana, samasaṁsthāna,* Yājñavalkya has described each of them in the passage which commences—

"Let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands, but in reverse order,
"Having placed the soles of his feet, O chief of Brāhmans, on his thighs ;
"This will be the *padma* posture, held in honour by all."

तस्मिन्नासनस्थैर्ये सति प्राणायामः प्रतिष्ठितो भवति स च श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदस्वरूपः । तत्र श्वासो नाम बाह्यस्य वायोरन्तरानयनम् । प्रश्वासः पुनः कोष्ठ्यस्य बहिर्निःसारणम् । तयोरुभयोरपि संचरणाभावः प्राणायामः ।

ननु नेदं प्राणायामसामान्यलक्षणम् । तद्विशेषेसु रेचकपूरककुम्भकप्रकारेषु तदनुगतेरयोगादिति चेत्—नैष दोषः । सर्वत्रापि श्वासप्रश्वासगतिविच्छेदसंभवात् ।

तथा हि—कोष्ठ्यस्य वायोर्बहिर्निःसरणं रेचकः प्राणायामो यः प्रश्वासत्वेन प्रागुक्तः । बाह्यस्य वायोरन्तर्धारणं पूरको यः श्वासरूपः । अन्तःस्तम्भवृत्तिः कुम्भकः । यस्मिञ्जलमिव कुम्भे निश्चलतया प्राणाख्यो वायुरवस्थाप्यते । तत्र सर्वत्र श्वासप्रश्वासद्वयगतिविच्छेदोऽस्त्येवेति नास्ति शङ्कावकाशः । तदुक्तं—"तस्मिन्सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः' (पात० यो० सू० २।४९) इति ।

The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.—When this steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of

the motion of inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of the external air ; expiration is the expelling of the air within the body ; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a general definition of regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply to the special kinds, as *rechaka*, *pūraka*, and *kumbhaka*." We reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found in all these special kinds. Thus *rechaka*, which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which has been mentioned before as "expiration ;" and *pūraka*, which is the [regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the "inspiration ;" and *kumbhaka* is the internal suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called *prāṇa*, remains motionless like water in a jar (*kumbha*). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt is needless.

स च वायुः सूर्योदयमारभ्य सार्धघटिकाद्वयं घटीयन्त्रस्थितघटभ्रमणन्यायेन एकैकस्यां नाड्यां भवति । एवं सत्यहर्निशं श्वासप्रश्वासयोः षट्शताधिकैकविंशति-सहस्राणि जायन्ते । अत एवोक्तं मन्त्रसमर्पणरहस्यवेदिभिरजपामन्त्रसमर्पणे—

षट्शतानि गणेशाय षट्सहस्रं स्वयंभुवे ।
विष्णवे षट्सहस्रं च षट्सहस्रंपिनाकिने ।
सहस्रमेकं गुरवे सहस्रं परमात्मने ।
सहस्रमात्मने चैवमर्पयामि कृतं जपम् ।। इति ।

Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two *ghaṭikās* and a half[78] in each artery[79] (*nāḍi*), like the revolving buckets on a waterwheel.[80] Thus in the course of a day and night there are produced 21,600 inspirations and expirations. Hence it has been said by those who know the secret of transmitting the *mantras*, concerning the transmission of the *ajapāmantra*[81]—

"Six hundred to Gaṇeśa, six thousand to the self-existent
Brahman,
"Six thousand to Viṣṇu, six thousand to Śiva,
"One thousand to the Guru (Bṛhaspati), one thousand to the
Supreme Soul,

"And one thousand to the soul : thus I make over the performed muttering."

तथा नाडीसंचारणदशायां वायोः संचरणे पृथिव्यादीनि तत्त्वानि वर्णविशेष-वशात्पुरुषार्थाभिलाषुकैः पुरुषैरवगन्तव्यानि । तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः :—

सार्धं घटीद्वयं नाड्योरेकैकार्कोदयाद्वहेत् ।
अरघट्टघटीभ्रान्तिन्यायो नाड्योः पुनः पुनः ॥
शतानि तत्र जायन्ते निश्वासोच्छ्‌वासयोर्नव ।
खखषट्कद्विकैः संख्याहोरात्रे सकले पुनः ॥

So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the elements, earth, etc., must be understood, according to their different colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been thus explained by the wise—

"Let each artery convey the air two *ghaṭīs* and a half from sunrise.

"There is a continual resemblance of the two arteries[82] to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel.

"Nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take place [in the hour],

"And all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand six hundred in a day and night.

"The time that is spent in uttering thirty-six *guṇa* letters,[83]

"That time elapses while the air passes along in the interval between two arteries.

षट्त्रिंशद्गुरुवर्णानां या वेला भणने भवेत् ।
सा वेला मरुतो नाड्यन्तरे संचरतो भवेत् ॥

प्रत्येकं पञ्च तत्त्वानि नाड्योश्च वहमानयोः ।
वहन्त्यहर्निशं तानि ज्ञातव्यानि यतात्मभिः ॥

ऊर्ध्वं वह्निरधस्तोयं तिरश्चीनः समीरणः ।
भूमिर्मध्यपुटे व्योम सर्वगं प्रवहेत्पुनः ॥

वायोर्वह्नेरपां पृथ्व्या व्योम्नस्तत्त्वं वहेत्क्रमात् ।
वहन्त्योरुभयोर्नाड्योर्ज्ञातव्योऽयं क्रमः सदा ॥

"There are five elements in each of the two conducting arteries,—

"They bear it along day and night ; these are to be known by the self restrained.

"Fire bear above, water below ; air moves across ;

"Earth in the half-hollow ; ether moves everywhere.

"They bear along in order,—air, fire, water, earth, ether ;

"This is to be known in its due order in the two conducting arteries.

पृथ्व्याः पलानि पंचाशच्चत्वारिंशत्तथाम्भसः ।
अग्नेस्त्रिंशत्पुनर्वायोर्विंशतिर्नभसो दश ॥
प्रवाहकालसंख्येयं हेतुस्तत्र प्रदर्श्यते ।
पृथ्वी पञ्चगुणा तोयं चतुर्गुणमथानलः ॥
त्रिगुणो द्विगुणो वायुर्वियदेकगुणं भवेत् ।
गुणं प्रति दश पलान्युर्व्यां पञ्चाशदित्यतः ।
एकैकहानिस्तोयादेस्तथा पञ्च गुणाः क्षितेः ।
गन्धो रसश्च रूपं च स्पर्शः शब्दः क्रमादमी ॥

"The *palas*[84] of earth are fifty, of water forty,

"Of fire thirty, of air twenty, of ether ten,

"This is the amount of time taken for the bearing ; but the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed,

"Is that earth has five properties'[85] water four,

"Fire has three, air two, and ether one.

"There are ten *palas* for each property ; hence earth has fifty *palas*,

"And each, from water downwards, loses successively. Now the five properties of earth,

"Are odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and audibleness ; and these decrease one by one.

तत्त्वाभ्यां भूजलाभ्यां स्याच्छन्तिः कार्ये फलोन्नतिः ।
दीप्तास्थिराव्यूहवृत्तिस्तेजोवाय्वम्बरेषु च ॥
पृथ्व्यप्तेजोमरुद्व्योमतत्त्वानां चिह्नमुच्यते ।
आद्ये स्थैर्यं स्वचित्तस्य शैत्ये कामोद्भवो भवेत् ॥
तृतीये कौपसंतापौ चतुर्थे चञ्चलात्मता ।
पञ्चमे शून्यतैव स्यादथ वाधर्मवासना ॥
श्रुत्योरङ्गुष्ठकौ मध्याङ्गुल्यौ नासापुटद्वये ।

सृक्किण्यो प्रान्त्यकोपान्त्याङ्गुली शेषे दृगन्तयोः ॥
न्यस्यान्तःस्थपृथिव्यादितत्त्वज्ञानं भवेत्क्रमात् ।
पीतश्वेतारुणश्यामैर्विन्दुभिर्विरुपाधि खम् ॥ इत्यादिना ।

"The two elements, earth and water, produce their fruit by the influence of 'quiet,'
"But fire, air, and ether by the influence of 'brightness,' 'restlessness,' and 'immensity.'[86]
"The characteristic signs of earth, water, fire, air, and ether are now declared ;—
"Of the first steadfastness of mind ; through the coldness of the second arises desire ;
"From the third anger and grief ; from the fourth fickleness of mind ;
"From the fifth the absence of any object, or mental impressions of latent merit.
"Let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears, and a middle finger in each nostril,
"And the little finger and the one next to it in the corners of his mouth, and the two remaining fingers in the corners of his eyes,
"Then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the earth and the other elements within him,
"The first four by yellow, white, dark red, and dark blue spots,[87]—the ether has no symbol".

यथावद्वायुक्तत्त्वमवगम्य तन्नियमने विधीयमाने विवेकज्ञानावरणकर्मक्षयो भवति । तपो न परं प्राणायामादिति ।

दह्यन्ते ध्मायमानानां धातूनां हि यथा मलाः ।
प्राणायामैस्तु दह्यन्ते तद्वदिन्द्रियजा मलाः ॥ इति च ।

When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52] ; hence it has been said—

"There is no austerity superior to regulation of the breath."[88]
And again—

"As the dross of metals, when they are melted, is consumed,

"So the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath."[89]

तदेवं यमादिभिः संस्कृतमनस्कस्य योगिनः संयमाय प्रत्याहारः कर्तव्यः। चक्षुरादीनामिन्द्रियाणां प्रतिनियतरञ्जनीयकोपनीयमोहनीयप्रवणत्वप्रहाणेन अविकृतस्वरूपप्रवणचित्तानुकारः प्रत्याहारः। इन्द्रियाणि विषयेभ्यः प्रतीपमाह्रियन्तेऽस्मिन्निति व्युत्पत्तेः।

Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to attain "self-mastery" (*saṁyamu*)[90] and "restraint" (*pratyāhāra*). "Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses as the eye, etc., to the nature of the mind,[91] which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. This is expressed by the etymology of the word ; the senses are drawn to it (*ā*+*hṛi*), away from them (*pratīpa*).

ननु तदा चित्तमभिनिविशते नेन्द्रियाणि। तेषां बाह्यविषयत्वेन सामर्थ्याभावात्। अतः कथं चित्तानुकारः। अद्धा। अत एव वस्तुतस्तस्यासम्भवमभिसंधाय सादृश्यार्थमिवशब्दं चकार सूत्रकारः—'स्वविषयासंप्रयोगे चित्तस्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहारः' (पात यो० सू० २।५४) इति। सादृश्यं च चित्तानुकारनिमित्तं विषयासंप्रयोगः। यदा चित्तं निरुध्यते तदा चक्षुरादीनां निरोधे प्रयत्नान्तरं नापेक्षणीयम्। यथा मधुकरराजं मधुमक्षिका अनुवर्तन्ते तथेन्द्रियाणि चित्तमिति। तदुक्तं विष्णुपुराणे—

> शब्दादिष्वनुरक्तानि निगृह्याक्षाणि योगवित्।
> कुर्याच्चित्तानुकारीणि प्रत्याहारपरायणः॥
> वश्यता परमा तेन जायतेऽतिचलात्मनाम्।
> इन्द्रियाणामवश्यैस्तैर्न योगी योगसाधकः॥
>
> (वि० पु० ६।७।४३-४४) इति।

'But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind?" What you say is quite true ; and therefore the auther of the aphorisms, having an eye to their want of power for this,

introduced the words "as it were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of concernment with their several objects for the sake of being accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, etc., are restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in the Viṣṇu-purāṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]—

"Let the devotee, restraining his organs of sense, which ever tend to pursue external objects,"
"Himself intent on restraint, make them conformable to the mind;"
"But this is effected to entire subjugation of the unsteady senses;"
"If they are not controlled, the *yogin* will not accomplish his *yoga*."[93]

नाभिचक्रहृदयपुण्डरीकनासाग्रादावाध्यात्मिके हिरण्यगर्भवासवप्रजापतिप्रभृतिके बाह्ये वा देशे चित्तस्य विषयान्तरपरिहारेण स्थिरीकरणं धारणा । यदाह— 'देशबन्धश्चित्तस्य धारणा' (पा० यो० सू० ३।१) । पौराणिकाश्च—

प्राणायामेन पवनं प्रत्याहारेण चेन्द्रियम् ।
वशीकृत्य ततः कुर्याच्चित्तस्थानं शुभाश्रये ।।
(वि० पु० ६।७।४५) इति ।

"Attention" (*dhāraṇā*) is the fixing the mind, by with-drawing it from all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of the *suṣumṇā* artery, etc., or something external, as Prajāpati, Vāsava, Hiraṇyagarbha, etc. This is declaced by the aphorism, "Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too, say the followers of the Purāṇas—

"By regulation of breath having controlled the air, and by restraint the senses,"
"Let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of mind."

तस्मिन्देशे ध्येयावलम्बनस्य प्रत्ययस्य विसदृशप्रत्ययप्रहाणेन प्रवाहो ध्यानम् । तदुक्तं—'तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम्' (पात० यो० सू० ३।२) इति । अन्यैरप्युक्तम्—

> तद्रूपप्रत्ययैकाग्र्या संततिश्चान्यनिःस्पृहा ।
> तद्ध्यानं प्रथमैरङ्गैः षड्भिर्निष्पाद्यते नृप ॥

प्रसङ्गाच्चरममङ्गं प्रागेव प्रत्यपीपदाम ।

The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is "contemplation" (*dhāyana*) ; thus it is said, "A course of uniform thought there, is 'contemplation' " [iii. 2]. Others also have said—

"A continued succession of thoughts, intent on objects of that kind and desiring no other,"

"This is 'contemplation'—it is thus effected by the first six of the ancillary things."

तदनेन योगाङ्गानुष्ठानेनादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितेन समाधिप्रतिपक्षक्लेशप्रक्षयेऽभ्यासवैराग्यवशान्मधुमत्यादिसिद्धिलाभो भवति ।

अथ किमेवमकस्मादस्मानति विकटाभिरत्यन्ताप्रसिद्धाभिः कर्णाटगौडलाटभाषाभिर्भीषयते भवान् ? नहि वयं भवन्तं भीषयामहे । किं तु मधुमत्यादिपदार्थव्युत्पादनेन तोषयामः । ततश्चाकुतोभयेन भवता श्रूयतामवधानेन ।

We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the remaining eight ancillary thing, "meditation" (*samādhi*), By this practice of the ancillary means of *yoga*, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and "dispassion" the devottee attains to the perfections designated by the names Madhumatī and the rest.

"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous words from the dialects of Karṇāṭa, Gauda,[94] Lāṭa ?"[95] We do not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of these strange words ; therefore let the reader who is so needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.

तत्र मधुमती नामाभ्यासवैराग्यादिवशादपास्तरजस्तमोलेशसुखप्रकाशमयसत्त्वभावनया अनवद्यवैशारद्यविद्योतनरूपऋतंभरप्रज्ञाख्या समाधिसिद्धिः । तदुक्तम्

—ऋतंभरा तत्र प्रज्ञा' (पात॰ यो॰ सू॰ १।४८) । ऋतं सत्यं बिभर्ति कदाचिदपि न विपर्ययेणाच्छाद्यते । तत्र स्थितौ दार्ढ्ये सति द्वितीयस्य योगिनः सा प्रज्ञा भवतीत्यर्थः ।

i. The *Madhumatī* perfection,—this is the perfection of meditation, called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of "goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of "passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," etc. Thus it is said in the aphorism, "In that case there is the knowledge which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," i.e., to the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," i.e., when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second yogin.

चत्वारः खलु योगिनः प्रसिद्धाः प्राथमकल्पिको मधुभूमिकः प्रज्ञाज्योतिरतिक्रान्तभावनीयश्चेति । तत्राभ्यासी प्रवृत्तमात्रज्योतिः प्रथमः । न त्वनेन परचित्तादिगोचरज्ञानरूपं ज्योतिर्वशीकृतमित्युक्तं भवति । ऋतंभरप्रज्ञो द्वितीयः । भूतेन्द्रियजयी तृतीयः । परवैराग्यसंपन्नश्चतुर्थः ।

For the *yogins* or devotees to the practice of *yoga* are well known to be of four kinds, viz.,—

1. The *prāthamakalpika*, in whom the light has just entered,[96] but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts, etc.;" 2. The *madhubhūmika*, who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The *prajñājyotis*, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The *atikrāntabhāvanīya*, who has attained the highest dispassion.

मनोजवित्वादयो मधुप्रतीकसिद्धयः । तदुक्तं—मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च' (पात॰ यो॰ सू॰ ३।४८) इति मनोजवित्वं नाम कायस्य मनोवदनुत्तमो गतिलाभः । विकरणभावः कायनिरपेक्षाणामिन्द्रियाणामभिमतदेशकालविषयापेक्षवृत्तिलाभः । प्रधानजयः प्रकृतिविकारेषु सर्वेषु वशित्वम् ।

एताश्च सिद्धयः करणपञ्चकरूपजयात्तृतीयस्य योगिनः प्रादुर्भवन्ति । यथा मधुनः एकदेशोऽपि स्वदते तथा प्रत्येकमेव ताः सिद्धयः स्वदन्त इति मधुप्रतीकाः

ii. The *Madhupratīka* perfections are swiftness like thought, etc. These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness

like thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like thought ; "the being without bodily organs"[97] is the attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed to objects in any desired place or time ; "the conquest of nature" is the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential conditions.[98] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second state is called *Madhupratīkā* [i.e., that whose parts are sweet].

सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वादिरूपा विशोका सिद्धिः । तदाह—'सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं च' ।(पा० सू० ३।४९) इति । सर्वेषां व्यवसायाव्यवसायात्मकानां गुणपरिणामरूपाणां भावनां स्वामिवदाक्रमणं सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वम् । 'तेषामेव शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मित्वेन स्थितानां विवेकज्ञानं सर्वज्ञातृत्वम् । तदुक्तं—'विशोका वा ज्योतिष्मती' (पात० यो० सू० १।३६) इति ।

iii. The *Viśokā* perfection consists in the supremacy over all existences, etc. This is said in the aphorism, "To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all existences" is the over coming like a master all entities, as these are but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the other qualities of "passion" and "darkness" being already abolished], and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised upon.[99] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[100] is "omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [I. 36], "Or a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow[101] [may produce steadiness of mind]."

सर्ववृत्तिप्रत्यस्तमये परं वैराग्यमाश्रितस्य जात्यादिबीजानां क्लेशानां निरोधसमर्थो निर्बीजः समाधिरसम्प्रज्ञातपदवेदनीयः संस्कारशेषताव्यपदेश्यश्चित्तस्यावस्था विशेषः । तदुक्तं—'विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यासपूर्वः संस्कारशेषोऽन्यः' (पात० यो० सू० १।१८) इति । एवं च सर्वतो विरज्यमानस्य तस्य पुरुषधौरेयस्य क्लेशबीजानि निर्दग्धशालिबीजकल्पानि प्रसवसामर्थ्यविधुराणि मनसा सार्धं प्रत्यस्तं गच्छन्ति ।

iv. The *Saṁskāraśeṣatā* state is also called *asaṁprajñāta*, i.e., "that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" it is that meditation "without a seed" [i.e., without any object] which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest "dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [i.e., that in which distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of thought after the departure of all objects] [i.e., *sāṁskāraśeṣa*, i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are abolished together with the internal organ.

तदेतेषु प्रलीनेषु निरुपप्लवविवेकख्यातिपरिपाकवशात् कार्यकारणात्मकानां प्रधाने लयः, चितिशक्तिः स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा पुनर्बुद्धिसत्त्वाभिसंबन्धविधुरा वा कैवल्यं लभत इति सिद्धम् । द्वयी च मुक्तिरुक्ता पतञ्जलिना—'पुरुषार्थशून्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः कैवल्यं स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा वा चितिशक्तिः' (पात० यो० सू० ४।३४) इति । न चास्मिन्सत्यपि कस्मान्न जायते जन्तुरिति वदितव्यम् । कारणाभावात्कार्यभाव इति प्रमाणसिद्धार्थे नियोगानुयोगयोरयोगात् ।

अपरथा कारणाभावेऽपि कार्यसम्भवे मणिवेधादयोऽन्धादिभ्यो भवेयुः । तथा चानुपपन्नार्थतायामाभाणको लौकिक उपपन्नार्थो भवेत् । तथा च श्रुतिः—'अन्धो मणिमविन्दत् । तमनङ्गुलिरावयत् । अग्रीवः प्रत्यमुञ्चत् । तमजिह्वा असश्चत' (तै० आ० १।११।५) । अविन्ददविध्यत । आवयद् गृहीतवान् । प्रत्यमुञ्चत् पिनद्धवान् । असश्चताभ्यपूजयत्, स्तुतवानिति यावत् ।

When these are destroyed, there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded "discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects into the primal *prakṛti*; and the soul, which is the power of pure intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding (*buddhi*), or with existence, reaches "absolute isolation (*kaivalya*.) Final liberation is described by Patañjali as two perfections: Absolute isolation is the repressive

absorption [102] of the 'qualities' which have consummated the ends of the soul, i.e., enjoyment and liberation, or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature ;' [iv. 33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the individual be born again even though this should have been attained ?" for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor decision ; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like absurdities ; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel ; one without fingers seized it ; one without a neck put it on ; and a dumb man praised it."[103]

एवं च चिकित्साशास्त्रवद् योगशास्त्रं चतुर्व्यूहम् । यथा चिकित्साशास्त्रं रोगो रोगहेतुरारोग्यं भेषजमिति, तथेदमपि संसारः संसारहेतुर्मोक्षो मोक्षोपाय इति । तत्र दुःखमयः संसारो हेयः । प्रधानपुरुषयोः संयोगो हेयभोगहेतुः । तस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिर्हानम् । तदुपायः सम्यग्दर्शनम् । एवमन्यदपि शास्त्रं यथासंभवं चतुर्व्यूहमूहनीयमिति सर्वमवदातम् ।

इति श्रीमत्सायणमाधवीये सर्वदर्शनसंग्रहे पातञ्जलदर्शनम् ।।

Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the Yoga-śāstra consists of four divisions ; as those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śāstra also treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from ; the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to experience this existence ; the absolute abolition of this connection is the escape ; and right insight is the cause thereof.[104] The same fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in other Śāstras also. Thus all has been made clear.

The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere ; it is therefore left untouched here.[105] E.B.C.

## NOTE ON THE YOGA

There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain Raivataka in Māgha (iv. 55).

"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence (*maitrī*) and those other purifiers of the mind,—having successfully abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of a seed', and having reached that knowledge which recognises the essential difference between the quality Goodness and the Soul,—desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."

It is curious to notice that *maitri*, which plays such a prominent part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary condition from which the votary is to take as it were, his first start towards his final goal. It is called a *parikarman* (=*prasādhaka*) in Vyāsa's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is borrowed by Māgha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as in arithmetic the operations of addition, etc., are valuable, not in themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.

### *NOTES*

1. On this see Dr. Hall's Pref. to Sāṅkhya Pr. Bhāṣ., p. 20; S. Sāra, p. 11.
2. i.e., he revealed the Veda, and also originated the meanings of words, as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life.
3. I read *ye* for *te* with Dr. Hall's MS. *Tapya* means rather "susceptible of suffering."
4. This is really Vyāsa's comm. on Sūt., iv. 21.
5. Cf. *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, 15, *a*.
6. Śatapatha Br., xiv. 7, 2, 28.
7. I read in the second clause *tadbhāve'pi*, understanding by *tad* the different conditions which *atha* is supposed to assume as being necessarily present.

8. These are, i, the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal ; ii., the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter ; iii., the possession of the six qualities, tranquillity, etc. ; and, iv., the desire for liberation.

9. It may be *sukha-janaka*, but it is not itself *sukha*.

10. Granting that *atha* does not here mean "auspicious," why should not this be the implied meaning, as all allow that the particle *atha* does produce an auspicious influence ?

11. i.e., a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction.

12. This is found with some variations in the Mahābhāṣya (p. 7, Kielhorn's ed).

13. The commentators hold that the word *vṛddhiḥ* is placed at the beginning of the first sūtra, while *guṇaḥ* in the second is placed at the end (*ad eṅ guṇaḥ*), in order to ensure an auspicious opening, *vṛddhi* meaning "increase," "prosperity," as well as "the second strengthening of a vowel."

14. In the old Bengali poem Chaṇḍī, we have an interesting list of these omens. The hero Chandraketu, starting on a journey, has the following good omens : On his right hand a cow, a deer, a Brāhmana, a full-blown lotus ; on his left, a jackal and a jar full of water. He hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling "milk" to buyers. He sees a cow with her calf, a woman calling "jaya," *dūrvā* grass, rice, garlands of flowers, diamonds, sapphires, pearls, corals ; and on the left twelve women. He hears drums and cymbals, and men dancing and singing "Hari." It is, however, all spoiled by seeing a guana (*godhikā*). The author adds, "This is a bad omen according to all śāstras, and so is a tortoise, a rhinoceros, the tuberous root of the water-lily, and a here." Elsewhere, a vulture, a kite, a lizard, and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens.

15. These are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day, in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating Brāhmans.

16. He is here called *phaṇipati*, "lord of snakes,—Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, being represented as a snake in mythology.

17. Cf. Śaṅkara, Vedānta-Sūt, iii. 3. 49.

18. This is the Mīmāṁsā rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another 1. *Śruti*, "a definite text," as "let him offer with curds," where curds are clearly an ancilliary part of the sacrifice. 2. *Liṅga*, "a sign," or "the sense of the words," as leading to an inference, as in the text "he divides by the ladle ;" here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee, since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes. 3. *Vākya*, "the being mentioned in one sentence," i.e., the context, as in the text " '(I cut) thee for food,' thus saying, he cuts the branch ;" here the words "(I cut) thee for food" are ancillary to the action of cutting; or in the text, "I offer the welcome (oblation) to Agni," the words "the welcome (oblation) to Agni," as they form one sentence with the words "I offer," are ancillary to the act of offering. 4. *Prakaraṇa* "the subject-matter viewed as a whole, with an interdependence of its parts," as in the *darśa-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, where the *prayāja* ceremonies, which have no special fruit mentioned, produce, as parts, a mystic influence (*apūrva*) which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven. Here the *prakaraṇa* proves them to be ancillary. 5. *Sthāna* (or *krama*), "relative position" or "order," as the recital of the hymn *Śundhadhvam*, etc. "Be ye purified for the divine work," in connection with the mention of the *sānnāyya* vessels, where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels. 6. *Samākhyā*, "title ;" thus the Yajurveda is called the special book for the *adhvaryu* priests ; hence in any rite mentioned in it they are *primā facie* to be considered as the priests employed. The order in the aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each ; the first, *śruti*, being the most important ;

the last *samākhyā*, the least. Cf. Jaimini's Sūtras, iii. 3, 14; *Mimāṁsāparibhāṣā*, pp. 8, 9.

19. i.e., Yogi-Yājñavalkya, the author of the *Yājñavalkya-gītā*. See Hall., *Bibl. Index*, p. 14 ; Aufrecht, *Bodl. Catal.*, p. 87 b.
20. *Karman* seems here used for *kriyā*, which properly belongs only to the body, as the soul is *draṣṭri*.
21. *Scil. Samādhi*, or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation.
22. *Scil.* "forbearance, religious observance, postures suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation (*samādhi*)."
23. See Bhoja, Comm. iii. 3, *saṁyag ādhīyate mano yatra sa samādhiḥ*.
24. Thus, e.g., the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself (the counter-entity to its own non-existence) resides by intimate relation (*samavāyasambandha*).
25. I read *niroddhavyānām* for *nirodhānām*.
26. *Cit-śakti* and *citi-śakti* = soul.
27. The *sattva* of the *buddhi* or the internal organ.
28. This second substance, "mind" or "understanding" (*buddhi, chitta*), is like a looking-glass, which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass (*sc.* soul).
29. Vācaspati explains *lakṣaṇa* as *kālabheda*.
30. I take *ādi* as meaning *asphuṭatva*. The change of state takes place between the several moments of the *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma*. Cf the Commentaries on iii. 13.
31. These are generally called the five states of the thinking principle, *chittabhūmayas* or *avasthās*. Cf. Commentary, i. 2, 18.
32. These three conditions respectively characterise men, demons, and gods.
33. Much of this is taken from Bhoja's Commentary, and I have borrowed Ballantyne's translation.
34. Can *citta* mean "soul" here ?

35. i.e., as, e.g., whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses, etc.
36. Read *sukhaprakāśamayasya.*
37. Read *sattāmātra* for *sattvas.* Bhoja well distinguishes *asmitā* from *ahaṁkāra.*
38. For these see *infra*, and cf. Yoga S., ii. 3, 12, 13.
39. I have ventured to after the examples, to suit the English translation.
40. Where the negation is prominent it is called *prasajya-pratiṣedha* ; but where it is not prominent, we have the *paryuddāsa* negation. In the former the negative is connected with the verb ; in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word, as, e.g.—

    (*a*) "Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note."
    (*b*) "Unwatched the garden bough shall away."

    The former corresponds to the logician's *atyantābhāva*, the latter to *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda.*
41. Cf. the *vārttika* in Siddhānta Kaum., i. 401.
42. Thus *adhana* stands for *avidyamānadhana*, with *vidyamāna* omitted in the compound.
43. As its subject would confessedly be *buddhi.*
44. As it is *avidyā* after all.
45. Read (with my MS. of Vācaspati's (Gloss), *sarvavṛttini-rodha-sampannāyā api tathātvaprasaṅgāt.*
46. I read *tanvavasthāśca* with the printed edition of Vācaspati's Gloss. If *tanudagdhāśca* is correct, it must mean *tanutvena dagdhāḥ.*
47. As in *rāmalakṣmaṇau*, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa.
48. I read *pakṣatraye* for *pakṣadvaye.*
49. In his Comm. on Sūt., ii. 5.
50. Thus *inimicus* is not a "friend," nor, on the other hand, a 'non-friend," but something positive, an "enemy." So *agoshpada* is said to mean "a forest."
51. Cf. Yoga Sūt., i. 8.
52. Read *kāyādau* for *kāryādau.*

53. This couplet is quoted by Vyāsa in his Comm. on Yoga Sūtras, ii. 5 and I have followed Vācaspati in his explanation of it ; he calls it *vaiyāsaki gāthā.*
54. Since the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more, and its loss gives correspondent regret (cf. Bhag. G. xviii. 38).
55. Literally, "it has four feet".
56. Thus "sight," or the power of seeing, is a modification of the quality of *sattva* unobstructed by *rajas* and *tamas.*
57. "Let the affix *ṇini* be used after a root in the sense of what is habitual, when the *upapada*, or subordinate word, is a not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case."
58. "Let *vṛddhi* be the substitute of a base ending in a vowel, when that which has an indicatory *ñ* or *ṇ* follows ;" *ṇini* has an indicatory *ṇ.*
59. Sc. *anuśaya+ini=anuśayin.*
60. *Ini* and *ṭhan,* which respectively leave *in* and *ika* ; thus *daṇḍa* gives *daṇḍin* and *daṇḍika.* The line is quoted by Boehtlingk, vol. ii. p. 217, on Pāṇ, v. 2, 115, and is explained in the *Kāśikā, ad loc.* The different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples : - (1) *svavān khavān* ; (2) *kārakavān* ; (3) *vyaghravān, siṁhavān* ; (4) *daṇḍavati śālā* (*i.e., drṇḍa asyām santi*).
61. By iii. 3, 56.
62. It is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext.
63. See the *Kāśikā* on Pāṇ. v. 2, 115. For *vivakṣārtha* (meaning "general currency"), compare Commentary on Pāṇ, ii. 2, 27. The edition in the Benares *Pandit* reads *vi hayanīyamārtha.*
64. i.e., Thus *nirodha* is not *vṛtter abhāvaḥ*, but *abhāvasyāśryaḥ.*
65. I read *prakāśapravṛttiniyamarūpa,* from Bhoja's comment on i. 12.
66. See Kāśikā, ii. 3, 36.
67. This passage probably occurs in the *Yājñavalkyagitā* of Yogi-yājñavalkya. See Colebrooke's Essays (ed. 2). vol. i. p. 145, note.

68. Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, ii. 1, 35-37.

69. The tantras are not properly concerned with what is *nitya* or *naimittika* ; they are *kāmya.*

70. The *vīja* of air is the syllable *jaṁ.*

71. The *vīja* of water is the syllable *baṁ.*

72. *Hrīṁ.*

73. *Śrīṁ.*

74. *Tāṇḍava* is the frantic dance of the god Śiva and his votaries.

75. Literally "they take severally in order the gender of one of two." Cf. "Thebae ipsae quod Boeotiae caput est," *Livy*, xiii. 44 ; "Animal hoc providum, actum, plenum rationis et consilii, quem vocamus hominem." *Cic., Legg*, i. 7.

76. I have borrowed these terms from Ballantyne's translation of the Sāhitya-darpaṇa.

77. Qualified indication arises from likeness, as the man is like on ox from his stupidity ; pure indication from any other relation as cause and effect, etc., thus butter is the cause of longevity.

78. i.e., an hour, a *ghaṭikā* being twenty-four minutes

79. The *nāḍīs* or tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be 101, with ten principal ones ; others make sixteen principal *nāḍīs.* They seem take afterwards in pairs.

80. Mādhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (iii. 29), where the relation of the vital airs, the seasons, and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons, is discussed. "The seasons never stand still ; following each other in order one by one, as spring, summer, the rains, autumn, the cold and the foggy seasons, each consisting of two months, and so constituting the year of twelve months, they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel (*ghaṭīyantravat*); hence the seasons never pause in their course."

81. This refers to a peculiar tenet of Hindu mysticism, that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra, as their sound expresses the word, *so'haṁ* (i.e., *haṁsaḥ*), "I am he." This mantra is repeated 21,600 times in every

twenty-four hours ; it is called the *ajapāmantra*, i.e., the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering.

82. i.e., that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath.
83. I cannot explain this. We might read *guruvarṇanām* for *guṇavarṇānāṁ*, as the time spent in uttering a *guruvarṇa* is a *vipala*, sixty of which make a *pala*, and two and a half *palas* make a minute ; but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details. The whole passage may be compared with theo pening of the fifth act of the *Mālatīmādhava*.
84. Sixty *palas* make a *ghaṭikā* (50+40+30+20+10=150, i.e., the *palas* in two and a half *ghaṭikās* or one hour).
85. Cf. Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 256.
86. Literally "the being ever more."
87. For these colours cf. *Chāndogya Up*., viii. 6 ; *Maitri Up.*, vi. 30.
88. This is an anonymous quotation in Vyāsa's Comm.
89. This seems a variation of Śloka 7 of the *Amṛta-nāda Up.* See Weber, *Indische Stud.*, ix. 26.
90. This is defined in the Yoga Sūt., iii. 4, as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation, attention, and meditation.
91. i.e., internal organ (*citta*).
92. This couplet is corrupt in the text. I follow the reading of the Bombay edition of the Purāṇa (only reading in line 3 *calātmanām*).
93. Viṣṇu-pur., vi. 7, 45, with one or two variations. The "perfect asylum" is Brahman, formless or possessing form.
94. The old name for the central part of Bengal.
95. A country comprising Khandesh and part of Gujerat ; it is the *Vapikñ* of Ptolemy.
96. In *infra*, read Pravṛtta for *pravṛtti*. Cf. Yoga S., iii. 52 in Bhoja's Comm. (50 in Vyāsa's Comm.)
97. Read *vikaraṇabhāvaḥ* ; Vācaspati explains it as "*vīdchānām indrīyāṇām karaṇabhāvaḥ*."

98. Vyāsa has *karaṇapañcakarupajaya*; Vācaspti explains *rūpas* by *grahaṇādi* (cf. iii. 47).

99. I read in p. 179, l. 11, *vyavasāyavyavaseyātmakānām*, from Vyāsa's Comm.

100. i.e., as past, present, or future.

101. *Viśokā*.

102. This is explained by Vācaspati, "The latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called *vyutthānā* (when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity,' or 'darkness,' iii. 9) and *nirodha* (when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'), are absorbed in the internal organ itself; this is 'egoism' (*asmitā*); 'egoism' in the 'merely' once resolvable' (i.e., *buddhi*); and *buddhi* into the 'irresolvable' (i.e., *prakṛti*)." *Prakṛti* consists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium; and the entire creation, consisting of causes and effects, is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant.

103. This curious passage occurs in the Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka i. 11, 5, Mādhava in his Comment. There explains it of the soul, and quotes the Śvetāśv. Up., iii. 19. Mādhava here takes *avindat* as "he pierced the jewel," but I have followed his correct explanation in the Comm.

104. This is taken from Vācaspati's Comm. on Yoga S. ii. 15. Cf. the "four truths" of Buddhism.

105. This probably refers to the Pañcadaśī. A Calcutta Pandit told me that it referred to the Prameyavivaraṇa-saṅgraha (cf. Dr. Burnell's preface to his edition of the Devatādhyāya-brāhmaṇa, p. x), but, if this is the same as the vivaraṇaprameya-saṅgraha, it is by Bhāratītīrthavidyāraṇya (see Dr. Burnell's Cat. of Tanjore MSS p. 88).

# APPENDIX

## ON THE UPĀDHI (pp. 9, 10, 242)

[As the *upādhi* or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the Bhāṣā-pariccheda and the Siddhāntamuktāvalī, which treat of it.]

cxxxvii. *That which always accompanies the major term (sādhya), but does not always accompany the middle (hetu), is called the condition (upādhi) ; its examination is now set forth.*

Our author now proceeds to define the *upādhi* or condition,[1] which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person;—"that which always accompanies," etc. The meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it

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1. The *upādhi* is the "condition" which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term. If the middle term, as thus restricted, is still found in the major term, the argument is valid; if not, it fails. Thus, in "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" (which rests on the false premise that 'all fire is accompanied by smoke"), we must add 'wet fuel" as the condition of "fire;" and if the mountain *has* wet fuel as well as fire, of course it will have smoke. Similarly, the alleged argument that "B is dark because he is Mitrā's son" fails, if we can establish that the dark colour of her former offspring. A depended not on his being her son, but on her happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee. If we can prove that the still keeps to her old diet, of course our amended middle term still prove B to be dark, but not otherwise.

invariably accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. [This in the false argument, 'The mountain has smoke because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being produced from wet fuel," as an *upādhi*, since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as e.g., in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not follow that *(a)* in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, "This [second] son of Mitrā's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrā's son,' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'[1] as a 'condition,'—inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, etc., which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? *(b)* Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[2] because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the soul, etc., and yet soul, etc., have no form [and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form 'does not invariably accompany perceptibility]. *(c)* Again, in the argument, 'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'[3] [destruction being a form of non-existence,

1. The Hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from the mother's living on vegetables, while its fair colour comes from living on ghee.

2. By Bhāṣā-parich. śl. 25, the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, are *sparśavat*, but by śl. 27 of these air is neither *pratyakṣa* nor *rūpavat*.

3. This condition would imply that we could only argue from this middle term "the being produced" in cases of positive existence, not non-existence.

called "emergent" *dvaṃśābhāva*], inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the mojor term which our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany. Thus (*a*) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrā's son whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument ; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (*b*) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[1] (*c*) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term advanced ; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms, i.e., there is nothing *there* which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so called condition. [Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been

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1. "Soul," of course, is not external ; but our topic was not *soul* but *air*.

given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each ; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case ?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term which is too general, the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects thus to be included are either (i) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[1] or else (ii) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but excluding the said condition ;[2] and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[3]

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1. As, e.g., the mountain and Mitrā's first son in the two false arguments, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire" (when he fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke), and "Mitrā's first son A is dark because he is Mitrā's offspring" (when her second son B is fair). These two subjects possess the respective *sādhyas* or major terms "smoke" and "dark-colour," and therefore are respectively the subjects where the conditions "wet fuel" and "the mother's feeding on vegetables" are to be respectively applied.

2. As, e.g., the red-hot ball of iron and Mitrā's second son ; as these, though possessing the respective middle terms "fire" and "the being Mitrā's offspring" do not possess the respective conditions "wet fuel" or "the mother's feeding on vegetables," nor, consequently, the respective major terms *(sādhya)* "smoke" and "dark colour."

3. This will exclude the objected case of "dark jars" in (*a*), as it falls under neither of these two alternatives ; for, though they are the sites of the *sidhya* "dark colour," they do not admit the condition "the feeding on vegetables," nor the middle term "the being Mitrā's son."

cxxxviii. *All true Conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms;*[1] *and, their subjects being thus common, the (earing) middle term will be equally too general in regard to the Condition and the major term.*[2]

cxxxix. *It is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the Condition has to be employed.*

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term ; and hence the use of having a condition at all. (*a*) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited[3] major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition ; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel ;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied. (*b*) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany—there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark

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1. I.e., wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel there is smoke. The condition and major term are "equipollent" in their extension.

2. Where the *hetu* is found and not the *sādhya* (as in the red-hot ball of iron), there the *upādhi* also is not applicable.

3. I.e., one which requires no determining fact or mark, such as the three objected arguments required in § 137.

because he is Mitrā's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrā's son" is too general in regard to the *sādhya*, "dark colour," because it is too general in regard to the *upādhi*, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrā's second son [Mitrā's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitra herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretented condition which fulfills your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such a condition as "the beirg always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject" becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial]," we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since

we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,[1] [thus the *upādhi* here is a means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, etc., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[2] But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.[3]

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1. The disputant says, "Fire must be non-hot because it is artificial." "Well," you rejoin, "then it must only be an artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire,—i.e., one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point." Here the proposed *upādhi* "the being always found elsewhere than in fire" answers to the definition, as it does not always accompany the *hetu* "possessing artificiality," but it does always accompany the *sādhya* "non-hot" as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot.

2. As in the argument, "The earth, etc., must have a maker because they have the nature of effects," where the Theist disputes the Atheistic condition "the being produced by one possessing a body." See Kusumāñjali, v. 2.

3. In fact, it would abolish all disputation at the outset, as each party would produce a condition which from his own point of view would reduce his opponent to silence. In other words, a true condition must be consistent with *either* party's opinions.